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**BULLETIN
No. 14**

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NEWS & DEVELOPMENTS

INACCURATE POLICE RECORDS

About one-fifth of the population has a police record, much of which consists of inaccuracies, gossip and hearsay. Anyone approaching the police for help stands a good chance of ending up on file for life. That is the conclusion from four incidents in which police record-keeping methods became public. Although they all relate to the Metropolitan Police, procedures are such that there is unlikely to be much deviation in other parts of the country.

Earlier this year, a detective working in the Brixton area of London lost several files, copies of which were eventually

passed to **Time Out** and the **New Statesman**. The files 'provide a unique and chilling view of police methods of getting information' (Duncan Campbell, **New Statesman**, August 10, 1979). Information filed on one woman included the fact that her car was seen outside a house being watched by the Serious Crimes Squad, which was reason enough to open the dossier, though she had no connection with the person — her car had been borrowed by someone else. Also noted was the fact that she had stood bail for someone, moved house, and that her sons had been in contact with the police. One of the sons' files starts with a minor conviction, for which he was fined £1, and records of several brushes with the police, none of which resulted in arrest or conviction. One incident, in which he claimed to have been roughly treated by plain clothes officers, seems a classic sequel to his status as 'known to police'.

The woman's other son, has a number of convictions for theft and burglary — but his file also includes the names of others, without convictions, who are now in police records as his 'associates' because they were once stopped walking down a street with him. Another man, who lodged with this woman, has a police file that claims that he is the father of a child, which he is not.

Such files, prepared locally by the 'collator', or local intelligence officer, and maintained and added to by CID officers in each of the Metropolitan police divisions, no doubt formed the basis for the information on potential jurors in the Persons Unknown case. 19 out of 93 were on police records. These details were printed by **The Guardian** (September 20, 1979). The information disclosed on the potential jurors was drawn from the local CID records and from the national Criminal Records Office, where records on those convicted of most offences are held.

The Guardian did not have any details from Special Branch files, which were never handed over by the prosecution (see Jury Vetting, in this Bulletin).

Typical 'local CID' information was that one person's address was 'believed to be a squat'; one had made a complaint against the police, five had been victims of crime and four had no convictions but were 'associates' of criminals. Of the eight with convictions at least four were 'spent' under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act.

Miller's Tale

'Criminal Intelligence' files at Scotland Yard contain the results of local CID work plus the efforts of the Metropolitan police specialist squads, and information from other forces. These files too seem overfull with hearsay and opinionated comment. At the Old Bailey, Chief Superintendent John Groves, a Metropolitan police officer, is on trial on corruption and official secrets charges, arising out of his relationship with the late Sir Eric Miller. According to the prosecution, the official secrets charge relates to files which he

obtained from C11, Scotland Yard's Criminal Intelligence section, of which copies were passed to Sir Eric. The police file on Sir Eric Miller himself dealt at length with his allegedly close relationship with MPs Sir Harold Wilson, Reginald Maudling and Bob Mellish. According to the file, Sir Eric had provided helicopters for the Labour Party's 1974 election campaigns, and laid on hospitality for party leaders at a London hotel owned by his company, Peachey Properties. The file also contained the comment that Sir Eric was 'a very unpleasant person who would screw anyone for a buck' — as nasty a piece of hearsay as ever passed for a police file. The existence and content of the file is not contested by the defence. But its accuracy may be indicated by the fact that Bob Mellish MP employed a barrister to record in court that the allegations in the file that he had attended Sir Eric's daughter's wedding and knew him closely, were not true. He had never met him.

Much local CID work, and some higher level police work, seems therefore to be based on records of doubtful accuracy. Yet, if the proportion in the Persons Unknown case is reliable, some 20 per cent of people have police records, whereas only eight per cent have convictions. In the whole country, this suggests that there are more than 10 million people on police records — though many may only merit their name and address on a file card. But the police continue to compile such records, and to trade them among different police forces. It was reported recently that:

'Police in F Division, which has Chelsea, Fulham and Queen's Park Rangers in its area, are compiling a special black-list detailing the wild ones. The index will identify all known trouble-makers, those who go to away matches, the way they travel, and other details. Before each away match, police will pass information to other London districts and provincial forces. Eventually they hope to open files on problem fans in the other 19 clubs in the Second Division' (**Evening Standard**, 4.9.1979).

Effectively, there is no right to privacy for someone who the police have decided is 'of interest' to them, and no-one at present has any right to correct mis-statements and biased comments on records which form the basis of local policing.

JURY VETTING

The practice of jury vetting has been challenged yet again by events surrounding the trial at the Old Bailey of six people on charges of conspiracy to rob and possession of arms. The 'Persons Unknown' case is the latest in which the police, on behalf of the prosecution, have investigated potential jurors. Such vetting is standard practice in cases where the police feel that serious crimes have political motives, or believe that a 'gang' of professional criminals is involved. Vetting has again become an important issue because for the first time, the results of the police investigation of jurors has been published, by the **Guardian** on September 20, 1979.

The trial Judge, Alan King-Hamilton, referred the **Guardian** story to the Director of Public Prosecutions, describing it as 'an outrageous intrusion into confidential matters, and not in the public interest.' He discharged the jury panel, and ordered that a new one be vetted. The Metropolitan and City of London police are to investigate the source of the leak.

The vetting of the 93 members of the panel from which the Persons Unknown jury was to be chosen was sought by the police in accordance with guidelines drawn up by the Attorney General in 1975, but not made public until last year. (**The Times** October 11, 1978, and **Bulletin** No 9). The guidelines codified practice which had been common for many years, but included a statement that 'It is open to the police defence ... to seek the same information.'

A defence application to vet was duly made, and on August 10, Judge Brian Gibbens at a pre-trial hearing allowed them to do so, and allowed legal aid funds to be used for the private detectives who would carry out the vetting. Not all the defendants

were happy with this in principle. It seems clear that it could not have provided the defendants with the same information in the possession of the police, who, according to the guidelines are allowed to check at the Criminal Record Office, with the Special Branch records (both now held in part on national, computerised files) and with local CID officers.

Details for the defence

At a later pre-trial hearing, Judge Gibbens limited the amount of money which the defence were allowed to spend on investigations, but ordered that the results of the prosecution investigation should be handed to the defence (**Guardian**, September 12, 1979). He specifically referred to the impossibility of an 'anarchist-minded' person trying a case dispassionately (**Leveller**, Oct. 1979). The prosecution in the end promised to hand over only such results of the vetting as did not refer to 'sensitive matters'. In the event, this has been interpreted to rule out all information from Special Branch files, which in practice is the prosecution's main basis for challenges to the jurors.

The information published by the **Guardian** is referred to at greater length in the story 'Inaccurate police records', on page 1. It refers to recorded convictions, and public contact which members of the jury panel had with the police, such as reporting crimes of which they were the victims, or making complaints against the police.

There was no reference to membership of political organisations, attendance at meetings, signing petitions, or any information of the sort which the Special Branch are known to hold. As there are nearly three million people on Special Branch files out of a population of 52 million, it seems unlikely that a random sample of 93 people would contain no-one at all in whom the Special Branch were interested. None of the information printed in the **Guardian** would be useful to the prosecution in determining whether a potential juror, in the words of the guidelines, had political convictions

which were 'of so extreme a character as to make it reasonably likely that they will prevent a juror from trying a case fairly.'

The publication of the partial information has illustrated the extent to which jury vetting is a prosecution weapon, and the impossibility of placing the defence on an equal footing when it is used. The national press has expressed concern, and one member of the original vetted jury panel, transferred to another trial at the Old Bailey, announced that the fact that he had been vetted had biased him against the prosecution. He was again discharged from the jury (**Guardian**, September 25, 1979).

The vetting row will be aired in the House of Commons when Parliament re-assembles. Jo Richardson, MP, Chairperson of the Labour Civil Liberties group, is to ask the Attorney General why the 'Persons Unknown' case merited jury vetting, and the Home Secretary why the practice is allowed to continue.

- A pamphlet from the support group for the six people on trial, 'Persons Unknown', is reviewed elsewhere in this Bulletin.

INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF JAMES McGEOWN

A public inquiry is to be held into the death of James McGeown who died from injuries sustained while in police custody in Glasgow in November 1978. (The circumstances of the death were more fully explained in **The Leveller**, September 1979 and in the background paper on Special Patrol Groups in Britain in Bulletin No 13.) The decision by the Crown Office to hold an inquiry one year after the death and three months after the unsuccessful prosecution of a police sergeant for culpable homicide, has clearly been influenced by the widespread concern at the case — a petition calling for a reopening of the case was signed by over 4,000 people in the area where the dead man formerly lived — and has been welcomed by both the recently formed James McGeown Justice Committee and the Scottish Council for

Civil Liberties which have been calling for a public inquiry.

The inquiry ordered, however, has been set up in terms of the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976 and is narrower in scope than a public inquiry 'into any matter connected with the policing of an area' which could be ordered by the Secretary of State under section 29 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967. It is not likely therefore to consider the broader question of the use of Special Patrol Groups which the SCCL feels is an important, indeed crucial, aspect of the McGeown case. (A report in **The Scotsman** said that Strathclyde Police's equivalent of the SPG, the Support Unit, was involved in the apprehension of McGeown and were responsible for taking him to the police station, and that the sergeant who was eventually prosecuted was at the time attached to the Unit. This has now been denied by the police.) In a letter to the Secretary of State for Scotland, George Younger, calling for an inquiry, SCCL said 'This "fire brigade" style of law enforcement leads readily to excessive and dangerous use of violence, and represents a threat to public safety, and to the relationship between the public and the police.'

