

STATE RESEARCH

21157 S
BULLETIN
No. 27

BERUFSVERBOT – GREECE AND NATO

THE ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE – TOXTETH 1981

NATO AND MIDDLE EAST OIL: US AND EUROPE AT ODDS?

NEWS &
DEVELOPMENTS

CS GAS: NEW GUIDELINES IGNORE DANGERS

New guidelines on the use of CS gas and 'baton rounds' have been issued to the police by the Home Office. Announced to parliament by the Home Secretary in almost the same breath that he stated his acceptance of Chief Constable Oxford's report on the use of CS gas in Toxteth, they ignore the considerable scientific evidence of the danger of CS and plastic bullets.

CS gas was developed at the British

Chemical Defence Experimental Establishment at Porton Down in the 1950s and 1960s and takes its name from two American scientists, Corson and Stoughton, who synthesised it as a curiosity in 1928. CS was a replacement for CN gas or 'tear gas', as it was popularly known. Both are lachrymatory but the effects of CS are more severe than those of CN. CS gas is a stable, off-white powder with a faint peppery smell which produces its effects by settling on the skin or by inhalation or swallowing. Its effects were described by Porton Down when the patent was filed:

'In addition to causing pain in the eyes, tears, and spasm of the eyelids it also produces a sharp pain in the nose, throat and chest, which becomes worse and causes choking sensations as exposure continues . . . When . . . experienced in high concentrations the violent coughing which is set up may induce vomiting . . . a

concentration of between one part in 10 million and one part in a million is enough to drive all but the most determined persons out of it within a few seconds.' (Quoted in Ackroyd *et al.*: *The Technology of Political Control*, Pluto Press, 1980. This contains a full discussion of 'riot control' technology.)

CS gas can be fired in a number of ways including grenades. In Northern Ireland the British army has used 1.5 inch L3A1 cartridges which are fired from signal pistols or riot guns. The army also has CS gas in pellet form contained in a grenade. When the grenade bursts on impact burning pellets are scattered. In this way, a greater area can be covered and there is no danger of people throwing burning canisters back at the firer.

Use and misuse

Until this summer CS gas had never been used in a public order situation on mainland Britain. Indeed, such use would have been contrary to stated official policy which was that gas would be used only:

'in dealing with armed criminals or violently insane persons in buildings from which they cannot be dislodged without danger or loss of life. The tear smoke would not be used in any other circumstances.'

So the Home Secretary told parliament in May 1965. Another government minister added in 1968 that 'in no circumstances should it be used in the control of disturbances.' Yet, as Ackroyd *et al.* point out, CS gas was used in Derry only a year later (*op. cit.*, p. 216). The Home Secretary's statement was still official policy until the new guidelines.

CS gas has been used extensively in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. Ackroyd *et al.* say that CN and CS gas were used on 124 occasions between 1960 and 65 in British colonies and was widely used by the American army in Vietnam. It was also used in 1968 by the French riot police, the CRS. Professor Francis Kahn of La Boisiere hospital in Paris reported that he was treating patients with damage to the cornea (Elizabeth Sigmund, *Rage Against the*

Dying, Pluto Press, 1980) and one woman in Paris died after concentrated exposure to CN and CS (Ackroyd *et al.* p 219).

The misuse of CS gas in Northern Ireland, when the RUC bombarded the Bogside in 1969 for two days led to the establishment of the Himsworth Committee to look at the medical aspects of the CS gas attack. Two of the eight members of the Himsworth Committee were on Porton Scientific Advisory Committee which had cleared CS gas in the first place and not surprisingly the Committee accepted the continuing use of CS.

The findings of the Himsworth Committee were in stark contrast to those of a team sent to Derry by the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science (BSSRS). It found three cases of loss of consciousness arising from the gas and several other serious injuries to the young and the elderly. In 1975, a report by the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) stated:

'It ought to be pointed out that the toxicological hazards of CS gas have often been underestimated . . . The fact remains that lachrymators may cause permanent eye lesions, even blindness. It would be irresponsible to belittle their effects.' (quoted in Sigmund, *op. cit.*)

New Guidelines

Despite such evidence and despite the arguments of the World Health Organisation and others that the long term effects of CS gas require attention, the use of CS gas in Britain is to be made easier rather than subject to stricter controls. The new guidelines state that the use of CS gas is to be authorised by the chief constable or his deputy. CS gas is to be used only by those trained to do so and only as a last resort,

'where conventional methods of policing have been tried and failed, or must from the nature of the circumstances obtaining be unlikely to succeed if tried, and where the chief officer judges such action to be necessary because of the risk of loss of life

or serious injury or widespread destruction of property.'

A public warning that CS gas may be used is supposed to be given whenever practicable. The guidelines also apply to the use of plastic bullets or 'baton rounds' (*Hansard* 19.10.81).

In his statement announcing that new guidelines had been issued, the Home Secretary told MPs that the decision to use CS gas in Toxteth – in complete disregard of the maker's instructions – was 'necessary and justified'. No mention was made that the use of CS also ignored previous guidelines and government statements. The new guidelines not only continue to ignore the scientific evidence against CS gas but there is no guarantee that they too will not be ignored in the future.

BERUFSVERBOT – THE NET WIDENS

The West German state has a sorry tradition in the suppression of civil liberties. This has been highlighted by the recent *Berufsverbot* (career ban i.e. sacking) of Hans Peter, who was employed as a Post Office Clerk for 30 years. The Federal Administrative Court sitting on October 27th 1981 found that Hans Peter was 'hostile' to the constitution because of his active membership of the legal German Communist Party (DKP) and therefore could be dismissed by the Post Office. This ruling enlarges the scope of the *Berufsverbot* to those existing public sector employees of *Beamte* (permanent position) status as well as to those wishing to work in the public sector.

