

STATE RESEARCH

**BULLETIN
No. 22**

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**NEWS &
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STORNOWAY: RESISTANCE TO NATO EXPANSION

The Ministry of Defence will have to defend its plans for expansion of Stornoway airport in the Western Isles at a local planning hearing, as a result of vigorous opposition. The hearing was announced by the Secretary of State for Scotland, George Younger, on December 30, 1980. It will only consider objections on planning grounds – consideration of issues of national defence or Britain's role in NATO have been ruled out from the start, which has angered local people opposed to the plans.

The main concern is that the Ministry of Defence intends to turn Stornoway into a full NATO base which would replace the Keflavik base in Iceland if that country withdrew from NATO. (It is believed that in the early 1960s, Stornoway was to be developed as a full base but that difficulties arose gaining access to fuel.)

The airport, now primarily in civilian use (it is leased to the Civil Aviation Authority), was acquired by the government in 1939 under the Requisitioning Act for, as local crofters recall, ungenerous compensation. It is used as an emergency stand-by base for NATO.

The plans for expansion were first announced by the Ministry of Defence in August 1977 and comprised mainly a 1,200 feet extension to the present 6,000 feet runway, which was described by the Ministry as being 'vital for operational requirements in the event of hostilities.' Planning clearance was sought from Comhairle nan Eilean (Western Isles

Council) and was granted in October 1977. It was withdrawn in mid 1978 once councillors began to realise the full implications of the plans and after extensive objections had been made by several local organisations and individuals. By 1979 the expansion plans had themselves been expanded to include a further runway extension, the construction of a parallel runway, improved lighting and fuel storage tanks. (*The Scotsman*, 1.6.79)

By December 1979 it had become known that a mile-long undersea pipeline was also to be built, allowing tankers to feed fuel direct from the sea to the airport (*The Scotsman*, 6.12.79) and in the same month the Ministry of Defence announced that it also planned to build 30 feet high hardened aircraft shelters to protect NATO aircraft from enemy attack. (*The Scotsman*, 17.12.79)

Opposition to the plans is widespread and includes both the local Labour and Scottish National Parties, the local SNP MP Donald Stewart (Western Isles) and a local Keep NATO Out group. Objections are numerous.

The first is to Stornoway becoming an eventual replacement for Keflavik in the event of an Icelandic withdrawal from NATO. The threat of this, or withdrawal of NATO facilities, is less now than several years ago, when an increased left-wing presence in the government led to discussions about a phased NATO withdrawal. Nevertheless, NATO facilities on Iceland continue to be negotiated on a year to year basis and it is conceivable that Iceland will at some point withdraw them. NATO would then require a fall-back base to cover the North Atlantic and the only alternative in such a situation would be Stornoway, a site, as local people point out, which is 'cheap' in terms of its social and environmental cost.

This is emphatically denied by the Ministry of Defence, which says that the airport would act only as a forward operating base in times of hostilities or international tension, particularly to protect Polaris installations in the west of Scotland for example, at Holy Loch, from a Russian

airstrike coming through the 'northern gap' between Iceland and Britain from Murmansk. In peacetime, say the Ministry, Stornoway would only serve as an exercise base for aircraft such as the Phantom, Nimrod and Tornado.

Even if Keflavik remains the main NATO base for the area the north west of Scotland is of considerable importance to current military thinking. It is crucial, in official thinking, as a base for short range surveillance of Soviet activity in the north Atlantic. Its proximity to the north Atlantic allows increased aircraft range and it would in any case act as a recovery point for the new Tornado aircraft which will probably be based at Leuchars on the east coast of Scotland.

In *NATO Review* (No 2, April 1980) Nils Orvik, Director of the Queen's Centre for International Relations, Kingston, Canada, argued that 'with the high rate of nationalist/socialist sentiments in Iceland and Greenland it would seem politically unwise and unduly risky to try to make any drastic changes in either the size or the function of these bases. A possible alternative would be to establish a new NATO base on some British-owned site either in Britain itself or in the island area north of Scotland.' Such a base 'would also, by its very existence, demonstrate Western determination to put up an effective and credible defence of the whole area.' The article adds that a new Northern NATO base was first proposed in 1975 at a conference organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Reykjavik.

Local people remain highly sceptical of official assurances, arguing that they have heard it all before, especially in the case of the missile testing ranges on Benbecula since the mid-1950s. They argue too that even if Stornoway did not replace Keflavik, Ministry of Defence plans must lead to a greatly increased presence on the island; and they point not only to the extension of the plans themselves, but also to the general experience of the highlands and islands with military expansionism. This has involved a gradual build up of military personnel and installations, including the missile testing

ranges on Benbecula and South Uist, a NATO fuelling point at Loch Ewe, an underwater testing range in the Inner Sound of Raasay and an Admiralty Marine Technical Establishment on the island of Rona.

Inevitably, there has been friction, most notably over the illegal detention of civilians on the island of Harris by NATO troops taking part in Exercise Whisky Galore in 1978 (see *Bulletin* No 8). A tourist to Rona was prevented from taking a photograph of a ferry alongside a pier and questioned by Defence Ministry personnel (*West Highland Free Press*, 11.11.77) and the military are known to have ejected other visitors from the island even though the Ministry of Defence have since said that there is no restriction on landing or freedom of movement on the island (*Glasgow Herald*, 10.9.79). A woman living in North Uist was reportedly interrogated by two Special Branch officers from Glasgow after she had complained about inconvenience caused by military exercises (*West Highland Free Press*, 16.6.78).

Many other objections are enunciated in a recent pamphlet, 'Islands At Risk', which covers the history of the islanders' struggle to prevent further disruption to their lives, available from Keep NATO Out, 5 Mill Road, Stornoway, Lewis, PA87 2TZ, price £1. Objectors feel that the island would become a prime military target; that there would be increased danger to the public from the transport and storage of weapons and fuel; the possibility of aircraft crashes would increase; there would be a massive increase in the level of noise; and there would be further restrictions on the use by local crofters and fishermen of natural resources.

Although the planning hearing is likely to bring the government and NATO some undesired publicity and embarrassment, in the end it could be little more than cosmetic, as ultimately the Ministry of Defence can proceed regardless of local opposition. The decision to exclude consideration of the broader political issues reinforces the irrelevance of the procedure.

According to a recent parliamentary

answer, the cost of the proposed development would be £40 million, £38.5m of which would be paid by 'NATO infrastructure funds' (*Hansard*, 19.1.81). Donald Stewart MP has said: 'With costs of that size we are not dealing with a side-show. This is a clear warning signal to the communities around Stornoway of the enormous scope of the Government's intentions' (*The Scotsman*, 13.5.80).

FRENCH POLICE: TRIGGER HAPPY

French Police

French police officers began 1981 as they ended 1980 – by shooting people. And police use of firearms has emerged as the central issue in a campaign for greater police accountability in France. The latest incident took place in Marseilles on 8 January, when two armed burglars were surprised by police and escaped with a hostage. A chase across the city ended with police killing the two burglars. A woman passer-by was also shot in the hip by a stray police bullet.

Compared with their British counterparts, French police are relatively trigger-happy. And this attitude brings its inevitable toll of mistaken and questionable killings. There has been a mounting toll of such incidents over the past year, in which identity checks on immigrant and young people have been prominent features.

- November 1979: Police in Orléans shoot 20 years-old Claude Francois whom they wrongly believe is driving a stolen car;
- 9 January 1980: Two Corsican separatists are shot dead in Ajaccio and a third person is wounded;
- 13 January: An Algerian, Yazid Naili, is shot dead by police in Bischheim during a burglary;
- 2 February: 16 years-old Algerian, Abdelkader Grib, is shot dead by police in Valenton, after a chase;
- 11 February: A policeman at Vallauris

accidentally shoots one of his colleagues dead during an anti-kidnapping operation;

- 19 March: A suspected burglar is shot dead at Muizon;
- 25 March: During a police raid on a cafe in Saintes, a customer is shot in the head;
- 9 April: Police at a roadblock at Trielfire on a car which fails to stop, killing an 18 years-old passenger;
- 3 May: A policeman at Luneville kills a 24 year-old man whom he had tried to stop;
- 7 June: Police officer in Luviers kills a 23 years-old drunken man;
- June: A police officer in Plombières kills a man who refuses to allow police to search his house for a wanted man;
- 30 June: Paris police open fire on a stolen car, killing a 20 year-old woman passenger;
- 19 October: A member of the CRS, Jean-Paul Taillefer, shoots dead a 17 year-old Moroccan, Lahouari Ben Mohammed, during an identity check in Marseilles;
- 11 October: Police in St Julien-en-Genevois fire without prior warning on seven young men who are tearing down flags which have been put up for a local visit by right-wing politician, Michel Debré;
- 13 November: A 26 year-old electrician, Michel Paris, fails to stop for speeding and is shot dead by police in St Macaire;
- 3 December: A Paris policeman shoots one of his colleagues dead during an arrest raid.

Critics trace the beginning of this recklessness to the policies adopted in 1974 by former interior minister, Michel Poniatowski. He encouraged police use of guns, while failing to investigate and punish police abuses. In particular, the October 1980 killing of the young Moroccan exposed the dangers which are caused by major police raids in immigrant areas. A raid in Lyons last year, similar to the Marseilles exercise in which Lahouari was killed, was the largest French police operation since the Algerian War.

But shootings are not the only issue. As in Britain, allegations of police brutality are common. Recent cases have included claims that Marseilles police beat up two men suspected of an armed robbery, that Rennes police beat up an arrested Breton militant

and that two Parisian brothers were beaten up by police who resented their allegation that traffic police failed to help the victim of a road accident by the Arc de Triomphe.

The French press now refers to such incidents as 'bavures' (smudges or unfortunate errors) on the police. The liberal weekly, *Nouvel Observateur* recently stated: 'Society gets the police it deserves. Our society hates and rejects immigrants and young people. It is to be expected, then, that their blood should overflow in these police 'errors''. And the influential *Le Monde* said last October: 'To have fear of one's police is already quite something. To know that it gets away scot free with whatever it does is too much to accept.'

Concern about 'bavures' has led to the formation in France of locally-based 'information committees on police activities', which have set themselves the task of collecting and publicising evidence of police abuses – and of providing support for victims of police violence. Such work runs risks. In Strasbourg last November, a member of the left-wing Lutte Ouvriere, Pierette Morinaud, was given a two-month suspended prison term and fined 4,000 francs (about £400) for 'public defamation of police administration' when she handed out leaflets attacking inaction over various police abuses.

The issue of police violence is inseparable from violence against the police. Up to last October, 44 police officers were killed since the start of 1977. At the funeral of the most recent victim (an officer shot dead by a paroled prisoner in a bar in a Paris suburb on 13 October), the interior minister, Christian Bonnet, said the killing showed the need for an increase in police powers, while right-wing police leaders claimed that it was due to the undermining of respect for the police caused by radical police trade unionists.

Bitter internal disputes are now taking place within French police unions. They have come to a head following the bombing of a Paris synagogue on 4 October 1980, in which four people died. Leaders of the two main unions claimed that the government

had advance knowledge of the bombing and that 30 of the 150 members on a list in government hands of members of the outlawed fascist organisation, FANE, were police officers.