A Fatal Accident and Sudden Death Inquiry is usually held into a death resulting from an accident at work, one which is suspicious or unexplained or a death in legal custody, although where criminal proceedings have established the circumstances of death an inquiry will not usually be held. Clearly in this case the criminal proceedings which did take place raised, but did not answer, a whole series of questions relating to the circumstances of the death. The inquiry, which will probably take place in November, will involve a rehearing of all the relevant evidence and, as in a criminal trial, all those witnesses cited to appear will have to do so. While there is no finding of fault in such an inquiry the presiding sheriff makes a determination setting out the cause(s) of death and 'the reasonable precautions, if any, whereby the death and any accident resulting in the death might have been avoided'

(section 6) as well as any other facts which are relevant to the circumstances of the death. Such a determination is not admissible as evidence in court proceedings nor may it be founded on for such proceedings but the inquiry may help to answer the question of the general responsibility of the police officers in whose custody McGeown died.

•A definite date has now been set for the Inquiry — November 19.

MANCHESTER: GO-AHEAD FOR POLICE COMPUTER COMPLEX

Greater Manchester Council has given the go-ahead to the Greater Manchester Police for a massive new computer complex. The scheme, costing an estimated £5,395,000 at present prices, is due to start in July 1981, and be operational by 1984 with a life expectancy of 20 years. It will, according to Chief Constable James Anderton, be the largest single local computer system in Britain and possibly in Western Europe. An increasing number of British police forces, particularly urban ones, are adopting 'computer-aided policing'. This is one element in the trend towards 'fire-brigade' policing.

The Manchester system will incorporate several distinct functions: command and control; criminal records; information support; message handling and management information systems. It is also being designed for possible future extensions such as crime reporting and criminal intelligence.

Computerising criminal intelligence has produced a volume of criticism, directed mainly at the Thames Valley criminal intelligence computer and the Metropolitan Police 'C' Department computer. No doubt mindful of this, the study for the Manchester system said: 'The present political climate is not favourable to the retention of such data on police computers. It is of course possible that this climate may change ... A generally open mind should be maintained.'

Command and Control

A command and control system (also known as computer-aided despatching) is designed to collate information of incidents and requests for police assistance with information of police resources available, so that a more efficient and faster use of resources is possible. Command and control systems were first introduced in this country in 1972 with a joint Home Office Police Scientific Development Branch/Birmingham City Police experiment based in Birmingham. This was followed in 1975 by an enlarged system in Strathclyde, which was described by the then Chief Constable David McNee as 'the advanced and extensive use of computer equipment by any British Police Force' (**Strathclyde Chief Constable's Report 1976**). Since then both Dorset and Suffolk have introduced similar systems. The proposed Manchester command and control computer will cover the entire force area, with both the Force Control Room and the Divisional offices having visual display units and keyboards. The police say that it will reduce the police response time from minutes to seconds.

The second major application planned is the conversion of the 174,000 personal criminal records held in the Manchester Criminal Records Office (MANCRO). These records, at present held manually, are index only by name and date of birth, and response to inquiries can take up to 17 minutes. The computer will be a fast retrieval system, like the Police National Computer, giving almost immediate response, with a multi-factor search capacity including 'modus operandi' and description, and allowing the storage, indexing and cross-referencing of a mass of random data.

The computer will contain indexes of traffic and minor offences, prostitutes and juveniles who have been cautioned, fingerprints and firearms, as well as actual criminal records covering convictions and sentences. These records will be drawn from those presently held centrally by the Greater Manchester Police, and those informal records currently held in local

offices, partly because the manual Criminal Records Office has been too unwieldy for police officers on patrol to use.

The proposed computer is of the same type which was described by the Data Protection Committee on its report published last December as posing 'a grave threat to a person's interests and possibly liberties'. The Committee distinguished between 'information', which is hard, factual data such as name, date of birth, physical description, and 'intelligence', which may be speculative and unverified, such as notes about places frequented, associates and suspected activities. They were concerned about the use of intelligence in conjunction with information.

Information Support

Information held on the computerised MANCRO, the Police National Computer and other sources will be quickly and easily available to police officers patrolling on foot and in cars, through multi-purpose terminals with copy facilities located throughout the force area and linked by radio; this is 'information support'.

The new computer facilities are seen as sufficiently sensitive to warrant housing in a high security purpose-built structure, that will have no street access at all. The only entrance will be via a hardened passage from the adjacent Chester Street Police HQ. The staff will all require 'positive personnel clearance' — that is, the staff will be subjected to a form of positive vetting. (This practice is described in **Bulletin** No 12).

The study which produced the plans for this computerisation was conducted, for a fee of £12,000, by PA Computers and Telecommunications Ltd, a subsidiary of PA International. They are one of the world's largest consultancy firms, who have worked for governments (British, Malaysian and Hungarian amongst others) and large corporations such as the Ford Foundation. They conducted a management study of New Scotland Yard in 1968.

CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS ASK FOR TOUGHER PICKETING LAWS

Picketing and public order were the main topics discussed at this year's annual conference of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), held at Preston in the first week of September. The meeting decided to press for 'clarification' of picketing law, without at this stage adopting a public position for or against particular changes. This stance differs both from the Superintendents Association, which on 25 September called for tough anti-picketing laws, and from ACPO's previous policy, adopted in 1975, opposing the Labour government's proposal to give pickets a statutory right to stop vehicles.

For the moment, ACPO has set up a specialist committee to draw up detailed policies both on picketing and on public order law generally. These will be submitted to the government before any legislation is proposed. The government has already announced its intention of banning 'secondary' picketing and has set up a legal review of the Public Order Act and related laws, following the demos at Southall and Leicester in April this year.

The subcommittee is chaired by the new president of ACPO, Alan Goodson, Chief Constable of Leicestershire. In April, Goodson deployed 5000 officers to guard a National Front march in the heavily immigrant city of Leicester. Goodson was quoted at the time as saying, 'I treat the National Front in the same way as the Salvation Army.'

ACPO was formed in July 1948. Membership is open to all police officers in England and Wales above the rank of chief superintendent. This includes not only the different grades of Chief Constable but also the Metropolitan Commissioner, Deputy, Assistant and Deputy Assistant Commissioners and Commanders of the Met, as well as the equivalent ranks in the City of London force. Since 1970, it has also included the equivalent officers in the

Royal Ulster Constabulary.

Since 1968, ACPO has had a paid secretariat at Scotland Yard, with a full-time general secretary. This post is currently held by Brian Morrissey, a former Assistant Chief Constable of Hampshire. The cost of the secretariat in 1978-79 was £46,000.

ACPO is run by committees. In overall charge is a steering committee of seven, chaired by the president, and including the general secretary and the Metropolitan Commissioner. Most policy business is dealt with by one of seven specialist committees, covering traffic, communications, crime, computer development, technical services, training and general purposes. As in the case of public order, further ad hoc committees are sometimes formed.

Traditionally, ACPO is regionally based. Regional meetings of members are held four times a year. The eight regions broadly correspond to the eight districts established by the Home Office in 1918 to improve local coordination of and liaison with the police. The regional meetings forward resolutions and views to the secretariat, which refers them to the committees, which in turn report to meetings of the ACPO council, a body consisting of the Metropolitan Commissioner, Chief Constables, the national officers of ACPO and its regional secretaries. ACPO council meetings are also attended by three representatives of ACPO (Scotland), and are held four times a year. The full membership of ACPO attends the annual autumn conference.

Freedom of Manoeuvre

Like the Superintendents Association, but unlike the Police Federation, ACPO is not a statutory body. In July this year, the third report of the Committee of Inquiry on the Police, chaired by Lord Justice Edmund-Davies, proposed that it should stay this way. In evidence, ACPO had strongly opposed statutory recognition. As the report says, 'The Associations ... have made it clear that they would prefer to

forego statutory recognition rather than accept regulations.' In other words, ACPO was keen to retain maximum freedom of manoeuvre.

This desire is closely related to the development of ACPO from its original function as a staff association to become also a focus for senior police opinion and, lately, a pressure group. A Chief Inspector interviewed by sociologist Robert Reiner expressed what is probably the accurate view of ACPO: 'The Association of Chief Police Officers is the one authoritative body the government will go to to seek views.'

No Interference

As long ago as 1962, a Home Secretary — R.A. Butler — addressed an ACPO annual conference. Now, such high-level liaison with the Home Office is routine. However, Robert Mark has pointed out that ACPO's views 'can be and are safely disregarded if they do not accord with ministerial wishes, since the legislators can rely upon the traditional silence of the police.' Mark believed that this reticence allowed the other staff associations — the Federation and the Superintendents Association — to make 'irresponsible and ill-informed comment' on matters 'of which they have no experience or knowledge and for which they have no responsibility.' The continuing tension which exists between the other associations and ACPO was amply demonstrated in the evidence to Edmund-Davies, with ACPO determinedly fighting off any attempts to erode the discretion and powers of Chief Constables.

Initially, ACPO's opinion-making function was largely confined to regular consultation and to the submission of evidence to government inquiries. Police independence from outside control has always been an important theme. In 1962, they told the Royal Commission on the Police that a policeman 'must be part of the community, and yet at the same time it is always dangerous to become on too intimate terms with people to whom at any time he may

have to apply the due process of law.' By 1978 the annual conference was expressing concern at attempts by local authorities to make their Chief Constables more accountable. And in 1976, the issue of autonomy was raised in ACPO's campaign against the government's bill to introduce an independent element into the system of dealing with complaints against the police. In June 1976, ACPO telexed each of its members asking them to take a stand for or against the bill. The membership responded with unanimous messages of opposition.

A similar lobbying technique was used in 1975 — with greater success — when ACPO mobilised its members against Michael Foot's picketing proposals. Picketing and public order have loomed large in ACPO's emergence in recent years as an active pressure group. In 1977, following the Lewisham disturbances, ACPO announced that 'the police can no longer prevent public disorder in the streets' and called for the passing of 'a new Public Order Act giving the police power to control marches and demonstrations, similar to police powers in Ulster.' At the September 1979 conference it again debated public order, concluding that though officers should be given extra protection on demonstrations, such as body armour worn under the usual uniform, they must avoid looking like the 'man from Mars' the moment they went on 'anti-riot duties.'

