

STATE RESEARCH

**BULLETIN
No. 18**

BSC'S NEW BOSS – THE DEFENCE ESTIMATES – THE

PRINCES GATE SIEGE – POLICE COMPLAINTS – TRANSPORT

POLICE PLANS – OPERATION FIRE – TELEPHONE TAPPING

**NEWS &
DEVELOPMENTS**

BRISTOL: POLICE REACTIONS

'When Brian Cubbon of the Home Office met Avon and Somerset's chief constable and Bristol community leaders recently, the consensus was that race relations in the city were quite good. A few weeks later St Paul's went up in flames (Police, the magazine of the Police Federation, April 1980).

Not only were the chief constable and the 'community leaders' taken by surprise at the ferocity of the events on April 2 (when

a 'no-go' area for the police existed for four hours), so too must Sir Brian Cubbon, the Permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office (from 1976 to 1979 the Permanent Under Secretary at the Northern Ireland Office). The government's reaction was given by Mr Whitelaw to the Commons on April 27 when he announced that the primary initiative he was taking was to ensure that police forces make better arrangements for responding to 'spontaneous public disorder'. Home Office officials, the Chief Inspector of Constabulary, together with the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and the Association of Chief Police Officers are to 'thoroughly and urgently' examine present plans.

Mr Weigh, the Chief Constable for Avon and Somerset, in his Report to the Home Secretary on the 'riot' came to the same conclusion (Report issued by the Home Office, 28.4.80). Mr Weigh

concluded that 'improved call-out procedures to ensure a more sharp and coordinated response' were needed, and that he is now 'revising' his procedures.

The Avon and Somerset police already have an SPG-type group called Task Force which has 55 members. The force also has, according to Police magazine, eight Police Support Units (PSUs) although apparently only three were fully equipped and they should, according to Home Office instructions, have 11 PSUs, one from each of the local divisions (see **Bulletin** No. 16). On the night of April 2, these forces were supplemented by SPG units and PSUs from Devon and Cornwall, Wiltshire and Gloucestershire, which took six hours to arrive. Police also points out that few forces, the exception being London and two or three other large forces, are properly trained for 'riots'. The main lesson that is being drawn by the police from St Paul's is that every force in the country has to be prepared to face such a situation. Particularly, each Chief Constable will be under pressure to ensure that PSUs, trained and equipped, are formed in every local division under their command.

Britain's Third Force'

Despite official denials that the police in Britain do not have a 'third force', like the French CRS riot police, it is becoming increasingly clear that they do have a para-military capacity, well-hidden though it is most of the time (see Special Patrol Groups in Britain, **Bulletin** No. 13). In an article in the April issue of the Police Journal, Charles Nelson of the Thames Valley Police, has written an article entitled 'Third Force'. The article looks at different countries' responses to providing a 'third force' which stands between the police and the army as a 'mobile reserve' for public disorder situations. Before going on to examine the French and German systems he says: 'In England and Wales Special Patrol Groups and Support Units have been formed as reserves within individual forces'. 'Mutual aid', whereby

one force comes to the aid of another, as at St Paul's, is 'provided by Police Support Units'. SPGs and PSUs are, in effect, the 'British' way of creating a mobile third force.

The Metropolitan Police have the most advanced arrangements for dealing with public order situations. In his report for 1979 Commissioner McNee said that more than 7,000 London Police officers received riot training, including the use of riot shields in 1978, which is about one-third of the force. The 200-strong Special Patrol Group thus forms but a tiny proportion of London's police now trained for riot control. In addition to the SPG, there are the newly-created mini-SPGs in some local divisions ('high crime' areas like Lambeth and the East End); each of London's 24 local divisions have at least one trained and equipped 33-strong PSU; and, finally, each division now has at least one 30-strong 'Shield Trained Unit' (STUs). PSUs and STUs are both drawn from the ranks of local divisions for special occurrences and thus represent a large, and hidden, reserve.

Mr Weigh, Mr Whitelaw and Police magazine are all of the view that the answer to riots in Britain's inner city ghettos lies in better police 'response' arrangements. The police, it is held, cannot solve the underlying social conditions of the people living in the ghettos; they can only enforce the law. What this view ignores is the inherent racism in the police experienced by the black and white inhabitants in inner city areas. It is this experience, just as much as the social conditions, that leads to situations like St Pauls where, it is agreed on all sides, that the target of anger were the police and not the white residents of St Paul's.

BSC'S NEW BOSS

Ian MacGregor, the Scots-born American merchant banker appointed recently to head the British Steel Corporation, is US co-chairman of the British North America

Committee, BNAC, a transatlantic group of bankers and industrialists which has close links with key organisations of the Tory right such as the Institute for the Study of Conflict and the Freedom Association. His appointment throws new light on the links between Anglo-American business and the 'new' right in Britain. MacGregor is also a director of Amax, a company that owns mines in Namibia.

BNAC was founded in 1969 in New York, 'to study and comment on the developing relations between Britain, the United States and Canada' according to one of its official publications. It has 41 British, 59 American, and 22 Canadian members. The Committee as a whole meets only twice a year, once in Britain and once in North America. But it sponsors a series of publications devoted to the problems of business and the international economy, and has four planning groups, on world monetary affairs, inflation and unemployment, world economic affairs and 'the changing role of the corporation and labor' in society. The overwhelming majority of members are industrialists and bankers. Firms represented among its membership include the Chase Manhattan Bank, Occidental Petroleum, British American Tobacco, RTZ, Reed, Lloyds Bank, Kleinwort Benson, Heinz, Shell, BP, Hill Samuel, Sainsbury's, Commercial Union Assurance and Barclays. Some trades unionists are represented – mainly from the US and Canada; the three leading British trades unionists who are members are UPW (postal workers) General Secretary Tom Jackson, NALGO (local government white-collar workers) General Secretary Geoffrey Drain, and Patternmakers' Union General Secretary Gerry Eastwood. Eastwood is also a member of the NATO-financed Labour Committee for Transatlantic Understanding (see Bulletins 16 and 17) which publishes the right-wing Labour And Trade Union Press Service.

BNAC's sponsoring organisation in the USA is the National Planning Association (NPA), which, roughly, is the US equivalent of Britain's Aims of Industry. It

was founded in 1934, in response to President Franklin Roosevelt's 'New Deal', which leading industrialists opposed because they saw it as state intervention in the economy. According to an NPA official publication, it exists 'to strengthen private initiative and enterprise . . . NPA believes that through private planning we can avoid a planned economy' (*The Economy of the American People*, NPA, 1958).

Inevitably for such a ruling class organisation, NPA has provided cover for secret intelligence operations abroad. Despite its opposition to state intervention in the US economy, NPA has supported US official intervention in other countries. NPA's Committee on International Policy has provided cover for US covert operations. In 1953, members of the Committee included Frank Altschul, a leading member of the Council on Foreign Relations; Richard Bissell, then with the Ford Foundation, who shortly afterwards joined the CIA and became Deputy Director of Plans (covert Operations); and Paul Nitze, then attached to the State Department, and now one of America's leading hawks (see Bulletin 16).

Under the auspices of this committee, NPA published *Communism versus progress in Guatemala*, a book which sought to portray the nationalist government of that country as a creation of the country's tiny Communist Party and of Moscow. Its author, NPA Head of International Relations Theodore Geiger, wrote that 'At present, the Communists are so deeply entrenched that it may no longer be possible to eliminate them by peaceful means. Should this be the case, the Guatemalan people would be faced with the unhappy alternatives of submission to communism or destructive civil war of a scale and intensity unknown in Latin American revolutions.' The book was designed to contribute to legitimising the overthrow, the following year, of the elected Arbenz government by a CIA-backed coup which installed a right-wing military dictatorship. At stake, of course, were US agricultural interests in

Guatemala, notably those of United Fruit.

Since its inception, BNAC has also provided at least one person with cover for intelligence activities. Former Liberal MP Peter Bessell has admitted that he used his position as an MP to 'run messages' between American intelligence and the South Vietnamese (**The Pencourt File**, Secker and Warburg, p. 283, and Bulletin 5). Bessell was also a member of the BNAC.

Currently, BNAC occupies the same offices in London – 1, Gough Square, EC4 – as the Foundation for Education in Economics, FEE. Sir Richard Dobson, who was forced to resign as Chairman of British Leyland after describing foreign customers as 'wogs', is British Co-chairman of BNAC, and was a founder trustee of FEE. Simon Webley, Director of Research for BNAC, is also the Director of FEE. Despite being a registered charity, FEE declares as its aim 'to explain the working of the market economy which is the basis of our freedom and prosperity'. One of FEE's recent actions has been the distribution free of charge to schools of 8,000 copies of **In Defence of Freedom**, edited by Dr Ken Watkins, a leading member of the Freedom Association, but contains political tracts by eleven people closely associated with the Freedom Association and the Institute for the Study of Conflict (See Bulletin 1). The contributors include Robert Moss, John Gouriet, Winston Churchill MP, Stephen Haseler and Lord De L'Isle. (**Time Out**, 9.5.80).

Professor Julius Gould and Jack Wiseman are also FEE trustees. Gould, of Nottingham University, was the author of a report, **The Attack on Higher Education**, published by the Institute for the Study of Conflict, aimed unsuccessfully at provoking a McCarthy-style campaign against left-wing academics. Wiseman, of York University, is a leading proponent of free market economics and monetarist ideas. FEE was a co-sponsor, last year, of the University of the Open Society at Cambridge, a summer-school designed to counter left wing ideas in higher education.

The other co-sponsor was the Centre for Policy Studies – the right-wing think-tank founded by Sir Keith Joseph.

Defending his appointment of Ian MacGregor in the House of Commons, Sir Keith said: 'He is an example of a type of which I wish we had more in this country' (**Times** 16.5.80). The question which arises is whether a man so committed to opposition to state intervention in the economy can be trusted to run a nationalised industry.

HOW SAS ENDED THE PRINCES GATE SIEGE

The deaths of two hostages and five hostage-takers during the siege of the Iranian Embassy in Princes Gate, London, could have been avoided if the British Government had been prepared to negotiate. But it is the standing policy of the British Government – and of all other western governments – that no concessions will be made to terrorists. The policy dictates that once hostages are taken, the hostage-takers have two alternatives – to surrender voluntarily to the security forces, or to be overwhelmed by them.