The two union leaders are Jose Deltorn, general secretary of the *Syndicat National Autonome des Policiers en Civil* (SNAPC), and Henri Buch, general secretary of the *Federation Autonome des Syndicats de Police* (FASP). Between them, the two unions represent 80 per cent of French police. Their accusations were supported by the magistrates' union. But they have drawn defamation suits from Interior Minister Bonnet who says that the charges undermine 'the honour and dignity of the police' and stir 'trouble in the public mind.'

The government's action against the two unions has hastened moves towards their amalgamation, which will be discussed at congresses this year. The FASP is the largest independent police union outside France's two big political trade unions, the communist CGT and the socialist CFDT – both of which have their own police sections. As we reported in Bulletin 21, the FASP takes a highly critical stance towards extensions of European police co-operation.

MI5 USE COMMERCIAL COVER

Former police officers employed by firms trading with foreign countries, particularly with Warsaw Pact countries, are expected to report on their employers' activities to MI5, the internal Security Service. And police officers join firms trading with such countries on 'retirement' in order to acquire cover for intelligence work. That became clear from a statement issued in December last year by former Prime Minister Sir Harold Wilson, which was intended to clarify his relationship with the textile business owner Lord Kagan, who was jailed for ten months in December after admitting charges of theft and false accounting.

Sir Harold said in his statement that the

late Sir Arthur Young, then Commissioner of Police of the City of London, was carrying out enquiries into 'Russian activities' in Britain in the late 1960s. Lord (then Sir Joseph) Kagan introduced Sir Arthur to Richardas Vaiguskas, a Soviet diplomat apparently concerned with trade between Britain and the Soviet Union, but allegedly a KGB officer under cover. In order that Sir Arthur Young could continue his investigation of Russian activities, it was arranged, Sir Harold said, for him to join Gannex Ltd, Lord Kagan's firm, as a 'security advisor' on his retirement in 1971.

Sir Harold said in his statement:

'In his (Kagan's) contacts with the Soviet Trade delegation in Highgate in relation to possible exports to the Soviet Union there is no doubt that in common with chairmen and export directors of other British firms exporting or seeking to export to Russian he would be bound to meet Russians, so-called traders, who were in fact concerned with espionage, a fact which led Sir Alec Douglas Home in 1971 to expel 105 Russians from Britain, the majority, as he said, being Soviet trade mission employees. During all this period, Sir Arthur Young clearly used this to secure information on the Soviet trade-spy network.' (*Daily Express*, 19.12.80).

MI5's tasks, of course, include the surveillance of political and trade union activity which has nothing to do with foreign espionage, and which is entirely legal (See *Bulletin* no 20). It is thus highly probable that all 'retired' police officers acting as security advisors in industry make extensive reports on trade union activities to MI5.

SUS UNDER A NEW NAME

In May 1980 the Home Affairs Committee of the Commons recommended the abolition of 'sus', Section 4 of the 1824 Vagrancy Act. The Committee found in evidence submitted that the offence was

largely used by only three police forces – the Metropolitan Police, West Midlands and Merseyside – and that a high proportion of those arrested for ‘sus’ were young black people. In London half of the arrests for ‘sus’ were young black people (see, ‘“Sus”, a report on section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824,’ by Clare Demuth, Runnymede trust, 1978). The government accepted the recommendations of the Committee and last December published the Criminal Attempts Bill which abolishes most of Section 4 of the 1824 Act. However, the Bill introduces new offences which could be used in much the same way as the old ‘sus’ law.

Under Section 4 of the 1824 Act, which was only triable in a magistrates’ court, not before a jury, a person could be arrested if they were either a ‘suspected person’ (having a known criminal record) and loitering with intent, or were loitering and acting suspiciously on two separate occasions. This charge was used extensively against young black youth to ‘get them off the streets’. Not all of Section 4 is to be abolished though; the sub-section dealing with the use of offensive weapons on private premises remains. In one recent case a West Indian woman, who was making sandwiches in her kitchen, was arrested for having a bread-knife when the police came to arrest her son.

While on the face of it ‘sus’ is to disappear, even **Police Review** commented that the Bill was ‘conceived in haste’ and ‘gives the police a wider power of arrest than they ever wanted’ (16.1.81). The new substantive offence created under the Bill, only triable in magistrates courts, is interference with motor vehicles (Section 9), which is clear-cut in definition. But Section 9(4) proposes the following power of arrest: ‘A constable may arrest without warrant anyone who is or whom he with reasonable cause suspects to be guilty of an offence under this section’. **Police Review** says that this loophole could easily lead officers to ‘interpret “reasonable cause” in a manner calculated to produce nervous breakdowns’. Section 1(1) of the Bill is an attempt to clarify the law on attempt, but

one which is likely to lead to little practical effect. It makes a statutory offence of attempt: ‘If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act which goes so far towards the commission of that offence as to be more than a **merely preparatory act**, he is guilty of attempting to commit the offence’. This section is clearly open to as much abuse as the old ‘sus’ law if police forces so choose.

Under the much criticised Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act most charges were brought for suspected theft from the person, theft of vehicles, or theft from premises. Most charges brought against young black people were suspected theft from persons which were only triable in magistrates courts. Police in the three major forces who widely used the ‘sus’ law preferred this charge to that of ‘attempted theft’ (a common law offence) because this allows the right of trial by jury.

The abolition of the ‘sus’ law is not going to change the basic racism of the police and the new Bill will (especially sections 1(1), and 9(4)) do little to stop persistent harassment on the streets which is the commonplace experience of young blacks.

NATIONALITY BILL: STATUTORY RACISM

The British Nationality Bill, published on 13 January, would replace the present citizenship of the United Kingdom and colonies with three new classes of citizenship. Present citizens of the UK and Colonies (CUKCs) would either become British citizens, citizens of British Dependent Territories or British Overseas Citizens. British citizens would be those people born in the United Kingdom to a parent who is a British citizen or who is settled here. Citizens of British Dependent Territories would be those born in dependent territories. All other CUKCs would become British Overseas Citizens. Only British citizens (and Commonwealth citizens settled here) would have the right of

entry and abode in the UK. Citizens of British Dependent Territories would have a right of entry to one dependency while British Overseas Citizens would have no right of entry anywhere.

The transfer and acquisition of citizenship would be strictly controlled. It would no longer be sufficient to be born in the UK to become a British citizen but a person would have to have a British parent or a parent settled here. Settled is not defined in the bill and it is far from clear what it would mean. People born to parents in the UK temporarily or here under conditions would only become British citizens after ten years continuous residence. (The original bill would have conferred citizenship on such people only if their parents subsequently became settled or acquired British citizenship. The change was contained in an amendment tabled by the Government after Opposition pressure, between second reading and the Committee stage of the Bill.)

The Bill's provisions would almost certainly require the introduction of new formal after-entry or internal controls. At present a valid birth certificate is sufficient to obtain a British passport. The new law would mean either a more complicated method of obtaining a passport, presumably including checks on status, or different types of birth certificate indicating the immigration status of the child. This in turn would lead to demands for passports and other immigration documents to be produced from any people who were not obviously white and therefore thought to be immigrants.

This is presumably what the White Paper on British Nationality Law referred to when it spoke of 'some administrative and practical difficulties' of which a further study was being made.

The new law would greatly increase the discretionary powers of the Home Secretary who would have a virtually unlimited power to grant or refuse citizenship to substantial numbers of people. In the case of naturalisation applicants for citizenship would have to show they were of 'good

character'. This is not defined and is most unlikely to be so in the future. The White Paper rejected the idea of introducing an objective test or objective criteria on the grounds that there were 'people who have not been before the courts but who are known to be engaged in criminal or other undesirably activities, who are heavily in debt, or whose activities are open to objection on grounds of public order or national security'. The White Paper also expressed objection to the idea of granting citizenship to those whom it described as 'people of dubious reputation . . . known to be working against the interests of this country, or to have no sense of loyalty to it.'

Applicants would also to have to have lived in the UK for 5 years with no more than 15 months spent abroad during that period and would also have to show a 'sufficient knowledge' of the English or Welsh language and an intention to live in the UK. Most important, perhaps, they must not have been in breach of immigration law during the period of their stay. This is of crucial importance given recent judicial decisions which have ruled that people are 'illegal immigrants' years after they came to Britain, in particular the catch-all case of Zamir which ruled that immigrants owe a 'positive duty of candour' obliging them to provide information even if not asked and even if they believe honestly that the information to be of no relevance. The bill specifically rules out the possibility of any appeal or review of the Home Secretary's decisions.

The effect of the new law would be to ground in the law of nationality and citizenship the institutional racism of British immigration law and would permit the government to remove the racist concept of patriality from immigration law because it had been transferred to citizenship. This in turn would become the new basis for immigration. The resulting citizenship would be predominantly white with many people being given a worthless 'citizenship' which carried with it no real rights whatsoever.

CHALLENGE TO POLICE DETENTION

On December 8 last year the High Court ruled that however serious the offence a person taken into custody should be charged and brought before a court within 48 hours (*Times Law Report*, 8.12.80). Furthermore they ruled that as soon as enough evidence was available to the police to bring a charge then this should be done. The ruling was made after an application for an order of habeas corpus for the release of two men who had been held for four days without being charged.

The two men, Sherman and Apps, were arrested by the Metropolitan Police on November 18 in connection with alleged handling of goods from a recent robbery. However, although the police had sufficient evidence to bring charges on this count they did not do so because the Metropolitan and the Hertfordshire forces wanted to question them about a further 100 burglaries over a three-year period. If police had charged the two, they would have to have been brought to court, and questioned no further.

The men's solicitors applied to the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus and two judges, Justice Donaldson and Justice Hodgson, gave the arresting officer 90 minutes to get back to Kentish Town police station and charge the men, which he did. The habeas corpus application then became unnecessary, and the hearing adjourned. The judges said that the arresting officer had been completely frank and was doing his duty as he saw fit. 'If that was right any criticism should be directed not at Sergeant Holmes but at those in command of the Metropolitan police whose systems and standing orders had allowed such a situation to arise' (*op.cit*). When the hearing was resumed on December 8, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir David NcNee, was represented.

Two questions concerned the judges – the disregarding of principle (d) of the Judges' Rules 1964, which state that a charge should be brought 'without delay' once enough

evidence was available, and disregard for Section 38(4) of the Magistrates' Court 1952, which states that where a person is brought into custody without a warrant 'he shall be brought before a magistrates' court as soon as practicable'. The court was told that the Commissioner was critical of principle (d) of the Judges' Rules; however, the judges ruled that whatever the Commissioner thought of the Rules 'amendment must be achieved in a constitutional manner and *not by a process of modification in practice*' (our emphasis).

On the second aspect the Commissioner told the court that he had made representations to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure asking that a person could be detained in custody for up to 72 hours before being presented in court. Furthermore, the Commissioner said that statistics specially prepared for the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure showed that only 212, or 0.43%, of people arrested in the survey period were held for more than 72 hours before being brought before a court. Their Lordships commented in reply that no figures were available for those detained for more than 48 hours but clearly this figure would be higher and that: 'The percentage might be tiny, but *the court was concerned with people, not percentages*' (our emphasis).

