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STATE RESEARCH

**BULLETIN
No. 26**

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**NEWS &
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Riot equipment bought by police forces during the July disturbances or in the aftermath have already cost the taxpayer several hundred thousand pounds. In Lancashire, equipment costing over £56,000 was bought or ordered by the police as a result of the riots in Liverpool and Manchester. The force also spent £1,765 on

CS gas during the riots (*Guardian* 11.9.81). In Gwent, the chief constable was given the go-ahead to spend over £41,000 on equipment while in Liverpool there was a considerable row as a result of Chief Constable Oxford's purchase of equipment worth £53,000 without prior consultation with the police authority.

Meanwhile, a new riot control weapon has been developed by a private firm which specialises in the manufacture of internal security equipment. The weapon, the Valkyrie Light Shield, has been developed by Security Equipment Supplies. The gun is a high powered, high frequency strobe light which works by scrambling brain circuits. The high frequency used is achieved by the use of micro-circuitry previously developed for lasers. The weapon can operate from its own battery pack but can also be plugged

into the cigarette lighter socket of a car and could therefore easily be used from a police patrol or army vehicle. Each Valkyrie weapon costs £500 which, the company told the *Sunday Telegraph*, 'compares favourably with rubber bullet equipment at £100 for the gun and £11 per bullet' (30.8.81).

The Valkyrie Light Shield appears to be a development of the photic driver described in the background paper 'Riot Control: a new direction?' in *Bulletin* No 25. Its effects are to induce giddiness, nausea and a blinding headache, 'similar to a severe hangover', lasting for about five minutes. A snatch squad would therefore then be able to move in and apprehend the person so disoriented.

Little is known about the long term effects of a weapon such as the Light Shield. The Home Office said that a similar weapon used in the United States was considered to be the sort of weapon the British police should not use unless the disorders 'deteriorated considerably' although the chairman of the Police Federation, Jim Jardine, said that the light shield was 'the sort of thing that, thoroughly tested by the Home Office, could prove very useful in difficult situations' (*Sunday Telegraph* 30.8.81). Security Equipment Supplies have circulated police forces with details of the weapon and a promotional tour in the Middle and Far East was being planned for later this year.

Second hand police Landrovers and water cannon are presently being overhauled in Belfast, painted in the Metropolitan Police blue colour, instead of the RUC battleship grey, and shipped across to Britain (*Sunday World* 16.8.81). Armoured landrovers, mounted with twin clusters CS gas grenade launchers, 'used when the vehicle is driven at high speeds when used to break up crowds' have been photographed in Belfast en route to Britain with the Northern Ireland registration numbers removed (*op.cit.*).

At the Police Staff College, Bramshill, a 'simulated operations room' for training in public order situations has been set up as part of a plan to make courses 'less

philosophical and more practical' (*Sunday Telegraph* 24.8.81). The room will not only be used to provide training for police officers in handling operations including large demonstrations but will also be available for police forces to use to rehearse contingency plans.

The Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, told the Police Superintendents' Association Annual Conference that police forces up and down the country were acquiring 12,000 new riot helmets as a result of the riots and that chief constables had told him that better protection allowed for more 'positive' policing. He also told the conference that CS gas, water cannon and plastic bullets were vital to the police as a last resort in the light of recent experiences. The police, he said, had to adhere to the principle of 'minimum force' but, he said, 'Which minimum force? Using CS gas or having people running round beating people over the head with truncheons?' (*The Times* 23.9.81).

The Home Office confirmed that guidelines have been issued by the Home Secretary to police forces on the circumstances in which CS gas can be used and plastic bullets fired.

POLICE AUTHORITIES: NEW STRUGGLES

In the aftermath of the summer's riots at least a few police authority members have tried to assert their authority over their chief constables. In Merseyside, the scene of a long-running battle between Chief Constable Kenneth Oxford and the police authority, the chief constable was formally censured by the authority for spending £53,000 on riot equipment, ten times the amount he is normally permitted to spend without previous consultation. By a 10 to 9 vote the police authority voted to express its concern 'at the lack of adherence to standing orders' and resolved that no

further equipment be bought until a full report had been submitted and discussed. The chief constable had gone to the meeting to ask the police authority to authorise expenditure of £325,000 on further equipment. The chairwoman of the committee, Margaret Simey, told the press: 'What we are arguing about is who has the right to spend the money – the chief constable or the elected representative of the people.'

When the committee met the following week to discuss Oxford's report on the riots it voted by 14 to 9 merely to 'receive' it, expressing the view that it offered insufficient help to the police authority in evaluating the extent to which it had carried out its statutory function of ensuring the maintenance of an adequate and efficient police force. The report, which defended the use of CS gas, had the backing of the Conservative members of the committee.

In Manchester, where the Moss Side Enquiry Tribunal has been hearing evidence of police harassment and brutality and allegations of Chief Constable Anderton's 'complacency and insensitivity' over complaints of police misbehaviour, the police authority voted 13 to 12 – the minority including three Conservatives and nine magistrates – to prevent Anderton reading a lengthy report on the riots. Instead, the authority noted the report and agreed to defer discussion to a special meeting. Anderton promptly told the press that he had been 'gagged' and in an 'exclusive' interview with the *Daily Express* (7.9.81) told of how he feared for his job if a Labour government were returned to power.

In Leicestershire, Labour members of the police authority issued a statement expressing their concern at allegations of racism in the police force, calling for further progress towards 'community policing' and an independent agency to investigate complaints against the police. They argued too that no riot equipment other than individual protective gear should be purchased. The statement was attacked by Conservative members and others on the

police authority and discussion of the report was vetoed by the chairman of the police authority, the Duke of Rutland, on the grounds that it was not on the agenda and had not been properly circulated (*Leicester Mercury*, 4 and 8.9.81)

In Gwent, Chief Constable Over was told by his police authority in August that he could not buy three armoured Transit vans costing £11,000 apiece, although he could spend £8,250 on protective helmets and overalls. The decision on the Transits was, however, reversed the following week after the police authority had been told how ten local officers had been injured during the riots in Liverpool.

MOUNTIES GET THE PUSH

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) will no longer carry out internal security work, the Canadian government has decided; the move follows systematic criticism of the RCMP's security branch in the report of a royal commission which had investigated it for four years.

The commission, headed by Mr Justice David McDonald of the Alberta Supreme Court, found the RCMP (the Mounties) guilty of routine law breaking and deception of government ministers. When the report was published in Ottawa in August, the government immediately moved to abolish the RCMP security branch and announced that it would create a separate civilian security and intelligence agency, headed by Fred Gibson, a senior official in the federal Justice Department. The new agency is expected to be in operation by mid-1982.

The RCMP was established in 1873. It provides law enforcement in eight of Canada's ten provinces; Ontario and Quebec each have separate police forces.

The McDonald Commission was established in 1977, following a series of

court revelations of illegal activities by RCMP officers. These included the bombing of a private residence in 1974 and break-ins at the offices of Quebec nationalist groups. Its terms of reference were to investigate unauthorised and illegal RCMP activities and to make recommendations for necessary reforms.

The commission's first report, entitled 'Security and Information' was released in January 1980 and dealt with government information policies. It led to the introduction of a federal Freedom of Information law.

In August 1981, the commission published a further two reports, running to over 1,700 pages, entitled 'Freedom and Security under the Law' and 'Certain RCMP Activities and the Question of Governmental Knowledge'. It had previously published commissioned research studies on the parliamentary, ministerial and legal dimensions of national security.

The report documents the changing interpretations of its mandate by the RCMP in the aftermath of the Cold War (the present RCMP Security Service – now disbanded – evolved from the RCMP Special Branch which had been set up in 1946). In the Cold War period, government guidelines in the form of Cabinet directives, regulations and legislation covering security screening and internment in preparation for war had been drafted to counter espionage by Communist regimes, and the activities of Communist groups.

The report states that these widened in the 1960s and the early 1970s:

'The perception of threats to security and the concept of subversion were gradually extended to encompass a wide spectrum of groups associated with radical dissent, political, social and constitutional change and the use of demonstrations and confrontations for political purposes. Security Service surveillance of these groups was not directed by any explicit government policy or guidelines. Nor was there explicit authorisation for a number of the investigative and countering

activities developed over the years by the RCMP in its security work'.

This led to new Cabinet Guidelines drawn up by the Trudeau government in March 1975. These authorised the RCMP 'to maintain internal security by discerning, monitoring, investigating, deterring, preventing and countering' individuals or groups engaged in espionage or sabotage, foreign intelligence activities, hostile or terrorist acts by foreign powers or groups, 'activities directed towards accomplishing governmental change within Canada or elsewhere by force or violence or any other means', and finally, 'the use or the encouragement of the use of force, violence or any criminal means, or the creation or exploitation of civil disorder, for the purpose of accomplishing any of the activities referred to above'.

The then head of the RCMP security service, in a letter written in May 1975 to his senior officers explaining the purpose and meaning of the Directive, emphasised that 'while at first glance the ingredients of our guidelines appear to be strict legal precepts, they are not'. And he explained that the service 'will continue to monitor traditional areas of interest'.

The McDonald Commission condemns the Security Service's mandate as 'diffuse and ambiguous'. The Directive failed, it concludes, to mention a number of the Security Service's functions, such as security clearance investigations which involved it in information gathering outside the Directive's terms. Nor were the Service's methods and powers set out in any way. The commission concludes that the functions of the service, its powers and methods 'must be explicitly, coherently and comprehensively stated'.