The Special Air Services Regiment, the SAS, were used to end the siege. Five gunmen died. At least two of them were shot in cold blood after they had surrendered. According to Abbas Fallahi, Iranian Embassy doorman and hostage, after they entered the room where the hostages were being held,

'the SAS began to shout, "who are the terrorists?"' No one responded. We just couldn't do anything. Eventually Dr Ezzati, the press counsellor, who was almost mistaken for one of the gunmen, pointed one or two of them out. The SAS shot them where they sat, and the gunmen's bodies remained there, slumped against the wall and facing it.' (**Sunday Times**, 11.5.80).

Another hostage, Pakistani journalist Muhammad Faruqi, added:

'One of the terrorists was sitting on the floor, and when he was pointed out by the Iranians, the commandos asked him to stand up, and then he was shot. It was a war situation.' (*Observer*, 11.5.80).

A spokesperson for the Prime Minister's Office could not say for exactly how long such refusal to negotiate had been Government policy, but confirmed that it had also been the policy of the last Labour Government.

European and western co-operation on terrorism has been steadily increasing over the past decade, and this firm resolve not to deal with terrorists has been a matter of joint agreement between western governments and security forces.

The last deal done by a British Government was in 1970, when a Palestinian, Leila Khaled, was released from Uxbridge Police Station and flown to Jordan in return for the release of hostages held aboard three planes, two American and one British, which had been hi-jacked.

Since then, and in the light of the number of violent incidents in Britain, mainly connected with Ireland or the Middle East, successive British Governments have re-thought the administrative, policing and military aspects of internal security. Considerations of terrorism and those of demonstrations and strikes have both influenced the outcome.

Contingencies committees

A 'National Security Committee' of Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, and representatives of the military and the security services was set up by the Heath Government. Its creation was announced in March 1973. The Wilson Government re-named it the Civil Contingencies Committee. Its role was to re-vamp policy in these matters. Under it, there is a Civil Contingencies Unit (CCU) in the Cabinet Office, with a staff of civil servants. When

a strike is threatened, or an incident such as the embassy siege takes place, events are handled by a committee within the Cabinet Office with representatives of appropriate ministries, the armed forces, the security services and the police, serviced by the CCU. It is this committee which the media chose on this occasion to call 'Cobra' (an acronym for Cabinet Office Briefing Room which is not where the planning was done). The Downing Street spokesperson refused to confirm the relationship between Cobra and the CCU.

The ability of the Army to intervene in this country has been steadily extended since 1972. If a decision is taken to call on the military, the appropriate units are alerted through the Civil Contingencies Desk at the Ministry of Defence. This directs troops in activities in Britain, which fall into three categories.

Military aid to the civil Power (MACP) covers public order, including demonstrations and terrorism; Military Aid to the Civil Ministries (MACM) covers intervention in industrial disputes to replace striking workers; and Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) covers help in natural disasters, air-sea rescue, and so on (see Bulletins 8, 10 and 14). Specifically for anti-terrorist actions in Britain, a special unit of the Special Air Service Regiment the SAS, was created in 1972 – the Special Operations Group, SAS-SOG. SAS-SOG provided the commandos who stormed the Iranian Embassy; according to one report, it is divided into four units, one of which is permanently on duty (*Guardian*, 2.5.80).

Some of the units are based at the SAS HQ at Bradbury Lines, Herefordshire, others at a secret base in West London. The SAS's head of Intelligence, Major Andrew Nightingale, is at Chelsea barracks in London. The Regiment is commanded by Colonel B.M. Franks.

As television viewers saw during the siege, those members of the unit not in combat uniform appear in plain clothes. They are reported to have Rovers and Range Rovers at their disposal. The SAS-SOG team has been involved in almost all

anti-terrorist operations in Britain, and has practised storming planes on numerous occasions, for example at Stansted in 1973 and Prestwich in 1974. Storming of buildings is practised at the disused Army married quarters at Lydd and Colchester, which the army uses as urban warfare training grounds.

Expertise has been shared with SAS-SOG's West German equivalent, GSG-9, which stormed the hi-jacked Lufthansa plane at Mogadishu; with the Israelis (Entebbe) and the US (where the technology went rather badly wrong in Iran).

SAS-SOG have detailed plans of all major airports in Britain, and of all London embassies, down to such details as the catches on the windows, and the direction in which doors open. They are supposed to be kept informed of security procedures adopted by each diplomatic mission.

The SAS are involved from the start of any incident in which it is thought that they may be needed. In Britain, implementation of the western policy that there should be no surrender to gunmen rests first of all with the police, who have had a degree of success in previous sieges. But the plans for using the SAS are an integral part of the handling of any such situation – as the fixing of the assault ropes on the Iranian Embassy roof on the first day of the recent siege indicated.

As well as complete plans of the building, the police and the Army in this case had access to information from the released hostages; and they used fibre optic cables inserted through the walls from neighbouring flats to observe what was happening (*Sunday Mirror*, 11.5.80).

The *Sunday Times* Insight column (11.5.80) gave a detailed account of the storming of the embassy including accounts of the shooting of two of the hostage-takers after they had surrendered. The MOD will not comment on any aspect of SAS operations, so it is not possible to ascertain whether they have any instructions, such as the yellow card issued to British soldiers in Northern Ireland,

about the circumstances in which they may or may not open fire. A recent trial in Northern Ireland heard evidence which suggested that the yellow card instructions were not followed properly there.

The MoD confirmed to State Research that each of the 20 soldiers involved in storming the embassy has made a statement to the police to be used in their investigations. Inquests have opened and been adjourned on the dead five gunmen and two hostages, and the surviving gunman faces charges of murder and unlawful detention.

But at present, it seems there will be no inquiry, and certainly no court martial, of the soldiers who opened fire. As the Towers, McKeow and Jimmy Kelly cases showed, an inquest is not a very suitable forum for inquiry into one mysterious death, let alone seven. Major constitutional issues raised by the actions of the SAS have been ignored.

Control of information about the siege is an important part of official strategy. The police aim to become the sole means of communication between the hostage-takers and the outside world, in order to control them. This is achieved gradually. Though BBC producer Chris Cramer and Syrian journalist Mustapha Karkouti were allowed by the police to communicate with their offices for the first two days of the siege using the Embassy's telephone and telex, these were later cut off – though police asked the media not to give prominence to this.

Official control of the news media is also crucial. The police aim to control the information reaching the hostage-takers through TV and radio sets which they have in the besieged building; in doing this, they also elicit media co-operation in controlling the information reaching the public as a whole. The media practise censorship with the aim of helping the authorities to end the siege, but in doing so, suppress information on which objections to the policy of forcing an unconditional surrender might be based.

In the recent case, the police were able to suppress the change of heart when the

hostage-takers, on the day before the siege ended, offered to release the hostages in return for safe conduct out of the country. It was this offer which prompted Sir David McNee's letter to the hostage takers, urging them again to surrender unconditionally. The suppression of the hostage-takers' offer also removed a possible basis for criticism of official policy.

The Foreign Office too played its part by dissuading those Arab Ambassadors in London who had offered to mediate from doing so; mediation is not allowed. But it might have been embarrassing if the hostage-takers, through an Arab diplomat, had been able to publicise their request to be allowed to leave the country in return for the safety of the hostages. The fact that such a deal had been ruled out by the Foreign Office was revealed only after the siege was over (**Daily Telegraph**, 7.5.80).

Live television coverage of the SAS raid was deliberately uninformative, according to representatives of the BBC and ITN. Nothing was broadcast which might have affected the raid. ITN, with commendable initiative, had placed a camera at the back of the Embassy, concealed in a case by Outside Broadcast Director David Goldsmith. They saw, but did not broadcast, the SAS grouping on the roof at the rear of the building. When the raid began, ITN were kept off the air for four minutes – apparently because Coronation Street had to end. But they did show sequences from the rear of the Embassy, while the BBC's Kate Adie repeatedly informed viewers that filming at the back was 'not allowed'.

Ms Adie was a participant, last November, in a secret international exercise which examined how the media should handle such affairs. 'The Abingdon Conference on Political Extremism, the Media and the Law', held on November 16, 17 and 18 last year brought together top British, American, West German and Israeli media people with civil servants, soldiers, policemen and politicians. It was sponsored by the BBC, along with the Ford Foundation and the International Press Institute.

Other participants included Deputy Assistant Commissioner John Dellow, the Metropolitan Police officer actually in charge of the Iranian Embassy siege; Merlyn Rees; BBC TV News and Current Affairs Director Richard Francis; former Northern Ireland GOC Sir Frank King; and Neil J. Welch, Assistant Director of the FBI.

One of the Case Studies in which those present participated concerned the seizure of hostages in a western capital by a dissident movement from the Middle East. The denouement of this case study was a shoot-out, organised by the Government, which, though it had carried on talking, had throughout never intended to allow the hostage-takers to escape.

Discussion centred on whether a newspaper, which had been told that the hostage-takers were in the end to be ambushed and shot rather than any deal being struck, should release the information.

TRANSPORT POLICE PLANS SPECIAL PATROL GROUPS

Mobile reserve squads similar to the Special Patrol Group are likely to be set up in several centres by the British Transport Police (BTP). The proposal, which was first made by the British Railways Board, received the public backing of the BTP and of Transport Minister Norman Fowler at a Home Office conference on violence on public transport held on May 6.

The squads of five constables and a sergeant would be held in reserve in 'key strategic centres' and would be available to combat late night violence, to augment routine patrols and to deal with football fans. 'We're not talking about a special force; they would be ordinarily trained police officers,' BTP assistant chief constable Basil Nichols said. Norman Fowler told the conference that such squads 'would be of great assistance', especially at weekends.

The British Transport Police was 1,900 strong at the beginning of 1980 (see **Police**

Review, 23 March 1979). Most of its members police the railways but the BTP is also responsible for British Transport Docks and for the London Underground. Its officers are normally all committed on station or moving transport duty. As such they are in constant contact with local forces (for instance, as soon as the BTP have shepherded football fans out of a railway station, they hand over to the local force). But though the BTP is not a Home Office administered police force, its officers are available for general duties (they assisted the Metropolitan police at Grunwick, for example).