Control of juries

ACPO's evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure closely follows the more publicised proposals of Sir David McNee, who is, of course, a prominent ACPO member. 'No further safeguards to the rights of suspects need be given' sums up their view of police powers. In the second volume of its evidence, it called for easier majority verdicts in jury trials. It argued that since magistrates can convict on 2:1 or 3:2 majorities, juries should too. But it would allow the present 10:2 majority to stand if there were 'a closer control of the selection of juries' to remove people who are 'irresponsible or criminally dishonest.'

The working party which prepared ACPO's evidence was chaired by Kent's Chief Constable, Barry Pain. In his own annual report for 1978, Pain regretted that some of the proposals 'caused comment from organisations whose main interest is not the well-being of society.' Pain is one of the assertive new brand of Chief Constables who increasingly dominate ACPO. In a report presented to ACPO's June meeting with local authorities, Pain proposed that the police should be allowed into the classroom to run classes on 'citizenship'. Any heads who refused to allow this should be overruled by education authorities.

The amalgamation of police forces in the 1960s and local government reform in the 1970s helped to create fewer Chief Constables, with weaker local accountability. As a result, the Chief Constables have become more powerful. Their growing influence and the seriousness of ACPO reflect this change and there is every sign that the process is far from complete.

THE SCOTTISH CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL

The powers of the police in Scotland are likely to be greatly increased by a new Scottish Criminal Justice Bill which is presently being drafted for introduction during the next parliamentary session. Like the Bill published by the Labour government in October 1978, this new Bill will take up recommendations made by the 1975 Thomson Report concerning new powers of detention and stop and search. As yet the Government has refused to release details of these new provisions, but in a recent interview Scottish Office Minister Malcolm Rifkind stated that the Tory Bill is to be 'more ambitious' than its predecessor.

Under the Labour Bill the police were to be given: 1) a general power to detain persons suspected of an imprisonable offence in a police station for up to four hours, without arrest or charge. 2) a general power of stop and search, allowing the police to detain suspects at places 'other than a police station' in order to ascertain

their name and address, to search them and to obtain an explanation of their behaviour. 3) a general power to detain possible witnesses or persons suspected of having information about an offence, in order to ascertain their name and address etc. In all cases it would be an arrestable offence to refuse to remain with the police officer, to refuse to give one's name and address or to give a false name and address (see **Bulletin** No 10, page 58).

The prospect of these powers being re-introduced, perhaps in a 'more ambitious' form, has provoked opposition from a large range of groups and organisations. Nevertheless the Government intends to press ahead with these controversial and far-reaching proposals while refusing to engage in any public debate or consultation. Thus there is every likelihood that the Bill will become law in the coming parliamentary session.

In response to these developments a Campaign to Stop the Scottish Criminal Justice Bill has been set up and is currently mobilising support among trade unions, political parties, and civil and minority rights groups. The Campaign is an umbrella organisation which aims to co-ordinate and inform opposition to the Bill. It is particularly opposed to the introduction of powers of detention and stop and search which it believes to be unnecessary, inappropriate and a grave threat to civil rights. Its immediate aim is to press the Scottish Office to publish its proposals in the form of a Green Paper, in order to allow a full and public discussion of the important issues involved.

The address of the campaign is 58 Broughton Street, Edinburgh.

SALT-2: NEW LOOK FOR A COLD WAR

On September 2nd, Jimmy Carter gave the go-ahead for the spectacularly expensive M-X missile system, in an attempt to buy Congressional support for the ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty

(SALT-2). Those opposing SALT-2 claim that a few thousand Soviet troops in Cuba threaten US security, and that the Soviet Union is both spending more on its military than the US, and threatening it with a nuclear first-strike. The Thatcher Government presents a similar case and in this context will make its decision, later this year, on replacing Britain's 'independent' nuclear 'deterrent'.

The SALT-2 Treaty was signed in Vienna in June by Brezhnev and Carter, and the latter has pledged that the US will observe it in any case. But the U.S. Constitution requires its approval by a two-thirds majority of the Senate. SALT talks began as unofficial soundings after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and became official negotiations a decade ago; they are thus the oldest symbol of detente. As a means of arms reduction, detente has been a total failure. SALT-1 ran from 1972 until October 1977, and was extended by the two governments pending SALT-2. It limited the number of strategic nuclear delivery systems, and ignored the presence of some 7,000 US 'tactical' nukes in Europe. (Delivery systems are land-, air-, and submarine-launched missiles and strategic bombers). The US had already decided that it had enough delivery systems (see Robert C Aldridge, **The Counterforce Syndrome**, Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, 1978. Aldridge, during his 16 years in Lockheed's engineering department, helped design every submarine-launched ballistic missile bought by the US Navy). The main effort was directed towards increasing their accuracy and number of warheads carried. SALT-1 directed the arms race towards this, without any reduction in expenditure.

In the theory of nuclear war, 'deterrence' depends not on the numbers of missiles or warheads, but on 'mutual assured destruction', or MAD — the near certainty that if either side unleashed a nuclear attack, it would be unable to destroy all enemy forces in one strike. The enemy's surviving forces could inflict unacceptable damage on the 'aggressor'. MAD does not require great accuracy. US Secretary of Defense McNamara in the sixties defined 'unaccept-

able damage' as the deaths of twenty to twenty-five per cent of the population and the destruction of half the industrial capacity. Pentagon experts calculated that, while the reliable delivery of 400 equivalent megatons would destroy 30 per cent of the people and 75 per cent of the industry of the USSR, the US can deliver over 6,000 equivalent megatons. In the 'worst case' of a surprise Soviet attack, there would still be over 2,000 equivalent megatons to assure the destruction of the Soviet Union.

Spending for insecurity

Constant increases in U.S. nuclear capability, justified by claims that the Soviet Union is ahead in this or that respect, have not increased US security in the postwar period. The bomber gap of the fifties, the missile gap of the sixties and now the claims that the Soviet Union has both greater military expenditure and a strategic counterforce advantage over the West turn out to be equally dubious. The director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, points out that continental north America in 1945 was not threatened with attack or invasion from any quarter. But after spending 3,500 billion dollars since 1945 (at 1979 prices) gaining strategic superiority, the US can be destroyed in a matter of minutes.

'American loss of security has been total and expensive.' (Frank Barnaby, *New Scientist*, 23.8.1979, p581).

The 1979 SIPRI Yearbook says: 'The more the two great powers adapt to counterforce nuclear doctrines the greater the probability of a nuclear world war.' U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's 1980 Annual Report on the Pentagon shows that counterforce has opened a new world of exciting ways to die.

'A strategy based on assured destruction alone no longer is wholly credible ... We now recognize that the strategic nuclear forces can deter only a relatively narrow range of contingencies ... (and) that a strategy and a force structure designed

only for assured destruction is not sufficient for our purposes,' he writes.

Brown then goes on to talk of various possibilities of actually fighting nuclear wars as if they were realistic, even reasonable, policy options, talking of 'the degree to which "hard targets" such as missile silos, command bunkers, and nuclear weapons storage sites need to be completely covered ...' (quoted from *SIPRI Yearbook* p14).

SALT-2 will run to the end of 1985. It limits the number of delivery systems on either side to only 2,400 until the end of 1981, and only 2,250 thereafter. The US has 2,058 and the Soviet Union 2,500 at present, so only the Soviets need reduce deployment. Of these, 1,320 may be 'MIRVed' — equipped with stated numbers of warheads — or in the case of bombers, may carry a definite number of cruise missiles. SALT-2 also includes agreements not to interfere with verification systems, and only to develop, test and deploy one new type of intercontinental ballistic missile — which in the US case will be the M-X. These 'limits' shape or control the arms race, but they do not reduce defence spending.

No 'Soviet threat'

The 1979 SIPRI Yearbook challenges the views that

- Soviet military expenditure now exceeds that of the US.
- military expenditure takes a much larger share than it used to of the Soviet gross national product;
- Soviet military expenditure has, over a long period, been rising in real terms by at least 3 per cent a year, while military expenditure in NATO countries has not been rising at all.

It says: 'These propositions are not "known facts"' — as NATO commentators claim — 'they are highly questionable.' But NATO officials, and officials of all member governments take advantage of the dependence of the average person on

'authoritative' statements about what the facts are to promote 'the Soviet threat'.

The Soviet Union helps by its secrecy, and by publishing only one global figure — 17.2 thousand million roubles — for its military expenditure. A rouble is worth 65 cents at current exchange rates, so US military expenditure of 105 thousand million dollars far outweighs the Soviet budget of 11.2 thousand million. US agencies, of course, do not accept the Soviet figure. They work out what the Soviet Union has in weaponry, personnel, support and so on, and perform a neat little trick — which would fail any first-year economics student. They value the numbers of weapons and people in terms of what it would cost the US to field the same forces. Soviet 'expenditure' therefore increases, according to the CIA/Pentagon/NATO estimates, if the US armed forces get a pay rise.

Relative costs are of course very different in the two countries. Labour in the Soviet Union is cheap, relative to advanced technology, compared to the US. So the USSR uses military workers to perform tasks which in the US are mechanised or electronically performed. These workers are counted as if they cost what the same numbers of workers would cost in the US.

The procedure, SIPRI confirms, is 'wholly invalid'. 'Yet this invalid procedure is the basis of the statement ... (by) political commentators in Western countries that it is a 'known fact' that Soviet military expenditure exceeds that of the United States.' (SIPRI Yearbook, p30).