The most important single conclusion of the commission is that this must be done by statute:

'We believe it essential to set these boundaries in legislation. The statutory definition of the limits of security intelligence operations should express Parliament's will as to the kinds of political activities it regards as threats to

the security of Canada and therefore as proper subjects of security intelligence surveillance'.

The commission recommends that four types of activity should be covered:

– activities directed to or in support of the commission of acts of espionage or sabotage;

– foreign interference, meaning clandestine or deceptive action taken by or on behalf of any foreign (including Commonwealth) power in Canada to promote the interests of a foreign power;

– political violence and terrorism, meaning activities in Canada directed towards or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political objective in Canada or in a foreign country;

– revolutionary subversion, meaning activities directed towards or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow of the democratic system of government in Canada.'

The commission stresses that authorisation under the third criterion – that against terrorism – should not permit surveillance of every group which might be planning an act of 'vandalism'. The service's role should be confined, it says, 'to collecting intelligence about those who appear to be organising political violence as systematic strategy or on a very large scale or who have international sources of support'.

In countenancing the fourth criterion, 'revolutionary subversion', the McDonald report emphasises that 'so long as political organisations which espouse totalitarian subversion stick to the methods of liberal democracy to promote their cause, they should not, simply by virtue of their beliefs, be subject to intrusive investigations by the security intelligence agency'. So-called 'non-intrusive techniques' could, however, be used.

The legislation should also contain a specific limiting clause, the report recommends. Drawing on the British 'Maxwell Fyfe Directive' to MI5 in 1952 and on the New Zealand Security Intelligence

Service Act, McDonald calls for legal protection to prevent the security intelligence agency from investigating a person or a group 'solely on the basis of that person or group's participation in lawful advocacy, protest or dissent'.

Surveillance techniques

The report examines in detail the ways in which the RCMP's security service and its Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) have carried out their clandestine intelligence gathering operations. It characterises the whole process as 'the breakdown in the rule of law'. Legal constraints were either vague or disregarded, and the RCMP failed to understand its proper relation to government, McDonald says. The commission found, 'a willingness on the part of members of the RCMP to deceive those outside the force who have some sort of constitutional authority or jurisdiction over them or their activities'.

Evidence submitted to the inquiry showed that, between 1971 and February 1978, the Security Service of the RCMP carried out 47 surreptitious break-ins to premises. The purposes of these break-ins included the examination and photography of objects and papers, the installation of listening devices and surveying the premises prior to installation. Two of the best-known of these operations were directed against French Canadian groups – 'Operation Bricole' against the Agence de Presse Libre du Quebec and 'Operation Ham' against the Parti Quebecois (the party which holds power in Quebec). Full details of these operations have been deleted from the published version of the report because the events are still *sub iudice*.

The Security Service was not alone, of course, in employing such techniques and aids. The Criminal Investigation Branch use of them normally exceeds the security uses. For instance, between 1963 and 1974 (when Canada passed a Protection of Privacy Act), the CIB made 83 installations of long term eavesdropping devices and 3,336 of short term devices, involving 123 and 995 secret

break-ins respectively. Since 1974, there have been more than a thousand authorised microphone installations by the CIB.

The RCMP has tapped telephones since the 1930s, the report says. Recent figures published by the Canadian government under the 1974 privacy legislation show that authorised use of phone tapping for anti-crime operations has increased each year, from 562 authorisations granted in 1975 to 764 in 1979. Taps authorised on behalf of the RCMP Security Service, by contrast, have declined from 465 in 1975 to 299 in 1979.

However, these figures are misleading, since they include renewals of taps which, in some cases, are almost permanent. For example, 222 of the 465 security taps authorised in 1975 were renewals of warrants granted in 1974 (all of them renewed in one document). Of 199 warrants renewed at the end of 1976, 97 had been originally granted in 1974 and had been renewed at the end of both 1974 and 1975.

It is interesting to note that these figures show that Canada appears to have twice as many authorised phonetaps as the United Kingdom, which has twice the population of Canada. Figures published by the British government in a 1980 White Paper claimed that 509 warrants to tap phones were authorised in 1975 in England, Scotland and Wales and 467 in 1979. The Canadian figures – 1,027 in 1975 and 1,063 in 1979 – lend further support to the criticism that the 1980 white paper understated the actual incidence of the practice in this country (see *Bulletin* no 18).

The commission conducted a detailed review of RCMP Security Service records to determine the extent and prevalence of mail interference operations between 1970 and 1977. Ninety four such operations – code named 'Cathedral' operations – were identified, of which 66 involved the actual opening of mail. Of these, 21 were carried out between 1970 and 1973 in Quebec and were related to people known or suspected to be involved in Quebec Liberation Front activities.

The CIB was still more heavily involved

in mail intercepts, the vast majority of its operations being in connection with drugs cases. Between 1970 and 1977, it carried out 954 mail intercept operations, 799 of which involved opening. In addition, 592 pieces of mail were examined externally and 258 were delivered under 'controlled circumstances'.

Both the Security Service and the CIB were found by the McDonald inquiry to have had unauthorised access to government information banks on individual citizens. 'The RCMP, in pursuit of its duties, has breached these provisions either with specific approval from headquarters, as a force policy, or with the tacit approval of senior officers . . . This practice of law-breaking became institutionalised within the RCMP'.

The inquiry found that the Criminal Investigation Branch had been interested in five sets of records: income tax records held by the Department of National Revenue, employment records held by the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, family allowance and old age security records held by the Department of National Health and Welfare, industrial research grant records and foreign investment records. Although police access to tax and benefit records was sought for the purpose of fraud investigation, it was frequently also sought for other reasons. For instance, in 1977, the police requested access to Unemployment Insurance Commission records on 648 occasions, but in 428 of the cases, no UIC related offence was alleged and in 313 no reason for the request was given at all.

The Security Service was also interested in these files. The commission was told that it was given information from supposedly confidential income tax files on 132 occasions between 1971 and 1977. It failed to discover how much UIC information was passed to the Security Service but records that requests for information were made regularly – and 567 times in 1977 alone. The Security Services own files contain 1,300,000 entries and 800,000 files on individuals.

It is clear from this report that 'dirty

tricks' are a stock-in-trade of the RCMP Security Service. One Montreal officer summarised the tactics as making 'use of sophisticated and well-researched plans built around existing situations such as, power struggles, love affairs, fraudulent use of funds, information on drug abuse etc., to cause dissension and splintering of the separatist/terrorist groups'. A national programme of such measures was developed by a special operations group between 1971 and 1974, targeted principally against Quebec separatists and leftist militants. The operations included arson, feeding false information to the media, and pressurising employers to dismiss targeted individuals. The report concludes that 'there is no evidence before us of any consideration having been given to whether operations should be within the law'.

The report reveals that successive federal governments have authorised general surveillance of legitimate political parties and movements – or of sections within them. The Communist Party of Canada is revealed to have been under 'systematic surveillance', as was the Maoist Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist). So too were left-wing members of the social democratic New Democratic Party – which regularly receives between 15 and 20 per cent of the vote at national elections.

But the most significant surveillance was conducted against the Parti Quebecois (PQ) which came to power in Quebec in 1976. The RCMP justified its interest on the grounds that 'it is our responsibility to inform the government of any, and all, groups and organisations that are dedicated to the dissolution of Canada'. The McDonald Inquiry found that RCMP disregarded government guidelines on surveillance of the PQ and actively sought and collected information which went beyond its mandate. This included investigation of PQ links with the trade unions and local pressure groups, and 'isolating radical elements operating under PQ cover'. The RCMP was careful to keep all these activities secret from the Quebec Provincial Police and the Montreal police.

Many of these practices and assumptions have lessons for Britain, as the report itself observes:

'While the activities of security agencies in other liberal democracies are, with few exceptions, not a matter of public record, we would be surprised if these countries were completely immune from the kind of excesses recorded in this chapter. That at least some of the Security Service's sister agencies were engaged in similar activities does not excuse what happened in Canada, but it does increase our understanding of why improprieties and illegalities occurred. In the secret and closely knit world of security intelligence, the perspectives and activities of sister agencies must have had some influence on the security service, especially in a situation where little direction was forthcoming from government'.

POLICE RESPONSES TO SCARMAN

The Scarman enquiry into the Brixton riots ended its second phase in September after receiving written evidence from over 50 individuals and organisations, among them the Metropolitan Police, the Superintendents' Association, the Police Federation and John Alderson, chief constable of Devon and Cornwall.

The Metropolitan Police, not surprisingly, demanded a new Riot Act. This would not be merely an updated version of the now repealed 1714 Riot Act which gave power to *magistrates* to order crowds to disperse but would put such power in the hands of the police. In Commissioner McNee's version, a chief superintendent or superior officer, could designate a riot area and order dispersal. Those who failed to do so would commit an arrestable offence which could be tried summarily, without a jury.

The Met, however, had also gone ahead

in advance of Scarman's report, to alter its plans for the future. While the Commissioner wanted to increase the size of the Special Patrol Group he was aware, the enquiry was told, that such a decision would be 'politically sensitive'. Instead, each of the 24 districts of the Metropolitan Police had been instructed to have on call two Transit vans each with a team of ten officers headed by an inspector. These would be equipped with riot shields, helmets, fireproof overalls, and fire extinguishers. They would be a rapid deployment force to be used locally.