Sir David argued that he had told the Royal Commission that an aggrieved person could always apply for a writ of habeas corpus and that this legal remedy had 'by no means' fallen into disuse with 55 applications being made in 1977. Very few of these were successful; most lawyers advise against such applications as the courts rarely find against the police. On this point their lordships were even more adamant. However real this potential legal recourse was, they said, '*Habeas corpus was a remedy for an abuse of power and it should rarely be necessary to invoke it*' (our emphasis).

On both counts therefore the judges found that in this case the officer 'appeared to display a complete disregard of the fundamental principle of common law' that the police should without delay prefer a

charge against a suspect as soon as they had enough evidence. Their judgement, which has not been further challenged by the Commissioner, means that however serious the offence the police must bring a suspect before the court within 48 hours and extends the statutory provision in the Magistrates Courts Act 1952 that if the offence is not serious and the suspect cannot be brought before the court in 24 hours then bail must be granted – a provision often abused by the police.

The principle of habeas corpus pre-dates the Magna Carta. In the fourteenth century, the modern function of the writ itself emerged. 'The most celebrated safeguard of the liberty of the subject is the prerogative writ of habeas corpus', writes one of Britain's leading constitutional lawyers ('Constitutional and Administrative Law, S.A. de Smith, Penguin, 1977). The principle is that a person subject to invalid or excessive physical restraint may sue or prosecute for assault or false imprisonment. So deeply embedded in the traditions of common law is the principle of habeas corpus that applications have priority over all other business, in the courts and if prime face grounds are demonstrated that detention is unlawful, it is up to the police to show cause why the writ for release should not be made.

In the light of the judgement in the above case and the historical struggles, especially during the last century, to provide legal safeguards against unlawful detention, it is interesting to look at the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure which were published in January. The Commission makes but two slight references to habeas corpus each emphasising its ineffectiveness (paras 3.95 and 3.108). Instead of seeking to strengthen the principle of habeas corpus the Commission has proposed a system that will make habeas even more redundant, placing even more powers in the hands of the police. It proposes that after six hours a senior officer should review whether a suspect should be detained, that after 24 hours if not charged a suspect should be brought before a magistrate, and that if not charged after a

further 24 hours the suspect should again be brought before a magistrate. Given the propensity of magistrates to follow police 'advice' this recommendation could, if made law, lead to unlimited periods of detention.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF SAS ACTIVITY

Constitutional, legal and political problems raised by the way in which soldiers of the Army's Special Air Services Regiment, the SAS, ended the siege of the Iranian Embassy in Princes Gate, London, in May 1980, have not been at all clarified by the trial of the one surviving gunman and the inquest on the five who died. The Government would evidently like the matter to be considered at an end. Dennis Canavan, Labour MP for West Stirling, recently asked Attorney General Sir Michael Havers in the Commons whether the soldiers who were sent in to end the siege were granted immunity from prosecution (*Guardian*, 10.2.81); Sir Michael replied that he was 'horrified' by the question.

Mr Canavan said:

'I think the armed forces have an unenviable task in dealing with terrorists. Do you agree that it would be a deplorable legal precedent in this country for members of the armed forces to be given immunity from prosecution for carrying out summary execution of terrorists especially after they have given themselves up? Was there any such immunity from prosecution or was any order for summary execution approved by you or the Home Secretary in the case of the raid on the Iranian Embassy?'

Sir Michael did not deny either of Mr Canavan's allegations. He replied:

'I am horrified by that question. There was a certain amount of evidence but the matter has been reviewed in part at the trial at the Old Bailey. So far as I am concerned, the courage and determination shown by those involved

which saved an unknown number of lives and innocent hostages, is a matter of pride for us all. I especially would like to add my admiration for the conduct of police officer Trevor Lock.'

Replying to Sir Hugh Fraser, a Conservative MP and former SAS member, Sir Michael said that the evidence was reviewed by the Director of Public Prosecutions and himself. 'There was no basis on which proceedings in relation to the death of the terrorists could have been justified,' he said. He told John Morris, Shadow Attorney General, that the criteria for prosecution were the same in all cases.

In fact, most of the evidence of the role of the SAS came not at the Old Bailey trial of the surviving gunman, Fowzi Nejad, but at the inquest at Westminster Coroner's Court into the deaths of his five associates. The verdicts of justifiable homicide which the jury gave in these five cases amount to the main legitimisation of the role of the SAS and of the government's policy towards the use of troops in such situations.

The prosecution counsel at the trial of Nejad said: 'There is no doubt that the soldiers were shooting to kill. That is what soldiers are trained to do' (*Guardian*, 23.1.81). But in law, the soldiers would not have been justified in shooting to kill unless they had been fired on, or were genuinely convinced that the terrorists were going to kill them or hostages. As the SAS attack began, three or four of the gunmen opened fire on the hostages; one was killed and others wounded. But according to hostages Ron Morris and Ali Tabatabai the gunmen then put down their weapons. Nevertheless, they were shot (*Guardian*, 23.1.81). That they had previously murdered is not legal grounds for shooting them. The murder charge against Nejad was withdrawn, and he pleaded guilty to manslaughter and kidnapping. It was the Coroner's jury which was asked to decide whether the circumstances of the deaths amounted to justifiable homicide. On the basis of statements from ten anonymous soldiers, they did so. Both the jury in the Nejad trial – which was not in the event asked to give a verdict – and the inquest jury were almost

certainly vetted by the authorities. Terrorist cases are specifically mentioned in the Attorney General's guidelines on vetting (See *Bulletin* no 15).

Both trial and inquest demonstrated how determined action by the security forces, and sympathetic treatment from the courts, can frustrate any possibility that court proceedings can discover the truth about an incident in which violence is used by the police or the Army. Some of these defects surfaced during the inquest into the death of Blair Peach and are set out in 'Licence to Kill', by David Ransom, published by the Friends of Blair Peach Committee.

The problem centres on the fact that members of a uniformed, disciplined force can co-ordinate their statements to an inquest, whereas other witnesses cannot. It is not known when the statements given to police by the SAS soldiers involved in the Embassy operation were taken, but it is unlikely to have been before they had participated in the usual de-briefing session which takes place after every military operation. It is thus not surprising that the soldiers' statements were consistent, whereas those of the hostages were not. The inference which the Coroner, Dr Paul Knapman, asked the jury to draw from this was that the SAS statements were to be believed, and those of the hostages were not.

Unconcealed pressure was brought to bear on the inquest jury by Dr Knapman, in a summing-up which attracted wide publicity, at all costs to bring in a verdict of justifiable homicide. This pressure was only part of the steps which the authorities appear to have taken in order that the manner of the ending of the siege and the subsequent court cases should on the one hand arouse as little public concern as possible, but on the other should demonstrate that armed action in pursuit of political ends will not succeed, and will possibly have fatal consequences.

In *Bulletin* no 18, we reviewed the situation as it appeared immediately after the siege ended. Two questions raised then are still unanswered. The first was raised by Mr Canavan: the orders which were given to

the SAS unit which ended the siege, and in particular whether their actions were restricted by something like the 'yellow card' procedure officially followed by British troops in Northern Ireland. At neither trial nor inquest was there any questioning of senior military commanders of the unit involved. The police officer in charge of the siege, Deputy Assistant Commissioner John Dellow, gave only his reasons for deciding that the police could no longer handle the situation and that the Army had to be called in. This, he said, was because the police thought that two hostages had already been shot, and that the gunmen were preparing to murder others. (*Guardian*, 4.2.81). There was no mention of what orders which they were given in the soldiers' statements.

The Coroner told the jury 'not to bother with the details' of the statements, but the manner in which the gunmen met their deaths needs detailed examination.

Shot after apprehension

Salim, the gunmen's leader, was shot by soldiers identified as HH and J as he was fighting with PC Trevor Lock, the Diplomatic Protection Group officer who was one of the hostages. As he was apparently trying to reach for his gun, they entered the room where the two men were. HH said that he fired 'a long burst' from his automatic weapon, and J also said that he fired at Salim. From these two bursts, Salim was wounded by fifteen bullets (*Guardian*, 4.2.81).

The second gunman, Abbas, was seen by J apparently carrying a Browning pistol, and fired at him. J made no mention of any challenge to the man to drop the weapon. The gunman retreated into a room, and J described how a light was brought, and he was seen lying on a couch holding a gun. J fired at him again; soldiers HH, G and S also fired at him. G said that he recognised the man from a photofit picture, which had presumably been constructed from interrogation of the hostages released during the early stages of the siege. No Browning pistol was found. Abbas' gun may

have been an air pistol, which was found. Abbas was hit by 21 bullets.

A third gunman, Shai, was shot by soldier LL, who had entered the Embassy through an upper window. Shai retreated to the telex room where several of the hostages were being held. Soldier LL said that he saw a grenade in Shai's hand, and that 'he was moving to detonate it' (*Guardian*, 4.2.81). LL fired a single shot, which killed Shai. The pathologist who gave evidence at the inquest, Dr Ian West, said that Shai had been killed by a bullet which had entered behind his ear, and exited through his right temple, but said that it could not have been fired at close range.

One of the hostages, Abbas Fellahi, said that he had seen soldiers holding Shai and another man in the telex room. Another hostage, Ali Tabatabai, said at the Nejad trial that he had seen a soldier hold a gunman against a wall in the telex room. 'I heard him say "Bastard" through his mask. He held him to a wall and shot him through the neck,' he said (*Guardian*, 22.1.81). Mr Tabatabai thought that this was another gunman, Faisal.

In an apparent attempt to influence the inquest jury to ignore such evidence, Dr Knapman appealed directly to prejudice: 'I found his evidence confused and I think there was a certain amount of language difficulty,' he commented in his summing up on Mr Fellahi's evidence (*New Standard*, 4.2.81).

The fourth gunman, Makki, was also shot after being taken into custody. He was, according to soldier VV, the commander of the raid, lying flat on the floor in the same telex room, being searched by another soldier, CC, when he made a move, and was shot in the back by VV. He then rolled over and was shot again, in the chest, by another soldier.

CC said that he saw Makki's movement, and that he had a holster and a magazine. He thought that Makki might shoot him, though it seems equally possible that the gunman was attempting to indicate the weaponry in order to avoid giving the impression that he was still resisting (*Guardian*, 4.2.81).

Abbas Fellahi said that two terrorists were 'shot where they sat', against the wall in the telex room (**Sunday Times** 11.5.80). Another hostage, Pakistani journalist Muhammad Farugi, said that he saw a terrorist shot while sitting on the floor of that room (**Observer**, 11.5.80).

The fifth gunman, Faisal, described as the leader of the group, was shot 39 times after he had been taken into custody and was being escorted downstairs from the telex room. Lance-Corporal I said that he saw what he thought was a grenade in Faisal's hand, and clubbed him to the ground, where he was then shot by at least four other soldiers. (**Guardian**, 4.2.81). A grenade was produced which was said to be in Faisal's hand (**New Standard**, 4.2.81). No questions were asked about the advisability or otherwise of shooting a man, standing very near, holding a grenade which he might have primed.

Dr Knapman asked the jury:

'Imagine therefore, the SAS, coming across their enemy, the terrorists. They would not know if they had concealed grenades or weapons. Imagine them peering through the smoke and seeing the enemy and ask yourself whether it is not necessary to shoot first and ask questions afterwards. The SAS took no chances' (**New Standard**, 4.2.81).