However, the BTP does not have all Home Office resources at its command. Its officers are denied access to the Police National Computer, for instance. At the May 6 conference, Nichols pressed for BTP access to the PNC, but Stanley Bailey of the Association of Chief Police Officers strongly opposed the idea, arguing that only Home Office forces should have access and that to allow it to the BTP would be to set an undesirable precedent.

Bailey also cast doubt on the necessity for mobile reserve squads. He believed that incident response times would be too long, perhaps up to 30 minutes, for the squads to fulfil a useful purpose. Bailey's views seem to tally with those of BTP chief constable, Eric Haslam. In his latest annual report, Haslam observes that constant surveillance of all their areas of responsibility 'is just not practicable'. He writes: 'Unfortunately, as with many other forms of criminal activity, the violence is usually of such a transient nature that by the time the police have arrived on the scene the participants have departed. Identification problems and reluctance on the part of witnesses of assaults to come forward makes the task of bringing offenders to justice an extremely difficult one and the odds are greatly in their favour.'

Such considerations seem unlikely to deflect British Rail and the government from going ahead with the mobile reserve squads plan, if only so that they can show the transport unions and the travelling

public that something is being done about the problem of violence on public transport.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS AT PORTON DOWN

When State Research asked the Ministry of Defence about the expansion of the facilities at the Chemical Defence Establishment at Porton Down (see **Bulletin 17**) they said that it represented 'No change in policy'. Four days later the publication of the Defence White Paper announced such a change. Last November, the MoD informed Salisbury District Council, in whose area Porton Down lies, that work at present done at Nancekuke, Cornwall, would be transferred there.

This work can go ahead without the council having to grant planning permission, as Crown lands are exempt; and the MoD instructed the Council that the changes were covered by the Official Secrets Act (**Guardian**, 10.5.80).

The Property Services Agency of the Department of the Environment, responsible for the management of Government buildings, instructed the Council to exclude the press and public from its discussions of development at Porton Down. Objections from the planning committee to this have meant that the development has not been discussed. New processing plant and effluent tanks for nerve gases and riot control gases have been under construction at Porton Down for a year (**Times**, 11.5.80).

● A reader has pointed out an error in our story on NATO's new preparations for chemical warfare, in **Bulletin 17**. We were correct to say that one problem with chemical disarmament was the close relationship between chemical weapons and commercial products. But the example we gave – 2,4,5T, the commercial weed-killer – is not an organophosphorous compound. 2,4,5T used by the US in Vietnam as a defoliant, is dangerous because its contaminant – 2,3,7,8 tetra-

chlorodibenzoparadioxin (TCDD, commonly known as dioxin) – is highly toxic. It was the chemical released at Seveso in Northern Italy when a chemical factory exploded. Organophosphorous compounds include the nerve gas sarin, which is manufactured at Nancekuke and Porton Down, Wiltshire, and which is chemically related to weedkillers such as parathion and malathion.

THREE POLICE GUILTY AFTER 14,014 COMPLAINTS

The Police Complaints Board dealt with 14,014 complaints (arising from 7,365 cases) during 1979. This a rise of seven per cent over 1978. But the Board's annual report for 1979, published on April 23, shows that disciplinary proceedings were brought in only 127 cases – fewer than one per cent.

The bulk of the Board's work (89 per cent of complaints) involves the scrutiny of completed internal police investigations of complaints made under section 2 of the Police Act, 1976. In 79 of the 12,513 cases of this kind, disciplinary charges were brought by the police themselves. In the remaining 12,434 cases (in which the police had decided to bring no charges) the board disputed the police conclusion on only 18 occasions – or 0.1 per cent. In all 18 of these cases, the Board and the police subsequently reached agreement whether charges should be brought. Three officers were found guilty as a result of the board's challenges.

The commonest type of complaint concerned assaults (22 per cent) and procedural irregularities including breaches of suspects' rights under the Judges' Rules (16 per cent).

In June, the Board completes its first three years' work. The Home Office is committed to reviewing how the new system has fared. But its modest record of disagreement with internal investigations means that the torrential abuse with which the police greeted the board in 1977 (it was

also one of the main reasons for Sir Robert Mark's resignation as Metropolitan Commissioner) is unlikely to be repeated.

Indeed the tone of police hostility to the complaints system has changed from the defence of police autonomy to attacks on the time and money consuming nature of the system. 'Money spent in this way is not available for other projects which might be urgently needed to increase operational efficiency,' says the Chief Constable of Sussex in his latest Annual Report. But Kent's chief constable, Barry Pain, is even more outspoken. He estimates that complaints investigation cost his force £60,000 in 1979. 'Without doubt,' writes Pain in his annual report, 'many people, often advised by solicitors, are making unfounded complaints against police officers as a means of creating red herrings to distract attention from their breach of the law and focus it elsewhere.' The complaints system, he concludes, is 'an expensive ploy for the ratepayers and yet another factor to inhibit police officers in the performance of their duty.'

THE DEFENCE ESTIMATES

Conservative reaction to the 1980 Defence White Paper (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1980, Cmnd 7826) has been far from enthusiastic. This centres around whether or not the White Paper provides any evidence that defence spending is to be increased by 3 per cent (allowing for inflation) which the government promised NATO it would be. Inspired no doubt by Ministry of Defence officials, who prior to the White Paper's publication were spreading the word that the promised 3 per cent increase was not taking place, elements in the national press suggested that substantial votes of supplementary funds would be necessary during the coming year to meet the target.

The numbers are difficult to get to grips with. The clearest account seems to be in the 'Finance and Trade' section of the White Paper statistics volume, where numbers are presented for the overall

defence budget, along with a comparison between Tory defence spending plans and Labour's announced intentions, and a function-by-function analysis of the defence budget including partially non-military services like the Meteorological Office, whose funds come via the defence vote.

Thus table 2.3 in the Estimates shows total defence and related spending up from £8,885.3 million to £11,112.6 million between 1979/80 and 1980/81. This amounts to an increase of just over 25 per cent. Pessimistically, assuming 20 per cent of inflation, that would leave an increase of just over four per cent. But in an adjacent table describing the defence expenditure plans embodied in successive public spending white papers from 1977 to 1979, the numbers appear in a slightly different light.

By setting out defence expenditure at constant 1979 prices, this analysis shows that defence spending is set to rise from £7,920 million in 1979/80 to £8,001 million in 1980/81, an increase of only about 1 per cent. Actual defence spending in 1980/1 equals this £8,001 million, plus nearly £2,800 million for inflation and other money for civilian pensions and other spending, to give the £11,112.6 million total. So the allowance for inflation already incorporated in the defence estimates is well over a fifth of the total, and there is a 15 per cent increase built in between 1979 and 1980. So although the issue is complex, it appears that defence spending is inflation-proofed and set to increase in real terms as well.

A week after the White Paper appeared, evidence appeared that MoD spending is viewed in a surprisingly favourable light, considering the pressure on public spending, by both ministers and Treasury officials.

Just a few days after the White Paper appeared, Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Geoffrey Howe produced his first budget, revealing that spending on forces' pay (not equipment or other items) is to be regarded as a priority item and given access to the Treasury's billion-pound contingency

reserve fund. The Tories are committed to 'comparable' rates of pay for the forces – involving a knotty problem of deciding whom the forces are comparable with – as well as an increase in their numbers. Pym seems willing to sacrifice some spending on equipment to achieve this, although he would rather use extra Treasury funds if, as seems likely, they are available. The Review Body on Armed Forces Pay is in favour of hefty increases, and the 1980/81 estimates contain £2.74 billion for armed forces pay, well up on 1979/80's £1.86 billion.

European comparisons

According to Pym, the UK's 1979/80 defence spending will mean that British defence spending is Europe's highest. And this spending will amount to 4.9 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), second only to the USA within NATO. On a per capita basis, it comes out at \$340 per head of population, well behind the USA's \$555 but on a par with European NATO countries. Figures recently published by NATO (*NATO Review*, February 1980) show that the UK's defence expenditure was already 4.9 per cent in 1979/80, well ahead of any other European NATO country: West Germany and France managed on 3.3 per cent and 4 per cent respectively, with others going down to Luxembourg's 1 per cent. Britain also spends more of its defence budget (24 per cent in 1979/80) on equipment than any other European nation, so that it has a comparatively low percentage (2.2 per cent) of its national labour force in uniform. The spending on equipment will be much higher in 1980/81.

So the 1980 defence white paper tries to muddy the waters on defence spending, which has actually increased by 25 per cent, while leaving little doubt that the Ministry of Defence is already a big spender by European standards and seems to have privileged access to more money still. The White Paper itself is an explosion of diagrams, maps, tables and charts which give the appearance of telling the reader all

he or she could possibly want to know about the British military effort. Parts of it are informative, especially the lengthy section on Britain and NATO, which after all absorbs the bulk of the MoD's attention.

Nuclear weapons

But other parts are much thinner, with Northern Ireland, the setting for Britain's only current war, being summarised in only 1½ pages.

Possibly the largest gap in information is on the central question of the Polaris strategic nuclear weapon and its successor/s. Polaris is Britain's very own, non-NATO ballistic missile. Despite having only four 'launching platforms' (submarines) and a relatively minute hitting power, the Polaris is ideologically important to British politicians of all parties as it gives the impression of at least some measure of independence from America and its vast military machine.

In the first Parliamentary debate on nuclear weapons policy for 15 years, the House of Commons was told on January 24, 1980, that Polaris, due to run out of spares in the early 1990s, would be kept in service till then by a £1,000m improvement programme code named Chevaline (**Hansard**, 24.1.80, cols 672-782). The Defence Secretary, Francis Pym, estimated that a successor to Polaris would cost £4-5,000m at current prices. The Ministry of Defence was then considering whether to spend such a large sum (revised upwards to £6,000m by leading defence correspondents by May) on five new submarines carrying American Trident ballistic missiles, or whether to opt for the much cheaper Cruise missiles, possibly costing £1,000m.