The Police Federation in its evidence sought to blame 'well-educated activists' who got young blacks to believe that they were victims of police oppression. This, said the Federation, made young officers wary of dealing with young blacks because of the 'almost automatic reaction' of being accused of victimisation (*Police Review* 28.8.81).

The Police Superintendents' Association in a less unrealistic vein, emphasised the importance of training, 'or the lack of it'. The Association said that the vast majority of officers having daily contact with the public were 'ill prepared' to deal with the many and varied problems that they encountered. 'The personalities of some officers were such', the Association said, 'that they will become overbearing to hide their own insecurity.'

It was John Alderson's evidence, however, which was to gain the maximum publicity and the greatest response. In a carefully timed submission, at the request of a local Brixton group, Alderson submitted a summary of his views on 'community policing' warning that 'one hundred and fifty years of British police heritage could go down the drain'. The Home Office, he said, 'has come up with dehumanising equipment such as plastic bullets and CS gas, greater police powers and the prospect of a detention camp on Salisbury Plain. Meanwhile, many police leaders seem unable to grasp the essential need for radical change.'

The response to such remarks was swift.

The Police Federation described Alderson as 'irresponsible' while George Terry, president of the Association of Chief Police Officers, wanted to 'make it clear' that Alderson spoke only for himself and not for ACPO. After the autumn meeting of ACPO (which Alderson did not attend) where the police chiefs had discussed equipment and public order, several chief constables publicly rebuked Alderson, rejecting any suggestion that police evidence to Scarman had been 'negative'.

Scarman's report is due to be published at the end of October. On the face of it it seems unlikely that he will be as impressed with the police evidence (other than Alderson's) as the police are themselves.

POSITIVE VETTING TO BE EXTENDED

The Security Commission is currently conducting the most far-reaching review of positive vetting procedures since the Ratcliffe Commission in 1962. Positive vetting, which began under the Attlee government in 1948, affects all civil servants considered to hold 'sensitive' jobs and those who work for private firms on defence contracts. And, according to well-informed sources, those who will be included in positive vetting procedures is to be widely extended (*The Times* 22.8.81).

This inquiry by the Security Commission was announced by Mrs Thatcher in March the day she cleared the late Sir Roger Hollis, former Director-General of M15, from allegations that he had spied for Russia. This allegation had been made by journalist Chapman Pincher in his book, *Their Trade is Treachery*. However, the inquiry into who leaked the material used by Pincher to support his claim was placed in the hands of M15 (see *Bulletin* no 23). The job of the Security Commission was to review 'the security procedures and practices' (*Hansard* 26.3.81).

Three members of the Security Commission, which was set up in 1964 in the wake of the Profumo scandal, have been asked to carry out the review (see *Bulletin* no 1). They are Lord Diplock, the chairman of the Commission, Lord Bridge, a Law Lord, and Lord Allen, a former permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office. They are being serviced by the Civil Service Department's PM5 division, which deals with security policy and the running of the positive vetting system. The secretary to the Commissioners is Mr Paul James, a principal in the PM5 Division. The Diplock Inquiry brief is to concentrate on personnel rather than physical security in the civil service and is expected to report at the end of the year (*The Times* 26.5.81).

Reports on the work of the enquiry so far indicate that while defectors in the pay of the Russians remain a major problem, this review has been stimulated because of the changing nature of extra-parliamentary political groups over the past twenty years who owe no allegiance to Soviet interests. The new problem this presents the positive vetting process with is that members of the civil-service trade unions include left-wing members and that even lowly-placed employees can leak secret documents or information embarrassing to the government of the day. As *The Times* correspondent expressed it information could be sent to 'to one of a number of fringe publications, an action that the security authorities would regard as damagingly subversive in its own way' (*The Times* 22.8.81).

The remit of the security services in conducting positive vetting, which in the past has officially been concentrated on members of the Communist Party and 'fellow-travellers', is, it seems, to be extended to anyone with 'left wing' or radical views.

A recent example of the present disaffection within the ranks of the civil service is provided by the exposure of correspondence from Denis Thatcher to Nicholas Edwards, Secretary of State for Wales. Mr Thatcher wrote in his personal

capacity, as consultant to a private property developer, on 10 Downing Street notepaper complaining about a delay in a planning enquiry for holiday houses and a hotel in Snowdonia National Park, North Wales. This letter and other documents went missing from the Welsh Office files in Cardiff during the civil servants industrial dispute, and the text was released after a disappointing settlement was reached. The letter first appeared in *Welsh Leek*, a news-sheet sponsored by the Society of Civil and Public Servants Association (see *Rebecca* October 1981; *Guardian* 18.9.81).

The origin of positive vetting

In March 1948 Mr Attlee announced in the Commons that no person 'known to be a member of the Communist Party or to be associated with it' would in future be employed on secret state work, and a Cabinet Committee on Subversive Activities was set up. The system was extended in 1952 when it was decided that a much greater in-depth investigation into an individual's life and background was necessary. This was called *positive vetting*. What was not known at the time was that the introduction of positive vetting was the result of an agreement between Britain, America and France (*U.S. News and World Report* October 1954).

In 1956 the *Report of the Conference of Privy Councillors* into the defection of Burgess and Mclean agreed that in addition to suspected communist sympathies, character 'defects' should also be grounds for exclusion from many state posts – 'failings such as drunkenness, addiction to drugs, homosexuality or any loose living' (*Report of the Conference of Privy Councillors*, Cmnd 9715, HMSO 1956, para. 16). Although the Report said that the main problem was to identify members of the British Communist Party it also referred to 'that wider body of those who are . . . sympathetic to communism . . . '.

Between 1948 and 1955 some 135 civil servants were said to have been affected by these procedures. Of these some resigned

(24), some were dismissed outright (25), and some were transferred to 'non-sensitive' work (86). No figures have been released of those affected by positive vetting procedures in the last twenty years. A further review of security procedures was conducted in 1962 by the late Lord Radcliffe whose remit extended to people employed by firms working on government contract work in 'sensitive' areas.

The 'purges' of the 1940s and 1950s led to a situation where the emphasis was to exclude from entry to the civil service those with 'subversive' connections or had character 'defects'. What is suggested by the latest review is that the interpretation of 'sensitive' areas is to be extended to all civil servants, however lowly graded, and that the term 'sensitive' is to be interpreted to cover not only classified information of use to an enemy but information which is politically embarrassing to the government.

9 MONTHS OF MARCH BANS

Bans on marches under the Public Order Act continue to be imposed with alarming frequency. In August alone six bans were imposed – in Bedfordshire (2), Crawley, Peterborough, Liverpool and London. This brings to 19 the number of bans which have been ordered in 1981, nearly five times higher than in the whole of the 1970s. The bans ordered so far this year have been:

- March 5: ban for 27 days in the London Metropolitan Police District
- March 20: ban for one month in Leicester.
- March 21: ban for 14 days in Wolverhampton
- March 21: ban for 29 days in Leeds
- March 22: ban for seven days in South Yorkshire
- April 25: ban for one month in the London Metropolitan Police District
- June 19: ban for 23 days in Coventry

- July 11: ban for 35 days in the London Metropolitan Police District
- July 17: ban for 10 days in Walsall
- July 18: ban for seven days in Oxford
- July 18: ban for 30 days in Plymouth
- July 24: ban for 17 days on marches in Grimsby, Hull, Cleethorpes and Scunthorpe
- August 1: ban for nine days in Bedfordshire
- August 14: ban for 14 days in Bedfordshire
- August 21: ban for 17 days in Crawley
- August 25: ban for 31 days in Peterborough
- August 26: ban for six weeks in Liverpool
- August 28: ban for one month in the London Metropolitan Police District

In the majority of cases there is a clear link between the bans and marches organised by the National Front, New National Front and the British Movement. In the most recent cases, for example, the ban in Peterborough coincided with a march planned by the British Movement. In Liverpool, the National Front had been planning to march through Toxteth and in London the New National Front had been planning a march to coincide with the Notting Hill Carnival. John Tyndall, chairman of the New National Front, told the press that the purpose of planning the march had been to show that it would attract a ban whereas a march shortly before by the Liverpool 8 Defence Committee had been permitted.

In addition, the majority of the bans imposed have been blanket bans, applying to all processions 'other than those of a religious, educational, festive or ceremonial character customarily held'. The blanket use of the Public Order Act 1936 has been criticised extensively by those affected by the bans and by others. Brownies and May queens have been forced to cancel processions because they were not 'customarily held' while others affected have included hospital staff in Epsom protesting about rates of pay and, most frequently, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

As has been pointed out on a number of occasions, and argued in court by the National Council for Civil Liberties the law does not *require* an 'all or nothing' approach as is suggested by the Home Office. In May, the Minister of State at the Home Office, Christopher Mayhew MP admitted to George Cunningham MP in reply to a question that selective bans had been imposed in the past. The three most selective had been:

- a ban imposed for 24 hours on 17 September 1961 in 'part of the Metropolitan Police District' on any procession by the Committee of 100 or 'any person or persons acting on behalf of the said "Committee"';
- a ban imposed for 48 hours on 6 July 1963 prohibiting all public processions 'of a political nature' in 'part of the Metropolitan Police District';
- and three separate orders in November 1974 banning for one month processions in connection with the death of James McDade in Birmingham, Coventry and Solihull (*Hansard* 6.5.81).