Cooking the books

After 1975, western intelligence agencies abruptly reduced their estimates of the productivity of the Soviet military procurement sector. The estimate of Soviet GNP devoted to defence thus rose from 6-8 per cent to 11-12 per cent. SIPRI comments: 'It is the same bundle of goods with higher prices put on them'.

The trend in military expenditure — claimed by the West to be rising in the Soviet Union, static here — is estimated

differently between the two blocs.

For the Soviet Union, a detailed product-by-product comparison is made; improvements in quality thus count as increases. For the West, estimates are based on money expenditure, deflated by price indices. Such a method severely undercounts improvements in quality, exaggerates the real rise in prices (which has included improved quality) and thus underestimates the volume increase. SIPRI comments: 'If, in NATO countries, estimates of the trend in their own military expenditure were made in the same way as estimates for the Soviet Union ... then it is very possible that the "real" series for military expenditure in NATO would show a rising trend as well.'

Though the European members of NATO have not so far been involved in SALT, the next round will specifically address itself to European-theatre nuclear weapons.

The Thatcher government's decision on replacing Polaris, then, will increase Britain's diplomatic bargaining chips for SALT-3. It may also help convince the West Germans to deploy the new version of the US Pershing missiles. Both of these questions have been on the agenda at recent NATO Nuclear Planning Group meetings, and will be central to the December meeting of NATO Defence Ministers, the North Atlantic Council.

Trident terror

The British government could decide not to replace Polaris. It could decide on Cruise missiles, which it could develop with the French, make itself, or buy from the Americans. It could buy more modern submarines which would be tremendously expensive, requiring some sort of US subsidy like that which provided the Polaris under the Nassau agreements — and this would hardly increase British 'independence'. The Poseidon submarine, the US Navy's Polaris replacement, is to be replaced (assuming that the arms race remains unlimited) by the Trident, and the Thatcher government is considering a bid for this. One Trident submarine will carry

'24 Trident-2 missiles, capable of striking any point over half the earth's surface. Each missile can deliver seventeen super-accurate MARV (manoeuvrable independently targeted re-entry vehicle) warheads to within a few feet of as many targets. With a typical payload of 75-100 kilotons per warhead, that means one Trident submarine will be able to destroy 408 cities or military targets with a blast five times that which was unleashed over Hiroshima' (Aldridge, op. cit., p25-26).

One submarine, in other words, could provide McNamara's assured destruction. The accuracy of the Trident makes it the ultimate first strike weapon. Its adoption by Britain would be an unprecedented escalation of the Cold War, and bring nuclear destruction nearer.

IN BRIEF

•**TUC attacks SPG:** the Trades Union Congress this year unanimously passed a motion calling for the disbanding of the Metropolitan Police Special Patrol Group (SPG) on the grounds that its activities posed 'a fundamental challenge to public order and to the civil and political rights of citizens legitimately engaged in industrial disputes and political activity'. The motion was proposed by Alan Sapper on behalf of the ACTT (Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians), and supported by Ron Todd, National Organiser of Transport and General Workers' Union. Later Bill Keys (SOGAT) attacked the government's refusal to hold a public inquiry into Blair Peach's death at the hands of the SPG: 'It is to be deplored that a country which considers itself a mature democracy can hide behind a police inquiry. Is this because the police and the establishment do have something to hide from public scrutiny? If they have anything to hide, let the truth come out at a public inquiry'. The day after the TUC debate Sir David McNee issued a press statement defending the SPG.

•**New police appointments:** three new police appointments have been announced. Sir Kenneth Newman, the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, will become the Commandant of the Police Staff College at Bramshill on January 1. Earlier this year the RUC came under criticism from the Bennett Committee which investigated the treatment and interrogation of suspects (see **Bulletin** No 11). The position of Commandant has been up-graded to match his seniority, and for the first time the Commandant will be a member of HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (overseeing 42 forces in England and Wales). The Chief Inspector of Constabulary Sir Colin Woods was appointed as the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police on September 1. This newly-created Federal force was set up following a report to the Australian government by Sir Robert Mark recommending the force to combat terrorism (see **Bulletin** No 10). Sir Colin Woods' successor as Chief Inspector is Mr James Crane, formerly head of the Scotland Yard Fraud Squad.

•**New Secretary to the Cabinet:** Sir Robert Armstrong, currently the Permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office, is to become Secretary to the Cabinet — one of the top three jobs in the Civil Service. He succeeds Sir John Hunt who has held the post for the past six years. Sir Robert is only the sixth holder of this office since it was created in 1917 by Lloyd George. The Secretary heads the Cabinet Office which comprises the Cabinet Secretariat which services the PM and cabinet committees, the Central Policy Review Staff (the 'think-tank'), the Historical Section (for preparing official histories) and the Central Statistical Office. Nearly 700 civil servants are employed in the Cabinet Office (**Hansard** 20.5.76).

•**Boost for the Territorials:** following the pay increases given to the police and the military in May the government has decided to increase spending on volunteer army reservists from £4 to £12 million a year. Most of the increased expenditure is going

on providing a £300 a year tax-free bounty (previously a partly-taxable £100 a year) in order to halt the high turnover (30% p.a.) among the 70,000 reservists. The Territorial Army provides just under a third of Britain's fully mobilised army — in the event of war half would be assigned to the British army on the Rhine, and half would remain in this country for 'home defence'. The Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve's name has also been changed, back to the 'Territorial Army'. In 1967, as part of cuts in defence spending, the Labour government amalgamated the Territorial Army and the Army Emergency Reserve (**Statement on Defence Estimates 1967, Cmnd 3203**).

•**South Wales Police refused access to traffic monitoring equipment:** South Glamorgan County Council have refused to grant permission for the South Wales Police to use the council's Cardiff traffic monitoring equipment. The Chief Constable, Sir Gwilym Morris, originally asked for access for general surveillance and crime detection purposes but was prepared to accept use limited to surveillance on special occasions like royal visits, and monitoring of operations in civil emergencies such as floods or explosions. The Council refused permission as such police surveillance could, said Cllr Lord Brooks, 'make the nightmare world of 1984 a reality' (**South Wales Echo**, 14.7.79). The County Solicitor also advised that use of the equipment for surveillance might be contrary to the right to privacy guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In retaliation, the police wanted to have the equipment, which is based in their Cardiff headquarters, removed but have been unable to do so since the Council has a lease.

•**Eldon Griffiths re-appointed as police adviser:** Mr Eldon Griffiths, Conservative MP for Bury St Edmunds, has been re-appointed as the Parliamentary Consultant and Adviser to the Police Federation. This decision has broken with the tradition

that the Federation's parliamentary adviser is drawn from the opposition party. The first person appointed to this post when it was created in 1955 was Mr Callaghan; he held it until 1964. Mr Griffiths held the post between 1964 and 1970, and Labour MP Mr Alf Morris from 1970 until 1974. Mr Griffiths returned to the post in 1974, and it was expected that a Labour MP would be given the job after the General Election. The Police Federation is the rank-and-file police organisation with over 100,000 members.

•**Doctors and nurses to refuse information to police:** having received 'countless' complaints from doctors who had been asked by the police to provide information on patients, the British Medical Association (BMA) took the unprecedented step of urging doctors not to comply with these requests. A BMA spokesperson said: 'Disclosure of information without consent and in the absence of a court order would be to the detriment of patients and would destroy a fundamental principle in medicine. Worried doctors tell us the police are attempting to use National Health Service resources in their search for suspects' (**Daily Star** 3.8.79). The BMA also published two letters seeking information on suspects for the police, one from a detective inspector in a regional crime squad.

•**A belated correction:** in the background paper on the police in West Germany (**Bulletin** No 11), we said that the recorded capacity of the Federal Criminal Office (BKA) computer system, INPOL, was 1440 kilobytes, and that one kilobyte was 1,000,000,000 pieces of information. This was wrong. The figure of 1440 kilobytes refers only to the central store of the system, and as each byte is roughly equivalent to a character — letter or numeral — this gives a capacity of about 1.5 million characters. But the disc storage capacity (the files) is much larger; as we said, around 400,000 booksized pages. This comes out to between 1,000 and 2,000 million characters. The capacity of the British Police National Computer is 8,000 million characters.

BACKGROUND PAPER

The sight of troops on the streets of Britain is now a fairly familiar sight. Familiarity, however, disguises the reality. A machinery has been created for the armed forces to be brought in to act in the civil sphere of society in order to break strikes. The police too have stepped over the traditional boundary of solely acting to enforce 'public order' during industrial disputes, and have actually replaced striking workers in the same way as troops.

This background paper is concerned with the state's machinery to break or pre-empt strikes. It deals with situations ranging from the initial threat of a withdrawal of labour by a group of workers up to the point where a 'state of emergency' is declared. When a 'state of emergency' is proclaimed, a distinctly different machinery is set in motion. This begins with the activation of the Regional Seats of Government (RSGs) and the appointment of Regional Commissioners. The last time this happened was when Mr Heath 'pushed the button' in December 1973 (see **Bulletin No 8**, Background Paper on 'Civil Defence or Internal Defence?').

Democracy, the constitution and the right to strike

The use of troops and police to intervene in strikes has brought changes in state practice which undermine some of the fundamental assumptions of liberal democracy, and which present governments and the state with problems of legitimation — public acceptance of their new practices.

The first assumption is that the basic chain of **democratic accountability** is through Ministers (the government) to

parliament, and parliament to the people. In fact, and this is by no means limited to the field under consideration, state agencies, like the police, the armed forces and senior civil servants, exercise considerably greater control over the government of the day than parliament and the people. One example in this field stands out. A secret, and complex, machinery to organise strike-breaking — which involves the Cabinet Office, the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence, the police, the military, and the security services — has been created but never sanctioned by parliament.