The *Berufsverbot* has its immediate history in the 1933 Nazi Law which said that all public employees should declare at all times unconditional support for the national state. This was retained after the war in an amended form (Article 33 section 5 of the German Constitution) which established for a public employees a special 'requirement' for them to show loyalty to the constitution and state above personal opinions. The practice of *Berufsverbot* conflicts with

Article 3 Section 3 (no discrimination on the grounds of sex, belief, origin etc); Article 5 (establishes freedom of thought, speech, writing etc) and Article 33 Section 2 (equal opportunity for all in every public position in accordance to suitability, ability, qualification etc). Thus for the 15% of the German workforce currently employed by the state, the same constitution simultaneously guarantees and denies a wide spectrum of civil and constitutional rights.

It was realised after the events of 1968, that many participants in the riots would seek employment in the public sector in the early seventies. The authorities were alarmed at the left's threat of the 'long march to change through the institutions'. Thus, in 1972 to defend the constitution an administrative edict was agreed at a meeting of the Heads of the individual West German states). This edict established the practice of *Berufsverbot* as a disciplinary measure in its modern form. It also allowed the *Verfassungsschutz* (a security service whose responsibility is the 'protection' of the constitution... see *Bulletin* No.11) carte blanche to gather information on all prospective public sector employees for use at disciplinary tribunals. Essentially the *Verfassungsschutz* were given a free hand to collect what information it thought appropriate.

Guidelines on the implementation of this edict were issued later on 25 July 1975 by the Constitutional Court in an attempt to resolve the ambiguity in the constitution. The Court made it clear that the concept of loyalty is required by public sector employees.

'The requirement of political loyalty demands *more* than a formally correct, disinterested, cool, inwardly distanced attitude to the state and its constitution. It specifically *demand*s of officials that they unequivocally distance themselves from groups and tendencies which attack, combat and demean the state and constitutional system.'

However, maintaining the ambiguity in the constitution, these guidelines also stated that 'membership of an organisation

thought to be hostile to the constitution . . . should not be the *sole* grounds for rejection' (our emphasis throughout). A significant feature of the Hans Peter Berufsverbot is that his membership of the legal DKP was the sole grounds for his dismissal.

The application of the Berufsverbot is both arbitrary and random in West Germany. Defended on grounds that it was to fight terrorism and extremists of both persuasions, the practice is applied most vigorously by the right wing controlled states against legally constituted groups on the left. The Hans Peter case is, by contrast, a Federal case brought by a social democrat (SPD) administration. Victims come from the whole range of employment (see later list), and are not always DKP members. Both SPD members and supporters of Peace Movements have also lost their jobs. However it is the scale of involvement of the Verfassungsschutz that is most remarkable.

State employment makes up approximately 15% of all job vacancies and includes government employees, teachers, lecturers, railway workers, postmen, park and swimming pool attendants. When an applicant applies for a job in any area of state employment, the Verfassungsschutz, if approached, will check computer records if they exist or open a new file on the applicant if they do not.

Between 1973 and mid-1975, the security services made 1.5 million such investigations resulting in the non-appointment of 3,000 candidates to public employment. Although this is a very small percentage, the important point is that over 1.5 million files became active, to ensure 'loyalty' to the state and its constitutional organs. Current estimates place the figure at 2.5 million files and 6,000 job bans. If there is doubt about a candidate's loyalty, then a hearing can be held to establish whether or not a candidate is 'loyal' to the constitution, and therefore 'fit' for employment in the public services. At these hearings, the Verfassungsschutz provide evidence for 'disloyal' behaviour. This has included:

- Attending a meeting of the communist party
- Candidature in an election on a

- communist or 'radical' platform
- Signature in on a 'radical' leaflet
- Distributing a 'radical' leaflet
- Living or having lived in the same house as a 'radical'
- Parking near a communist party office when a meeting was being held
- Signing a petition against the closedown of a hospital
- Participation in an anti-nuclear group
- Participation in a socialist song group
- Working in an organisation such as prisoners' aid, community organisations, where a 'radical' is known to be active
- Drawing a 'politically contentious' cartoon
- Criticising the practice of Berufsverbot
- Being on the mailing list of a 'left' publishing house
- Signing a resolution against the Berufsverbot
- Sticking up posters for a 'radical' group
- Protests about cuts in education budget
- Parking of a car at the start of a demonstration
- Conscientious objection to conscription
- Protesting against the increase in bus fares
- Informing the public of your own Berufsverbot (seeking refuge in the public)
- Protesting against the abortion laws
- Contributing a picture to an exhibition organised by the communist party
- Inviting a political theatre group to a school or university

The Hans Peter case extends this to current state employees.

This incomplete list of 'evidence' brought formally at disciplinary court hearings by the Verfassungsschutz demonstrates their disinterest in the activities of the right and the depth to which technology has brought modern day surveillance. At these hearings defendants are expected to prove their 'non-hostility' to the constitution. If they cannot do that, then disciplinary proceedings end with the dismissal of the defendant.

(Information in this article comes from the National Campaign Against the Berufsverbot, 67 Woodland Gardens, London N10)

GREECE AND NATO

The Greek general election of October 18 has led to a remarkable breakthrough in that country's political climate. Only 8 years ago the Greek people were in the grip of a dictatorial military junta; now, in free and democratic elections, Greece has voted for a Socialist government committed to fundamental change. This change is not aimed at the domestic situation alone, but has consequences for NATO, US foreign policy and the EEC.

The Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement – PASOK – is a relatively new party. Formed in 1974 by Andreas Papandreou (son of former Prime Minister George Papandreou) it has channelled the Greek tradition for populism into a marxist direction. PASOK gained 47.7% of the poll against the Conservative New Democracy's 35.8%. The pro-Soviet Communist Party increased its share to 11.2% and has promised to work closely with the PASOK government.

Amongst the most significant of PASOK's policies (which includes 'socialisation' of the economy) is its campaign for withdrawal from both NATO and the Common Market, and the removal of American bases from Greek soil. These were key aspects of the election manifesto and are basic to Papandreou's aim to transform Greece into a non-aligned nation, independent of both the two superpowers.