The Cruise is a shorter-range, smaller but very accurate missile, similar to the German V2 rockets of World War Two, which comes in ground, sea or air-launched versions (the Government announced in December that the United States Air Force, on behalf of NATO, would be deploying at least 160 ground-

launched Cruise missiles in Britain from 1983 (**Hansard**, 13.12.79). It was hoped that the White Paper would shed some light on whether Britain was going to choose the Trident or go for its own Cruise missiles on top of the USAF's. In the event, all the White Paper said was '... the Polaris force will remain effective into the 1990s. The Government is considering possible systems to replace it thereafter and a decision will be taken soon' (Vol One, para 211).

The other major difficulty that the White Paper failed to resolve was the future of the British tank-building programme. Should Britain soldier on with its main battle tank (MBT), the Chieftain, suffering from insoluble engine defects that keep it off the fields as well as the roads, until the new NATO-standardised MBT-80 appears at the end of the decade? Or should the Chieftain be immediately replaced with the purely British Challenger, a modified version of the Shir Iran tank that the Leeds Royal Ordnance Factory was building for the Shah of Iran before he was deposed? Para 709 of the White Paper is not giving away any secrets on this one: 'Future tank requirements are receiving particular attention in the light of current assessments of the Warsaw Pact tank threat, while project definition studies of a new main battle tank are continuing.'

Changes in practice

The White Paper did announce some changes in military practice, however. The role of women in the armed forces is being re-examined, with the possibility being floated (very tentatively) of arming women in the Army and RAF, if only for self-defence or guard duties. The attitude of the British military establishment to women in the ranks is one of the most discriminatory of any major Western power, and appears increasingly so as other countries take positive integrative steps. This has obviously influenced the MoD's decision to some extent, but the major reason seems to have been the '... shortage of regular manpower. This... has

underlined the need to look more closely at alternative resources. Prominent among these are the Women's Services.' (Vol One, para 263).

Chemical weapons are now back on the international armaments menu following the unsubstantiated rumours of their use in Afghanistan by the USSR in the New Year, and consequent scare-mongering by the USA and Britain. The White Paper said only that British defences against chemical attack were being improved (Vol One, para 713), but, as we showed in the last Bulletin, the truth seems to be somewhat different (Bulletin No 17, pp85-7).

East of Suez

Another significant change in British military policy that emerges from the White Paper (but only after careful scrutiny) is that Britain is heading back 'East of Suez'. Although Britain has concentrated on NATO since the contraction of military commitments in 1968, there has always been a limited capability to operate outside the NATO area. This is now to be boosted, and although there will be no return to the old East of Suez policing role, Britain is to keep at least one parachute battalion available to intervene anywhere in the world at seven days notice. The size of this Rapid Deployment Force (its name is the same as the newly-formed American equivalent for invading the Persian Gulf) is not clear. But the Eighth Field Force, the large Army 'Home Defence' formation until now responsible mainly for internal security and counter-insurgency in Britain in times of tension and war, is to have its role extended to that of potential world-wide intervention force.

Britain's nuclear deterrent may be an international joke, the RAF's planes may be of largely archaeological interest, and the Navy's latest frigates may have developed an embarrassing tendency to melt in the heat, but the British Army is still the most experienced counter-insurgency army in the world. In the intensifying struggle between the under-developed and developed countries for

control of the world's raw materials, the British Army's experience since 1945, from the jungles of Borneo to the streets of Northern Ireland, is in growing demand from authoritarian, pro-Western governments that can survive only with sophisticated military backing. The behind-the-scenes training, advice and assistance that the British Army gives to these governments is possibly its most important contribution to the maintenance of Western power in the world today – but it receives only one paragraph of coverage in the White Paper (Vol One, para 407). This shows that in 1978/9 over 6,500 members of non-NATO armed services were trained in British military establishments, and nearly 600 British personnel were on loan to governments outside the NATO area.

LONDON: BILL AIMS FOR POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

In March, Jack Straw MP introduced a ten-minute rule Bill in the Commons which sought, in part, to reorganise the Metropolitan Police and to create a Greater London police force and a National Police Agency, in effect to separate the policing of the community in London from the national functions carried out by Scotland Yard (**Hansard**, 11.3.1980. See Bulletin No 17). The Bill also sought to establish a Greater London police authority, thus bringing London in line with the other 50 forces in England, Wales and Scotland. Each of these forces is theoretically answerable to a local council police committee comprised two-thirds of elected local councillors and one third local magistrates.

Since its formation in 1829 the Metropolitan Police has only been answerable to the Home Secretary, who in turn can be questioned in parliament. However, like provincial councils, each London borough contributes from the rates almost half of the costs of running London's police, but have no say in how the money is spent.

The need for a separate GLC police

authority has recently been highlighted by Lewisham council's decision to withhold payment of the police 'precept' (the money raised to pay for policing) in 1981; by the continuing inquiry into relations between the police and the community instituted by Lambeth borough council in March 1979 (see Bulletin No 11); by the use of the Special Patrol Group in 'high crime' areas and their involvement at Southall in April 1979 and the death of Blair Peach; by attempts by Brent, Barking and other boroughs to question policing policy in their areas; and by a conference in March entitled 'What Sort of Police Force does London Need?' At the conference, which attracted a wide range of Labour Party, political, trade union, and community groups, the Deputy Leader of the Labour Group on the Greater London Council pledged that if returned to power in May, 1981, the Labour Council would set up a committee to oversee the activities of the Metropolitan Police.

What kind of police authority?

Jack Straw, in the House of Commons, said that the evidence showed that there was 'insufficient accountability' by the police to the community in London 'that can only be remedied by having a Greater London police force responsible to a local and democratically elected police authority'. However he emphasised that he did not 'wish to propose a Greater London force based on the present structure of police authorities, which would result in less accountability'. This observation referred to an earlier Bill Straw presented on 'Police Authorities' on November 14 last year, that sought to extend the powers of the existing police authorities outside of London in respect of the operations and organisation of police forces. At present under the 1964 Police Act local police authorities' powers are limited to looking at police conditions of work, e.g. cars, buildings, and equipment, and are precluded from questioning general operational policies (**Royal Commission on the Police**, para 87, Cmnd 1728, 1962).

This has recently led to conflicts between local police authorities and their Chief Constables (see Bulletin No 16 on Merseyside, and this Bulletin on South Yorkshire). The 1964 Police Act, echoing the 1962 Royal Commission, was presented to parliament by the Home Secretary, Henry Brooke, as ensuring greater accountability. On the second reading, Brooke said: 'The Royal Commission thought . . . that chief constables are not presently adequately accountable. I agree'.

Jack Straw's Bill on Police Authorities would give them powers to decide 'general policing policies for their areas'; the power to obtain more information from chief constables; the power of appointment and dismissal of all officers above the rank of superintendent (instead of just the Chief Constable as at present); and powers to supervise the complaints procedure (**Hansard**, 14.11.1979). In addition Straw's second Bill proposed that magistrates should no longer be members of the police authorities, their membership being 'an historic hangover based upon what was supposed to be a temporary compromise in 1888' (**Hansard**, 11.3.1980).

Lewisham: paying for London's police

The 1962 Royal Commission, while it reorganised local police authorities outside London, decided that the situation whereby the Home Secretary is in effect the police authority should be left unchanged (**Royal Commission on the Police**, paras 222-227). Only one minor change was proposed by the Commission. Since 1949, an 'informal arrangement' operated whereby the Receiver for the Metropolitan Police met the chief financial officers of the London boroughs 'as soon as possible after the Metropolitan Police estimates have been presented to parliament' (para 227). The borough representatives suggested that this meeting should take place before the estimates were presented, and the Commission recommended this change, which was effected.

When the Receiver met with representa-

tives of the various London borough's finance committee chairpeople this year, they were told that the net cost of the Metropolitan Police for 1980-81 would be £407 million, an increase of £61 million, 15 per cent. One London borough, Lewisham, decided on April 14 to withhold their contribution of over £5½ million towards the police precept with effect from April 1, 1981. The motion said that the money would be withheld until:

'such time as he (the Commissioner) and those responsible for the operational policy of the constabulary in this area demonstrate a more appropriate application of their resources to and awareness of the needs of the people of London generally and Lewisham in particular.

Additionally we demand that the Commissioner and his subordinates cease to exploit the irresponsible position in which current legislation places them and urges the Home Secretary to end the immunity that the Metropolitan Police enjoys from the scrutiny of the rate-payers and their elected representatives' (*Daily Telegraph*, 15.3.1980).

Mr Hawkins, the council's leader, after the decision to withhold the precept, commented: 'We know the problems the police have got. Any criticism of the police is seen as undermining morale, but they must be accountable, just as I am accountable as a local councillor' (*Times*, 15.4.1980).

One of the sponsors of the motion, Councillor Dowd, questioned the 'suspect' priorities of the police. Lewisham has one of the highest burglary rates in the country. Cllr Dowd said: 'The police say they haven't got the manpower to combat that, yet they can spend a quarter of a million pounds to escort Nazis and juvenile delinquents in the National Front when they march through this borough'. Concern over priorities had grown since the 1977 National Front march and was exacerbated when Sir David McNee, the Commissioner, declined to exercise his statutory powers under the Public Order Act to ban another NF march on April 20. The council unsuccessfully applied to the

High Court to compel McNee to ban the march. Lord Lane, the Lord Chief Justice, ruled that the power of the court to interfere with the exercise of discretion given to the Commissioner was strictly limited, and that there were no grounds for the court intervening. The Commissioner had experience of previous marches and there was no evidence that he would not take sufficient precautions to protect the community (*Daily Telegraph*, 21.4.1980).

In response to Lewisham Council's decision, the police could apply to the Secretary of State for the Environment, under the 1967 Rating Act, for a certificate to take the matter to court where a decision would be made to appoint a receiver to go in and obtain the money. A spokesperson for Lewisham said that there had been no response from the police, and that the ball was in their court.

BRITAIN: A U.S. AIR BASE?

American nuclear missiles are to be based in Britain from 1983, under the control of the United States Air Force. The NATO decision of December 12, 1979, to deploy at least 160 ground-launched Cruise missiles at USAF bases in Britain (announced to the UK Parliament on 13.12.79 – see Hansard, 1540-1556, and our Defence Estimates story in this issue) has provoked a widespread movement against the missiles and the presence of the USAF itself. But what exactly is the USAF doing in Britain?