OPERATION RUGBY

Unprecedented protest against the Springboks' rugby tour of New Zealand was met by equally unprecedented policing. At the start of the tour the police had hoped to be able to contain opposition by means of Team Policing Units of 'active, fit and highly trained' officers who 'often merely by their presence in strength have cleared up many of the trouble spots thereby enabling law abiding citizens to enjoy facilities in peace' (*Report of the Commissioner for Police for the year ending March 1981*). The estimated cost of policing the tour was put by the police at \$2.5 million. Such estimates and hopes were quickly irrelevant.

At the height of the protest more than 4,000 of New Zealand's 4,900 police were directly involved in 'Operation Rugby' while retired officers were called up and special constables recruited. The police

were given authority to seek 'logistical support' from the Ministry of Defence which came to mean catering, transport and the erection of barbed wire barriers around the touchlines of New Zealand's rugby grounds. It was, the Minister of Police, Ben Couch, said, 'a movement into a new phase of policing' (*The Times* 31.7.81).

Police tactics also changed from mere containment to aggressive policing. Police in riot gear (for the first time in New Zealand) and carrying long batons charged demonstrators on several occasions causing serious injuries. In Wellington, for example, police charged at a protest march on the South African consulate causing thirty serious injuries. The Riot Squads were, a New Zealand paper wrote, 'The country's top legitimate gang' (*Listener* 22.8.81). At the same time, plain clothes officers mingled with demonstrators to gather information and pro-tour supporters meted out their own 'justice' to protestors in the form of severe beatings.

As opposition to the tour mounted Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, denounced the protestors as 'fascists' and on 24 August released the contents of a report by New Zealand's Security Intelligence Service which named 15 radicals and alleged subversives as being 'behind' the protest. The report said that the 'extremists' fell into two main groups. There were those who were members of subversive organisations who were exploiting the protest for their own ends, and there were those who were not members of organisations of 'security interest' but who still posed a 'law and order' problem'. Included in the former category were members of the Workers Communist League.

The 'subversive extremists', said the report, attempted to 'politicise the issue making claims of police brutality and singling out the National Party and the Prime Minister as protest targets' while the 'non-political extremists tend towards anarchy, looking for physical confrontation for its own sake' (*The Times* 26.8.81).

The report, not surprisingly, contained no documented evidence to support its

allegations but the Prime Minister claimed that the Director of the Security Intelligence Services, Paul Molineaux, was prepared to stand up for everything in it.

The tour ended on 12 September leaving the country, in the words of *The Times*, 'riven as never before amid unprecedented scenes of protest and violent confrontation . . . it is reasonable to suppose that the Government in hindsight, measuring the social and perhaps political cost of prevailing divisiveness' would have tried harder to ensure the cancellation of the tour (14.9.81).

TUC DEBATE CIVIL LIBERTIES

Questions of unemployment and resisting wage restraint dominated this year's TUC conference. There were however a number of important developments in other areas.

Restructuring: although this might appear a purely internal matter, the agreed structural changes to the TUC General Council could have important political consequences. The conference agreed that all unions with 100,000 members should automatically get General Council seats, with smaller unions sharing a further 12 seats: 'By reducing the TUC's traditional reliance on manual workers, the new system is expected to produce a long-term shift to the right in the labour movement' (*The Times* 8.9.81). The 1982 conference is to discuss these changes further, and there might well be attempts to reverse the decision.

Unilateral disarmament: for the first time the TUC has adopted a unilateralist position on disarmament. Conference carried a composite moved by the Transport and General Workers Union calling for total opposition to nuclear weapons, including an immediate reduction in arms spending; total opposition to a defence policy based on nuclear weapons; opposition to the siting of

Cruise and Trident in the UK and the neutron bomb in Europe; and the closure of all British and American nuclear bases in Britain. It also called for these policies to be included in the Labour Party manifesto.

Inner city riots: there were no motions on this year's disturbances in the cities. These were referred to, however, in a composite on youth unemployment moved by the Society of Civil and Public Servants, which saw mass youth unemployment as the main cause of inner city rioting and rejected attempts to increase police powers.

Civil liberties: a motion from the National Union of Journalists on press freedom and civil liberties was passed. This included opposition to the report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure and the use of blanket bans on marches. It also called for a Freedom of Information Act and repeal of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. An amendment from the Post Office Engineering Union calling for the publication of rules governing telephone tapping was also carried. However, the section of the NUJ motion calling for repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act was rejected, following opposition from the General Council.

Prisons: a motion from the Tobacco Workers' Union, which was carried, expressed alarm at prison overcrowding and noted that increased unemployment had been accompanied by a growth in the prison population.

EEC: The TUC reaffirmed its policy of opposition to the Common Market but changed its tactics by rejecting the call for a referendum on withdrawal from the EEC.

PREJUDICIAL POLICING

Good police officers have to prejudiced if they are to do their jobs properly, a police superintendent told a seminar in September. Speaking at a seminar in Oxford, Detective Superintendent Dick Holland of West Yorkshire police and a member of the Ripper squad, said that:

'Subordinate officers are expected to act in a discriminatory way, that is against those people who by their conduct, mode of life, dress, associates and transport are most likely to be the criminals for whom we are searching. The checking and searching of youthful, athletic West Indian youths wearing short jeans, T-shirts and multi-coloured tea-cosy type hats who hover around pedestrian precincts, walkways and subways in city centres will detect outstanding handbag snatches and what has become commonly known as "street mugging" . . . That is the sort of prejudice and discrimination we want from police officers.' (*Daily Telegraph* 14.9.81)

A study of attitudes among police officers indicates that training has only a marginal effect on eradicating prejudice. The study, claimed to be the first of conservatism, dogmatism and authoritarianism in British police officers, carried out with a control group, was conducted by a police officer, Detective Chief Inspector Paul Gorman, and Dr Andrew Colman of the department of social psychology at the University of Leicester.

The research, based on tests given to 48 recruits at the beginning and end of training, 36 probationer constables after 20 months service and a control group of 30, suggests that the police force attracts conservative and authoritarian personalities. Training was found to have a liberalising effect but this was only temporary and continued service in the police resulted in increasingly illiberal and intolerant attitudes towards black people. Recruits were asked to give reasons for such intolerance. Among the replies were:

'because over 50 per cent of trouble today is either by niggers or because of them. Most of them are just Dirty, Smelly, backward people who will never change in a month of Sundays. In my opinion, Rastas should be out of distinction (*sic*)'.

Another recruit said:

'Coloured immigration into this country has brought with it a society of uneducated, troublesome people who

come here only for the benefit that we provide such as social security and housing. The majority are disrespectful of the law and wish people in this country only harm.'

Yet another replied:

'The country is being taken over slowly but surely by coloured immigrants, if we continue like this there will be no white people left.'

The research was conducted in an area of high black settlement and the authors note that the results might have been different elsewhere. They say that any attempt to generalise the results would be unsafe. They do note, however, that the liberalising effect of training was short lived and that, 'It does not, apparently, survive the integration of the constables into the police subculture.' (*The Times* 24.9.81).

TORY 'UNION' AT THE MOD

An attempt to form a breakaway staff association in the Ministry of Defence has so far failed to impress either MoD workers or the Ministry itself. Although a report in *The Times* (16.9.81) suggested that this move has come from 'defence civilians dissatisfied with the conduct of the civil service unions during their 21-week dispute with the government', the real motives for its formation are due more to the dissatisfaction of one individual. The secretary of the association is active Tory Tom Lawton. He was recently suspended from holding office for three years in his union, the Society of Civil and Public Servants. The reason for the suspension was that Lawton had been using his SCPS office (he was a branch secretary) for informal meetings with Tory ministers – cutting across the formal and democratic structures for union-civil service negotiations. Following his suspension, Lawton resigned from the SCPS and has since formed his own staff association.

The staff association is aiming to attract

members from:

'these civil servants who were uneasy at the prospect of taking industrial action that might jeopardise the defence of the country . . . and are prepared to consider the possible separation of the Ministry of Defence from the rest of the Civil Service.' (*The Times* 16.9.81)

The Ministry of Defence has not yet recognised the association and it is therefore denied any official facilities (time off, use of offices for activities, etc).

It is not yet clear whether this association is linked with any groups holding a similar philosophy – such as Truemit or the Freedom Association. What it does indicate is Tory disdain for union democracy; before his suspension, Lawson was consistently defeated by the SCPS membership in his attempts to stand for executive office. So far his self-styled staff association has failed to attract defections from the 109,000 member SCPS.

TORIES BACKTRACK ON POLICE PAY

The government is looking for a way of renegotiating its commitment to index-linked annual police pay settlements which has existed since the Edmund-Davies report of 1978 was accepted by the previous Labour government. The move follows a series of pay rounds in which the police have secured much larger increases than other public service workers, and comes at a time when the government is aiming to hold public service pay increases to 4 per cent in the 1981-82 pay round.

The Edmund-Davies inquiry was established by the previous Home Secretary, Merlyn Rees, after a sustained outbreak of police militancy over pay. The first of the inquiry's reports, published in July 1978, recommended increases of 30-45 per cent on all grades. Rees, while accepting the report, decided to pay the award in two

stages – September 1978 and September 1979. When the Conservative government was elected in May 1979, its first action was to bring forward the second stage and pay it immediately. This brought the basic pay of a constable aged 21 or under to £3,600 on joining the force (£4,300 if aged more than 21). London police received an extra allowance of £969.