NATO

After withdrawing from NATO's military structure in 1974, when Turkey – another NATO member – invaded Cyprus, Greece renewed its military participation in 1980. The contradiction of being in an alliance with a hostile neighbour, which is supported by the US government as an apparent 'buffer' with the Soviet Union, has led to widespread rejection of Greece's NATO

commitments. The PASOK policy of Greek withdrawal from NATO raises some difficult problems however. In particular, the switching of military resources from Greece to Turkey could well endanger the security of a socialist government, perhaps leading to a Turkish invasion under the guise of a territorial dispute which could then allow elements in the armed forces (with undoubted US backing) to stage an anti-PASOK coup.

The possibility of such a scenario has led to a modification of the demand for immediate withdrawal. Papandreou has stated the intention of withdrawing from NATO's military wing, whilst maintaining Greece's other commitments (which is precisely the relationship which France has to NATO): 'since Greece was in the unique position of being threatened by another member of the alliance – Turkey' (*Times* 26.10.81). Papandreou is also demanding that NATO guarantees Greece's eastern frontiers against attack from Turkey.

The whole background to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus is also to be examined by the new government:

'To expose and document for the first time the collusion which existed in 1974 between the junta, the Greek army, the CIA, NATO and individual western countries in the attempt to topple Makarios and the subsequent Turkish invasion of Cyprus.' (*New Statesman*, 16.10.81)

US bases

Unlike its conservative predecessor, the new Greek government is separating negotiations on American bases from the question of Greece's membership of NATO. Negotiations with Washington over these bases will be starting in 1982. Again the possibility of a complete withdrawal of the bases leads to the danger of their removal to Turkish soil, with all the dangers of destabilisation which that might entail. Papandreou has now stated three

conditions if the American bases are to stay:

- the bases are not to be used to launch a military attack against a country friendly to Greece;
- intelligence-gathering by US monitoring stations in Greece would not be made accessible to Turkey;
- American weapons should be supplied on equal terms to Greece and Turkey.

Although in a weak position to carry out a full commitment to expelling US bases, the new Greek government is more able to challenge the type of presence which the US has on Greek soil. For example, it seeks the removal of all American nuclear weapons:

“The government wanted a denuclearised Balkan peninsula, Mr Dimitrios Maraudas, Press and Information Secretary, said yesterday. Bulgaria and the Soviet Union had recently called for the removal of all nuclear warheads from the Balkans, he added. “The removal of the nuclear warheads will be one of the first demands in the negotiations on the American bases . . . we hope it will be achieved soon, but realise this cannot be a question of one or two months, but of up to a year.”” (*Daily Telegraph*, 13.11.81)

EEC

Greece entered the EEC in January 1981 and is still in the process of transition to full membership. PASOK campaigned around withdrawal and wants a referendum on this issue. However, only the Greek President is empowered to call a referendum, and as Constantine Karamanlis holds himself largely responsible for gaining Greece's entry, the chances of an early vote are slim. In the meantime, the government's emphasis is on changing Greece's terms of membership.

Whilst Greece still retains EEC membership however there is the possibility of an important socialist grouping in the Common Market being now formed around Greece and the newly socialist France. This

casts new light on the enlargement of the EEC, which has been previously seen as leading to a two tier structure of the prosperous northern industrial countries and the poorer agricultural south. PASOK already has close links with socialists in France, Spain and Portugal, as well as social democrats in West Germany. A powerful Socialist grouping within the European Parliament and Commission might well lead the British labour movement to reconsider its present policy of withdrawal from the Common Market.

SUPPORT GROWS FOR CHANGES IN COMPLAINTS SYSTEM

Changes in the police complaints system have become more likely following criticism of the existing arrangements by three chief constables and by the Police Federation, which represents rank and file officers.

The existing system was set up in 1964 and amended in 1976. Under this system, all complaints are dealt with by the police themselves. The Police Complaints Board, an independent body, merely has the power of review. The ineffectiveness of the system, means that an unknowable number of complaints are never made and that up to 45 per cent are withdrawn before completion.

Criticism of the police complaints system reached new levels in the autumn of 1981. In the political field, Shirley Williams of the SDP told a police audience on 22 September that it was now time for a fully independent system. Four days earlier, in his closing speech to the Liberal Party Assembly, the party leader, David Steel, described the existing arrangements as ‘wholly inadequate’ and said he favoured an independent body.

The Labour Party strengthened its criticism at its annual conference, too. A motion describing the procedure as ‘highly inadequate’ and calling for an independent system was passed by 6,035,000 votes to 849,000, thus becoming official party policy.

Among the delegates who argued in favour was a retired police officer.

When parliament reconvened after the summer recess, an attempt was made to introduce a bill establishing an independent system. The Labour MP for Battersea South, Alf Dubs, moved a motion for leave to bring in a private member's bill on 27 October. The bill, which would have led to the setting up of a police ombudsman office with no serving police officers on its staff, received a first reading but fell for lack of parliamentary time at the end of the session in November. However, Alf Dubs promised to reintroduce his bill during the 1981-82 session.

In the meanwhile, the prospects for change had been significantly strengthened by the statements of three chief constables, who abandoned support of existing system. Peter Imbert, Chief Constable of Thames Valley, told a meeting in Oxford on 1 October that he was not opposed to an independent element in the process. Imbert opposed giving investigations to an independent body but he supported submitting complaints files at an earlier stage than at present to a police ombudsman who might, he suggested, be a Crown Court judge.

He was soon joined by James Anderton, Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, who told a *Manchester Evening News* interviewer in October that people who otherwise supported the police were genuinely disturbed by the lack of independence in the system. He feared that a future government might introduce a fully independent system and therefore proposed a new two-tier system, distinguishing between minor complaints and 'serious allegations of corruption, violence and brutality'.

The third dissident was Chief Constable Albert Laugharne of Lancashire. Speaking to a meeting of the Guild of British Newspaper Editors in Bath on 18 October he said that the only way to 'put to bed' public disquiet about investigation of complaints is to have an independent body responsible to someone outside the police service.