The second assumption in question is the **constitutional status** of the new practices. Britain as is well-known has what is called an 'unwritten constitution' which tradition sees as a strength compared to written constitutions (as in the USA). The British constitution is determined by accepted practice, which is partly formalised and partly based on historical precedent (see Richard Crossman's Introduction to Bagehot's **The British Constitution**, Fontana). More precisely the constitution is a combination of: i) statute law, i.e. an Act passed by parliament; ii) common law precedents, accumulated since feudal times; iii) the exercise of the 'royal prerogative' by Ministers acting by 'order-in-council' on behalf of the monarch; iv) the most vague area of all that can only be described as conventions historically accepted either by default or consensus which can be changed. An example of the latter was the decision to redefine which authority had the power to call in troops. It was taken from democratically-elected mayors and given to the Home Secretary, by a change of Army Regulations in the mid-1970s. Although this was in contradiction to common law precedent it has not been challenged in the courts or parliament and therefore now stands as the constitutional position.

The constitution places no limits on action by governments and the state to

intervene to break strikes. Even the main Act of parliament governing the use of troops in strikes — the 1920 Emergency Powers Act — has been by-passed and the common law position ignored by Ministerial use of the 'royal prerogative'.

The third assumption of liberal democracy at stake is the **right to strike**. Established by the historical struggle of the British working class though not embodied in law it constitutes part of the fabric of liberal democracy. It was part of a historical settlement — as much as the right to vote and the creation of the welfare state between capital and labour. Striking is not a sudden seizure of power by trade unionists but part of this historical settlement, accepted by the Conservative as well as the Labour Party (see **The Conservative Nation** by Andrew Gamble, Routledge, 1974). Moreover, the popular notion that the 'post-war consensus' between the two major parties is breaking down ignores the historical struggle that led to that consensus.

Each of these assumptions either no longer holds or is under threat. Changes in this field rely not on open parliamentary approval or past constitutional authority but on the 'engineering of consent' (legitimation) through the media, and a tacit assumption that parliament will not intervene.

The constitutional position

The constitutional position on the use of troops and police to replace workers on strike is exceptionally unclear, to the extent that at present there are few if any limits on their use. As one commentator remarked 'constitutional rules reflect what politicians can get away with' (G. Marshall, **The Armed Forces and Industrial Disputes in the UK**, in *Armed Forces and Society*, February 1979). There are, in theory, limits placed on the use of troops in strikes — two Acts of parliament, Queen's Regulations for the Army, and common law.

The main statute on the use of troops in strikes is the 1920 Emergency Powers Act,

which allows for the declaration of a 'state of emergency' when it appears to the government that 'the essential services of the country are threatened'. Two aspects of the Act are important. First, the intention in passing the Act was to authorise the employment of troops in industrial disputes, while ensuring parliamentary control over their use. The declaration of emergency and the new powers taken by the government, known as Regulations, have to be agreed by parliament and renewed every month. Second, the Act laid down when a government could, by declaring a state of emergency, assume these new powers. Namely, where a dispute would interfere with:

'the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, or light, or with the means of locomotion, to deprive the community, or any substantial portion of the community, of the essentials of life'.

The 1920 Act has been used on 11 occasions, the last four being under the 1970-74 Heath government when four declarations of a 'state of emergency' were issued. Only in 7 of the 11 'emergencies' have troops actually been used.

The 1964 Emergency Powers Act amended the 1920 Act. Its main provision (section 2) made permanent a wartime Regulation which allowed for the use of the armed forces, at the direction of the Defence Council, for:

'agricultural work or other work, being urgent work of national importance'.

The intention behind the 1964 Act was to regularise post-war practice in using troops for natural disasters. The Act, because it seemed uncontroversial, passed quickly through parliament without opposition. The situation was therefore generally understood to be that the 1920 Act allowed the government to employ troops on a national scale, while the 1964 Act allowed for the use of troops in natural disasters.

After the use of troops in the national firemen's strike in the winter of 1977-78 it emerged that the then Labour government had used the 1964 Act, which only required authorisation of their use by two members of the 13-man Defence Council. Thus

when, for the first time in history, troops were used to replace an entire workforce parliament was effectively by-passed. The only previous occasions when the 1964 Act had been used were in limited and local situations — the 1970 dustmen's strike in Tower Hamlets, London; the 1973 Glasgow firemen's strike; and the 1975 Glasgow dustmen's strike.

The use of the 1964 Act rather than the 1920 Act to authorise the use of troops not only by-passes parliament; it also hides from public view the new powers assumed by government, for example, the appointment of Regional and County Emergency Committees in the lorry drivers' and firemen's strikes.

The military themselves are also accountable through the Queen's Regulations. The Regulations are issued under the 'royal prerogative' by the monarch, on behalf of the Defence Council. The Regulations are based on common law precedent and various Acts of Parliament. They were last revised in 1975 (the two previous post-war revisions being in 1955 and 1961). On the use of troops in strikes they reflect the two Emergency Powers Acts. Under the heading 'Military Aid to Civil Ministries' (MACM) are two regulations. The first (Reg J11.004 a) refers to a state of emergency being proclaimed under the 1920 Act, and the second (Reg J11.004 b) to situations where

'there is no proclamation and the emergency is **limited and local**, the Defence Council may, under the Emergency Powers Act 1964, authorise service personnel to be temporarily employed on work which the Council have approved as being urgent work of national importance'

After the firemen's strike it was reported that the use of troops in the **national** firemen's strike was contrary to Queen's Regulations (see **Bulletin** No 4 and **Guardian** 20.3.78). On June 1 1978 the Defence Council decided to delete the words 'and the emergency is limited and local' from the above Regulations thus, post-hoc, legitimating the use of troops. This change was clearly contrary to

the intent of parliament in passing the 1964 Act.

A leading constitutional lawyer, S.A. De Smith, writing in 1977 found that the relation between statute law (Acts of parliament) and the use of the royal prerogative 'remarkably abstruse'. And as regards the use of the royal prerogative, which is exercised by the Defence Council, he observes that:

'it cannot mean that troops can lawfully be ordered to do whatever the Crown thinks fit whenever it thinks fit to maintain internal security, irrespective of what necessity requires' (p501).

But in practice, this is precisely what is happening. Whatever the supposed constitutional position there are at present no effective parliamentary or legal controls on the use of troops in strikes.

The police

In the case of troops, the supposed checks on their use are ineffective; but on the police, there are **no checks at all**. At the level of rhetoric, the impartiality of the troops and the police is still maintained. As late as mid-1977 Sir Robert Mark could write that there was:

'a firm and deepening conviction, shared by soldiers, police and public alike that the army has no part to play in Great Britain in matters of political and industrial dispute not involving the overthrow of lawful government by force' (**Policing a Perplexed Society**, p28).

In reality the power of the police in strike situations was increased by a change in the early 1970s. This was the redefinition of the 'civil authority' which had powers to summon help from the military. Since the late nineteenth century elected local councils had insisted on control over the troops in their areas. A military commander thus responded to requests from the mayors, and this principle was enshrined in Queen's Regulations, where the 'civil authority' was defined as the Commissioner of Police in London, and a magistrate or mayor (who was until 1973

automatically a JP) outside of the capital. The legal authority thus rested with mayors by virtue of their being JPs. But under the Administration of Justice Act 1973 the office of JP was removed from the mayors and the Police Commissioner in London.

In 1976 it emerged that the 'civil authority' had been redefined as the police (letter to the Cobden Trust from the MOD, 12.4.76), and the 1975 revision of Queen's Regulations reflected this change. As a result of questions in parliament to the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, it further transpired that the power to formally request the employment of troops now rested with the Home Secretary alone (**Hansard** 8.4.76). These changes were made without reference to parliament and were in conflict with common law.

Sir Robert Mark recognised this contradiction and justified it on the grounds of present practice:

'whatever the legal position, present practice reflects the emergence of a professional, well-organised police service which has inevitably assumed the primary responsibility for law and order' (Policing a Perplexed Society, p30).

But there is another, hidden aspect to the role of the police in strikes which is masked in the media by the attention paid to 'sending in the troops'. In relation to strikes the police have a formal responsibility to maintain public order — to try and limit pickets and if necessary to break them up, as at Grunwick. Much of their training is intended to cope with 'violent' pickets, and for elite units like the Special Patrol Groups this is especially so. However, in strikes since 1977 the police themselves have actually acted in a strike-breaking role by replacing striking workers — in the firemen's strike (1977-78), the ambulance drivers' strike (1979) and the social workers' strike (1979). None of the existing Police Acts place any limits on actions of this kind.

The constitutional position can be simply summed up by saying that there are **no** limits whatsoever placed on the employment of police officers replacing striking workers. While the introduction of troops

presents problems of constitutionality and legitimation, the use of the police in a similar role is only a question of legitimation.

National co-ordinating machinery

Parliamentary control in this field has been replaced by a new and secret machinery, at the centre of which is the Civil Contingencies Unit in the Cabinet Office. The Civil Contingencies Unit (and the ministerial Civil Contingencies Committee) is the successor to the National Security Committee set up by the Tories in 1972 after the first miners' strike. It is currently run by Sir Clive Rose and was reported to have a full-time staff of fifteen in 1978, although this is thought to have risen sharply since the Tories took office.

The CCU has three main functions in relation to industrial disputes. Whenever a strike looms a task force of civil servants, headed by a person from the CCU, is appointed from the Ministries thought likely to be affected. In 1977 it was reported that:

'Such a group has been planning, for example, to alleviate the consequences of today's threatened firemen's strike. Another has just ceased sitting on the power workers' strike. A similar team was appointed to handle the consequences of unrest at British Oxygen' (Times 14.11.77).

These task forces not only gather assessments of the likely effect of a strike from each of the Ministries but also receive reports from overt and covert surveillance by the security services — the Special Branch and MI5. Intelligence from the security service plays a very important part in the process because the CCU:

'continually has to ask itself which unions taking direct action can exert an immediate effect on the nation's life and morale ... It must also try to estimate which unions will honour another's picket lines ... If the railwaymen and the TGWU had not recognised the miners' picket lines in 1973-4 the outcome might have been very different (Times 9.11.77).