Edmund-Davies also recommended – and the government accepted – that subsequent pay awards should be made from 1 September each year and should be based on the Department of Employment index of average earnings. On 1 September 1979, therefore, the police got a further 13.5 per cent, and on 1 September 1980 an extra 21.3 per cent.

This year's award, recommended as usual by the Police Negotiating Board, was accepted by the Home Secretary on 24 July. It gave the police a further 13.2 per cent increase from 1 September 1981. A constable aged 21 or under who joins the force will now get £5,610 basic pay (£6,699 if aged more than 21); London police get another £1,011 on top of that, while members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary get a special allowance of £777 on top of the basic. (For a full list of the new scales up to Chief Inspector rank, see *Police* magazine, September 1981).

This means that basic police pay has gone up by a minimum of 55.8 per cent in the lifetime of the Conservative government. And while it has made great political play out of its generosity to and support for the police, the government is now finding the price too high.

That is why, at this summer's meeting of the Police Negotiating Board, the Home Office and the local authorities began the process of untying the commitment to automatic index linking to average earnings. They announced that, over the next few months and in time for the 1982 settlement, they will 'examine whether there is a case for any changes to the level at which the link is made; the method by which the link is established; or the pay structure'. Also floated was a proposal not to pay an

increase in the London allowance next year. The reaction of the police representative organisations is that there is no reason for such a review and that, if anything, their pay relativity should be improved. The Conservative government's honeymoon with the police could be coming to an end.

ROYAL NAVY EQUIPMENT EXHIBITION

The Royal Navy is only going to survive in anything like its present form by becoming a floating exhibition and testing ground for British weapons manufacturers – and by buying weapons designed with export markets in mind rather than real Royal Navy needs. This, the current consensus view of the government and the British defence industry (although not necessarily the Navy), came over clearly at the latest of the biannual Royal Navy Equipment Exhibitions, held at Portsmouth from 7-11 September, 1981.

Britain used to be a world leader in warship exports, but has not sold a major new warship of Royal Navy design overseas for a decade, although naval equipment sales are up. With the government anxious both to reduce the cost of the Royal Navy and to boost the profits of the defence industries, priority is to be given to evolving new warship designs that will be attractive to overseas buyers. The Navy will have to buy these vessels as well as they will be the only British ones available and also to give overseas confidence in the product.

The trouble with existing British warships is that they are too complicated – and therefore expensive – for most overseas markets. They are built to stringent NATO standards that many navies do not always need, they are designed for operations in the world's worst weather conditions – not always a necessary feature in milder climates – and they have multi-role, long range capabilities, when most customer

countries are looking for more role-specific vessels. So the Royal Navy is to be persuaded to accept ships it might find unsuitable in order to boost the British defence industry.

Military exports are becoming an increasingly important part of the national economy, currently accounting for 2½% of all exports. Total weapons sales overseas for 1981/2 are forecast at £1,500m, an increase of 25% on the previous year. During the last five years individual defence sales contracts worth over £20m each were concluded with 40 countries while contracts worth £1m or more were signed with no less than 86 countries. (All official figures.)

93 countries were invited to attend the 1981 RNEE, four more than in 1979. The most prominent of the countries sending delegations for the first time was Chile, whose presence provoked protest demonstrations by people in Portsmouth opposed to the Chilean military junta. Naval strength is a priority for most South American countries, many of whom were at RNEE, and Chile was a particularly important target for the British sales personnel as a new submarine is on offer, the Type 2400, replacing the Oberon class of submarine for which Chile was a prominent customer.

THATCHER'S CABINET LEAPS RIGHTWARDS

Margaret Thatcher's recent cabinet reshuffle effectively purges all potential U-turners from leading posts, replacing them with hard-line monetarists. *Out* of the cabinet go Sir Ian Gilmour, Lord Soames and Mark Carlisle, all opponents of monetarism. The soft line James Prior has been taken out of the Department of Employment and 'exiled' to Northern Ireland. His replacement by the extreme right-winger Norman Tebbit both indicates the central role which the Thatcher

government places on weakening organised labour and the low priority it gives to working towards a solution in Northern Ireland.

The new employment secretary Norman Tebbit (MP for Chingford) has made a rapid rise from his former non-Cabinet post as industry minister. Amongst his right-wing credentials he was formerly (1974-79) assistant director of information to the National Federation of Building Trades Employers – one of the most anti-union employers' associations. Perhaps more significantly, he has been a member of the Monday Club (*The Story of the Monday Club*, Robert Copping, Current Affairs Information Service, 1972). In common with other cabinet members (Thatcher, Sir Keith Joseph, Peter Walker), Tebbit is a supporter of the Freedom Association, formerly National Association for Freedom (see *Bulletins* no 1, 7, 11, 17).

During NAFF's campaign in 1977 to assist George Ward's refusal to recognise union members at his Grunwick factory, Tebbit spoke at a NAFF rally on Grunwick at the Tory Party conference, not a promising background to his future dealings with the unions. Tebbit also joined in a NAFF campaign to get trade unionists to opt out of the political levy. He claimed that the union political funds 'are not even used to support the Labour Party, but . . . for the purposes of the extreme Left.' (*Free Nation* 29.9 - 13.10.78).

An article in the *Daily Telegraph* on the new cabinet (15.9.81) gave a Tory's-eye view on its new political complexion. New energy secretary Nigel Lawson – a former editor of the *Spectator* is 'a pugnacious supporter of Mrs Thatcher's economic and monetarist strategy.' Social services secretary Norman Fowler – former adviser to Group 4 Security – when transport secretary 'was seen as implementing Mrs Thatcher's philosophy more thoroughly and imaginatively than almost any other minister. Despite this, he is nearer the centre than the right of the party.' The new leader of the House of Lords, Lady Young, is to 'the right of centre'. New Tory Party

chairman and paymaster-general (with a place also in the cabinet) is Cecil Parkinson, 'slightly to the right of centre'.

The forthcoming Tory Party conference will be the first test of the popularity of Thatcher's government changes with her supporters and will show the extent to which monetarism dominates Tory philosophy.

SECRET TRACING SYSTEM

The police and other emergency services will soon be able to trace emergency 999 calls immediately as a result of research now being carried out by British Telecom in conjunction with the Home Office. At present the research deals only with calls made from public telephone boxes where tracing will be made easier by the introduction of the new System X exchange which operates by using microchips. The first exchange of this kind is to be opened soon in Brixton, South London.

The tracing system is expensive and would be even more so if it were to be extended to private telephone calls but plans are already in hand for the gradual introduction throughout the country of System X exchanges which will be able to identify the sources of calls in preparing subscribers' accounts. While the only System X exchanges in Britain are in Suffolk and the City of London, the system is more widely used in the United States. It now appears that the introduction of the system depends on the Home Office. British Telecom told the *Guardian* (23.7.81) that 'we have shown that it is feasible and we have left it up to the Home Office to say whether we should go further.' The Home Office denied knowledge of the research, but the Home Secretary subsequently told parliament that the research was being carried out at the request of the Home Office. (*Hansard* 27.7.81)

In July the Metropolitan Police introduced a simplified version of the system which allows police officers to be

dispatched to the scene of an incident before the caller reporting it had finished speaking. This system is that of a computer listing of all coin boxes in London and is dependent on the caller supplying the correct telephone number of the box. The new system would be able to identify the source even if an incorrect number, or none at all, were supplied.

NEW SUS LAW?


The Criminal Attempts Act 1981 which replaces section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824, the 'sus' law (see *Bulletin* no.22) was passed by parliament and came into force on 24 August. The Act creates a new offence of interfering with a vehicle or its contents, or taking it unlawfully and abolishes the

'impossibility rule' so that a person could now be convicted of attempting to do something which is in fact impossible.

In the House of Lords the government defeated an attempt to amend the law so as to limit the power of the police to arrest someone suspected of interfering with a motor vehicle. Lord Mishcon moved an amendment to ensure that before an offence was committed a person had to pursue a course of action involving two or more separate acts of interference. The 'sus' law, he said, required evidence of more than one suspicious act to secure a conviction and its replacement should make no less a requirement. The government rejected any analogy with 'sus' and rejected the amendment.

It remains to be seen whether the abolition of 'sus' and its replacement has any effect on the level of police harassment of young blacks on the streets.

THE RUC: A SECTARIAN POLICE FORCE



The history and development of the Royal Ulster Constabulary are inextricably linked with the origin and development of Northern Ireland itself.

With partition of Ireland in 1921, the old all-Ireland police force, the Royal Irish Constabulary, was divided into two. In the South, a new force called the Garda Siochana (Guardians of the Peace) was formed, consisting of old RIC officers and pro-partition supporters of the IRA. Unlike the RIC – which had been seen as a pro-

British force of occupation – the Garda Siochana was able to win and retain general public support.

In the North, however, the old RIC was simply renamed – as the Royal Ulster Constabulary – maintaining its previous character of an armed, barracked and quasi-military police force committed to the maintenance of the union with Britain. In the new Northern Ireland state, the Protestants saw it as both a source of employment and as a protector of their privileges – while Catholics identified the force as the military wing of the ruling Protestant Unionist party.

In other words, the constitutional and political basis of the police in Northern Ireland has always been different to that of the police in Britain. While British police forces have grown up within the traditions of local accountability, community consent and political independence, the RUC

comes from an imposed and sectarian tradition.

Since the modern resurgence of violent conflict in 1969, the RUC has undergone several changes. These changes have refined the crude old bludgeoning RUC into one of the most highly sophisticated counter-insurgency police forces in the world, a model for many internal security planners. Its experience is used directly by British forces, too. As recently as July 1981, at the height of the city riots, six senior British police chiefs flew to Northern Ireland to discuss riot control with the RUC.