But hostages said that the SAS had had a great deal of time to ask questions, and had mainly been asking who the gunmen were (**Sunday Times**, 11.5.80). Nejad survived because he was not identified to the SAS as a gunman by the hostages; his identity only became known when he was outside the building.

The operation inside the embassy was not a split-second movie climax. The SAS were in control of the building for nearly forty minutes. The answer to Dr Knapman's question must be that legally, it is never right to shoot first and ask questions later. The 'yellow card' restrictions were introduced in Northern Ireland because it became obvious that the Army were doing that.

Thus there was no suitable forum into which the questions raised by the ending of the

siege could be aired. Two other important questions could not conceivably have been raised at either trial or inquest; the international background to the siege, and the tacit agreement between western governments about the handling of situations in which hostages are taken.

The International Background

The gunmen were trained and financed by the Iraqi government, Nejad said in a statement read at his trial (**Guardian**, 22.1.81). All six came from Iranian Khuzestan, but were opposed to the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini. Like most of the population of Iran's southwestern province, they were Arabs. They were recruited, after they had fled to Baghdad, by a separatist leader, Sayed Hami. Nejad was given a government job, and was trained for the attack on the London Embassy. After arriving in London, the gunmen were provided with weapons and money by a man known as Sami, who held 'some position with the Iraqi Army', according to Nejad's defence Counsel, Richard du Cann QC (**Guardian**, 23.1.81). Sami fled and was traced to a government office in Baghdad (**Sunday Times**, 11.5.80). The weapons were almost certainly brought into the country in an Iraqi diplomatic bag.

In May 1980, the Iraqis were planning the invasion of south west Iran which was launched in September. Arab diplomatic sources in London suggest that the assault on the Iranian Embassy was intended to convince public opinion that the Arabs or Khuzestan were so disenchanted with Ayatollah Khomeini that it was morally right for Iraq to invade and to liberate their fellow Arabs. In the event, the total lack of support for the Iraqi invasion from Iranian Arabs exposed this as an empty claim.

The invasion was cleared in advance with the Saudis, and through them with the British and the Americans. The Saudis tacitly backed Iraq; King Hussein of Jordan, who is kept on his throne by overt US and British backing, did so openly.

Radical Arab states have backed Iran. Some Arab diplomatic sources have

suggested that the attack on the Embassy, intended to prepare the ground for the invasion, might also have been known to sections of the British security services. According to Nejad, the Iraqis told the gunmen that they would not be killed because the British police were unarmed. But they must have been aware that the British government has agreed with other western governments that concessions will never be made to those who take hostages. (See **Bulletin** no 18).

The only way in which the gunmen could have survived would have been by unconditional surrender. By convincing them that they would be allowed to leave Britain if they pressed their demands, the Iraqis condemned the gunmen to certain death. If the SAS, possibly granted the sort of immunity from prosecution which Mr Canavan asked about in the Commons, had actually killed all the gunmen, there would have been no evidence of the Iraqi connection; in official Iraqi eyes, the operation would have been complete success.

But Nejad survived. His statements about official Iraqi involvement, and the tracking of Sami to Baghdad, rather spoilt this. The role of the Iraqis was exposed; the role of the British authorities, as usual, remains unclear. but the activities of the SAS were almost certainly illegal.

PHONE TAPPING IN IRELAND

Telephone tapping without warrant is being carried on in the Irish Republic on a widespread scale according to a recent report. In the December issue of the magazine *Magill*, Frank Doherty, a former Technical Officer with the Northern Ireland Region of the Post Office states that telephone tapping is being carried out from the Observation Centre on the top floor of the GPO building in central Dublin as well as at exchanges in Cork, Portlaoise, Galway, Limerick and other places.

Among those tapped by the Special Branch are said to be prominent republicans

such as Ruairi O Bradaigh and David O'Connell, trade unionists such as Michael Mullen, General Secretary of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union and Philip Flynn, Assistant General Secretary of the Local Government and Public Services Union, and other such as Kadar Asmal, a prominent civil liberties activist and Joe Costello of the Prisoners Rights Association. A number of journalists are also listed.

The article says that the legality of telephone interception in the Republic must remain dubious. The subject has not been tested in court and politicians have given differing authorities for their actions, with both the Post Office Act 1908 and the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1926 being cited. No figures have been issued detailing the number of warrants and Post and Telegraph department sources say that this is at least partially because such details would show the number of warrants to be low, and indicate that most tapping is being done without warrant.

NEWS

Pressure for Privacy Law

The parliamentary Home Affairs Committee strongly criticised inaction on legislation for privacy in a report published in December. The committee examined a number of recent dealings with matters which are the responsibility of the Home Office, including the Younger report on privacy published in 1972, two White Papers on computers and privacy published in 1975 and the Lindop Committee report on data protection published in 1978. Each report stressed the necessity of legislation and, in the case of the Lindop report, the urgency of legislation so as to keep pace with technological developments and developments in other countries.

The Home Affairs Committee said that it was made clear in evidence that the Home Office attached no great priority to

legislation on technical surveillance devices and that all that was under consideration were the proposals of the Lindop committee and the control of private detectives. The committee's report concluded with an expression of dissatisfaction at the Home Office's failure to take seriously the work of the various committees. (*Home Office Reports*, HC 23, November 1980)

The *Guardian* reported at the same time that a long delayed Home Office report on legislation on data protection was being circulated within Whitehall but was meeting considerable resistance, the central point of contention being the unwillingness of the Home Office to accept the Lindop committee recommendation for a powerful data protection authority with powers of inspection and enforcement (6.12.80). The Home Office view was said to be rooted in support for the police view that police computer systems should be exempt from the scope of any such authority and free from any constraints of privacy laws.

CBW

The process of softening up the British public to accept chemical and biological

warfare (CBW) took a further step forward in December following two statements by the then Defence Secretary Francis Pym (John Nott replaced Pym in the January 5 Cabinet reshuffle).

Pym, supported by articles in the *Daily Telegraph* (eg, January 13) has constantly claimed that a CBW capability is necessary because of offensive moves by the USSR in this field. The *Guardian*, however, drawing on the work of the Sussex University Science Policy Research Unit, has shown in two major articles (December 18 and January 5) that Russia built up its CBW stocks in the past largely in response to similar moves by the USA, and that there is little evidence to suggest that Russia is anticipating initiating a CBW-based conflict.

Britain does not officially possess stocks of chemical and biological weapons but the USA does. These are now coming to the end of their shelf lives (the last are claimed to have been manufactured in 1969) and part of the present manoeuvring is aimed at justifying their replacement. (See *Bulletins* nos 17 and 18 for the last episode of the Nato campaign to legitimise CBW.)

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

BACKGROUND PAPER

The election of Ronald Reagan brought to power a man of the extreme right. Reagan's campaign was supported and engineered by a fearsome array of right-wing groups espousing some truly neanderthal political positions. In this background paper we examine the likely effects on Britain and America's other NATO allies, and look at the different pressures of the extremist 'new' Right and the establishment Right on

the Reagan administration. The origins of Reagan's militarism lie in the persistent lobbying of a well-placed coalition of right-wingers, Democrats and Republicans who had already succeeded in pushing Carter into substantially similar policies to those espoused by Reagan. The top Reagan appointments are experienced Republican figures, and these appointments have already been denounced by key figures in the campaign. So it is by no means clear how the neanderthal politics of the Reagan campaign will translate into policy in Washington.

On economic policy, the electoral promises of 10% tax cuts for three years advocated by economists such as David Stockman, the new White House budget

director, are already opposed by Reagan's appointee to the top economic policy post, Treasury Secretary, Donald Regan. Regan for ten years the head of the largest US stock exchange firm Merrill Lynch, adopts the traditional Republican position of balanced cuts in taxes and public expenditure. Since immediate cuts in government spending are not possible without legislative approval from the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, immediate tax cuts on a large scale seem unlikely. Then there is a contradiction in cutting expenditure between the intention to expand military budgets, the largest component of federal spending, and cutting overall government spending. Even if effective overall cuts in government are made, the Thatcher government's experience is that anyway such cuts do not transfer resources to productive activity in the private sector, but simply cut production and employment. Given the economic weight of the United States in international trade, such loss of production and jobs means reduced exports, production and jobs for America's major trading partners in Europe and Japan. This interdependence of the major capitalist economies would produce disastrous consequences if the Reagan administration repeats the economic policies of recent British governments. However, the senior figures of the new administration have recently emphasised this interdependence, and the most probable prognosis is that the Reagan team will fail to cut both the overall government budget and the budget deficit in the immediate future.

The military budget will increase, but the Radical Right has also been critical of the appointment of Caspar Weinberger to head the Pentagon. Weinberger controlled the California budget while Reagan was governor and moved on to Washington under Nixon and Ford, earning the nickname 'Cap the Knife'. Weinberger, however, like all the appointees, is committed to large increases in military spending.

Foreign policy will be under the thumb of General Alexander Haig; as Secretary of

State, Haig demonstrates the essential continuity of the Reagan administration with its Republican predecessors. Haig owes his standing to Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. President Ford appointed him to be Supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe, where he strove mightily for the commitment to a minimum three per cent real increase in military spending by NATO governments.

Haig's record, which we will describe further below, combined with Secretary Weinberger's and CIA director William Casey's commitment to rebuilding US military strength and covert action assets, and replacing 'human rights' with 'international terrorism' as primary emphases in foreign policy, suggests that American interventionism in support of its alliances with dictators and right-wing forces will escalate dramatically.

Problems for Reagan

The new administration is faced with the necessity to consolidate a US domestic consensus behind aggressive foreign policies. Even if it does this, helped by the now-Republican controlled Senate, which under the constitution must ratify treaties and advise on foreign policy, there is likely to be considerable criticism from America's allies.

Then there is the fact that neither military intervention, as in Vietnam, nor covert intervention necessarily work for the US. Haig has stressed as top priority the need to 'strengthen and integrate more effectively the Atlantic Community so as to really concert our policies . . . sharing perceptions and intelligence and information from which a common set of policies can evolve' (Interview with Michael Leeden, editor of Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies' *Washington Quarterly*, and Arnaud de Borchgrave, both members of the new Committee for the Free World, see below; *Washington Star*, 1.2.81).

So we can expect increased American pressure to the Right throughout Europe both directly and through NATO,

combining Cold War rhetoric with military assertiveness. European popular and governmental resistance will significantly reduce the ability of American foreign policy makers to act more 'effectively' than the Carter administration.

In the Ledeen/de Borchgrave interview, Haig was asked:

'Q: Has the time come for NATO and Japan to co-ordinate with other pro-Western countries for the defence of Western interests outside the NATO area? Shouldn't the Persian Gulf be declared an essential Western interest, and not simply an American responsibility?

Haig: Whether NATO as an organisation decides to deal with these problems outside its geographical area, it will be affected by them. And while I do not foresee in the near term an extension of NATO's boundaries, regularised consultation on the issues in that forum is both necessary and desirable.

Q: Are you saying that, like it or not, the whole world should be NATO's concern?

Haig: The whole world is in fact NATO's concern.'