Of the 107,000 USAF personnel serving outside the USA, nearly a fifth (just over 20,000) are in Britain, the second largest deployment worldwide after West Germany. There are believed to be nearly 340 USAF aircraft in Britain, roughly 90 per cent of them fighters and fighter/bombers, and many of advanced design. The potential striking power of these planes and their nuclear weapons considerably exceeds that of the UK-based units of the RAF itself (the air defence of the UK, for example, rests solely with less than 100 ageing BAC Lightnings, Hawker

Siddeley Hunters (veteran of 26 years service) and McDonnell Douglas F4 Phantoms).

Most of the USAF in Britain is part of the Third Air Force of the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). The USAFE is headquartered at Ramstein in West Germany and has three component Air Forces: the 16th, based at Torrejon in Spain; the 17th, at Sembach in West Germany; and the Third, with its headquarters at Mildenhall in Suffolk. In a war emergency, the USAFE would integrate with other NATO air forces to become the Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH) and Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE). The British-based Third Air Force would join AAFCE and conduct operations from the British mainland and forward posts in Europe against the Eastern Bloc in Central Europe, leaving the air defence of Britain and its neighbouring seas (the 'UK Air Defence Region') in the not very capable hands of the RAF.

The United States (and NATO) have made it very clear that Britain's primary role in a major war is to act as an unsinkable aircraft carrier for the USAF, and that the USAF units in Britain will not be used to defend Britain, unless those units themselves were threatened (at which point they could equally withdraw to the United States). In such a war, up to 40 per cent of NATO's air forces could be based in Britain, with massive air convoys of troops and equipment passing through British air bases en route to the battle front from the USA.

The British people have no control over the presence of the USAF in Britain, one of the most sensitive of military problems for politicians. The USAF is very rarely, if ever, discussed by parliament, and only becomes a public issue when protests have been made at USAF bases. Yet a significant proportion of Britain's military effort is earmarked for the defence of these American installations. (When protestors marched past the USAF base at Upper Heyford in Oxfordshire on May 17, 1980, they were met by British military police at

the gates, while members of the British Territorial Army were standing by inside the compound.) American military autonomy is such that the USAFE could initiate a nuclear war against the USSR from British soil without the involvement of the British parliament.

The USAF, which first moved into Britain in strength in the early 1950s, now controls ten of the RAF's largest airfields. Seven are occupied permanently by the Americans: Upper Heyford, Fairford in Gloucestershire, Alconbury in Huntingdonshire, and Lakenheath, Mildenhall and the twin bases of Woodbridge/Bentwaters in Suffolk. The other three, Greenham Common in Berkshire, Wethersfield in Essex and Sculthorpe in Norfolk, are kept at constant readiness for full American occupation in an emergency.

The main fighter bases are at Upper Heyford, Lakenheath and Woodbridge/Bentwaters, housing the 20th, 48th and 81st Tactical Fighter Wings respectively. Upper Heyford and Lakenheath are the bases for a total of seven squadrons (approximately 180 aircraft) of one of the most unreliable military machines: the General Dynamics F-111 fighter. Six of these aircraft crashed in Britain in 1979 alone, killing six crew, and they are widely considered to be one of the most dangerous planes in the world. Lakenheath was also nearly the setting for one of Britain's worst-ever peacetime disasters, when on July 27, 1956, an American bomber crashed beside the atomic bombs store at the air base. Burning fuel from the plane engulfed the store, damaging the three bombs inside. Although there was apparently no danger of an explosion, later reports said that radioactive material could have been scattered over a wide area, and that Air Force personnel left the base in a 'stampede' (*Guardian*, 6.11.79).

Woodbridge/Bentwaters is being built up into a major centre for one of America's latest fighters, the Fairchild A-10A Thunderbolt. Despite having massive hitting power and the distinction of having a design inspired by the Vietnam War, the Thunderbolt has been criticised

for its inability to operate in bad weather or at night, and its slow speed that makes its vulnerable to being shot down in its primary role of close-support aircraft for ground troops.

Mildenhall is the administrative headquarters of the Third Air Force and a busy staging post for US-European military traffic. The 'host unit' at Mildenhall is the 513th Tactical Airlift Wing, which provides support and maintenance for the wide range of aircraft that pass through or arrive on temporary deployment (these include the Lockheed C-130 Hercules transports and the occasional spy plane, such as the Lockheed U-2 that was based there during much of 1979).

Alconbury houses the 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, equipped with 20 surveillance versions of the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom that spend most of their time prowling around the Central European frontier regions. Also at Alconbury are 20 Northrop F-5E Tiger fighters of the 527th Tactical Fighter Training Aggressor Squadron, built to resemble the Soviet's Mikoyan MiG-21 and give NATO pilots some idea of what it is like to be one of the 'enemy'.

Fairford, Gloucestershire, home of the 11th Strategic Group and its 15 Boeing KC-135 Stratotankers, is the USAF's most recently acquired British base, and one that has highlighted the strength of the growing movement against the USAF presence in Britain. Originally the USAF wanted to activate their stand-by base at Greenham Common, Berkshire, for the Stratotankers, but a well-organised and powerful opposition campaign launched by local residents in February 1978, stopped the Americans in their tracks. The USAF quickly seized upon Fairford as an alternative and, before another protest movement could start, the British Ministry of Defence handed the base over and by early 1979 the Americans were firmly established there. At the same time (late 1978) it was hurriedly announced that a special runway repair unit of USAF – the 400-person Red Horse squadron – would be moving into another of the stand-by bases, Wethersfield in Essex.

Not all the 20,000 USAF personnel in Britain are engaged on straightforward Biggles-type air operations. Being so close to the enemy, Britain makes an ideal site for listening in to their communications, and also, of course, the communications of the American allies in Europe. The 7274th Air Base Group at Chicksands, for example, is a monitoring centre for the world's largest intelligence-gathering organisation, the American National Security Agency, which spies not only on the Soviets but also the British.

The American military presence in Britain has always made Britain into a prime target in the event of a US/Soviet war. Two factors have now combined to make Britain even more vulnerable: the Cruise missile and the policy of 'flexible response'.

Military theorists now no longer see just two options open to the world: peace or total destruction in a nuclear holocaust of huge missiles. Today, America anticipates being able to respond 'flexibly' to Soviet attack by first trying to confine the war to Europe (the so-called 'Theatre' war). The 160 Cruise missiles to be based at USAF camps in Britain are specifically designed to fight this European war, and their presence here must increase the likelihood of such a war happening. The idea of a nuclear war confined to Europe is, of course, a very popular one in the increasingly aggressive and militaristic USA.

But for European nations it has become a major source of concern, as it means that Europe could become the battlefield for a conflict that Europeans are actually opposed to. This is why the presence of the USAF in Britain is now rapidly becoming a major political issue.

S. YORKS: POLICE CRITICISED

In April, South Yorkshire county council published the results of its inquiry into relationships between the police and the public. The council's policy committee set up the working party which produced the report following criticism of the way

Sheffield police had arrested a black man and after the local authority had failed in 1977 to persuade the chief constable to provide police supervision of a Barnsley street crossing.

The working party was set up in July 1978 under the chairmanship of Councillor George Moores, who also chairs the South Yorkshire police committee. The decision was heavily criticised by the local press and South Yorkshire police refused all cooperation with the inquiry. The then chief constable, Stanley Barrett (who resigned in February 1979 to become one of HM Inspectors of Constabulary and was succeeded by James Brownlow, deputy chief constable of Greater Manchester) told the working party that 'the correct forum for examining and discussing sensitive issues is the police committee', and reported that his officers' 'strongly held unanimous view would militate against cooperation with and acceptance of any proposals which might be formulated.'

The report strongly criticises 'reactive policing' while favouring the philosophy of Devon and Cornwall Chief Constable, John Alderson. However, its proposals in this field are very generalised, concentrating on demands for more 'preventive policing' and for more policemen on the beat - demands which fall far short of Alderson's community policing model and which are of a level of generality to have enabled chief constable Brownlow to welcome them.

The working party called for a transformation in police attitudes towards ethnic minority groups and towards gays. The law should also be repealed, it said, and the complaints system revised to allow consideration of 'complaints of a general nature on police style and behaviour.'

Police responses to the working party's report have been highly critical. In an address which is published in the report, James Brownlow says that it has been 'hanging over the head of my Force like the sword of Damocles.' Brownlow declares himself 'insensed' by the report: 'I felt that a subtle bias against the police pervaded the report. I have read and

re-read the report and still I cannot get that feeling out of my mind.'

The local Police Federation has been no less critical of and uncooperative towards the working party and towards local authority criticism. They are now angry that the council plans to cut the police budget by £2 million. Police Federation secretary Joe Martucci told his local members' annual meeting: 'We cannot help noticing the contrast between the priority given to the rule of law by the national government and the priority it gets from the South Yorkshire County Council.'

AGEE HARASSED

Former CIA officer Philip Agee is still without his passport after action by the US State Department at the end of December last year. The passport was revoked because, according to the US Government, his activities 'are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security of the United States.' Agee's lawyers appealed to the Washington District Court, which overturned the State Department's decision. The State Department went to the Circuit Court, the next highest court, which granted a stay of execution on the District Court's direction that the passport should be restored (**Covert Action Information Bulletin**, March-April, 1980). That was in March, and since then, Agee has been passportless. He told State Research that there is no danger at present of him being deported from West Germany where he lives, but he cannot travel elsewhere, which makes the passport revocation one of the more effective of the many harassing tactics which the US Government has tried against him.

Even if he wins the case in the Circuit Court, the State Department will probably appeal to the Supreme Court, and a continuation of the stay on the order returning his passport may mean that he could be without it for over a year.

Meanwhile, Agee is pressing on with his

suit against the CIA for the release of documents concerning him while he was employed by them and afterwards. Some have already been released, as have State Department reports on reactions to his activities and writings around the world. These include reports from the US Embassy in London on the progress of the campaign against his deportation from Britain.

The Justice Department has filed a counter claim asking for an injunction against Agee similar to those against Victor Marchetti and Frank Snepp, two other former CIA officials who have published unauthorised accounts of Agency actions, and are subject to injunctions to prevent them from making further disclosures. Snepp has had the royalties from his book, *Decent Interval*, confiscated by the courts.