Up to 1970, the RUC was wholly and exclusively accountable to the Minister of Home Affairs in Belfast, a post that since 1921 was always filled by a Unionist politician. It possessed a staggering array of legal powers under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, 1922, which remained in force until 1973. The Act empowered the police to intern without trial, to ban political parties and meetings, to suspend habeas corpus and even to ban or censor books or records. The former South African prime minister, John Vorster, once declared that he would exchange all the repressive legislation available to him for the Special Powers Act.

When British troops arrived in Northern Ireland to provide military aid to the civil power in August 1969, the RUC was thoroughly discredited in the eyes of Catholics. The violence it had used against civil rights protesters in the previous twelve months had finally sparked off four days of vicious rioting in the largely Catholic city of Derry. At the end of those riots the RUC was exhausted, demoralised and defeated. In Belfast, RUC men had gone on the rampage and had fired indiscriminately into Catholic areas with Browning heavy machine guns killing three people. The first task of the British government was to reform that force if it was ever to hope that it would police Northern Ireland normally again. In the meantime the British Army took control of policing functions in Catholic areas.

The Hunt Commission

The first act of the government was to establish a commission of enquiry into the RUC. The commission was chaired by Lord Hunt and its other members were Robert Mark, the future Metropolitan Commissioner, and Sir James Robertson, chief constable of Glasgow. Writing later of his experience on the Hunt Commission, Mark stated:

'As time went on we became more and more aware of the colonial system which had administered the province for years. Only its association in law with the United Kingdom and its representation at Westminster prevented it from being seen in realistic terms as in no different relationship to Great Britain than Cyprus, Aden or any other of the countless colonial territories from the great days of empire.' (*In The Office of Constable*, p111)

The Hunt Report contained several radical, reforming proposals. The most controversial was the disbanding of the 'B Specials'. The B Specials were officially the RUC's reserve force and dated from 1921. In practice they were a Protestant gang, officered by local unionist politicians, which was used to terrorise the Catholic population and was not properly under police control. Robert Mark called it 'a paramilitary organisation whose continuance was clearly incompatible with democratic government'. Hunt recommended that it should be replaced by a non-sectarian military force, known as the Ulster Defence Regiment, which would be controlled by the British Army.

The report also proposed that the RUC should be disarmed, that a police authority free of direct political influence should govern its day-to-day affairs, reform of the rank structure, the creation of a new reserve, new uniforms and a general 'demilitarisation' of the force's role and image. It also made the important recommendation that the RUC's terms of pay and employment should be aligned with the British police. The first holder of the

new post of RUC chief constable was Sir Arthur Young, former commissioner of the City of London police, a police officer with experience in Malaya, Kenya and the Gold Coast.

Mainly because they were not fully implemented the reforms have failed to convince most Catholics. The disarming of the RUC lasted only a few months when the IRA campaign forced the authorities to re-issue guns. The police authority has failed to convince Catholics that political influence over the RUC has ended. Most of its members are Unionist politicians, and its notable quiescence during the allegations of police torture made by Amnesty International convinced many Catholics that it was a cosmetic body. The RUC continues to carry out military duties and rebelled against the change in uniform, although it did agree to a numbering system. The UDR has replaced the B Specials as an aggressive sectarian force and dozens of its members have been convicted for violence and murder aimed at the Catholic population. But most of all the failure of the RUC to attract Catholic recruits is an indication that it has not won acceptability by the minority population. 91 per cent of the RUC men and 98 per cent of the UDR men are Protestant.

Despite the failure of those 'reforms' the British government has pushed ahead with the second phase of its strategy; that of reintroducing the RUC into Catholic areas, and re-establishing 'normal' policing by also making the force more efficient. From 1969 until 1976 the British Army was in total control of security operations against the IRA but in 1976 the government introduced a policy called 'Primacy of the police', 'Ulsterisation' or 'normalisation'. The thrust of that policy was the operational replacement of the Army by the RUC and the gradual withdrawal of the Army as a physical presence on the streets of Catholic Belfast and elsewhere in favour of the RUC with the UDR in support. (See *Bulletin* No.4)

If that was the strategy the tactic was the law. The British government belatedly

recognised that the rough and ready methods of the British Army (vide Bloody Sunday in Derry in 1972), coupled with the use of extra-legal processes like internment without trial, alienated the Catholic population and fuelled support and recruits for the IRA. The RUC was thereafter to use the law against the IRA. The principal weapon in their arsenal was the extraction of confessions by interrogation in the sure knowledge that the no-jury courts would convict. The RUC established two major interrogation centres in Northern Ireland (at Castlereagh in Belfast and Gough in Armagh) and proceeded to arrest former internees and IRA suspects as well as innocent people and interrogate them. It was a spectacularly successful policy. During the period 1977 to early 1979, 80 per cent of all convictions for terrorist offences were based on confessions extracted in the interrogation centres. The policy also had the advantage of being much less obtrusive than the heavy military presence which characterised British Army operations. In addition the government emphasised the 'normalisation' process by taking away 'political status' from convicted IRA prisoners; a development which has led to the present H Block protest. The policy depended of course on the use of violence during interrogation and it was the increasing outcry at the alleged use of police brutality and torture in the interrogation centres that led to the ultimate failure of the government's police strategy.

Amnesty International reported in 1978 that the allegations were well founded and a subsequent government committee of inquiry, chaired by Judge Harry Bennett, (see *Bulletin* No. 11) largely upheld them. Deprived of its foundations, the 'normalisation' policy foundered. The committee recommended tighter supervision of interrogations – by closed circuit surveillance and by ensuring regular solicitor's visits. These reforms deprived the RUC of its main weapon.

Nevertheless, the RUC is still 'in charge' of security operations. Arrests by the Army must be sanctioned by the RUC and the

RUC continues to replace the Army in riot and confrontation situations. But the failure of the 'normalisation' policy has caused friction between the two forces, with the Army saying that it should now be given greater primacy. As a result, in 1979, the British government appointed a 'security co-ordinator' to co-ordinate RUC and Army operations and intelligence. (The Army were equally in favour of a 'security supremo') The first 'co-ordinator' was Sir Maurice Oldfield, former chief of M16. The post is currently held by Sir Francis Brooke Richards, formerly British Cabinet Intelligence co-ordinator.

The general background to the appointment of the co-ordinator has been described by Tony Geraghty in his history of the SAS. Geraghty says that in the early 1970s there was an 'intelligence supremo', a M15 officer, attached to the Northern Ireland Office. His deputy however was a member of M16. The army had its own structure and line of responsibility to the Ministry of Defence while the RUC continued its intelligence gathering through the Special Branch. The lines were further blurred by the existence of the army's Special Military Intelligence Unit reporting directly to the M16 Intelligence Chief at army headquarters, by-passing normal military command structures. All these agencies, says Geraghty, 'were jostling for control, offering conflicting analyses of what was happening on the ground and not revealing their thoughts to one another.' (*Who Dares Wins* p192-3) After the Prime Minister visited Northern Ireland herself in 1979 and was reportedly appalled by conflicting intelligence reports the new co-ordinator post was created.

Following the failure of 'normalisation' and a re-organisation of the IRA into a cellular system, the emphasis on security policing is now officially on intelligence work and the gathering of evidence that will stand up in court. The British Army has for a long time employed covert surveillance units such as the Special Air Service (SAS) in Northern Ireland but there are now suggestions that the RUC is also

establishing a covert, specially trained section to carry out such work. Either way security today is geared to the long slow haul.

RUC: structure and organisation

The number of police officers in the RUC has more than doubled since the British government sent troops into Northern Ireland in 1969. Then, the RUC was 3,000 strong. Its current establishment (the maximum it is permitted to employ) is 7,500. Its actual strength on 31 December 1980 was 6,935 officers of whom 6,224 were men and 653 women. In addition, the RUC reserve numbered 4,752, of whom 1,685 were full timers. The RUC hopes to reach its establishment ceiling by the end of 1981, so by then there will be over 9,000 police in Northern Ireland. This represents one officer to every 160 civilians – the ratio is even lower if the army and the UDR are also taken into account.

The force is responsible, through the chief constable to a police authority consisting of 18 people sponsored by the secretary of state for Northern Ireland. It is currently chaired by Sir Myles Humphries, a former Lord Mayor of Belfast.

The chief constable is assisted by two deputy chief constables (one Protestant and one Catholic) and by nine assistant chief constables. Three of the assistant chiefs are in charge of the force's three regions. The remainder are responsible for headquarters departments.

Operationally, the RUC divides Northern Ireland into three regions: Belfast, North (based in Derry) and South (based in Armagh). Each region is subdivided into divisions, which are each commanded by a chief superintendent. Within the 16 divisions which make up Northern Ireland, there are 152 police stations, previously known as barracks.

Special Branch

According to figures given by the Northern Ireland Office in 1978, the RUC's Special

Branch is 279 strong and has tripled in strength since 1969. Before the emergence of the civil rights movement in 1967/68 it was even smaller and was initially expanded to investigate the civil rights movement which it suspected of being manipulated by the Communist Party. Before that it existed to keep an eye on IRA and Republican sympathisers. When Protestant violence broke out in 1970/71 British Army intelligence officers complained at the paucity of Special Branch information on Protestant extremists. It was also criticised by the Army for its inaccurate information on IRA supporters when, during the internment swoops of 1971, soldiers found that some 'terrorists' it had been sent to arrest were long dead or senile. The fact that it also hopelessly misread the civil rights movement also damaged its reputation and led to its functions being taken over for a long time by the military.