Nato is the primary foreign and defence policy commitment of the UK, and Haig's stand will reinforce the Thatcher government's resolve to proceed with Cruise missiles and the Trident submarine/missile package.

After a stronger Atlantic alliance, the main emphasis of the new administration is upon the alleged Soviet threat to western dependency on oil from the Middle East. Haig, in the interview cited, explained that: 'We are examining a number of potential locations for an increased American presence. But the greater dependency of several Western European countries and Japan on Middle East oil has so far made a co-ordinated 'western' policy strategy impossible. The Reagan administration's blanket support for Israel creates further difficulties. The proposal, half-aired, to put the US Rapid Deployment Force under NATO command seems to be just as unrealistic and naive as the Right claims that

Carter's emphasis on 'human rights' was.

Despite Reagan's campaign backing for Taiwan, the new administration is unlikely to reject the western opening to China and the informal Sino-American alliance against the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Haig, for example, visited for example, visited China for Nixon during the improvement in relations. China remains useful for the US.

Carter's rightward gallop

Many of the problems which the new administration faces arise from its success during the campaign in presenting false and over-simplified characterisations of international issues in order to portray Carter as soft and as responsible for US setbacks such as Iran and Nicaragua, and for the alleged military weakness of the US vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The irony is that by the end of his term, Carter had been pushed into policies broadly similar to those of Reagan.

Carter assumed a Presidency weakened by the Watergate scandal and the defeat in Vietnam. After Watergate, there was a need initially for clean and open government. After Vietnam, there was the necessity to rebuild the domestic consensus for renewed US global interventionism. 'Human rights' was the chosen path to these ends (see Noam Chomsky, *Human Rights and American Foreign Policy*, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1978). After a short flirtation, forced by Congress, with using 'human rights' against some of the more exposed US allies — like Chile — the policy came to be directed almost exclusively against the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

Even before Carter took office, the so-called 'A-team/B-team' exercise set up by President Ford's Foreign Intelligence Intelligence Advisory Board had laid the basis for the post-Vietnam renewal of American militancy. George Bush, now Vice-President, was CIA Director when the exercise was set up in August 1976. The CIA's professional Soviet analysts were pitted against a team of outsiders, 'experts' with strong political backing. Both teams

had the same information. The outsiders, the B-team, put a dramatic interpretation on that information and concluded that the CIA 'had been grossly underestimating Soviet developments and intentions'. (See *Bulletin* no 17 and *Casey and the CIA* below.)

Soviet behaviour had not changed, but a new interpretation of that behaviour was constructed. The political weight of the B-team compared with that of the CIA's slightly less pessimistic professionals ensured that they won the day. On their views were based the new official US estimates of the Soviet threat. Since other Western intelligence agencies get most of their intelligence on the Soviet Union from the US, the notion of a rapidly-increasing 'Soviet threat' was accepted at a stroke throughout the west, without any change in the evidence about Soviet behaviour.

This was a crucial political success for the American right, and the basis for subsequent attacks on Carter's 'weakness'. By the end of 1977, Carter was caving in to pressure from an increasingly confident and well organised right. The massive opposition in 1977 against Carter over the Panama Canal Treaty came from the same right-wing forces which were to back the Reagan campaign. At the end of the 1980 election campaign, the two candidates were not far apart, and it was not Reagan who changed.

Carter used the newly-constructed calculation of the Soviet threat, to push through the commitment by NATO nations to increase their defence spending by three per cent, at the May 1977 NATO summit; he had been in office just four months. At that time too, proposals for 'European Theatre force modernisation' — escalation of NATO's potential by cruise and Pershing 2 missiles of vastly increased range, accuracy and destructive power — were launched on their way to agreement by the allies in December 1979. Carter tried to have the neutron bomb accepted by NATO, but no European government would take public responsibility for advocating it.

In 1977, there was uncertainty about China and Indochina. The decision to

recognise China and set China and Kampuchea against Vietnam resolved that, and immensely strengthened US influence in Asia (see *Bulletin* no 17). Refugees from the China-Cambodia-Vietnam conflict became the 'boat people' and for the US 'human rights' became purely an anti-communist ploy.

In Africa, Congress refused in 1976 to allow covert CIA intervention in Angola. Carter rapidly adopted the view of the radical Right that Cuban troops in Africa were mere Soviet proxies running Angola on behalf of the Soviet Union. More recently, the Carter administration's earlier willingness to criticise South Africa and push for reforms there evaporated in the face of the rising American right's support for white supremacy.

All this was reinforced by the right wing tactic of 'targeting' certain leading liberal politicians such as Senator Frank Church. Like Church, many responded by moving rightwards; he denounced the 'threat' from 3,000 Soviet troops in Cuba. Also like Church, important liberals lost their seats in 1980 anyway.

The SALT 2 treaty was another victim of the political weakness of Carter and the liberals. The negotiating team headed by liberal Paul Warnke was replaced by a team of hawks drawn from the ranks of the Committee on the Present Danger and the Coalition for Peace through Strength (see *Bulletin* nos 14 and 17). Then the treaty, signed by Carter and Brezhnev was attacked by the right as recognition of US weakness in strategic weapons, and the Senate refused to ratify it.

The fall of the appalling regime of the Shah of Iran to a popular insurrection was blamed on Carter's human rights doctrine. He in turn blamed intelligence failure, yielding further ground to the right. The failure of the Iran hostage rescue during the presidential campaign probably sealed Carter's fate. He was criticised not for armed invasion of Iran, but only for its failure.

The North South talks on a new international economic order with improved prospects for Third World

countries came under attack from the Right which thought that the way to deal with the Third World was to divide it diplomatically and to deal with countries individually, as Egypt was split from the other Arab states by the Camp David agreement. (See W Scott Thompson [ed], *The Third World: Premises of US Policy*, Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco, 1978; Thompson and several contributors are members of the new Committee for the Free World, see below.)

The eclipse and resignation of Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State, and the rise of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's Kissinger, reflected the shift in US foreign policy. In 1977, Carter declared that the Soviet Union was not the primary problem for US foreign policy. By January 1980, he could seize on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and call it 'the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War'. Even US diplomat Helmut Sonnenfeldt had to point out the exaggeration involved in that well-known left-wing publication, *NATO Review* (April 1980). Afghanistan borders the Soviet Union, and the invasion is not remotely similar in strategic intent or scope to the US invasion of Vietnam.

But the Afghanistan/Vietnam comparison is not central to current western propaganda. Carter and Reagan alike presented the invasion as dubious evidence of the Soviet Union's intention to cut off western supplies of oil from the Middle East. Carter's immediate response was to declare that 'an attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by the use of any means necessary, including force' (State of the Union message, 23.1.81).

The Radical Right

The election of Reagan is a conclusion of the radical right campaign which had so effectively swung US policy through 180 degrees in three years. The electoral organisation of the radical Right is important. In the campaign, liberals like

Kennedy were hindered by an unintended consequence of a tightening up of electoral campaign laws following the Watergate exposure of illegal company contributions to the Nixon campaign.

Unions as well as companies were prevented from making large contributions for electoral purposes. Companies avoided the restrictions by setting up Corporate Political Action Committees (PACs) which received 'voluntary' contributions from executives for political purposes. The PACs were successfully used by the Right, but getting voluntary contributions from individual union members with far lower incomes than corporate executives proved impossible. Effectively, union influence in campaign funding was destroyed by a liberal reform intended to cut out corporate influence.

Another important part was played by the growth of mail-order political organising by a variety of rightwing groups. Richard Viguerie is the acknowledged mail order king. (On Viguerie, see Sidney Blumenthal, *The Permanent Campaign, Inside the World of the Elite Political Operative*, Beacon, Boston, 1980, ch 12. On the new Right in general, see Alan Crawford, *Thunder on the Right, The 'New Right' and the Politics of Resentment*, Pantheon, New York 1980. Crawford is a conservative worried about the Right.)

Viguerie and other groups helped to link fundamentalist Christian broadcasting operations with massive fund-raising potential and audiences to the political Right. 'Single-issue' pro-family, anti-gay, anti-Equal Rights Amendment pressure groups helped. They avoided campaign laws by publicising the right's issues without contributing directly to candidates. These groups were the spearhead of the targeting strategy which hit liberals like Senator Church.

But none of these groups have much clout in government. They can not directly affect the administration's policy except through the threat of electoral opposition. But as a propaganda machine they have been very effective. They account for much of the rhetoric in the statements of the new

administration and thus for its problems in following more realistic policies than publicly promised.

It is the separate but related apparatus on the Right which is in a position to influence both broad outlines and details of policy. This apparatus is part of the traditional Washington politics: the right-wing think-tanks and their campaigns among the limited policy-forming elite, like the Committee on the Present Danger and the Coalition for Peace through Strength. Among the more important are Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Heritage Foundation, the National Strategy Information Center, the Hoover Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Institute of Contemporary Studies. (On these groups see the articles on the Reagan campaign by David Edgar, in *Searchlight*, October, November, December, 1980.)

Reagan and the radical right

Foreign and economic policy making throughout the west are profoundly elitist and narrowly based, masking political and social questions in quasi-technical jargon of economics and national security, and keeping the largest questions outside democratic processes. In foreign policy, 'bi-partisan consensus' is engineered in support of elite-defined positions. The competence of political parties and mere politicians to address such vital questions except along lines of the engineered consensus, is universally denied in Western democracies.

Nowhere is this more the case than in the United States, where 'elite' private groups like the Council on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Economic Development and Business Roundtable are at the centre of small groups of top movers who dominate policy making in successive administrations. (See for example, the various works of G. William Domhoff, beginning with *Who Rules America?* (1967); Lawrence H Shoup and G William Minter, *Imperial Brains Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and*

US Foreign Policy, 1977; Richard Barnett, *Roots of War: The Men and Institutions Behind US Foreign Policy*, 1972; Noam Chomsky, *For Reasons of State*, 1973; Chomsky and Edward S Herman, *The Political Economy of Human Rights*, reviewed *Bulletin* no 16; and Holly S Sklar, (ed), *Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management*, South End Press, Boston, 1980.)

Despite the role of the radical right in Reagan's victory these elite groups will undoubtedly remain structurally dominant in foreign policy. Vice-president Bush and Defence Secretary Weinberger are Trilateral Commissioners, as are Anne Armstrong, co-chair of the Reagan campaign, and former Treasury Secretary William E Simon who headed the campaign's executive advisory committee. Various other Trilateral Commissioners appear on boards of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and Internal Studies (including Henry Kissinger), the American Enterprise Institute, the Committee on the Present Danger, and other Reagan power-houses. So the overall trajectory of US policy worked out in established elite circles may not change as radically as the electoral campaign suggests. That trajectory, however, developed under Carter, is worrying enough.

The Reagan Team

Ronald Reagan's political base is in California, where he was governor from 1966 to 1974.

'Of the total defence contracts in the US, California holds 30% — more than any other state. About half a million people in California are employed in the aerospace industry, which accounts for 30% of all manufacturing industry in the state; and the backbone of aerospace is defence . . . The biggest employers are defence companies . . . Lockheed, Rockwell, McDonnell Douglas and Northrop, whose great plants surround Los Angeles like an army camping outside its walls' (Anthony Sampson ,

The Arms Bazaar, Coronet, London 1978, ch 12, p 205).