On a more positive note, legislative efforts in the US to circumscribe investigation of CIA and other covert government activity have succeeded only in one small particular. The CIA is now required to report covert activity to two committees – the Intelligence Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, rather than eight committees as previously. But efforts to prohibit the naming of agents have been dropped for the time being, partly because of lobbying from the establishment press.

(*International Herald Tribune*, 19.5.80).

CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner has told American editors that the Agency is continuing to use journalists to spy for the US. (*Daily Telegraph*, 12.4.80).

OPERATION FIRE

Between December 1979 and April 1980, 37 of an estimated total number of 20,000 second homes in Wales were set on fire as part of a campaign against homelessness amongst those actually living in Wales. In addition, bombs were placed in Conservative Party offices in Cardiff and Shotton. The events led to the largest ever police operation in Wales, involving all four of the police forces in Wales. Dubbed

by the press Operation Fire, the exercise in the last week of March included extensive searches and seizure of property, the setting up of roadblocks and the arrest and detention of over 50 people.

Operation Fire, according to a recently published report compiled by the Welsh Campaign for Civil and Political Liberties (an umbrella organisation formed in April in response to the police activity), was primarily a political intelligence gathering operation by the police. Only four of those arrested or detained were subsequently charged with any offence and none of these charges related to arson or criminal damage. Questioning by the police was primarily about political beliefs or activities (including voting at the last general election) and much of the material seized by the police concerned a wide range of political groups or campaigns. Those subject to arrest, search and questioning included Welsh language campaigners, Welsh nationalists, anarchists and members of the Labour Party.

The report situates the recent events firmly in the overall context of political developments in Wales since the late 1960s and the concomitant policing developments. These began with the campaign against Prince Charles' investiture as Prince of Wales in 1968 when an estimated 200 Welsh people were subject to 24 hour surveillance by the 'Leddlu cudd' or 'secret police', as they were locally known. Later developments included the use in 1971 and 1978 of conspiracy charges against Welsh nationalists and, in the latter trial, the use of jury vetting which only came to light five months after it had taken place and which apparently was carried out on the instructions of a junior police officer.

The account of the most recent events, based on an extensive questionnaire completed by over 80 per cent of those known to have been arrested or detained, shows that the law was flouted by the police on a routine basis. Many of those held were not informed of the reason for their arrest; others were 'detained', that is neither lawfully arrested nor assisting the police voluntarily. Several were not

brought before a magistrate's court 'as soon as possible' as laid down in the Magistrates Courts Act 1952 – one arrestee was held for three and a half days, one for nearly two days and another for one day and 15 hours during which he was moved between three different police stations.

During searches, large numbers of items were removed which were unrelated to the offences supposedly under investigation. These included business documents, cartoons, stationery, examination papers, a John Bull printing set, as well as anti-nuclear material, papers on the fourth television channel and Plaid Cymru literature. Floorboards were ripped up and a fire gate pulled out, while in one case a request for the police to provide identification before entry was met by the police breaking the front door down. Generally, few people were able to establish accurately what was removed by the police because of the number of police on the premises and much of what was removed has yet to be returned.

The Judges Rules, which are supposed to govern police procedures after arrest, were extensively ignored. Suspects were either not informed of their right to phone a solicitor, or they were denied it, or access was delayed. Others were told bluntly by

the police that they had no rights at all.

Interrogation by the police covered attitudes to, among other things, anarchist, Cofiw'n (which commemorates important events and figures in Welsh history), the Welsh Socialist Republican Movement and the recent closure of steelworks in Wales. In some cases, the arson attacks were mentioned only cursorily or not at all.

The report concludes that Operation Fire was not an isolated example but part of a wider pattern of policing, a pattern which must be seen to include a broadening definition of who and what is 'subversive' and the current demands by the police for greatly increased powers of detention, arrest, search, fingerprinting and interrogation. Such demands have already been conceded to a large extent in the supposedly 'temporary provisions' of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and are being conceded to the police in Scotland in the precedent-setting Scottish Criminal Justice Bill now before parliament (see **Bulletin** No 14 and 16). Operation Fire shows how such increased powers might work.

● **Operation Fire / Operation Tan** (in English and Welsh) from 108 Bookshop, 108 Salisbury Road, Cathays, Cardiff (£1.50 inc postage).

TELEPHONE TAPPING

BACKGROUND PAPER

In April the Home Secretary gave the official figures for the number of warrants issued for telephone-tapping and mail-opening for the first time in 23 years (**The Interception of Communications in Great Britain**, Cmnd 7873, April 1980). The only other report on the subject was the **Birkett Committee of Privy Councillors Report** in October 1957 (Cmnd 283, October 1957). The latest report from the Home Secretary,

a mere eight pages, leaves open more questions than it answers as to the actual extent of telephone-tapping by the Customs, the police, Special Branch, MI5, MI6, Defence Intelligence and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in Cheltenham.

The reasons occasioning Mr Whitelaw's report were the outstanding promise by the previous Home Secretary, Mr Merlyn Rees, to review the matter 'in due course' (**Hansard**, 8.3.79) after a judgement by Sir Robert Megarry in the *Malone v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis* on February 28 last year. While Judge Megarry did not uphold Malone's attempt to have the practice declared illegal, he did

say that the subject 'cries out for legislation' (see Bulletin No 11).

Malone declared his intention to appeal to the European Court which ruled in the case of *Klauss and others v. Federal Republic of Germany* that certain minimum safeguards were necessary to protect the rights of the individual under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Britain is a signatory. The Court found that the West German system just satisfied the minimum conditions. However, in West Germany interception is covered by legislation, which allows for supervision by a parliamentary committee, for the right of complaint against suspected interception, and of notification to the victim once surveillance has ceased.

In the Malone case Judge Megarry made it 'abundantly clear' that current British practice fails to meet the standards laid down by the Convention and the European Court's ruling.

The need for a statement was further accentuated when, on February 1, the *New Statesman* published a well-documented article by Duncan Campbell which said that a tapping centre existed at 93 Ebury Bridge Road, London SW1, with the capacity to tap 1,000 lines simultaneously. An employee who worked at the tapping centre said that the system had been planned in the late Sixties – well before the onset of terrorist activities in the 1970s. The *New Statesman* article further stated that the bulk of the interception carried out by Ebury Bridge Road was not for the police (some 10 per cent) but largely for the security forces – the Special Branch, MI5 and others.

On April 1, Mr Whitelaw told the Commons that the government had decided 'not to introduce legislation' but thought it desirable to introduce a 'continuous independent check' by inviting a 'senior member of the judiciary' to review the procedures and safeguards set out in the White Paper. The first report, of the unnamed judge, would be published, but subsequent reviews would not.

In the White Paper the Home Secretary

argues that the warrant protects 'the Post Office staff from activities which might otherwise be illegal' under the 1953 and 1969 Post Office Acts. However, neither of these Acts (nor their predecessors of 1711, 1837 and 1908) confer the **legal power** to intercept communications, they merely recognise the **practice** of interception by the state.

The first question taken up by the Birkett Committee was to establish the legal or statutory basis for the practice of telephone-tapping – a task which was to prove insoluble. (Part I, **Birkett Report**). The Home Office, giving evidence to the Committee, expressed the view that the power stemmed from the prerogative right (of the Crown) to examine all material carried (by letter or phone) by the Crown and that this extended to new means of communication not envisaged in the 18th century. The Committee rejected this view and observed that not a single constitutional writer on the royal prerogative had ever referred to this particular power to intercept communications. The Committee's conclusions were inevitable; they accepted that the practice had been going on for several centuries but they could find no statutory authority giving the state the power to intercept the mail or a telephone conversation.

A ten-minute rule Bill introduced by Robin Cook MP in December last year, the Security Service Bill, proposed that warrants for any form of interception should be given by a High Court Judge and that the grounds for doing so should be strictly defined, e.g. no general warrants and a strict definition as to what constitutes subversive activities (**Hansard**, 11.12.79); another ten-minute rule Bill to place controls on tapping and bugging was introduced by Robert Cryer MP on February 20. Neither Bill has any chance of becoming law.

The system of issuing warrants

Up until 1937, the Post Office intercepted calls at the direct request of the police, the Special Branch or MI5 without reference to

any Minister. In that year the then-Home Secretary decided to regularise the system by bringing tapping in line with mail-opening, and that it was to be done only on the issuing of a warrant by himself. This practice was recognised in the 1953 Post Office Act (Section 58.1) which states that there must be 'an express warrant under the hand of a Secretary of State' (our emphasis). Although it is always officially held that all warrants are issued by the Home Secretary and no one else, it is quite clear that the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Minister are empowered to issue warrants which are not covered by the rules laid down by the Home Office. Warrants for Northern Ireland and Scotland are signed by the relevant Secretary of State. The only exception being that MI5 warrants for Scotland are signed by the Home Secretary (*Scotsman*, 2.5.1980).

The criteria laid down, both by Birkett and the White Paper, to apply for a warrant are much the same. For the police and customs there are three conditions: the offence must be serious where there is no previous conviction; normal methods of investigation must have been tried and have failed, and there must be reason to think that the interception would result in a conviction. The conditions for MI5 are that: there must be a 'major' subversive or espionage activity involved 'likely to injure the national interest'; that the information gained must be of direct use in fulfilling the duties of MI5 outlined in the Maxwell-Fyfe directive (see, Lord Denning's Report on the Profumo Affair, Cmnd 2152, 1963); and that all other methods have failed.

The major loophole in these conditions is that the Home Office is entirely dependant on the interpretation of the applying agency that all normal methods have failed and that a conviction is likely to result. In the case of MI5 the rationale is even more tenuous. As outlined in the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive Ministers, including the Home Secretary, are subject to the 'need to know' principle in terms of cases related to espionage and subversion. Indeed in 1947, MI5 became so concerned

at the records held at the Home Office that all records were destroyed and only a list of serial numbers was held thereafter.