Their second function is to present these assessments to the 'Emergencies Committee' (a sub-committee of the Civil Contingencies Committee, whose remit also covers disasters and terrorism). This is an interdepartmental committee including Ministers and senior civil servants from the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Departments of Health and Social Security, Employment, Trade, and Industry, the Treasury, together with the police, military and security services. During a major industrial dispute it is chaired by the Home Secretary, and otherwise by Sir Clive Rose, a Deputy Secretary in the Cabinet Office.

Their third function is to act as a clearing house during the course of a strike for each of the agencies or Ministries involved. For example, a request by the Home Office to send in troops to replace ambulance drivers is routed through the CCU to the Ministry of Defence.

Although the work of the Civil Contingencies Unit is shrouded in mystery, it is clear that it is able to activate, through the respective Ministries, both a regional and county structure.

Regional and county committees

It is clear that a parallel and flexible machinery to that envisaged under a declaration of a state of emergency exists for situations short of this. But there are significant differences. Regional and county structures act as **co-ordinating** and **command** structures, exercising powers to direct the various agencies. During the 1977-78 firemen's strike 'Regional' and 'County Emergency Committees' were set up usually comprising the Chairman of the County Council, the Chief Constable, the Chief Fire Officer, the Chief Executive of the Council and the local Army commander (see **Bulletin** No 10). In practice local police Operations Rooms played a central role. 999 fire emergency calls were routed through to the police and the police UHF radio links were used to co-ordinate with both the army Green Goddess Units and county halls.

On the other hand during the road

haulage drivers' strike in 1978-79, 'Regional Emergency Committees' were activated on January 11 1979. Home Secretary Merlyn Rees told the Commons:

'The TGWU declared the strike official ... on 11th January. That same day the Government activated their emergency organisation throughout the country. Regional emergency committees came into immediate operation' (in contact with) 'operations rooms in the Department of Transport and other main Departments in London and are under the direction of a co-ordinating committee under my chairmanship' (**Hansard** 15.1.79).

Eleven Regional Emergency Committees were set up, based on the Department of Transport's Traffic Areas. The job of each Committee was to monitor strike action, liaise with the TGWU over the movement of 'essential' supplies, and to prepare the police and troops for possible intervention. The Chairman of each Committee was the Regional Director of the Department of the Environment, and its members regional representatives of other ministries, the police and the army. Each set up a Regional Operations Room which reported to the DoE's Emergency Operations Room, which in turn reported to the CCU.

As the selective ambulance drivers' and social workers' strikes showed, a less formal co-ordinating mechanism exists for localised disputes. During the ambulance drivers' strike earlier this year in the North-West, troops were called in. The MoD said they had been co-operating on a 'deployment plan' with the DHSS since the previous autumn, but claimed that decision to use troops lay with the Secretary of State for Health and Social Services, David Ennals (**New Manchester Review** 6.4.79). The DHSS said, rightly, that Mr Ennals had no power to send in the troops — that was passed up to the 'Civil Contingencies Unit'.

Who to take on and who not to

The decision to use troops, police or other agencies to intervene in a strike rests, as we

have seen, on an assessment at top-level of the likelihood of success. Both Tory and Labour governments know that to threaten to use troops to replace, for example, water workers would be useless. As one official said, the military 'does not have the manpower, expertise or the knowledge' (**Guardian** 19.1.79). Similarly, during the winter of 1978-79, the Labour government decided not to declare a state of emergency or to introduce troops into the road haulage drivers' strike because, the Home Secretary told the Commons, the army could have moved less than 5% of supplies. The power of the government and the state to intervene in strikes is therefore limited by their ability to replace or outlast striking workers.

Despite the difference in style it is quite clear that Tory and Labour governments have received much the same information from their advisers. In April 1978, a full year before coming to office, Mrs Thatcher received a confidential report prepared by a group of senior Tories headed by Lord Carrington (**Times** 18.4.78). The group was set up in 1976 in the light of what Mrs Thatcher saw as Mr Heath's failure to act firmly against the unions in 1973-4. The Carrington group spent two years sounding out senior businessmen and top former civil servants and advised Mrs Thatcher that there were key areas of the economy where strong unions and/or advanced technology made it likely that any government would lose an all-out confrontation. They concluded that the military could not be used on any large scale and that to do so would permanently alienate the unions from the Tories. But they did advise that they could be better prepared than Mr Heath and that the Civil Contingencies Unit should be greatly strengthened.

Just a month later an internal Tory report leaked by **The Economist** (27.5.78) spelt out the implications of the Carrington group's findings. The report had been prepared by the Conservative Party's policy group on nationalised industries, chaired by Nicholas Ridley MP (a Freedom Association Council member). It recommended that a Tory government

should choose when and where to fight strikes, and suggested that there were three categories of vulnerability of public services: (a) sewerage, water, electricity, gas and the health service in the most vulnerable group, (b) railways, docks, coal and dustmen in an intermediate group, and (c) other public transport, education, ports, telephones, air transport and steel in the least vulnerable. The policy group concluded that where industries 'have the nation by the jugular vein the only feasible option is to pay up' (**Economist** 27.5.78).

Maj. Gen. Clutterbuck, a counter-insurgency expert, summed up any government's predicament in February this year (**Observer** 11.2.79). By and large he said that the army could replace a small, and preferably unskilled workforce. But it could not replace water and sewerage services, electricity power station workers, post office telecommunications, nor, effectively, the postal services.

Clearly any government could decide to break with this advice and take on a major confrontation. Similarly, it could decide to take further measures to break strikes. The Ridley report also recommended that social security payments to strikers and their families should be stopped and that large mobile squads of specially equipped and trained police should be organised.

Recent uses of troops and police

Having examined the command structure, we now look at some specific examples. Over the past two years troops, police and sometimes voluntary agencies, have been employed in strike-breaking activities. Just prior to the firemen's strike, in October 1977, the 1964 Act was used to authorise RAF fuel tankers (escorted by 60 police officers) to break the picket lines of air traffic control assistants at West Drayton Air Traffic Control Centre. The General Secretary of the union concerned, the Civil and Public Services Association, accused the MOD of strike-breaking: 'There has been a military intervention in a purely industrial dispute' (**Times** 14.10.77).

Plans to combat the firemen's strike were clearly well laid in advance. Local authorities, who employ local fire services, were circularised in advance by the Home Office 'inviting' them to request help from the military when the strike started — which all duly did. Plans for police-military co-ordination were also planned well in advance, and joint police-military exercises and Home Defence/Internal Security planning increased the speed with which the Army 'command points' were established, the re-routing of 999 calls to police stations and the setting up of Regional and County Emergency Committees occurred.

In the event, 21,000 troops successfully broke a national strike by replacing 32,000 firemen. Their ability to do this relied heavily on local police command and communications networks as well as police at the scene of the fire. In many cases police, called first to establish whether a fire engine was required, extinguished the fire themselves (see **Bulletin** No 10).

Fire losses jumped from £52 million to £117 million, but this was largely kept from the public. The Army was also prepared to admit that 'they have gained greater efficiency in operating control and communications centres in a High Street environment which would formerly have been a political minefield' (**Daily Mirror** 17.1.78).

During the ambulance drivers' dispute earlier this year the army and the police were called in on several occasions. In February, London ambulance drivers closed 46 of the capital's 76 ambulance stations. The control room of the London Ambulance Centre was supplemented by police and army officers to co-ordinate the police, army, RAF, St. John's Ambulance and Red Cross vehicles brought in. The largest number of calls, it transpired, were dealt with by police vans (**Guardian** 22.2.79).

In mid-April police and army crews moved in to provide emergency ambulance services when the ambulance drivers' strike spread, especially in the North West, as a response to the government's advice to hospitals to use volunteer labour (**Guardian**

17.3.79). In Greater Manchester when the ambulance drivers walked out the army moved in 15 field ambulances which were based at police stations. However, the army only handled about 40% of all emergency calls; 60% were handled by the police (**New Manchester Review** 6.4.79). Even though the army claimed they 'held their own' a Manchester ambulanceman commented: 'There were hair-raising tales of corpses being left at private houses as young army crews vainly tried to meet calls for assistance. At times it was claimed calls were being "stacked up" 15 at a time'.

In February this year a seven-month long strike by social workers in 14 selected areas of the country ended, the longest-ever stoppage by social workers. Some three dozen statutes define their work, and their withdrawal meant that in some cases legal processes came to a stop, and in others that the police, health, education authorities and voluntary workers moved in to fill the gap. The reaction of the press in general was hostile to the strike. The police gloried in their role. Chief Superintendent Farr, of the Cheshire Police, said: 'The police have been doing social work for a great deal longer than they have. And we still are' (**Guardian** 12.3.79).

One of the 14 areas affected was Liverpool where a study among social workers was being conducted at the time of the strike. It concluded that voluntary agencies 'saw a decrease in their work load and much of the evidence suggests that it was other statutory agencies ... who picked up social work cases during the strike' (**Community Care** 7.6.79). The intervention of some voluntary agencies in this instance were more important than the role played by the police, though some supported the strike by refusing to take on extra cases. There were individual horror stories like:

'The family whose daughter was sectioned, struggling and screaming, by six burly policemen instead of the social worker who knew and understood her' (**Social Work Today**, 22.5.79).

The present strike by industrial civil servants, some 170,000 workers represented

by 12 unions, presents another kind of challenge by its technique of short selective strikes in support of their pay claim. Six specialists went on strike at Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) at Cheltenham; police photographers withdrew their labour; and work on a Polaris submarine undergoing repairs at Devonport stopped. In dozens of instances army, navy, air force and police personnel have stepped in to cover, although some workers are so specialised that they cannot be replaced. At St Athan's RAF station in South Wales the introduction of servicemen to replace civilian fitters repairing fighter planes led to all the civilian work-force walking out until the servicemen withdrew (**Financial Times** 13.9.79).