New proposal from Police Federation

But the biggest about turn among previous police opponents of change came on 8 November, when the Police Federation announced that it now backed an entirely independent system. The Federation's Chairman, James Jardine said: 'The criticism has done enormous damage to relationships between the police and public, so we have bowed out. With all the clamour for independent investigation it was inevitable that something would be brought in against our will. But we do mean now that every complaint should be taken out of our hands, there should be no half measures'. The new system should be jointly controlled by the Police Complaints Board, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Attorney General, the statement said.

In return for such a change, the Federation wants its members to have better procedural protections when accused by a complainant. These protections would include legal representation, full operation of the judges rules and the right to have a lawyer right up to an appeal system at Crown Court level. This legal service would be paid for from public funds.

The change of policy won sympathetic support from the Superintendents' Association, which has hitherto also opposed change and which represents the officers who at present conduct the investigations of complaints. But the President of the Association of Chief Police Officers, Barry Pain, opposed the Federation's plan, saying that it undermined the disciplinary authority of chief constables.

The Jardine statement was welcomed by Alf Dubs and by the National Council for Civil Liberties as a victory. It also won Fleet Street's approval. The *Daily Express* said that, once the Scarman Report had been digested, the Home Secretary should set up an independent system. The *Daily Star* called it 'a decision to applaud' and *The Sun* also said that 'the police are right to change their minds'.

POLICE COMPUTER DEVELOPMENTS

More information about police computers has come to light (see *Bulletin* 24 and 25 for earlier information).

PNC links

An increasing number of police forces are having interfaces between their own local computer and the Police National Computer as well as message switching facilities. The following police forces have or intend to have such facilities: Bedford, Cambridge, Cleveland, Derbyshire, Lothian and Borders, Manchester, Merseyside, North Yorkshire, Northumberland, South Wales, Staffordshire, Strathclyde, Sussex, West Mercia, West Midlands and West Yorkshire. Indeed, the provision of a wider access to the PNC through force computers can be expected to be a standard acquisition in future applications for new computing equipment.

The PNC is currently connected to about 800 terminals situated throughout the country. Each police force has a certain number of these terminals, and enquiries can be made to the PNC through them. Usually these terminals are found in the control rooms within ready access via UHF/VHF radio. These directly linked PNC terminals can communicate with each other via the message switching facility on the PNC and so allow for a degree of inter-force communication.

One effect of a computer with a link to the PNC is essentially to allow more terminals to be attached to the PNC. A terminal connected to the local force computer can also have access to the PNC by using the interface and can contact any other terminal connected to the local force computer via the local message switching system. For example the West Midlands has 3 dedicated

PNC linked terminals (used for the longer PNC enquiries) yet 54 terminals connected to the local computer. As yet, it appears that terminals connected to local force computers cannot contact other terminals on other local force computers via the PNC. This still requires the intervention of the directly linked PNC terminals in the control rooms. Even so, the extent of the police computing system is considerable, with automatic inter- and intra-communications.

Street indexes

The following forces have or intend to have a street index: Cleveland, Merseyside, Northumberland, South Wales, Sussex and West Midlands. Here again there is evidence to suggest that for forces with urban responsibilities a street index is an important application. The system chosen by West Midlands (TRAMS, see *Bulletin* no 24) allows for the street index to be accessed by street, route and grid reference or area landmarks. According to *Police Research Bulletin* 1980 it has an index for locations which are 'of interest to the police.' What is meant by this phrase in the article is as yet unclear.

THE ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE

Right wing groupings continue to flourish. One recent addition to the cluster which includes The Freedom Association, Aims of Industry, Institute of Economic Affairs etc has been the Adam Smith Institute, based in Westminster. One of the activities of this institute has been to circulate a document to councillors up and down the country called *Re-servicing Britain*. This argues the case for 'privatisation' ie the selling-off of municipal services to private industry (this has already been done most notably in Southend where refuse collection is now in the hands of a firm owned by a man who is a

Tory councillor in St Albans, see *Labour Research*, December 1981, and *Socialist Worker*, 7.11.81). Producing a glossy booklet for free distribution obviously involves a considerable outlay, the source of this money is not at all clear, however.

What is clearer is the connection between the Adam Smith Institute and both Aims and the Freedom Association. The names of the Institute's Council members continually appear in the pages of *Free Nation* and on the covers of Aims of Industry booklets. Council members include the following:

Professor Friedrich Hayek Austrian economist and philosopher. Was economic professor at LSE 1931-50. Has spoken at Freedom Association meetings. Believes that 1906 Trades Disputes Act which gives unions legal immunities should be repealed. Very pro-Thatcher.

Professor Stanislas Andreski Professor of Sociology, University of Reading.

Stuart Butler, Executive Secretary. A writer for Aims of Industry, including booklet on *The American Telephone System: a blueprint for de-nationalisation*. co-author of *The British National Health Service* with Eamon Butler (also on Council).

Professor Anthony Flew Professor of Philosophy, University of Reading. A council member of the Freedom Association. Was involved with the magazine *Encounter* (revealed in the sixties to be CIA-funded). Wrote *Controlling Nationalised Industries* for Aims of Industry. Member of a study group which produced *The attack on higher education – Marxist and radical penetration*, published by the Institute for the Study of Conflict (also shown to have CIA links).

Professor Cyril Grunfeld Professor of Law, LSE. Books on trade union law. Co-author of *Trade unions: public goods or public 'bads'* published by right-wing Institute of Economic Affairs.

T E Utley Leader writer for *Daily Telegraph*. Won a 1979 Aims 'Free Enterprise' award. 'One of Mrs Thatcher's closest political advisors during the victorious election campaign'. (*Free Nation* 6-19.7.79). Former unionist candidate and president Paddington conservative association 1979-80. A consultant director to the Conservative Research Department.

Professor Esmond Wright Professor of American History, London University. Conservative MP for Glasgow, Pollock, 1967-70. Deputy chairman Border Television. Vice Chairman, Automobile Association.