The process of servicing applications varies. The police and customs apply to the Criminal Department of the Home Office and their applications are considered by the Permanent Under-Secretary before the Home Secretary signs the warrant. MI5 applications are made via a Home Office Deputy Under-Secretary before being passed to the Permanent Under Secretary. The issuing and renewal of warrants remains, according to the White Paper, much the same as outlined by the Birkett Report. Initially all warrants are issued for two months; applications by the police can be renewed for one month at a time, by the Customs and Excise for two months at a time, by the Security Service (and for 'postal warrants issued on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch') for six months at a time (Cmnd 7873 para 11). These different time limits reflect the different interests of the agencies, the police being more concerned with short-term surveillance and MI5 with long-term. (For general historical background, see pp196-211, *The Political Police in Britain*, Tony Bunyan, Julian Friedman Publishers.)

The White Paper

Apart from the official figures for the warrants issued by the Home Secretary (see chart), the White Paper apparently merely reiterates the principles laid down by Birkett two decades ago. But differs from the assumptions laid down in the Birkett Report in four important respects. Prior to 1957, warrants were often issued to cover several names and addresses, known as 'general warrants', a practice which the Birkett Committee recommended should cease (para 57). It was therefore not unreasonably assumed that, along with the other recommendations, this was accepted. Indeed in the White Paper, and in the Commons, Mr Whitelaw was at pains to emphasise the diligent scrutiny of applications for warrants. Paragraph 10 states

that 'each warrant names only one person and one address or telephone number', and that where 'the target of interception uses or operates from more than one address or telephone number' these too are set out in the warrant.

Number of warrants signed

ENGLAND AND WALES			
	<i>Telephones</i>	<i>Letters</i>	<i>Total</i>
1958	129	109	238
1959	159	101	260
1960	195	110	305
1961	183	75	258
1962	242	96	338
1963	270	128	398
1964	253	120	373
1965	299	93	382
1966	318	139	457
1967	307	92	399
1968	333	83	416
1969	377	93	470
1970	395	104	499
1971	418	86	504
1972	413	95	508
1973	424	73	497
1974	436	93	529
1975	468	93	561
1976	410	62	472
1977	407	84	491
1978	428	44	472
1979	411	52	463
SCOTLAND			
1967	3	—	3
1968	10	—	10
1969	8	—	8
1970	14	—	14
1971	10	2	12
1972	15	—	15
1973	20	—	20
1974	33	5	38
1975	41	—	41
1976	41	—	41
1977	52	3	55
1978	42	—	42
1979	56	—	56

Source: White Paper.

However, this statement is prefaced by the phrase 'As a general rule', and the very same paragraph openly recognises that warrants are issued for 'organisations whose communications are to be intercepted' (our emphasis). This means that one warrant could be issued to monitor all calls from, say, the headquarters of the Communist Party, a national trade union, or any other politically active organisation, and makes a mockery of the contention that warrants only affect a small number of people (some 400 in a full year). By obtaining no more than 50-odd warrants to cover politically active organisations, it is possible for the security services to gain much information – both political and personal – on thousands of individuals.

For example, a Post Office engineer has stated that a tap was placed during the Grunwick strike on the telephone used by the strike committee in the Brent Trades Council offices. The tap was placed through the Harlesden exchange and, although a local engineer tried to disconnect it, it was rapidly reinstalled by an outside team. (*New Statesman*, 1.2.1980).

The second assumption, which relates to the point above, is that the conception of 'subversion' under which the security service (MI5) and the Special Branch operate, has qualitatively changed since the 1950s. The mandate given by governments of both parties, is now so wide as to include any politically or industrially active person or organisation as constituting a potential threat to the state (see, Bulletin No 6).

The conditions laid down for the police have also been broadened. Where Birkett allowed for warrants to be issued for serious crime the White Paper adds to this the following: 'or an offence of lesser gravity in which either a large number of people is involved or there is good reason to apprehend the use of violence' (para 4). This addition could certainly be taken to include political demonstrations and strikes.

Finally, the technology available for telephone-tapping (and bugging) is now capable, on a scale inconceivable in the 1950s, of the surveillance of thousands of

people or organisations simultaneously; it can ensure rapid transcription and communication to the relevant agency; and for the storage of intelligence so gathered.

These factors, plus the evidence that the security services are the main users of telephone interception, makes the 'safeguard' proposed by the Home Secretary – that a member of the judiciary will provide an independent check – totally inadequate. And seems highly unlikely to satisfy the European Court if called to account.

How many phones are tapped?

The official figures, which only cover Customs and Excise, the police, the Special Branch and MI5, show that in England and Wales the total number of warrants issued in a year have risen from around 200 in the mid-1950s to a peak of just over 500 prior to and during the IRA bombing campaign (1971-1975) to 463 last year. Indeed, almost immediately after the issuing of the Birkett Report, when 129 warrants were issued in 1958, a sharp rise begins and continues in the 1960s well before international terrorism, cited by Whitelaw as a major factor, became relevant. In Scotland the post-Birkett rise is even more pronounced. Between 1950 and 1969 between 3 and 10 warrants were issued each year by the Secretary of State for Scotland. In 1979 a total of 56 were issued. No figures for Northern Ireland are given in the White Paper.

There is a discrepancy between the total number of warrants issued each year and the number in force at a single point in time (*New Statesman*, 11.4.1980), a discrepancy which supports the contention that the great majority of the warrants are issued to MI5 and the Special Branch. Usually, warrants for the police and customs are issued for two month periods, whereas MI5 and the Special Branch warrants are issued for six months. The latter therefore appear, at most, twice in the yearly totals. During 1978, a total of 428 warrants were issued but at December 31 that year 214 were in force. Duncan Campbell comments that: 'On the basis of

simple assumptions and some simple maths (warrants issued evenly through the year, and say, once only) the proportion of 'security' warrants may be calculated. For 1968 and 1978, the proportion is about 75 per cent' (op.cit.).

The official figures hide the real extent of tapping. Not only is there a national telephone tapping centre at Ebury Bridge Road with the capacity to monitor 1,000 phones simultaneously but Merlyn Rees recently told journalists that while he was Home Secretary 2-3,000 lines were tapped every year and that between 250-400 warrants were in force at any one time (*New Statesman*, 15.2.1980). The evidence suggests that Rees figures are accurate, because in addition to the direct-tapping facilities at Ebury Bridge Road, most interceptions are conducted by the Post Office and the tapes then forwarded to the relevant agency (see White Paper para. 15).

It should be emphasised that these figures only cover authorised tapping by the Customs and Excise, the police, the Special Branch and MI5, and make no allowance for 'unauthorised' taps by them. Other methods of interception, and interception by agencies not covered by the official figures, represent as great, if not greater, areas for concern.

Other methods of interception

There is no mention of the 'institutional' arrangements between the agencies and the Post Office laid out in a Home Office circular in 1969 (H.O. 'Consolidated Circular to the Police (1969)', S.1., paras 46ff). This circular empowers Head Postmasters and Telephone Managers to assist the police on request in cases where they are investigating an indictable offence, where an investigation has been authorised by the Director of Public Prosecutions, or where the police are acting on behalf of a government department in relation to a document 'missing' from that department. In each of these instances there is no need for a warrant from the Home Secretary.

Nor is there any mention of the potential use of the new generation of British

telephone exchanges, known as 'System X', which is about to come into service. System X computers will automatically generate records of who calls whom, when and for how long. A simple analysis of this information could easily provide the basis of the surveillance of a new, or existing, 'target' for surveillance.

Neither the Birkett Report nor the White Paper cover the use of 'bugging', that is, eavesdropping on conversations either via a telephone (which can be turned into a microphone even when not in use), by microphones, or laser devices. Bugging is thus not covered by the procedure for issuing warrants and can be used on the sole authority of the head of the agency concerned. In the Metropolitan Police bugging is generally authorised by a Deputy Commissioner. But the major use of 'bugging' is by MI5 and MI6, Britain's overseas agency (*New Statesman*, 8.2.1980). On February 3, the *Sunday Times* revealed that a massive surveillance operation was mounted against delegates of the Patriotic Front during the Lancaster House talks. Not only were all telephone calls monitored, meetings and private conversations bugged but Rhodesian security officers were employed to interpret the languages and dialects used by the delegates.

Finally, interceptions by three major state agencies are neglected completely by official explanations and figures. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) at Cheltenham is one of the main state departments concerned with the interception of communications. GCHQ, which employs some ten thousand people on 'communications intelligence' is not solely concerned with intercepting messages from foreign powers. As Chapman Pincher first pointed out in the *Daily Express* in 1967 it is also concerned with intercepting **all** communications (by phone, telex, and telegrams) from and to this country. The nature of the intelligence thus gathered is not simply of 'military' importance but also covers economic, political and personal matters, which is forwarded to respective agencies. MI6, the Secret Intelli-

gence Service, Britain's CIA, is not covered, nor is the possibility that the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office also issues warrants. Finally, Defence Intelligence, a part of the Ministry of Defence which has 89 sections, is left out. In the light of the military's increasing involvement in internal matters – such as strikes and potentially in public order situations – this is a major omission.

REVIEWS & SOURCES

BOOKS

SOUTHALL, 23 APRIL 1979, Report of the Unofficial Committee of Enquiry, published by the National Council for Civil Liberties, 192pp, £2.20.

REAL TROUBLE: A Study of aspects of the Southall Trials, by Robin Lewis, The Runnymede Trust, 62 Chandos Place, London WC2, 31pp, £1.25.

'Of all the events which have . . . caused a sudden deterioration in race relations, we think that the disturbance in Southall is probably the gravest so far.' Thus the NCCL Report puts into proper perspective the tragic events of April 23 last year, when a provocative pre-election meeting held by the National Front in Southall led to 342 arrests, injuries to 97 police officers and large numbers of demonstrators, and the death of Blair Peach.

The Unofficial Enquiry was set up by the NCCL at the request of local community leaders in Southall, after their calls for a public enquiry had fallen on deaf ears. The Committee was chaired by Oxford Professor Michael Dummett, and included Joan Lestor, MP, the Bishop of Willesden, Bill Keys, SOGAT General Secretary and representatives of the immigrant community, the church, the trade unions, academics and teachers, and the

NCCL. It heard evidence from more than 100 witnesses, analysed press reports, saw videos and monitored court proceedings of those arrested. Its thoroughness is marred only by the repeated refusal of the Metropolitan Police to give evidence.