Each of these instances so far concerned the state sector of employment, but the Labour government was also prepared to intervene in the private sector. The creation of Regional Emergency Committees during the road haulage drivers' strike has already been referred to. Fuel tanker drivers employed by the big oil companies twice threatened to strike during the winters of 1977-78 and 1978-79. In 1977 a plan was drawn up, called 'Operation Raglan', in conjunction with the oil companies. 3,000 soldiers were on stand-by to drive tankers which were to be requisitioned by the government from the oil companies with their agreement. The plan divided the country into five 'Emergency Divisions', one to be handled by each of the five main oil companies (**Bulletin No 4**). In December last year it was reported that 15,000 soldiers had been placed on stand-by, and this time called 'Operation Drumstick' (**Guardian** 29.12.78). In both instances, wage agreements were reached. Otherwise, a great deal of major industry would have been shut down.

Police, pickets and special units

As well as replacing strikers, police have developed their plans to deal with pickets. When the proposals of the Ridley report were published the then Home Secretary Mr Rees attacked the idea that police

should set up special squads to deal with 'violent' picketing. The police, he said, should not be used in a strike-breaking role, 'the role of the police in industrial disputes is to enforce the law impartially' (**Times** 2.6.78).

But the police themselves, if not Labour Home Secretaries, have learnt lessons from the miners' pickets during 1972 and in particular their failure to break the picket lines at Saltley in Birmingham. In November 1973 Home Secretary Robert Carr announced that next time the police intended to 'stop the masses' forming. The police planned to set up regional 'intelligence units' co-ordinated by Scotland Yard (**Daily Telegraph** 14.11.73). Since then the police have increased training in 'riot control' and the effect of this was seen during the lengthy Grunwick struggle. The permanent Special Patrol Groups of various local forces are specially trained for such situations (see **Bulletin No 13**), and they can be supplemented by 'Police Support Units' (PSUs). PSUs are theoretically intended for use in the wake of a nuclear attack according to the 'Police Home Defence Manual' (**Region 1: Supplementary**, by Martin Spence, 1979).

Conclusion

The government has at its disposal a permanent, and well-tries, standing machinery at national, regional and local level designed to pre-empt or break strikes. But the troops and the police would be quite incapable of coping with a major industrial dispute, for example the closing of power stations or the non-delivery of petrol. Their effectiveness in some previous strikes has depended on a level of co-operation from unions and their members.

But any constitutional limits there may have been on the use of troops in strikes have now been by-passed, and there are no limits at all on the use of police in a strike-breaking role.

Finally, we have shown that the police are just as important as troops in breaking strikes by replacing striking workers, and in some cases more so.

REVIEWS & SOURCES

BOOKS

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, F.H. Hinsley with E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom and R.C. Knight, Volume One. HMSO, London: 1979, £10.

This first volume of the official history of intelligence in the war covers the pre-war situation, the war up to summer 1941 and the German invasion of the Soviet Union ('Barbarossa'). By then Germany controlled almost the whole of continental Europe from Norway to Greece, and much of North Africa. The United States was not to declare war until December 1941. The history covers events that took place four decades ago; events about which H.M.G. has published over forty volumes of official history. No official history of intelligence had been expected, long-term official doctrine having been that there should be no recognition of even the existence of such bodies as the Security Service, MI5, and the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6. But it seems that the historical department of Cabinet Office decided this doctrine had become counter-productive.

Death had reduced the flow of works by reliable war-time spooks willing to have their work officially edited; the declining credibility of Cold War ideology and political opposition to 'Western' interventions against progressive movements throughout the Third World and in postwar Europe was exacerbated by the writings of renegades from U.S. agencies. Independent writers about British activities were beginning to use the U.S. Freedom of Information Act to get at secret U.S. archives, and in the last few years most of the 'weeded' British war-time

records became available under the thirty year rule. Unofficial interpretations were raising or re-opening troublesome questions, such as whether Churchill had known through the breaking of the German Ultra codes about the massive bombing of Coventry but had not given warning to preserve knowledge of the code-breaking from Germany. (Hinsley uses 3 pages of text and 21 pages of appendix to deny the story).

In such controversies an official historian has the overwhelming advantage since 'files of the intelligence-collecting bodies ... are unlikely ever to be opened in the Public Record Office (P.R.O.) ... our text must be accepted as being the only evidence of their contents that can be made public'. This may require 'more trust than historians have the right to expect' (p.viii). Hinsley is no crude apologist, but his perspective is a 'responsible' one laid down by the state, supposedly for security reasons: 'On 12 January 1978 ... the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Dr Owen) advised war-time intelligence staff on the limited extent to which they were absolved from their undertakings of reticence in the light of recent changes in policy with regard to the release of war-time records'. Records of the three armed forces war-time intelligence directorates would be placed at the P.R.O. but 'other information including details of the methods by which this material was obtained ... remains subject to the undertakings and to the Official Secrets Acts and may not be disclosed' (p.vii-viii). This guidance and the title accurately define the work. It is not a history of British spying in the war, and even less is it the history of dirty tricks, deception, propaganda and 'subversion'; nor can we tell from it what has been left out. Hinsley's book is a history of the one intelligence role generally considered legitimate — the discovery and analysis of current events and developments so that governments can make sensible decisions and assess their effects. As such it blandly provides a devastating critique of departmental military and political ideology supplanting

information and analysis.

There is already a series of official histories on Grand Strategy of the war. Hinsley confines himself to development of the various intelligence organizations as such. Initially there was no joint defence intelligence staff beyond rudimentary coordination at the top by the Joint Intelligence Committee. The Ministry of Economic Warfare controlled the Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) which managed covert action and constantly fought with MI6 who controlled the Government Code and Cypher School, the fore-runner of GCHQ.

Part I is an 85-page summary of the pre-war situation; Part II contains a chapter on intelligence on the German economy, and accounts of intelligence failures from Norway ('The Germans achieved total surprise ...'), France ('the belief that the Ardennes were impassable, an assumption dating from the First World War ... determined the course of the subsequent campaign'), Italian entry to war, Greece, etc. Part III carries the tale through to 'Barbarossa', including a review of the intelligence organisations around the end of 1940. At that stage, 'Whitehall ... in the absence of incontestable intelligence from Sigint and from regular photographic intelligence ... (had) no adequate machinery, within departments or between them, for confronting prevailing opinions and lazy assumptions with rigorous and authoritative assessments of the massive but miscellaneous information about the enemy that was nevertheless available' (p125). Now our intelligence is much bigger. The prevailing opinions and lazy assumptions are those of NATO — which requires real increases in military spending when all other public expenditures are subject to real cuts. We await with interest the next volume of the story of how it got more intelligent.

THE ANATOMY OF POWER, by James Margach. London: W H Allen, 164pp, £5.50.

James Margach was chief political correspondent of the **Sunday Times** and died in

March 1979. His reflections on the Empire, parliament and the 12 Prime Ministers he knew are disappointingly lightweight, but there are brief references to the use of secrecy by the Executive, censorship of Parliament (in wartime) and the development of the lobby system of privileged correspondents whereby the state exercises a sophisticated control over communication through non-attributable utterances. Margach compares the early 1930s when Ramsay MacDonald had the only press officer in Whitehall — he was 'Private Secretary (Intelligence)' and his real job was to plug the Government's leaks — with the present establishment of 1,500 press and information officers on the state's payroll. There is also an information budget of £50m and advertising programmes of £15m.

After half a century of such developments, Margach is anxious to stress the importance and honour of those reduced by techniques of news management to becoming conveyor belts for every leak, lie or kite any leading politician may care to launch. In his judgment the lobby system is the inevitable result of the Official Secret Act, the Privy Councillor's oath and Parliamentary Privilege.

BRITAIN AND LATIN AMERICA: An Annual Review of British-Latin American Relations, 1979. London: Latin America Bureau, 189pp, £2.50.

This review by several hands, from the Bureau established in 1977, is notable both for its range and quality. The shortest contribution, on the management of political relations between Britain and Latin America, is possibly the most significant. It examines the role of the British Chilean Council (funded from Chile, with Lord Chalfont, Viscount Montgomery and sundry merchant bankers, former ambassadors and Tory MPs aboard) and shows how Canning House (an 'independent' Establishment Latin-American think-tank) in Belgrave Square (of which Lords Chalfont and Montgomery are president and chairman) plays a key role in shaping government policy.

THE QUEEN'S PEACE: The origins and development of the Metropolitan Police, by David Ascoli, Hamish Hamilton, London, 364pp, £9.95.

This book is written largely from secondary sources, and contains such meaningless gibberish as references to the 'democratic society' of Tudor times. It is essentially an official history, which reorganises the past in order to justify present activities of the police, and is not helpful as a source book either. There is a commendatory foreword by Sir David McNee.

BAY OF PIGS, by Peter Wyden. London: Jonathan Cape, 352pp, £7.95.

Ex-Newsweek correspondent Peter Wyden has made the fullest account of the CIA's 1961 abortive invasion of Cuba, backed by the most comprehensive collection of interviews. There is, however, scarcely any serious analysis of its political context: Wyden is from the would-be 'value-free' school of political journalism, but he cannot distinguish between a blunder and a crime, nor hide his admiration for some of the key figures. Thus a planner of the U-2 planes which flew at over 70,000 feet and whose cameras 'could pick up licence plates of parked cars' was 'an engineering genius' (though his handiwork wrecked the Paris summit in 1960). Richard Bissell, the CIA's deputy director of plans (i.e. chief of all covert operations), was an outsize visionary, anxious to 'push beyond the frontiers of the known.' (In fact he twice approved assassination plans to push Castro in that direction.)