In 1976 the role of the RUC Special Branch was eroded further by the creation by Chief Constable Newman of the *Criminal Intelligence Unit* based at RUC HQ. The CIU collates information on 'terrorists' from the Special Branch and CID and card indexes it for general use. The Special Branch relies almost entirely on informers for information but also intercepts telephone and postal communications.

Special Patrol Group

The RUC's special patrol group was established as an anti-terrorist unit in the border area during the IRA's 1956-62 bombing campaign. It was given the name, Special Patrol Group, in 1970.

It is used to escort prisoners, wage deliveries, explosives and VIPs, for random patrolling and road-block checks and for riot control. The SPG travel in grey, military-style, bulletproof landrovers, though in the dangerous border areas armoured cars are used. They are equipped with riot helmets, shields, batons, gas masks, rubber bullets, gas guns, Walther pistols (which it wants to replace with

American Magnums and Rugers which are still embargoed by the US government), Sterling sub-machine guns and American M1 carbines (spare parts and replacements for which are also stopped by the American embargo.) The 'bronze section' specialises in plain clothes surveillance – whether on foot or in vehicles, in Republican areas. The SPG uses separate radio codes.

In 1978, the SPG numbered 368, divided at that time into ten units, seven of them in Belfast. However, since then, its numbers have been reduced because of redeployment into Divisional Mobile Support Units (DMSUs) outside the Belfast area. These rural SPG sections now form the nuclei of new DMSUs (created in March 1980) which now number 13 in the North and South regions. The DMSUs are divisionally based and are accountable to the divisional commander. Their tasks include anti-terrorist operations, large scale searches, observation exercises and escort duties. In 1980, the DMSUs identified and reported some 6,500 offences – mainly from roadblocks.

Thus, although the SPG itself has been reduced in size, the redeployment of DMSUs means that the RUC is increasing the number of officers who are principally engaged in mobile reserve policing and who are thus the principal crowd control force of the RUC. Attached to the SPG is an Operational Training Unit, which provides courses for all RUC officers in public order, searching and anti-ambush drill.

Regional Crime Squads.

Another innovation of Chief Constable Newman in 1976 were the Regional Crime Squads (RCS). These consist of 89 detectives divided into four units. They specialise in interrogation and were at the centre of the Amnesty allegations.

Technology and Equipment

Strangely, the RUC, is not particularly advanced in the use of computers and only

recently introduced its first computer to coordinate communications. Criminal records, criminal intelligence and fingerprints are not yet computerised. The RUC does have access to the British Army's computer at HQ Lisburn but must get Army permission to use it. It is reckoned that details of 40 per cent of the population of Northern Ireland is in the computer, including details of car ownership, friends, jobs, relatives and even, reportedly, the colour of wallpaper in homes. The Army's computer reference is date of birth and both RUC and Army patrols are in radio contact with the computer.

Communications

RUC officers are in communication with their stations by means of individual UHF sets worn on the lapels of uniformed and motorised patrols alike. The IRA has developed the technology to listen in on both Army and RUC radio traffic so some units, for example the SPG, have their own special code system while the communications of others are 'scrambled' to prevent detection by the IRA. Telex and teleprinter messages have been regularly intercepted, mainly by Protestant groups but also by the IRA, and they are also therefore being computerised.

Forensic science

The RUC has a forensic science laboratory which deals with about 10,000 cases each year. It has also recently trained 42 scenes of crime officers (SCOs) to collect forensic evidence and this section is being upgraded in view of the importance attached to obtaining evidence which might be used in court against alleged terrorists. Equipment recently introduced includes a vacuum metallising machine which can process latent fingerprints on difficult materials. The records held by the RUC include over 108,000 fingerprints, one for 13 people and there are a further 20,000 palmprints on record also.

Weapons

The arms and other equipment available to the SPG are also distributed throughout the force and are available to reserve officers, on or off duty.

Legal powers

The array of legal powers available to the RUC is formidable and is based on two acts of parliament which replaced the old and discredited Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 1922. These are the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976.

The Emergency Provisions Act (as it is known) provides that bail in the case of an alleged terrorist offence may be granted only by the trial judge or Supreme Court judge. The situation in practice is therefore one which can be described as 'internment by remand' (section 2). Section 7 provides that trials for terrorist (or scheduled) offences shall be held without a jury in the 'Diplock courts'. Section 9 puts the burden of proof on any person on whose premises, vehicle or vessel explosives or a firearm is found. Section 11 gives the police power to arrest without a warrant anyone suspected of being a terrorist and to hold that person for up to 72 hours while section 18 gives a far-reaching power to detain suspected terrorists for up to four hours. Powers of search are provided in sections 15 and 17 while section 18 gives a far reaching power to police and army alike to stop anyone and question their identity and recent movements. Section 24 gives chief inspectors of the RUC and officers in the Army power to order assemblies of more than three people to disperse while a schedule to the Act provides for the rerouting of funerals and other processions.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act, passed originally in 1974 and altered slightly in 1976 and now renewed annually by parliament contains a number of similar provisions. It allows for detention without charge for up to seven days and gives the Home Secretary

power to exclude people from Great Britain to Northern Ireland or vice versa or from the United Kingdom altogether and it is a criminal offence to break an exclusion order. The Act also provides for extensive powers of search and detention for questioning at ports of entry. Up to the end of 1980, 5,061 people had been detained for questioning for various periods and 266 had been served with exclusion orders. A relatively small number (339) have been charged with any criminal offence and an even smaller number have been charged with any offence connected with terrorism.

Police/Army relations

The working relations between the Army and the RUC have not been as smooth as the British government would have liked. When it arrived in Northern Ireland in 1969 the Army openly distrusted the RUC and blamed it for allowing law and order to break down. The RUC in turn resented the fact that the Army had taken over security functions. This friction manifested itself at command level where there was disagreement over security policy, for example over internment which the Army favoured but which was gradually opposed by the RUC who saw it as counter-productive. At operational level there was friction in a number of areas, principally over the fact the Army jealously guarded its intelligence and distrusted the RUC Special Branch. There was also friction over the use of the Special Air Service by the Army and what the RUC saw as over-reactions by the Army in riot situations when it fired live bullets.

The Army vigorously opposed the introduction of 'Ulsterisation' which handed back the security reins to the RUC and after the Amnesty allegations and the killing of Mountbatten the Army attempted a take over (largely unsuccessful) of security powers. Such friction between the Army and the RUC was said to have been the main reason for the appointment of the security co-ordinator in 1979 to co-ordinate operations and the flow of intelligence.

Co-operation with other police forces

Not surprisingly the RUC co-operates and liaises mainly with the Garda Siochana and the British police forces although there is of course exchange of information between it and the FBI and Interpol.

A Joint Co-ordinating Committee of senior RUC and Garda Siochana police officers meets monthly on the Border to discuss common problems related to terrorist activity, and, in addition, the two chief constables have meetings twice a year. On the Border the two forces are in radio communication supplemented by land lines which allow divisional commanders in the Northern Border areas to communicate by scrambler telephone with their Southern counterparts. In addition, the Southern authorities in 1980 set up a Border Task Force to patrol the Border in a manner similar to that of the SAS in the North. The Task Force was modelled on the German GSG9 unit and senior Garda officers travelled to Germany to study GSG9's tactics. The Garda also allow RUC forensic experts to examine evidence South of the Border. The two police forces also exchange intelligence on a regular basis and a recent agreement between the two governments allowed British Army helicopters to overfly parts of the Border on surveillance operations.

Co-operation with British police relates to exchange of information, experience and training, and in 1980 over 200 RUC men attended courses at Scotland Yard, Bramshill, Hendon and Durham on courses as varied as CID, Special Branch, weapons and forensics.

Conclusion

As already stated it seems clear that security policy in Northern Ireland is now geared to a long slow haul. As Catholic and Republican resolve and attitudes harden over the H Block dispute and the deaths of the hunger strikers it remains to be seen whether the government (and the security forces) can resist Protestant demands for action and adopt a more aggressive policy.

REVIEWS & SOURCES

BOOKS

THE TERROR NETWORK: THE SECRET WAR OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM by Claire Sterling. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981, 357 pp., £7.95 cloth.

The 'Seventies were the decade of terrorism, and it was all orchestrated, linked, financed and armed by Moscow. Unfortunately complacency and innocence prevented many people from knowing about this global conspiracy, so Claire Sterling decided to write a terrible warning. In this she succeeded admirably.

The crux of Ms Sterling's warning is as follows. If you are going to write a credible book, make sure that it is properly researched. If you are going to rely heavily on 'academic' sources, make sure that they are not the Institute for the Study of Conflict, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Hoover Institute for the Study of War and Peace and the Georgetown Institute of Strategic Studies. If you are going to quote newspapers, make sure that they are a little more serious than *Paris Match* and *Il Giornale Nuovo*. If you are going to write about the IRA, make sure that you don't allocate to them Russian helicopters in 1972, or the forces of law and order will ridicule you. If you are going to write about terrorism, don't be selective and omit the terrorist units of the USA and Israel, and above all don't use these forces as sources

on their mirror opposites. If you are going to publish hundreds of pages on contacts, meetings, discussions, visits and endless detail, don't omit all analysis, or serious readers will conclude that the case is non-existent. Finally, if you are going to preface your book with a warning – 'This is not a book of fiction. It deals with facts' – don't make it so obvious how it deals with facts.