The Report's 50-page reconstruction of events paints a vivid picture of a community infuriated by racial insults and forced to flee from police brutality. The Committee argues that the National Front meeting was a 'calculated affront' to Southall's Asian community, which had the right to organise a protest against it. Police attempts to thwart this protest were a major factor contributing to the violence. It heavily criticises Scotland Yard's unprecedented decision to cordon off Southall completely to prevent demonstrations; its failure to consult with community leaders; and the use of snatch squads for random arrests. There is overwhelming evidence of 'excessive and unnecessary' violence as the police dispersed those trying to break through the cordon: 'Police officers used their truncheons, not for self-protection but as instruments of arbitrary, violent and unlawful punishment.' Some of those arrested were subjected to racist abuse by police officers.

The Committee finds that while there were isolated incidents of premeditated violence against the police – which it deplores – these were magnified out of proportion by Scotland Yard and the press, which on the whole proved only too willing to give a 'law and order' version of events.

After hearing eye-witness accounts of the death of Blair Peach, the Committee concludes that he was murdered by a Special Patrol Group officer, and finds it astonishing that the police have taken no action against his murderer. Among its 53 recommendations, it calls for a public enquiry into the role and operation of the SPG, and urges the Director of Public Prosecutions to reconsider his decision not to prosecute any police officer for Peach's death. It also recommends amending the Representation of the People Act to ensure that public election meetings are held on a

'first come, first served' basis, to prevent organisations like the NF from restricting access to their opponents. And it calls for the introduction of a statutory right to hold a peaceful demonstration.

The police and the media made much of the role of 'outside extremists', particularly the Anti-Nazi League, in provoking anti-police violence at Southall. The Committee found no evidence for this; on the contrary, the vast majority who appeared before Barnet Magistrates' Court on charges arising out of the disturbances were local people, mainly young blacks and Asians. The decision to hold the hearings at Barnet rather than locally is criticised as 'inept and insensitive'. This view is supported by Robin Lewis, a solicitor who acted as defence lawyer for 58 of the accused. His report, which analyses the trials in detail, is an essential complement to the Unofficial Enquiry.

Lewis shows how the Southall trials are an 'extreme example' of the deficiencies in public order legislation. Analysis of the verdicts reveals wide discrepancies in conviction and sentencing between different magistrates. While one convicted 65.5 per cent of defendants, another convicted only 23 per cent; and Lewis concludes that 'a considerable injustice may have been done to those accused who had the misfortune to appear before the "wrong" Bench.' Because charges such as assaulting the police and causing a breach of the peace are so ill-defined, some defendants felt they were victims of arbitrary arrest or arbitrary selection of charges. The alteration of charges as trials proceeded took place on such a scale that it suggested to Lewis a pattern: the prosecution were dropping charges which carried the right to elect jury trial, and all but six of the 342 accused were tried summarily.

Both these Reports are invaluable in going beyond the public disorder which hit the headlines to examine the real meaning of April 23, 1979, for the people of Southall. They raise disturbing questions about race relations, the law, public order, the courts and the role of the police. Some of the evidence emerging from the Blair

Peach inquest, particularly with regard to the SPG, substantially confirms the Unofficial Enquiry's findings. But, as the Committee itself points out, the inquest's field of enquiry is necessarily limited. There can be no substitute for a full public enquiry into all the aspects investigated by these Reports, with power to subpoena witnesses.

(A leaflet summarising the Report of the Unofficial Committee of Enquiry is available free from NCCL, 186 Kings Cross Road, London WC1.)

PAMPHLETS

Labour Research Guide to the Tory Employment Bill, from LRD, 78 Blackfriars Rd, London SE1. 45p inc. p&p. The Employment Bill is the first step in the Tory strategy to undermine trade union rights. This pamphlet sets out clearly how the new law would curb picketing rights, interfere with union membership agreements and dismantle individual rights on unfair dismissal and maternity. It also summarises other related proposals which would further restrict picketing rights by removing trade union immunities and would thus attack the very basis of the right to strike.

Protest and Survive, by E.P. Thompson, Spokesman pamphlet no 71. 45p. The Home Office has produced a pamphlet 'Protect and Survive', on civil defence in a nuclear attack. In consummate pamphleteering style, Thompson's 'Protest and Survive' explodes the myths of 'deterrence' and 'Civil Defence', backing his political arguments with vital facts about the nuclear weapons build-up and showing that governments of both west and east are preparing their citizens for eventual nuclear war. He argues that the siting of 160 or more US cruise missiles in Britain makes it a prime target for a series of pre-emptive strikes, and concludes with an 'alternative strategy' for building mass movements against nuclear weapons. 'We must protest if we are to survive. Protest is the only realistic form of civil defence.' Essential reading.

Drifting into a Law and Order Society, by Stuart Hall, Cobden Trust, 80p. This is the text of Hall's 1979 Human Rights Day lecture. His theme is the shaping of public opinion to generate a popular demand for law and order, parti-

cularly through the mass media. Hall identifies the production of an 'authoritarian populism' based on right-wing notions of the free economy, the strong state, undermining of welfare and labour rights, suppression of racial minorities and the growth of police powers. A useful overview of the draft towards authoritarianism.

Migrant Women Under Threat, Migrants Action Group, 68 Chalton St, London NW1. 40p plus A5 s.a.e. A court decision last November rules that any resident domestic worker from overseas who had dependent children at the time of work permit application, has entered the UK by deception, and is therefore liable to be deported as an 'illegal immigrant'. The report examines the implications of this racist ruling, which particularly affects women and Filipinos.

Here Is the Other News, Minority Press Group Series no 1, £1.25. There are around 70 local papers which print the news ignored by the largely conservative commercial local press in the UK. This survey examines the growth and functioning of these papers, covering aspects such as internal organisation, finance, distribution, printing etc. It includes contributions from six local publications. An appendix gives a comprehensive directory of currently published papers, and the pamphlet as a whole is a valuable source-work.

Benwell Community Project have asked us to point out that the pamphlet *Alternative Employment for Naval Shipbuilding Workers* (see State Research Bulletin No 13) is available from them at 85/87 Adelaide Terrace, Benwell, Newcastle Upon Tyne, NE4 8BB. Also available is the companion pamphlet, *Building a Chieftain Tank: and the Alternative*, published by the Vickers Combine Committee. Both 20p.

ARTICLES

Law and order

Could these Crimes have been Avoided? Robert Traini, Security Gazette, April 1980. Latest instalment in the private security industry's growing campaign against liberal bail laws.

Prisons cannot be run as Malefactors' Cooperatives, Jim Jardine, Police, March 1980. Police Federation chairman ventures into penal policy.

Military

SALT II and America's European allies / SALT II and the Dynamics of Arms Control, Lord Chalfont / Christoph Bertram, International Affairs, October 1979.

The Militarisation of Space, Frank Ashbeck, ADIU Report, April/May 1980.

Northern Ireland

Sir Maurice Oldfield's Secret War, Ed Moloney, Hibernia, April 24, 1980. Sceptical analysis of Oldfield's influence, written before the former head of MI6 quit as head of security in Northern Ireland.

Why the RUC is Ulster's Symbol of Survival, Basil Griffiths, Police, March 1980. Leading Police Federationist on the policing of Northern Ireland.

Ulster - Britain's Undeclared War. Eldon Griffiths, Police, April 1980. Federation's parliamentary "adviser" uses its magazine to expound his own theories.

Police: International

Forces of Disorder: How the Police Control 'riots', Robert Reiner, New Society, April 10, 1980. Comparative study of SPGs and their international equivalents.

INPOL: the West German Police Information System, George Wiesel, Police Studies, Vol 2 No 4 (Winter 1980). Detailed explanation of police use of computers in West Germany.

The Garda Siochana: Eire's National Police, Hugh J.B. Cassidy, Police Studies, Vol 2 No 4 (Winter 1980).

Third Force, Charles Nelson, Police Journal, April-June 1980. A serving British police officer compares quasi-military policing in Britain, France and West Germany.

Police: organisation

Countryman: a Failed Harvest? Ian Will, Police Review, April 18, 1980. Former Met officer examines the current corruption probe.

Policing the County with the Richest Pickings of All, Anthony Davis, Security Gazette, May 1980. Profile of Peter Matthews, chief constable of Surrey since 1968.

Police: powers

An Impossibly Acrobatic Feat, Rob Rohrer, New Statesman, April 18, 1980. Analyses the evidence that didn't come out at the Jimmy Kelly inquest.

After Kelly, Michael Meacher, New Society, April 3, 1980. Labour MP draws conclusions about patterns of police violence.

Giving It Arrest, Martin Kettle, New Society, April 3, 1980. Examination of the first reliable nationwide arrest figures ever published.

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The Sweetey: a Soft Cop, Tim Gopsill, Leveller 37, (April 1980). Police in the classroom.

You are Gambling with Public Safety, Joe Martucci, Police, April 1980. Federation secretary attacks South Yorkshire county council for cutting police expenditure.

You're Still Wonderful, Brian Hilliard, Police Review, March 28, 1980. Analyses recent surveys of public attitudes towards the police.

Community Policing in West Yorkshire, Daniel J. McKane, Police Journal, April-June 1980. An American police view of community policing methods.

Society and Social Work Training and Practice, Harry D. Orriss, Police Journal, April-June 1980. Critical examination of social workers' attitudes to policing and society.

Public Order

Call for New Powers to Ban Marches, Police Review, March 21, 1980. Chief constable of Thames Valley demands abolition of local authority constraints on police powers to ban marches.

Security industry

Does Private Security Reflect the Police? John Alderson, International Security Review. April 1980. Chief constable of Devon and Cornwall on the security industry.

Security services

The D Notice Quagmire, Duncan Campbell, New Statesman, April 4, 1980. First salvo in major new campaign against government news manipulation.

CONTENTS

News	113
Bristol: Police Reactions	
BSC's New Boss	
How SAS Ended the Princes Gate Siege	
Transport Police Plans Special Patrol Group	
New Developments at Porton Down	
Three Police Guilty after 14,014 Complaints	
The Defence Estimates	
London: Bill Aims for Police Accountability	
Britain: A U.S. Air Base?	
S. Yorks: Police Criticised	
Agee Harassed	
Operation Fire	
Background Paper	131
Telephone Tapping	
Reviews and Sources	136

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