TOXTETH 1981: REPORTS RESPONSES AND REACTIONS

Between 5 July and 15 August 1981 there was intense and widespread confrontation between the police and the people throughout Merseyside. The warnings and concern voiced throughout the seventies over the methods of policing in the country were realised on the street. The people in the community who took to the streets were returning the aggression and violence to which they had been subjected throughout the seventies. Clearly the areas in which the confrontation was most severe were those which have persistently been heavily policed. According to police estimates, the value of property damaged during the period was £3,314,285, and the value stolen was set at £525,858. They give the total number of police casualties as 781, recorded crimes as 1,070 and total arrests as 705. The Chief Constable of Merseyside, Kenneth Oxford, presented his report *Public Disorder on Merseyside: July-August 1981* to the Police Committee on 18 September. The report is six pages long but contains a detailed diary of the events (60 pages) and Oxford's report to the Scarman Inquiry (68 pages plus appendices). It was preceded by widespread public concern over the police tactics used in handling the disturbances which had included the use of CS gas and

police vehicles, which had resulted in serious injury and one death.

CS Gas

'In the early hours of 6th July, under my authority, CS gas was discharged by authorised and trained officers in order to regain control of the streets from the rioters'. (*Report*, p1)

The police used eighteen rounds of 1½'' canisters, seven rounds of 1½'' Ferret cartridges and 15 grenades. The 'firearms team' was led by two sergeants; four of the officers had Schermully 1½'' guns (for 1½'' canisters and 1½'' Ferrets) and two had 12 bore shotguns. Oxford states that the Ferret cartridge is 'designed to emit its contents after penetrating a barrier or on striking a hard surface' (*Report*, p2). In fact, each cartridge carries such a warning to prevent use on crowds.

Authority to use CS gas was delegated to the police commander at the scene. He had Merseyside's complete stock of CS gas at his disposal plus further supplies from the Cheshire force. The instructions were to use CS gas only if 'conventional tactics continued to be of no effect'. Oxford states: 'I was fully aware of the Home Office instructions limiting its use to dealing with armed and besieged criminals, but I was equally aware that we faced an unprecedented situation'. And so CS gas was used for the first time on the mainland, five civilians were injured, four of them by 'Ferret' cartridges. Oxford claims that these cartridges were used only against flat surfaces or against vehicles in their 'barrier penetrating role'. The injuries, he states, were 'likely to have been caused by ricochets or erratic flight following impact' (p3).

In his evidence to Scarman, Oxford claims that the 'situation was only brought under control' after the use of CS gas. 74 CS gas projectiles were used, 'some of which were of a type not designed for use in public order situations' (*Report to Scarman*, p37). In fact a total of 41 Ferret cartridges were used. Oxford concludes:

'While I am fully aware that some of the equipment used should not be used again

to deal with public disorder I firmly believe that the decision to use CS gas was a correct use of the minimum force which was necessary and available' (*Report*, p3). That is just what it wasn't; for the use of Ferret was, on his own admission, an incorrect use. This clear misuse of equipment is emphasised in his comment: 'The officers who attended were all highly trained in the use of firearms, including CS gas launchers, but this latter aspect did not . . . encompass the control of public order situations' (*Report*, p2)

Tactics

Oxford states that the 'majority' of uniformed officers involved had completed a riot shield familiarisation course, a 'high percentage' had used riot shields under 'simulated disorder conditions' and senior officers had attended a two-day public order course (*Report*, p4). This tactical training 'proved inadequate and control was only achieved by the use of CS gas'. During the disturbances, NATO-type helmets and short-shields were introduced. On the 25 July 'it was decided . . . that vehicles should be used in order to get police resources near to the crowd' (*Report*, p4). Three days later David Moore was killed by a police vehicle driven along the pavement at speed. It failed to stop. Oxford refuses to comment on the case as it is under enquiry. This does not stop his comments on a case which occurred earlier that day when 'during the course of his arrest' Paul Conroy was struck by a police vehicle and sustained severe injuries. In his report to Scarman he states that Conroy was 'running away after a petrol bomb attack' (p41). The use of vehicles in this way must be questioned. Oxford's intention is clear:

' . . . it was planned to resort to the use of protected vehicles deployed into the crowd in order to break it up and wherever possible to arrest the ringleaders.'

David Moore had nothing to do with the disturbances. He was partially disabled and on his way home after a visit. Given another of Oxford's statements, however, David

Moore had made himself a legitimate target for the police by being out of doors. He said:

'Law abiding citizens should get off the streets: this is not a Roman carnival' (*Sunday Times*, 2.8.81).

This statement not only appears to impose a curfew, it provided justification for the arrest of anyone on the street. Oxford reports that the vast majority of the 88 complaints received were investigated internally by Merseyside Superintendents.

Cost

Between 5 July and 15 August 690 police support units were used on Merseyside. Each unit consists of one inspector, three sergeants and thirty constables. Mutual aid came from 40 outside forces. The cost of overtime for this outside presence was £1,165,000. Internal overtime and rest-day work totalled £2,900,000. The food and refreshment bill alone was £146,000 and the immediate cost for extra protective helmets, riot shields and 'other equipment' came to £56,000. The whole operation cost £4,403,000 and will be 60 per cent grant-aided by the Home Office. Oxford's estimate for long-term public order equipment is £364,000 and this includes £53,000 worth of riot equipment for 3,000 men. This would be sufficient to equip almost the whole Merseyside force. Nowhere in his report does Oxford comment on his expenditure on riot equipment and CS gas without consultation with the police authority. Elsewhere he has justified this lack of consultation:

'It is a matter of interpretation. There is an *escape clause* in the rule book that in exceptional circumstances a chief officer can make a value judgement and tell people afterwards' (*Sunday Telegraph*, 13.9.81).

Subsequently Oxford was reprimanded by the Police Authority for this unauthorised expenditure.

Proposals

Oxford aims to 'reduce tension and prevent further serious disorder' by a system of foot

patrols, a crash programme of training 'aimed at influencing the attitudes of police officers' and to take measures to 'prevent a police over-reaction' (*Report*, p5). Each of these proposals suggests that the previous system of policing, the attitudes of officers and their reaction to events contributed to the confrontation. Yet at no point does Oxford deal with this implicit proposition. In fact a whole chapter of Oxford's report to Scarman is given over to arguing that the criticisms directed against the police over harassment, aggressive policing, oppression of young blacks, the complaints procedure and poor training are each unfounded. Oxford recognises that the police are mistrusted over accountability and complaints. He claims that this has been caused by the 'speculative reporting' and extreme criticism of his handling of the Jimmy Kelly case in 1979. But then he goes on to say that the 'paucity of experience at street level' of 1,534 young recruits, must have had its effect on police-community relations.