AIR WAR — VIETNAM, with an introduction by Drew Middleton. London: Arms and Armour Press, 361pp, £5.95.

The U.S. Air Force's own account of the air war over Vietnam underlines the possibility of historians and strategists, but seldom combatants, writing objectively on military matters: pride in destructive power blinds most participants to elementary realities. This lavishly illustrated hymn of praise to aerial firepower could find a cameraman for all occasions (except when helicopters fled from the U.S. Embassy

roof in Saigon during the final scuttle), but there is no interest in the effects of the new generation of weapons: from napalm, phosphorus and defoliants to 'smart bombs', electro-optical and laser guided bombs. Vietnamese readers of this book in the third decade of next century will gain little help in their continuing anxiety to reverse the long-term effects of the aerial bombardment.

THE COURT OF ST. JAMES'S, by Christopher Hibbert. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 254pp, £7.50.

Dutiful to the point of piety, this account of the monarch at work from Queen Victoria to Elizabeth II 'written with the help and co-operation of the Royal Household' adds little to public knowledge of the sovereign's place in the affairs of state. The total effect, however, is to emphasise the weight of royal influence in matters of high importance. There is a valuable summary of royal finances. Recognition that 'nothing detracts so much from the general popularity of the monarchy in Britain as discussion of royal finances' is buried in a discrete footnote. The author no doubt calculated that since Her Majesty was not in the habit of entering into hire purchase commitments, she would be unlikely to read the small print.

WHAT WENT WRONG, edited by Ken Coates. Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 256pp, £2.95.

This collection of essays by ten Labour Party activists, academics and parliamentarians provides a hasty interpretation of the fall of the Labour Government on May 3 1979. It sets out in considerable detail full-scale retreats from declared policy on public expenditure, poverty, industrial strategy, full employment, industrial democracy and the distribution of income and wealth. It also discusses relations between the party and government (which includes the story of the drafting of the party manifesto) and how the civil service maintained its influence on government. What went wrong with party members and guardians of the party's decisions and

policies, including the trade unions, deserves closer attention, but this collection makes an important start in examining key areas of democratic practice.

THE BROEDERBOND: The Most Powerful Secret Society in the World, by Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom. London: Paddington Press, 616pp, £8.95.

The Afrikaner Broederbond (brotherhood) was established in South Africa in 1918 as a secret society of zealous adherents of the cause of Nationalist minority domination. Today it has about 12,000 members — all white, male, Protestant and Afrikaner. Its power derives from the key positions its members occupy in the military, the police, education, the media, the Dutch Reformed Church, banking, the law, the civil service and the government (all but two of the present cabinet are members).

This comprehensive expose, by two Johannesburg *Sunday Times* writers, is based on substantial documentation provided by one of the society's members who decided to 'sing'. The documents show the mechanics and organisation of the society, and allow the authors to list about 7,500 names of members, including all those who joined since 1963.

What were formerly Broederbond racist policies of Afrikaner domination have become the policies of the state since the Nationalists came to power in 1948. The Bantustan policies, the Christian national education policy, the sport policy and the policy on 'coloureds' and Indians — all the distinctive characteristics of South African racism — bear the stamp of the Broederbond on their formulation and execution.

LABOUR LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS Paul Davies and Mark Freedland, Weidenfeld & Nicolson paper 766pp, £12.00.

An extremely comprehensive book covering law on collective bargaining (trade unions, recognition, bargaining practice); individual employment (unfair dismissal, redundancy payments); as well as the more politically topical issues of the closed shop

and industrial conflict. Designed for students, this cross between a textbook and a book of cases and materials does what few law books do — puts law into a historical, and, to some extent, economic and social context. What is missing however is any political context — a crucial setting for this area of legislation.

THE SEARCH FOR THE 'MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE', by John Marks: Allen Lane, London, 242pp, £5.50.

The CIA systematically made itself the world's leading organisation in the study and practice of the manipulation of human behaviour, and paid researchers, many 'eminent' in their fields, to perform the most inhuman experiments on unsuspecting victims. Marks is able to detail this, despite the CIA's destruction of its records on the subject, by a small number of overlooked files released under Freedom of Information legislation, and painstaking interviewing of those involved. The book is a model of its kind, and deserves a wide circulation. But it leaves unanswered the question of whether an organisation like the CIA can ever be 'accountable'.

PAMPHLETS

Sell-out in Zimbabwe, Counter Information Services, 9 Poland Street, London W1. 85p. Timely analysis of the war in Zimbabwe, concentrating particularly on the commercial interests of Tory MPs in Zimbabwe and the way these influence Tory thinking about the situation.

Free and Fair? The 1979 Rhodesian Election. British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, House of Commons, London SW1. A detailed report on the election which concludes that it was 'nothing more than a gigantic confidence trick', and that 'its results are meaningless'.

The Case for a Constitutional Premiership, by Tony Benn. Institute for Workers' Control pamphlet No 67, 23pp, 50. This lecture delivered in July 1979 sets out the extraordinarily wide

powers of the Prime Minister (and of the Leader of the Opposition) and their use, and argues for an extension of democracy through an end to peerages, the election of ministers, the development of the Commons Select Committee system, parliamentary confirmation of major public appointments, a Freedom of Information Act, etc. It is a model of compressed information and clarity.

The Need for a Free Press, by Tony Benn. Institute for Workers' Control pamphlet No 66, 8pp, 20p. Following last winter's press campaign on strikes, which may have determined the result of the May election, this address in April touches on many problems of mass media in a political democracy, and the role of trade unions in the media.

Persons Unknown, written and published by the support group of the same name, Box 123, 182 Upper Street, London N1. 40p. Traces the development of the case against the six anarchists currently on trial at the Old Bailey and examines several important questions that it throws up — the sensationalising role of the media, the police/media build up of an 'international conspiracy', the attempt to criminalise political activity, and the operations of police units notably the Anti-Terrorist Squad.

Don't Mark His Face, the account of the Hull Prison riot (1976) and its brutal aftermath, by the prisoners. National Prisoners' Movement, 104a Brackenbury Road, London W6. 60p. Collection of accounts by prisoners involved in the riot of the conditions that brought about the riot, the events of the four days and the treatment meted out afterwards.

British Labour and Ireland, 1969-79, by Geoff Bell. International Marxist Group, 328 Upper Street, London N1 2XQ, 40pp, 40p. The IMG's view of the Labour Party's failure to dissociate itself from the 'bi-partisan' policies on Northern Ireland as practised by all Governments over the past decade. Bell argues that the existence of the Northern Ireland mini-state is the reason for conflict, and that immediate withdrawal of British troops and the re-unification of Ireland are the only basis for its resolution.

The Exeter Community Policing Consultative Group; a Study of the First Year, by Ann Blaber. NACRO, 169 Clapham Road, London SW9. This interesting pamphlet details the setting up of, and the first year's experiences of, an experiment to tackle crime prevention through the

co-operation of a wide range of local government and community agencies. The initiative came from the police force, Devon and Cornwall, and developed out of its Crime Prevention Support Unit. The Unit is the brain child of the Chief Constable, John Alderson, who advocates the development of preventive policing based on the active consent of as wide a part of the community as possible. The Unit forms a direct contrast to the Special Patrol Groups being formed in many other forces, whose rationale lies in the 'fire-brigade' type reactive policing advocated by Sir David McNee and James Anderton amongst others.

The Politics of Secrecy, the Case for a Freedom of Information Law, by James Michael. National Council for Civil Liberties, 186 Kings Cross Road, London WC1. 90p. Michael argues for the introduction of three-tiered legislation on government records — compulsory disclosure of most records, a middle ground where officials would be given discretion to disclose, and a relatively small group where criminal penalties would be applied to ensure secrecy. This latter should include the contentious areas of 'national security' as well as personal information.

Report to the Committee of Inquiry into the United Kingdom Prison Services 1979, made by Prop, the National Prisoners' Movement. Prop, 21 Atwood Road, London W6. 25p. The terms of the Inquiry, chaired by Mr Justice May, were to look at the size and nature of the prison population, the staffing position and the treatment of prisoners. Prop rejects the terms of the Inquiry as too narrow to be useful, and stresses the need for a more fundamental examination of the whole system including such crucial issues as sentencing policy.

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Ideology As History: a look at the way some English historians look at the police, Cyril D. Robinson, Police Studies, Vol 2, No 2 (Summer 1979).

Police And People: The Birth Of Mr Peel's 'Blue Locusts', Michael Ignatieff, New Society, 30 August, 1979. The origins of the Metropolitan police.

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Security Of Computer-stored Data, Bill Davies, Security Gazette, June 1979.

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Civil Liberties And The New Technology, Tony Benn, Workers Control Bulletin No 2 (1979).

Backdoor Identity Cards, Nick Anning, The Leveller, October 1979. On proposals for a British machine readable passport.

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Legislative Hysteria And Firearms, Colin Greenwood, Police Review, 6 July, 1979.

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Published bi-monthly in February, April, June, August, October and December.

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autumn 1980. This will contain our year's work in hardback form, i.e. issues 14-19 of State Research Bulletin (October 1979-September 1980), an introductory overview of the year and an index. Hardback (jacketed) £10.00. It can be ordered in advance direct from Julian Friedmann Books, 4 Perrins Lane, Hampstead, London, NW3.

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Payment must accompany all subscriptions and orders for back issues. All cheques/postal orders payable to Independent Research Publications.

Typeset by Red Lion Setters, 22 Brownlow Mews, London WC1N 2LA

Printed by Russell Press, Gamble Street, Nottingham.

Trade Distribution PDC, 27 Clerkenwell Close, London EC1.

Published by Independent Research Publications, 9 Poland Street, London W1

ISSN0141-1667