California has its own financial apparatus — the Bank of America is a California bank — a strong right wing, and depends for its economic well-being on a large military budget. From California, Reagan's team includes his long-term personal lawyer, Los Angeles corporate labour lawyer William French Smith, who is the new Attorney General, responsible for the FBI among other things. According to the Wall Street Journal he thinks that 'government should interfere as little as possible [in] civil rights' (12.12.80). Defence Secretary Weinberger was Reagan's California budget director. Edwin Meese III, Reagan's supremo in the White House, was his chief of staff in California. He played a key role in the selection of Cabinet members, in the Reagan campaign, and in the transition teams. Meese's connection with Reagan goes back to his role in backing Reagan in reinstating capital punishment in California in 1967, when Meese was deputy attorney general for Alameda County. Both French Smith and Meese were staunch opponents of the student and anti-war movements in California. Verne Orr, from Reagan's California cabinet has been appointed Pentagon secretary of the Air Force. Lyn Nofziger, Washington correspondent for the right-wing Copley newspaper chain, and Reagan's press secretary in California, takes up the same task in the White House.

Richard V Allen, Reagan's National Security Advisor, put together the Reagan campaign's foreign and defence policy advisory panels. An ideologue from the extreme right-wing think tank at Stanford University, the Hoover Institution on War, Peace and Revolution, Allen persuaded leading members of the Committee on the Present Danger, the Coalition for Peace through Strength, and the 'B-team' exercise (see above) to endorse Reagan.

The Reagan cabinet however draws strongly on the Eastern Republican establishment. Besides Donald Regan of Merrill Lynch as Treasury Secretary, Malcolm Baldrige, a George Bush campaigner, of the Connecticut company,

Scoville, which makes Yale locks, heads the Commerce Department; campaign director William J Casey, top New York tax lawyer, heads the CIA; and Senator Lowell Schweiker, Reagan's 1976 prospective vice-president, is at Health and Human Services. The Reagan team can be trusted to respond well to traditional elite planning groups, and he has pledged to use his cabinet fully.

Haig and the State Department

Alexander Haig was recommended to Henry Kissinger by Pentagon Democrat Joseph Califano in 1969 as military assistant cum office manager. He rose rapidly to become Kissinger's top aide at the National Security Council. Nixon 'sent him to Vietnam as his personal emissary about a dozen times [and] made him his personal advisor on troop withdrawal . . . somewhat independently of Kissinger . . . Privately he requested that Haig report on Kissinger's work, and the General had complied' (Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, *The Final Days*, Avon, New York, 1976, p 21-22). Haig ran Kissinger's secret system of monitoring and transcribing Kissinger's phone calls, and when the secret and illegal bombing of Cambodia was reported in the press in May 1969, Kissinger sent 'Haig over to the FBI with the names of "suspected leakers" on the NSC staff'. On reading the phone tap transcripts, Kissinger commented: 'It is clear that I do not have anybody in my office that I can trust except Col Haig here' (See William Shawcross, *Sideshow*, p 105-6, reviewed in *Bulletin* No 13).

Haig's attitude to Indochina was that of a soldier; he considered that Kissinger was too soft on the enemy (*Sideshow* p 101). Before the US invasion of Cambodia in May 1970, Defence Secretary Melvin Laird's military assistant 'was receiving constant calls from Alexander Haig and others on Kissinger's staff, stressing the need for a coordinated assault on the sanctuaries' alleged right to exist in Cambodia (*Sideshow* p 130). When the invasion was launched, 'Alexander Haig . . . was delighted by Nixon's decision. Haig barked

at [NSC staffer] Watts that he could not resign. "You've had an order from your commander-in-chief" . . . For Haig, to refuse any order was unthinkable.' (*Sideshow*, p 145).

'Haig was despatched to Pnomh Penh soon after the invasion. It was his first important solo mission . . . for the President in his own right.' Earlier he had 'helped to develop the scheme by which the [Nixon] doctrine should be implemented in Cambodia' (*Sideshow*, pp 161, 167) In December 1972, Henry Kissinger, in Paris finalising the Vietnam talks, 'cabled back [options] to Washington [which] included the resumption of bombing in the North. Haig urged the President to take decisive action to finally bring the North Vietnamese to their knees' (*Final Days*, p 212). This Christmas bombing was 'designed partly, in General Haig's words, to "brutalize" the North' (*Sideshow*, p 260).

On the strength of such 'loyalty', Nixon 'promoted' him over 240 higher-ranking officers' (*Final Days*, p 212) to the position vice chief of staff of the Army in January 1973. He had been a mere colonel when he joined Kissinger four years before. When Haldeman and Erlichman were sacrificed, to preserve Nixon from Watergate, on April 30, 1973, Haldeman recommended Haig as White House chief of staff.

Kissinger threatened to quit: he would 'once again have a rival in the White House' (*Final Days* p 17). Haig remained loyal to Nixon to the end, but then stayed on at the Ford White House. Ford wanted to make him Army Chief of Staff, but this required Congressional approval. So instead Ford made Haig Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe. He resigned in 1979 to test the waters for a presidential campaign of his own. Illness intervened, and he became head of United Technologies Inc, a major defence contractor.

Haig explained at his first press conference as Secretary of State that: 'I was assured by President Reagan personally that I will be his chief administrator, [or] "vicar", [responsible] for the formulation, the the conduct and the articulation of American foreign policy.' He said that:

'international terrorism will take the place of human rights . . . because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights'. The Soviet Union Haig claimed, has programmes 'which foster, support and expand' international terrorism. These themes are currently being taken up at the Helsinki Agreements review conference in Madrid by US delegate Max Kampelman (another member of the Committee for the Free World). 'Terrorism', as used by the Reagan administration, means nothing more or less, than support for liberation movements; centrally, the ANC and SWAPO, the PLO, and resistance to right-wing regimes, particularly in Central America.

Weinberger and the Pentagon

Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger is an old Reagan official who later headed the massive Department of Health, Education and Welfare under Nixon, acquiring his nickname 'Cap the Knife'. Recently he has been Vice President of the Bechtel Corporation, a militantly anti-union contractor with big interests in Saudi Arabia.

Weinberger's initial speeches emphasised his own adherence to the post-1976 rightward shift in US perceptions of the East-West military balance: 'The absolute decline in our defence capabilities over the past 15 years has been exacerbated by the fact that during the same period the Soviet Union has embarked on a military build-up unprecedented in world history.' He stresses the need for a broad spectrum of US intervention possibilities; of a potential future Iran-style operation, he said:

'It requires some forces in being that have the training and the opportunity to move very much more rapidly into a situation of that kind . . . There is some training of some special forces going on that I am advised is a classified subject . . . I think a model would be the British Special Air Services, that made that remarkable and successful raid on the Iranian embassy in London.'

As the chairman of the US Joint chiefs

of Staff, General David V Jones told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 4, 1981:

'Not since World War II has the United States had a truly global military strategy, complete with sufficient resources, industrial base, military forces and national consensus to execute it . . . Through the 1970s, the loss of US strategic superiority, extensive modernisation of Soviet ground, sea and air forces, sustained improvements in Soviet force projection capability; Soviet use of proxy forces (i.e. Cubans and perhaps others) to support revolutionary factions around the world, increased turbulence in areas of vital economic importance to the industrial democracies . . . have transformed . . . our strategic requirements without a corresponding transformation in our strategy and the forces needed to carry it out.'

Jones went on to complain that 'other voices have been more persuasive [than military chiefs] in declaring the risks acceptable and in elevating the priority of non-defence spending.' But during the last year, 'much of the world has rediscovered . . . that military strength counts . . . The use and potential use of decisive military power can influence policies, alignments and actions.' He listed the hardware that the military chiefs want Congress to authorise or expedite: the MX missile, Trident missiles and submarines, air-launched cruise missiles, a new manned strategic bomber, cruise and Pershing missiles for 'European theatre nuclear force modernisation', new chemical weapons, a new tank, and more. Further, he said, a common Western strategy — 'a coordinated approach for dealing with the threat' — is necessary. 'Until events in 1979 and 1980 dramatised the problems, it would have been difficult to find a consensus on the urgency of action even in this country'. Now, 'we may have the most fruitful opportunity since the formation of NATO to help forge a comprehensive allied understanding of the global nature of the threat,' he added.

Jones cited the recent successful campaign by the military against SALT 2 in 1979 as a turning point for public opinion. Reagan and Haig were leading campaigners against SALT 2. Haig told the Senate that SALT 2 should not be ratified until four conditions were met — until NATO decided on cruise and Pershing II missiles, until the 'administration and Congress make a solid start on the strategic and theatre nuclear program improvements', until 'an agreed strategic doctrine other than mutually assured destruction' was formulated, and until the US linked SALT, and other arms control efforts, to other Soviet activities.

The Carter administration caved in on all but the last point well before the election. In his recent *Washington Star* interview, Haig said that NATO governments' present commitment to real annual three per cent increases in military spending 'is neither an adequate nor a necessarily timeless objective . . . I was opposed to the 3% solution at the time; I was in favour of 5% to 7%'.

Casey and the CIA

William J Casey managed the Reagan campaign from February 1980. Unlike Admiral J Stansfield Taylor, Carter's Director of Central Intelligence, Casey will be a cabinet member. President Nixon made Casey head of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1971; Casey is a New York corporate tax lawyer, and the appointment was said to resemble setting a wolf to guard sheep. When fugitive financier Robert Vesco was under investigation by the SEC, Casey, at the instigation of Richard Allen, Reagan's new national security adviser, met Vesco's lawyer to discuss the Vesco investigation.

During World War II, Casey was aide to General 'Wild Bill' Donovan, head of the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, and later headed OSS secret intelligence for the whole European theatre. Immediately after the war, he urged the need to continue the OSS as a permanent central intelligence agency, and

was involved in 'studying how such an organisation should be organised and function'. In 1969 Nixon put Casey on the arms control committee which prepared for and negotiated the SALT 1 agreement. After the stint at the SEC, Casey was Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs in 1973-74 and then head of the Export-Import Bank.

'As a member of the [Murphy] Commission on the organisation of the government for the conduct of foreign policy . . . I took a special interest in the organisation of the intelligence community,' Casey told his Senate confirmation hearing. In 1976, President Ford put Casey on to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).

At the same Senate hearings, Casey too endorsed the post-1976 re-assessment of Soviet strategic intentions and capabilities. Carter abolished the PFIAB in 1977, but according to Casey, Reagan will revive it. As the A-team/B-team exercise showed, it has been an effective means of making intelligence agencies responsive to their banking, business, military and covert action constituencies.

'As a founding director of the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC) I supported the establishment of chairs and professorships in national security on 200 campuses throughout the United States,' Casey told the hearing. NSIC was founded in 1962. It has financed the London-based Institute for the Study of Conflict; we described NSIC connections with British social democrats and the Labour and Trade Union Press Service in our background paper on 'Labour's Transatlantic Links' in *Bulletin* no 16. NSIC's director, Frank R Barnett, was on Reagan's list of foreign policy advisers to the campaign along with other directors of NSIC. In April 1979, the NSIC created a 'Consortium for the Study of Intelligence' (CSI), at a meeting in Washington. Roy Godson edited the papers and proceedings of the CSI under the heading, *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Elements of Intelligence* (NSIC, Washington, 1979). Casey's speech to his

Senate confirmation hearing is a digest of this book.