At least Ms Sterling has friends. Secretary of State Alexander Haig recommended her volume at his first press conference. It climbed into the US best-seller charts and is promoted worldwide by US government agencies. Perhaps they hope that nobody will actually read it. Suffice it to read the terrible warning.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Far Left: An exposé of the Extreme Left in Britain, by Blake Baker. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981, 182pp., £3.95 paper, £6.95 cloth. 'Recent events', say the publishers, 'have revealed a number of highly organised, secretive and determined parties whose declared aim is the overthrow of British democracy'. These people, it turns out, are not the organisers of secret, élite bunkers from which world war three can be directed. Nor are they the top civil servants who circumnavigate parliamentary and indeed cabinet government. They do not hold secret meetings in the City to organise the flight of capital, nor do they build networks of alternative communications and media to which all citizens may be switched instantly. No, these people are the groupuscules of the far left, who have for the past quarter of a century provided author Blake Baker with his bread and butter as a *Daily Telegraph* scribe. This time Mr Baker has pasted together more than a day's supply of press clippings, and has found that it makes a book. Some of it, if true, makes comical reading. Readers of this Bulletin who see Poland Street firmly transplanted across London may relax: we shall not be moved.

Manifesto: A Radical Strategy for Britain's Future, by Francis Cripps, John Griffith, Frances Morrell, Jimmy Reid, Peter Townsend and

Stuart Weir. London: Pan Books, 1981, 224pp., £1.95 paper. Anyone can write a series of demands and reduce them to slogans. It takes a much more substantial effort to produce a considered, 200-page statement, and these authors have made the effort. Their manifesto is an overview of what problems a radical Labour government would inherit, what it should do and why. Its strength is that it is comprehensive, free of jargon and financial obscurity, and has valuable historical and international perspectives. Few readers will not learn something from its parts; its whole is what the coming general election should be about. Unconsciously the statement also emphasises what still has to be considered: 'a future Labour government should consult with women's organisations and representatives of racial minorities to consider what policies of "positive discrimination" might have to offer in the short run.' That will be far too late.

The Shape of Wars to Come: The Hidden Facts behind the Arms Race in Space, by David Baker. Cambridge: Patrick Stephens, 1981, 177pp., £8.95 cloth. Dr Baker announces with lavish illustration some realities of the arms race in space, complete with laser guns and particle beam weapons which render debates about nuclear weapons 'meaningless'. Does this make his book one of cosmic objectivity? Not a bit of it: his text is riddled with the more fatuous demonology of the cold war, of the 'fear the Bear will break through its Asian gate' variety. Patient readers who will unravel technology from ideology will still have to go to publications of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute to know what to believe, but they may be better equipped to ask the right questions.

The Atom Beseiged: Extraparliamentary Dissent in France and Germany, by Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak. Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1981, 235 pp., £10.85 cloth. This comparative study of extraparliamentary opposition to 'civil' nuclear power plants in France and West Germany is extremely rewarding. It shows how opposition grew not only from fear of unsound and uncontrolled technology, but also from concern about 'the effect of technological change on traditional values, the gradual industrialisation of rural areas, the concentration of economic activities, the centralisation of decision-making power, and the pervasive intrusion of government bureaucracies'. The authors then demonstrate that the different political systems and cultural

traditions of the two countries make the French movement almost totally ineffective, whilst its German counterpart had significant policy effect. The notes and appendices make this a rich source book.

The War Between the Generals: Inside the Allied High Command, by David Irving. London: Allen Lane, 1981, 446pp., £9.95 cloth. More a compilation of gossip than a social history of command, this book centres on the relations and rivalries of Eisenhower, Montgomery, Patton, Bradley and de Gaulle in 1944-45. Roosevelt and Churchill, various bomber commanders, and other bit actors are also featured. Comparable studies, usually more concerned with professional competence, were made of generals of the Great War. In both world wars, the principal arm of the state – the military – was notable primarily as an instrument of mass slaughter. The hierarchical mobilisation of conscripts and civilians that this required, and the corruption of those at the top of the pyramid, was overshadowed by the awesome catalogue of carnage. Since 1945, so long as world destruction has been postponed, it has been easier to see the other role of the military, as the ultimate instrument of social discipline and order. The power of such bodies invariably corrupts the principal actors, though this is not the worst effect of global militarism. Author David Irving, however, draws no moral from his story. It remains a tale of bizarre incidents, good for Sunday journalism but lacking any social explanation.

The Battle of Stepney. The Sidney Street Siege: Its Causes and Consequences, by Colin Rogers. London: Robert Hale, 1981, 222pp., £7.95 cloth. In January 1911, two foreign outlaws in London's East End defied the massed and armed forces of law and order for seven hours. During the siege, some 2,000 rounds of ammunition were fired, Home Secretary Churchill visited the scene and appeared to be directing the battle, and finally the wanted pair died inside their flaming fortress.

Colin Rogers' book must be the definitive study of this event. He starts in mid-December 1910 with the shooting down of five policemen by a group of burglars recently arrived from Eastern Europe. The events of 3 January, including the arming of the police, the arrival of the Home Secretary and the calling in of the military, and their repercussions in the press, parliament and the courts, are then covered in detail. But the book's further strength is that it recognises the 1905 Aliens Act, and the widespread prejudice

against immigrants and Jews, as the necessary context for understanding the seige.

The Aliens Act was the first attempt to control by law the flow of immigrants. It applied only to the impoverished (cabin-class passengers were exempted), but there was provision for receiving those persecuted on political or religious grounds. In the following three years refugees – many of Jewish origin – poured into Britain from the autocracies of Eastern Europe. The ever-xenophobic *Daily Telegraph* pontificated on 'what sort of foreign riff-raff is being freely introduced into England' and ex-CID chief Sir Robert Anderson proclaimed Britain 'a cess-pool for the scum of creation'. The church was not to be outdone: for Father Bernard Vaughan, Britain was a 'dust-bin for the refuse of the continent'. In 1981, much of this admirable work of restrained research has a highly contemporary flavour.

PAMPHLETS

Southall: the birth of a black community, by the Campaign Against Racism and Fascism and Southall Rights. Institute of Race Relations/Southall Rights: 1981, £1.30. This booklet sets out to write the history of the Asian community in Southall from the 1950s to the present, and in doing so reveals a pattern of racism and resistance. It goes a long way to explaining why the black community in Southall – men and women, young and old, Asians, West Indians and white anti-racists took to the streets on 23 April 1979. The story begins with the arrival of Southall's first black settlers and their reception by a white society that was only interested in them as units of labour required by Britain's war-torn economy. Faced by racialism in housing and education the first community organisations emerged with the formation of the Indian Workers' Association in 1957.

The three main chapters look at: the work experience of Southall's community and the need for self-organisation because of white trade unions' indifference to black workers' grievances; the state racism faced by the black settlers in demands for welfare, housing and education with the arrival of the men's wives and children; and the experience of the black youth, born, or brought up in Southall, in education (with the bussing policy) and on the streets (at the hands of the police) and how in the process they by-passed the methods of organising that their

elders had pursued. These chapters contain not only accounts of the important struggles undertaken by men and women at work, for their children in the schools, and against racial attacks but shows how from each struggle the sense of community began to take shape.

If it was the murder of Gurdip Chaggar in 1976 by the white youths that had galvanised the youth of Southall, then the events of 23 April 1979 succeeded in uniting the whole community in its outrage against the police, and through them the racism of the state. This is the story of the building of one black community, for there are many Southalls, 'communities built on the rubble of our decaying cities'. But, as the preface states: 'It is the knowledge and pride of that achievement that binds the communities of Brick Lane, Brixton, Southall, Moss Side, Lumb Lane, Chapelton, Handsworth and makes them "no go" areas for police harassment and fascist tyranny alike'.

This is essential reading for those who want to understand racism, and the resistance to it.

Civil Disorder and Civil Liberties by National Council for Civil Liberties, 186 Kings Cross Road, London WC1X 9DE, £1.00. This is the text of NCCL's evidence to the Scarman enquiry into the Brixton riots. The causes of the summer's violence and the state's response to it, says NCCL, 'represent the gravest threat to the maintenance of civil liberties which this country has faced, outside Northern Ireland, since the war.' NCCL lays the blame for the riots primarily on the police and policing methods and notes that 'normal relationships' will only be created if the police themselves are prepared to admit that they are one of the causes. Similarly it says, 'Not only have the police failed to acknowledge their own part in the violence, but they have persisted in diverting the press and the public with false explanations.' This is a concise and comprehensive civil liberties response to recent developments which draws useful comparisons with Northern Ireland and the United States in the 1960s but which is marred by unnecessary (and irrelevant) moral judgements on 'violence'.

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Reagan's arms build-up, Newsweek, 8 June 1981.

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Eating his corn, Alan Goodson, Police Journal, July-September 1981. On police powers to ban marches.

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STATE RESEARCH PAMPHLETS

The Secret State by E.P. Thompson (no 1). This important essay states the case for defending and extending civil liberties against the increasing powers of the secret agencies of the state. 60p

Policing the Eighties: The Iron Fist (No 2). This is a unique analysis of developments in policing over the last 15 years. (First published as a background paper in State Research Bulletin no 19.) 60p.

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