In his report to Scarman Oxford situates the disturbances 'in the historical and current crime scene'. For Liverpool is a city with a tradition of serious crime; 'a city beset by problems of violence and public disorder throughout the centuries'. These problems were:

'multiple and aggravated . . . by large-scale immigration of Irish (and) enough remained to aggravate the problems of poverty, unemployment and famine . . . the breeding grounds of violence' (p3).

Then came the Welsh rural labourers and innumerable 'other foreign nationalities', until after the Great War when there was 'a remarkable increase in the number of coloured immigrants . . . who stayed and married local white girls'.

'Each of these communities brought with them associated problems, disputes and tensions which on occasion spilled over into outbreaks of violence'. (p4)

So the 'Liverpudlian' is 'violent', 'pugnacious' and 'belligerent'. Liverpool has a lawless, violent and crime-ridden history. Civil disorder 'similar to the recent outbreaks in Toxteth' is not new. More

recently there has been a 74.6 per cent increase in crimes of violence against the person and the worst area is Toxteth. A 'large number of ethnic minorities, including blacks', live in Toxteth, as it is 'the natural homing ground for immigrants' (p28). It is here that robbery is 10 times the national average, 'street prostitution is customary and there is a flourishing drug traffic' (p28). Toxteth, then, is a criminal area in a violent city. Oxford concludes:

'It is against this background that one should consider the allegations of police harassment which rank so highly on the list of causes attributed by local community groups to the "Toxteth Riots"' (p26).

Working Party on Police/Public Relationships

Set up on the 24th July 'to examine the means whereby relationships between the police and the public can be improved . . .' the working party on police/public relationships had no brief 'to establish the causes of the recent civil disturbances'. It took evidence from a whole range of community groups, professional agency bodies and the police organisations. Its Report was presented to the Police Committee on 20 October. The allegation 'expressed most vociferously and most often', was that of police harassment, particularly the 'indiscriminate and extensive use of stop and search', 'verbal abuse and physical violence on the part of the police' and 'subsequent arrest on the sole charge of assaulting a police officer'. Further to this was a general concern with 'over-policing and/or aggressive policing'. These incidents tended to be between younger officers and black youth. The concern voiced in the community is clearly supported by the Chief Constable's comments and policy proposals on this issue. In general it was held that the police 'treat people like second-class citizens', show no respect for citizens and their rights, a lack of understanding of race, and verbally abuse young people as a matter of course. The general belief was that the police from

outside forces 'had a better attitude towards the community'. There was concern at the level of racist abuse from the police and the background of 'racist statements which had been accredited to the Chief Constable' (p4). Police violence was alleged during arrests and while in detention, and the Police Staff Associations commented that 'policing in certain areas, including Liverpool 8, tended to be very physical'. The complaints procedure was heavily criticised. Many complaints were not pursued because the procedure was thought inadequate and partial. There was a basic mistrust of the police recorded and a fear of reprisals against complainants. The Report concludes:

' . . . the sheer weight of adverse evidence compels us to recognise that a gulf exists between the police and certain sections of the community in Liverpool 8.'

It calls for a change in 'police attitudes' on the street, particularly over stop and search, less aggressive policing and a better understanding of the problems of the community. Long-term foot patrols, as the first step towards community policing, were proposed as were improvements in training. On complaints, the Report seems to agree that 'the attitude of the police on occasion is less than cooperative', but is reluctant to criticise the operation of the procedures by the Merseyside police. The major recommendation to the Police Authority is the establishment of a programme of police consultation. This would be done by police authority members, the police, community organisations and professional bodies. It would be 'a forum for an exchange of views between those concerned with policing and the consumer' (p10).

The Response

At its meeting on 20 October the Police Committee agreed to establish 'a programme designed to promote mutual support and understanding'. This included: information and reassurance as to current policing policies and police authority decisions; improvement of the 'free flow of information' between the authority, the

police and the public; community consultative machinery; a study of allegations of harassment and the misuse of stop and search; encouragement of foot patrols; reappraisal of the community liaison scheme; improvements in inter-agency cooperation; and better basic training particularly in terms of police/public relations. The programme was accepted unanimously.

The Reaction

On 12 November, at a meeting of the Police Federation's Merseyside Branch, the chairman of the Federation, Jim Jardine, rejected all of these attempts by 'press-seeking politicians' and 'interfering churchmen'. He said:

'I find it disgusting that elected leaders,


charged with the responsibility of protecting the whole community seek to undermine the position of their own chief constables' (*Guardian*, 13 November).

And:

'All that our members in Liverpool have had from their authority has been criticism and downright abuse and distortion . . . mindless mobs can set out and in one night destroy a community and then find everyone in authority bending over backwards to apologise to them' (*The Times*, 13 November).

Jardine received a standing ovation, as did the local chairman who told the police authority to 'keep out' of operation business. It now seems that the mild proposals for consultative machinery have been rejected by the police on the beat.

NATO AND MIDDLE EAST OIL: US AND EUROPE AT ODDS?



The primary foreign policy commitment of the UK is to NATO, whose 15 member nations consult continuously on foreign policy questions, while UK military forces and their deployment are shaped in NATO's integrated command structure and joint military planning process. At present the dominant issue in foreign and military policy is European theatre nuclear war, but the role of the Middle East is at least as important, partly because it is seen as a more probable cause of nuclear holocaust than the central European front.

In recent years, the United States has increased its pressure on its NATO allies for extension of NATO to cover the Middle East, or for support for its rapid Deployment Force (RDF), and without any discussion in Britain, the UK's Diego Garcia base has become the pivot of RDF

planning for Middle East intervention. This British servility towards US intentions coexists with the apparent conflict between Foreign Secretary Carrington's work on behalf of the EEC/Fa'hd peace plan, and continued support by the US for the Israeli/Camp David process.