CSI took on itself the working out of 'what must be done now if there is to be a first-class US intelligence capability in the future' (p 4). Its report begins with a litany of complaints which Casey repeated to the Senate: the debate on the role of intelligence in the 1970s is about the past, is about abuses not 'successes', and is not about how to 'improve' US intelligence performance. The CSI suggested 'objective, scholarly and unclassified research into the intelligence process and product and examine their relationship to US decision-making' (p 85). It has four aims: to encourage teaching on intelligence; to promote 'the development of a theory of intelligence'; to encourage research into intelligence efficiency 'so that the product can be improved'; and to study 'tensions between intelligence activities and the democratic and constitutional values of our society, and . . . principles and methods for reconciling the two' (p 85); all good legitimate scholarly activity.

But this thrust towards 'scholarly' work on intelligence comes from the intelligence agencies themselves. The 39 participants in CSI included Cord Meyer, former CIA station chief in London and head of CIA covert action (see Agee et al. *Dirty Work: the CIA in Western Europe*, Lyle Stewart, New Jersey 1978); Lt Gen Daniel O Graham, Reagan advisor, co-chairman of the Coalition for Peace through Strength, member of the B-team and ex-director of the Defence Intelligence Agency; Richard Pipes, Harvard historian, Reagan advisor and B-team chairman; the present director of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence; Ray Cline, director of Georgetown University's CSIS, Reagan advisor and former Deputy Director of the CIA; Tom Kahn, assistant to the then AFL-CIO President George Meany; Hugh Tovey, ex-chief of CIA covert action staff; and other recent top intelligence and counter-intelligence officials. There were eight assistants to Senate and House intelligence committees or their members, an ex-member and an ex-staffer from the

PFIAB; two American Bar Committee on Law and National Security members; Joseph Coors, beer magnate and John Birch Society funder, a Reagan adviser and funder of the Heritage Foundation; and representatives of a wide-range of right-wing think-tanks. Critics of intelligence activities, from moderates like Morton Halperin and Victor Marchetti to socialists like Philip Agee were not invited to contribute to this new round of 'objective' scholarship.

The CSI's 'scholarship' is blatantly partisan. In its report the Ford administration's former assistant Attorney General for Legislation complains that retired intelligence officers and academic intelligence specialists were underrepresented in the debate on charters for the intelligence agencies and the FBI; the post-Watergate requirements for reporting covert action to Congress cripple the agencies, and 'intimidate foreigners who heretofore have cooperated with the US' (p 14-15): they do not indicate 'what the CIA would have to do to run agents abroad successfully', or 'require . . . capability for covertly influencing events abroad' at all.

Daniel O. Graham celebrates the A team/B-team exercise, attacks the slow response of professional analysts to right-wing propaganda about the Soviet threat, and calls for competitive centres of intelligence analysis.

A former CIA executive assistant for covert action calls for official 'covers' for agents to be provided by other bodies as well as the State Department and the Pentagon; relationships with colleges for recruiting purposes should be renewed; the Freedom of Information Act should not apply to intelligence agencies; sources and methods need legislative protection. Espionage targets in the 1980s, says the former spy, include the 'continued cohesion of NATO' and the 'political and economic stability of our current friends' as well as the Middle East, China, the Third World, nuclear proliferation and 'terrorism'.

Former CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci is approvingly quoted: he has been appointed Deputy Secretary of Defence in

the Reagan administration. The CSI report also offers a tract in support of the CIA's centralised counter-intelligence system formerly run by the fanatic James Jesus Angleton, which was disbanded in 1974. The President should reconstitute it by executive order, thus obviating the need for a charter, Angleton's old chief of operations says.

Turning to covert action (dirty tricks), the ex-chief of CIA covert action staff bemoans the limitations on covert action in the 1970s and calls for their removal. Around the world, the CIA needs covert action 'assets' among pressure groups, local media and politicians: 'the key to success [is] access to . . . the movers and shakers of a country' (p 75). Like other contributors, he emphasises that large subsidies are unnecessary. 'The US could profitably reconstitute its ability to use force, covertly or otherwise, without commitment of uniformed military personnel' (p 77). Five target areas for covert action are listed: wherever 'Soviet political action and propaganda are active'; 'at least four European allies . . . where "Eurocommunism" looms' (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal); Islamic radicalism; and Third World 'nationalism'. With this kind of 'scholarship', propaganda is rendered superfluous, and with Casey and Carlucci in place as CIA Director and Deputy Secretary of Defence, such moves can be expected.

Movers and shakers

A new transatlantic group including many of the leading figures backing Reagan was launched simultaneously in London and New York on February 10, 1981. The modestly-titled Committee for the Free World (CFW) revealed its existence at a London press conference chaired by Lord Chalfont, sparsely attended by the media, but replete with noted cold warriors from higher education and politics, with long experience in running 'cultural' and 'academic' institutions in support of right-wing causes in general and US foreign policy

in particular.

The founding statement of the CFW, issued at the press conference, reflects current US foreign policy concerns, borders on racism and claims that the 'the struggle for freedom may in the end be won or lost not on battlefields, but in books, newspaper broadcasts, classrooms and in all public institutions where the determination to remain free is enhanced or undermined.' Lord Chalfont said that the two main initiators of the CFW were Midge Decter, who is the organisation's New York-based Executive Director, and Leo Labedz, editor of *Survey*, the London-based 'Journal of East and West Studies'. Decter and Labedz personify the coalition which has created CFW. Decter is the author of *The New Chastity and Other Arguments Against Women's Liberation*, and is a leading member of the intellectual 'new right' which assisted the Reagan campaign. Many of these intellectuals were the liberal cold warriors of the fifties and sixties. They advocated social reform, particularly in the Third World, as the most effective means of combatting 'communism' which they defined as any movement intending far-reaching social or political change which threatened US economic or strategic interests.

When the cold war and liberalism parted company over Vietnam, these neo-conservatives dropped liberalism. Instead they have accepted, along with Reagan and Haig, that the maintenance of western and US hegemony entails support for any old dictatorship regardless of its treatment of its own people, as long as it is anti-communist.

Decter is a leading member of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) (see *Bulletin* no 16). Her husband, Norman Podhoretz, also a member of the Board of Directors of CFW, is editor of *Commentary*, journal of the American Jewish Committee, which has emerged in the past five years as the main ideological organ of the CPD.

Commentary was closely associated with the now-defunct Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), founded in 1947 as the USA's major cold war cultural intervention. *Survey* was started in the 1950s with CCF

finance. In 1967 the CCF collapsed into oblivion following revelations that its main source of income had been the CIA, which had pumped cash into the organisation and most of its associated journals and activities through 'conduit foundations'.

A list of over 500 members of the CFW has been published. It includes the names of dozens of people who have been associated in the past with CIA-backed cultural and academic interventions and the think-tanks listed above. They are drawn from the US, Western Europe and Israel.

Melvin J Lasky, editor of *Encounter*, the London-based literary periodical also formerly financed by the CCF is a CFW Director. He denied that the CFW was simply a reincarnation of the CCF. He pointed out that third world academics had been excluded from the new organisation, whereas CCF had made a major effort to recruit pro-western intellectuals and politicians in Africa and Asia. But, he said, this had meant that in journals and conferences, such issues as neutralism had perforce been 'fudged' so as not to offend third world intellectuals. So CCF had had to water down its anti-communism, the basic reason for its existence. CFW, he said, was a 'Committee for the First World, if you like.' The list of members is too long to reproduce in *State Research*. It is available from CFW, which can be contacted at present through *Survey* at 135 Oxford Street, London W1R 1TD. Prominent Britons besides those mentioned so far include Sir James Goldsmith, Prof. Julius Gould, Robert Moss, Paul Johnson, and Peregrine Worsthorne. Interestingly, though there is at present only one Conservative Party politician — William Waldegrave MP, Edward Heath's former PPS — there are several Labour and ex-Labour figures, all prominent supporters of the Council for Social Democracy. Hayes MP Neville Sanderson, and Social Democratic Alliance leaders Stephen Haseler and Douglas Eden are members and were at the launching press conference. EEPTU General Secretary Frank Chapple is a member, as is former Labour MP Dick Taverne and MP Mike Thomas. Mr Labedz said that Shirley

Williams had also been approached, but has 'not yet replied to our letter'.

Lord Chalfont refused at the press conference to divulge details of how CFW would be financed, other than to say that it would be a public company and its accounts would therefore be opened to inspection. Such accounts do not, of course, reveal the names of donors. Mr Labeledz said 'We don't intend to take any government money, it's as simple as that.'

Initial financial support of \$125,000 was provided by individual contributors and foundations such as Pittsburgh's Scaife Foundation, the John M Olin Foundation of Missouri and the Smith Richardson of North Carolina, International Herald Tribune stated (23.2.81). Richard Mellon Scaife (Mellon/Gulf Oil money) took over Kern House Enterprises, the CIA funding conduit for Forum World Features in London in 1973. The Smith Richardson Foundation is a major funder of the American Enterprise Institute. Both Olin and Scaife funded the new right-wing Media Institute of Washington.

CFW intends to publish a bulletin and pamphlets, to hold conferences, and to act as a centre for information exchange on the

activities of member countries of the western alliance, including their internal politics.

The status of the CFW as a covertly sponsored official intervention backed by state organisations in the west was spelled out, no doubt inadvertently, at the launching press conference by Prof. Hugh Seton-Watson, a CFW board member, and also a member of the Board of the Institute for the Study of Conflict. Seton-Watson said that both in the United States and in the United Kingdom, there were

'plenty of people in government who are aware of these dangers — indeed they know them better than we do. But they are not free to act; the prejudices of members of their own parties and public opinion prevents it. It hamstring governments. This organisation should try and work at public opinion to relieve those who have to take the decisions, so they can do so unhampered by double talk and nonsense.'

In other words, with at least tacit connivance from the state, public opinion is to be covertly manipulated from above, making nonsense of CFW's pretence of opposing 'totalitarianism'.

BOOKS

REVIEWS & SOURCES

THE FRONTIERS OF SECRECY, by David Leigh, Junction Books, 1980, £5.95 pbk

Guardian journalist David Leigh has written a passionate polemic against secrecy in British life, with abundant international comparisons which show just how ludicrous the British situation is. 'As a middleman in the information business, a journalist has a

fairly good vantage-point,' writes Leigh, and he gives telling instances of secrecy and media manipulation from his experience.

One example of 'the usual processes of news management' was the Protection of Official Information Bill. This was released on a Friday afternoon late in 1979 with a 'lobby guidance note' for the press giving the Home Office line that the bill fulfilled the Thatcher government's election pledge to reform the infamous Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. The press duly presented it in these terms. The **Daily Telegraph** gave direct quotes without acknowledgement from the guidance note, under the headline, 'Prosecution risk narrowed in secrets bill'. Other papers did

little better. When some journalists got around to reading the actual bill they found the guidance to have been thoroughly misleading. The bill would have made it a crime to print any information whatsoever on the Special Branch, MI5, MI6, phone-tapping, bugging, letter-opening and most police work. (The bill was eventually withdrawn, see **Bulletin** no 15.) The media coverage of the 1972 Franks Committee report and evidence on Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act was similarly based upon a lengthy Home Office press release which ignored that evidence in which senior civil servants called for more secrecy, not less. Journalists continue to report 'guidance' uncritically as independent judgement about the significance of 'news' from ministries.

Excellent chapters deal with the prison department of the Home Office, with secrecy and the jury system and the case for a freedom of information act giving citizens the right to official information except in defined cases. These include extensive quotations from 'secret' documents. The chapter on national security fails to grasp the nettle of defining what 'national security' might be, in particular when the more we have of it the less secure we feel. But it usefully reviews recent activities of security agencies. The opening chapter on information control is a sharp polemic against the traditional secrecy of Cabinet government, of Cabinet committees, of ministerial Question Time, and off-the-record briefings for well-behaved correspondents.

Parliament has failed to make any significant impact on executive secrecy:

'We apparently live in a country where a subcommittee of MPs is required to say in 1976 that the range of the Tow anti-tank missile is 'xxx' and the Dragon missile 'only xx'. (The US military announced to Congress at about the same time that the range of Tow was about 3,000 metres and the Dragon was medium-range, 60-1,000 metres,)' writes Leigh.

Leigh's account of 'manipulating the press' considers the effectiveness of the

media as a countervailing force to government secrecy. 'The British media are not strong-willed,' he writes, and have never accepted 'that knowledge about public affairs should be a right and not a privilege' (p48-49). The media, in Leigh's view, are generally willing to depend upon officially provided information and 'are often channels for official or political propaganda' (p49). These chapters are a fascinating description of the informal relationships that hack journalists rely upon for stories.

Leigh also catalogues some of the problems facing serious journalism, like the law on libel. 'There is no defence in Britain that defamatory remarks are published in good faith, after diligent inquiry, on a matter of public interest and subject to instant retraction and apology if necessary. Such a defence, coupled with a proper disciplinary body for journalists ought to be the basis of a civilised country's press law . . . (Instead, for example) Reginald Maudling . . . who nearly became leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister of Britain . . . died in 1979 to fulsome obituaries, having managed, thanks to libel laws in general, and the judicious issue of a few slow-moving writs, to avoid systematic exposure of his financial morals . . . Maudling was on the take, at various points in his political career, from three dishonest businessmen – Jerome Hoffman, . . . John Poulson, . . . and Sir Eric Miller' (p 79; see also **Bulletin** no 21).

SCIENCE ADVISERS, SCIENTIFIC ADVISERS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, by Lord Zuckerman. Menard Press, London, 1980, 15pp, 90p.

Zuckerman, full-time chief scientific adviser to a succession of Prime Ministers, and from 1964 to 1971 head of the Government's Scientific Civil Service, spoke to the American Philosophical Society in November 1979 – a month before NATO ministers went ahead with the Cruise and Pershing 2 escalation of the arms race. After a review of the growth of science advice and the role and limitations of advisers, he turns

to nuclear matters. First, nuclear power: 'top advisers have proved unequal to the task of generating the informed consensus which is essential to political decisions . . . in certain fields of technology. (Most notable is) the inability of chief advisers to achieve agreement in the scientific community about the best and safest policy for nuclear power.'

But nuclear weapons are his main concern:

'We have failed in . . . the most important single issue in which presidential and prime ministerial scientific advisers have been involved . . . – the arms-race, and in particular the nuclear arms-race. It need not have happened, but it did.'

Zuckerman proceeds to examine the advice given by science advisers to US presidents and UK prime ministers. He quotes Herbert York and Harold Brown; both were Pentagon Directors of Research and Engineering and the latter was Carter's Defence Secretary. They say that top civilian appointees at the Pentagon:

' . . . have recognised the severely limited utility of military power, and the great risks of its use, as well as the sad necessity of its possession . . . (The) higher their position . . . the more they have come to the conclusion that we must seek national security through other than strictly military means . . . and urgently.'

Zuckerman presents a somewhat self-congratulatory account of the sensible advice he and other science advisers gave – without them 'present prospects might well be worse than they are . . . but in general we all failed.' He proceeds to explain why such advice was not effectively heeded, and to repeat some of that advice:

'Any analysis of the predictions that have been made of the Soviet military threat over the past twenty years will show that they have always been far-fetched.

'There were then (when the 1957 UK Defence White Paper asserted it) no means of protecting the population against the consequences of nuclear attack. There are none today.

'Neither is there any military reality to what is now referred to as theatre or tactical nuclear warfare . . . Once nuclear weapons come to be regarded as weapons that can be used, as opposed to instruments whose powers of destruction deter all thought of war, they cease to have whatever strategic meaning their possession implies.'

Why then was such advice at top political levels over-ridden?

'When it comes to the technicalities of the arms race . . . military chiefs . . . the official advisers on national security, merely serve as a channel through which the men in the laboratories transmit their views . . . The man in the laboratory – not the (military man) – at the start proposes that for this or that arcane reason it would be useful to improve an old or to devise a new nuclear warhead . . . a new missile . . . a new system . . . formulating the so-called military need. It is he who has succeeded over the years in equating, and so confusing, nuclear destructive power with military strength . . . The men in the nuclear weapons laboratories of both sides have succeeded in creating a world with an irrational foundation, on which a new set of political realities has in turn had to be build.

'Chief scientific advisers have proved to be no match for the laboratory technicians and the other participants in the nuclear arms race. Part of the reason: the weapons laboratories have a continuous existence whereas presidents and prime ministers and military chiefs are both impermanent and concerned with a host of (other) problems . . .

'Given the existence of nuclear weapons . . . the concept of mutual deterrence, based upon an appreciation of the enormous destructiveness of nuclear weapons, is valid and inescapable . . . A state of mutual deterrence was certainly already in existence by at least the late fifties and early sixties. Even at the worst moments of the Cold War neither side was prepared to risk hostilities which would result in . . . "unacceptable damage".'

'All the presidential science advisers and Directors of Defence Research and Engineering with whom I have discussed the problem recognise that once the threshold of mutual nuclear deterrence has been crossed, there is no technical sense in the further elaboration or multiplication of nuclear weapons systems. But this is not the point of view that has got across.'

Apart from the role of nuclear design laboratories, Zuckerman blames the fact that the political leaders' science advisers who got all this fine advice did not have the political power to make and carry politically the required decisions: 'authority in the Western democracies has become too diffused'. It is not the chief scientific advisers that are at fault:

'no consensus can be expected among scientists who are involved in issues dominated by sectional vested interests, particularly those where the views of government scientists at lower levels are supported by powerful constituencies such as the military and certain sections of industry.'

What is to be done, then? Zuckerman makes passing reference to the need to enter the political fray, then asserts that

'we need far more open and informed public discussion of the immediate "causes" that have turned today's advanced industrial societies into the armed camps which they now are . . . How can an informed public be expected to understand the arguments about SALT II and the CTB (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) if they cannot participate because they are denied access to facts which, if one takes the trouble, one can usually find in the public domain because of "leaks".'

The pamphlet, then, without saying so, is a good liberal attack on Aldermaston's excessive influence as demonstrated by the Chevaline warhead programme, on the NATO decision on Cruise and Pershing 2, and on counterforce doctrine, and on the whole right-wing attack in the United States on detente and 'American weakness'. Good for authoritative quotations.

BRITAIN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, by Lawrence Freedman. Macmillan, London, 1980, 160pp. £3.25.

The major part of this book is a history of the development of the British strategic nuclear force. Written in February 1980, before official government announcement of the Trident decision, the author's grasp of his subject (and his Whitehall sources) allowed him to predict (or inform us of) the decision to buy the missile and build the necessary submarines.

The book, which claims (belatedly) to 'make public the debate on British nuclear weapons policy without infringing the Official Secrets Act' draws from Freedman's own considerable involvement in the Trident decision. As the special advisor on Polaris replacement to the Select Committee on Defence, his position no doubt allowed him to be aware of what information could safely contribute to the 'public debate'. The implications of the Trident decision are discussed in its later chapters.

Commenting that British long-term strategic decisions historically have been made 'reflect(ing) current pressures and interests rather than speculation over the future' (p.1), the first two chapters sketch out the early history of the British nuclear weapons programme. From the original secret decision to develop the Bomb, through the fiascos and cancellations of the UK 'Blue Streak' rocket and US 'Skybolt' missile, to the 1962 Polaris agreement as increasing dependency on US technology was established.

Chapter 3 considers the problem of the UK cementing itself to dependency on US technology while wishing to maintain national control of its nuclear force. In the search for a role where UK 'independent use' had some credibility, nuclear-armed V-bombers were stationed in Singapore during the early sixties, but the reality of declining UK status meant that any possible rationale had to be found in Europe. The 'more than one decision-making centre' (which would confuse and therefore deter the Soviets)

argument arrived, and is still with us.

Chapters 4 and 5 cover the 1964-70 Labour government's 'rationalisation' of the Polaris deal – cancellation of the fifth submarine as a sop to the disarmers, while planning for the future upgrading and replacement of the nuclear force went on behind closed doors. The political solution to the problem of a rather too democratic Labour Party (and the then-current EEC entry negotiations) was the re-direction of research at Aldermaston towards a new British warhead to upgrade the Polaris missile, avoiding the publicity of another US-UK deal and its 'anti-European' implications.

While the decision to develop the new 'Chevaline' warhead was taken by a group of Conservative ministers in 1973, the previous 5 years of 'serious studies' was undertaken at Labour's behest. The State's apparent necessity to keep available to itself a research team with the capability to design and develop nuclear warheads has had a powerful effect in determining these decisions.

The exploding cost of Chevaline development, from an uncertain £100-150 million estimate in 1973 to the estimated total of £1000 million given by Francis Pym, Defence Secretary, in 1980 as Chevaline was being fitted to Polaris missiles, may have chastened the decision-makers. The Trident deal bears a remarkable similarity to the Polaris deal. Indeed the 1962 commitment to a particular technology of United States Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles has had a considerable determining effect on the Trident as chapters 6 and 7 show. One Conservative Minister described the decision-making as a 'painstaking attempt not to be seen jumping to the obvious conclusion' (p.63).

Charting the future for the UK nuclear force Freedman goes on to examine its position in a number of contexts: UK Defence priorities of the 1980s; the SALT talks, where its existence has very little meaning as far as the US and UK are concerned; the 'strategic context' where again the search for a rationale for 'independent use' barely masks its

irrelevance; and in Europe along with all the other old, new, 'tactical' and 'strategic' weapons.

In the final chapter Freedman searches not for the reason why the UK State intends to preserve its nuclear power status and weapons development capability, but for its justification for doing so. We are expected to pay £5-10 billion over the next decade or so for the pathetic 'privilege' of being a 'second centre of decision'. That's the best they can do.

As a (sometimes too) concise, descriptive account of the development of UK nuclear weapons policy, this is as near as one will get to a book from the 'inside' on the subject for a long time. Useful tables on weapons systems, expenditure and nuclear tests are appended: recommended.

ARTICLES

Criminal procedure

Royal Commission Report, Harriet Harman, *New Statesman*, 2 January 1981.

How we drew the thin blue line, Walter Merricks, *New Statesman*, 9 January 1981. Two representative (but opposed) articles on the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure.

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