This background paper focuses on Western interests and policies in the Middle East. This involves firstly an examination of the way in which the oil factor, and particularly the role of the huge oil companies, has been obscured. Secondly, the formation and development of the Rapid Deployment Force is examined.

The years between 1969 and 1974, usually presented as the triumph of Arab oil power, are seen to be a time when the oil majors reestablished their control over world oil refining and marketing, after a brief challenge from independents, cutting the OPEC governments in on the new deal and continuing to market most OPEC oil. The 1973 Arab oil weapon was a partially successful attempt to force the US and other Western governments to take the issue of Palestine and the Palestinians more seriously, and to push for a settlement which recognised the rights of Palestinians.

Energy use and consumption

Since 1945, total energy consumption in the world outside the Soviet bloc and China (the 'Western' world) has nearly quadrupled. The sources of energy have also changed. While solid fuels (mainly coal and coke) have contributed roughly the same amount of energy since 1945, their share of Western energy use has fallen from some two-thirds to one-fifth. Nuclear power began to produce significant energy in the 1960s and now produces 3% of Western energy, still less than hydroelectricity (8% in 1980). The quadrupling of energy consumption has come from a ten-fold growth of oil consumption since 1945 (to 50% in 1980) and a six-fold increase in natural gas use (to 19%).

Nearly three-quarters of Western oil and gas use of 2.4 billion tonnes was by the Trilateral nations: the USA 33%, Western Europe 29% and Japan 10%. Latin America, Australasia, Africa and Asia outside Japan – including the Middle East – consumed only 28% of oil and gas used in 1980. Of Western reserves, Africa has 10%, Latin America 12%, Australasia and the Far East 3%, and the Middle East no less than 65%, though both Middle Eastern and Latin American – i.e. Mexican – reserves are understated here. The Trilateral consumers of 72% of Western energy have only 9% of Western reserves – the USA has 5%, and Western Europe 4%, while Japanese oil and gas is negligible.

These figures for reserves have been transformed since World War II. In 1947 the USA was self-sufficient in oil, had over one-third of Western reserves, and was the home of five of the 'seven sisters' – the seven major oil companies which controlled Western oil. Since 1947, US reserves have risen by 40%, and the USA still produces 60% of the oil it uses, but its reserves are now only 5% of Western reserves, and US dependence on imported oil must inevitably increase. In the same period Middle Eastern reserves have risen ten-fold.

Dependence on the Middle East

In 1980, the USA imported 40% of its oil,

West Europe 80%, and Japan all of its oil and the average dependence of the Trilateral area (US, Western Europe and Japan) on imports had risen from 8% in 1950 to nearly 60%. (France and Italy import over 80%, and West Germany over two-thirds of their oil.) This imported oil comes from areas producing more than they consume: Africa consumed 3% of Western oil use but produced 13%, Latin America consumed 9.4% but produced 13%, and the Middle East consumed 3.5% of oil used while producing 40% of the West's oil. As put by the most substantial analysis of world oil: 'consuming countries will become more and more dependent on a few large scale suppliers. And this . . . will mean increasing involvement with the Middle East.' (John M Blair, *The Control of Oil*, Random House, NY, 1977, p23).

These statistics, however, do not explain how Trilateral capitalist centres have ensured their access to oil. John Blair, a US government and Congressional economist for 40 years provided a clear and comprehensive account of the evolution of the 'seven sisters' arrangements through their successful adaptation to OPEC between 1969 and 1974. A brief summary of this is given here to provide the strategic context for Western efforts to promote a Middle Eastern settlement and to extend its military influence in the Middle East.

The energy crisis

In the 1960s, 'the energy crisis' came to public attention as part of a broader ecological concern about finite resources and pollution, but it became central for governments during the Arab/Israeli October war of 1973. In the USA, Blair presented the energy crisis as:

'the logical consequence of the limited and declining size of US reserves and the resultant vulnerability of oil consumers everywhere to those controlling foreign (i.e. non-US) oil – a dozen members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC) and a small group of giant international oil companies'. Single oil supplying countries, or the Arab oil producers, had made previous attempts to use Western dependence on imported oil to their strategic advantage but both during the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 oil 'supplies were available from alternative sources', according to an International Institute for Strategic Studies report. Similarly, when Mexico nationalised the seven sisters' oil holdings in 1938, the companies simply refused to market Mexican oil and Iranian nationalisation of BP's holdings in 1951 was met with a comprehensive embargo by the oil majors and the British and US governments, while the companies used expanded Arab oil production to fill the shortfall. In 1956, Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal with Arab oil suppliers' support cut two thirds of West Europe's oil but the companies increased production from the USA, Venezuela and Iran to maintain 90% of normal supplies throughout.

The use of the oil weapon in 1973 was, however, effective, albeit to a limited degree. But the oil weapon was the culmination of a period in which the seven sisters had reorganised their relations with crude oil-producing nations, re-established their predominance in refining and marketing, and escalated their profits from refining and distribution. (The seven oil majors in 1980 sold oil products worth more than the total GNPs of all the OPEC countries.) The much bruted 'success' of the 1973 oil weapon increased prices to the satisfaction of both the oil majors and the OPEC nations, but it did not cut off supplies. The result was a fairly stable system of continued interdependence of the oil companies and OPEC nations within which transformations on the scale of the price increases of 1973/74 are unlikely to be repeated. The stability is a consequence of the OPEC countries continuing dependence upon oil and oil majors in marketing, production control and refining, and of their financial and economic relations with the West which resulted from 'recycling' oil revenues. This is not to say

that particular oil supplying nations are stable, but even the fall of the Shah and the Iraq-Iran war since late 1980 have had little impact on the availability of supplies.

The conventional view, however, posits the centrality of oil in the general security concerns of the Western nations and Japan and the concomitant perception of threat at any prospect of destabilisation or Soviet penetration into the region. This standard view neglects the system of control of Western oil created and managed by the seven sisters in the 1930s and transformed between 1969 and 1974 into its present form. If the oil companies had not had such realistic intentions in 1973, some of the notions of direct Western military intervention in the Middle East canvassed then and since, such as the US Rapid Deployment Force, might have found wider support in official circles.

Control of oil

The largest transnational companies are oil companies, and they are very large. They are in fact larger than they were before the OPEC oil price rises of 1973/74, despite the illusion at the time that OPEC was somehow challenging their power. Not only do they dwarf many of the countries with which they deal, but the governments of the countries in which the oil majors are owned and controlled find it useful to leave the international oil industry to its own devices to a degree unequalled in any other industry. The industry is run internationally by something very like a cartel of the largest oil companies, which have had carefully limited competition among themselves for 50 years.

Such centralised control of oil was almost inevitable given a number of factors. Firstly, reserves are found in only a few places, eg, the Middle East, Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Venezuela, Indonesia and the North Sea – and within these areas reserves are centralised in a few large pools. Early concessions granted to companies covered vast areas for long periods, and, since subsoil mineral rights in these countries belonged to the state or ruler companies

could negotiate exclusive concessions comparatively easily. Secondly, once oil was found, its remoteness from consuming centres required large capital outlays for production, refining and transport. But these factors do not fully explain the degree of concentration and centralisation that exists in world oil.

The US oil industry, (before John D Rockefeller's Standard Oil came to dominate it in the 1880s and 1890s) and to a lesser degree international oil (before the majors established comprehensive control in the late 1920s) were characterised by rapid boom and bust cycles which helped to concentrate the industry. Given the amount of exploration activity and the apparent number of competing firms, oil prices and markets should be very unstable. Instead, prices were remarkably stable, especially between the late 1940s and 1970s. The observed stability of prices and markets for oil since the 1930s is no accident. It is engineered by the major oil companies. It 'requires almost complete control over markets since . . . it takes only a relatively small amount of "uncontrolled" supply to disrupt the market' (Blair, p27). So the 'natural' concentration of control over supply had to be supplemented by control of markets:

'In these efforts, the major international oil companies have received the enthusiastic cooperation of governments in both the producing *and* the consuming countries. By means of a web of cartel arrangements set up in most of the world's consuming countries, they secured control over most of the world markets. Through boycotts, intimidation, and the active support of governmental bodies, particularly the US State Department, they have been remarkably successful in keeping outsiders out. And by perfecting highly effective control "systems" they have been able to limit world output almost exactly to a predetermined growth rate, and, in addition, to eliminate differences in delivered prices at any given destination throughout the world. These "systems" provide the instruments by

which effective control over the supply and distribution of oil can be continued in the future by the companies, the producing countries, or, some combination of both. (Blair, p28).

Controlling oil marketing

At the same time that the international majors were gaining control over the vast reserves of the Middle East, they were also busily engaged in devising complicated cartel agreements to assure 'orderly' marketing. Beginning in the late 1920s, four international agreements were entered into, designed to establish the principles, guidelines and general *modus operandi* to be applied through cartels in most of the world's consuming countries. The first of these agreements, the Achnacarry Agreement of 1928, arose from a dispute between Mobil and Shell over Mobil's purchases of crude from the Soviet Union which had seized Shell properties. This dispute produced price war and competition which threatened the position and profits of all the majors. The heads of the big three, BP, Shell and Exxon, got together at Shell boss, Sir Henry Deterding's, Achnacarry Castle, and produced the 'As Is Agreement': seven principles for running international oil as a cartel. These stated that market shares should be maintained 'as is', and provided for the majors to cooperate to maintain existing market shares. These principles were to be given effect by local cartels in the various consuming nations.

Three further agreements specified local cartel arrangements. The Memorandum for European Markets (1930) made 1928 the base period, and called for meetings at which selling conditions should be 'fully and frankly discussed and agreed' and large contracts allocated 'to achieve agreed market-shares' (Blair, p60). It also allowed for revision of quotas. Fines for over-selling and penalties for under-selling were provided by the heads of Agreement for Distribution (1932)), by which time all but one of the seven sisters participated. (SoCal was not yet important in international oil.)

The fourth agreement, the Draft Memorandum of Principles (1934) discussed price policy and outlawed advertising claims about superior products (Blair, p62). The agreements discussed how to control non-participating oil companies, refiners or crude suppliers, preferably by take-over. The national cartels were 'the product of a great deal of very hard work'. The Swedish cartel, for example, held 51 meetings in 1939, at which 776 subjects were discussed.

There is some evidence that these cartel arrangements continued to exist long after this period. First, Exxon admitted to the US Federal Trade Commission that there were no papers in the company's files indicating when the Achnacarry Agreement was terminated. A Swedish official investigation found continued cooperation after World War II and after sustained investigations by the US Federal Trade Commission (reported in *The International Petroleum Cartel*, 1952), President Truman initiated an anti-trust action to end

'(a) the monopolistic control of foreign production; (b) the curtailment of domestic production to . . . maintain prices (c) quotas to limit sales in foreign markets (d) limitation of US exports and imports and (e) the exclusion of American independents from foreign sources of supply.'

The suit was cut back by President Eisenhower's National Security Council and Sullivan and Cromwell, the cartel's defending lawyers, were successful in having it dropped on national security grounds. (Sullivan and Cromwell was run by senior partner John Foster Dulles, later US Secretary of State, and Allen Dulles, later director of the CIA.) The evidence of cartel arrangements was never tested in court.

The prosecution had clear evidence that cartels persisted in some form between 1945 and 1953 in some 13 countries of Europe, Latin America, Africa, the Near East and the Far East and in 1979 an examining magistrate indicted the chief of British Petroleum's French subsidiary in a criminal action involving price-fixing and market-sharing arrangements with other companies

in the Marseilles area. Also to appear before the magistrate were officials of the French subsidiaries of Exxon, Mobil, Shell, two French firms (CFP and ELF ERAP), and the Belgian firm Petrofina. Two months earlier, these companies had been formally accused of organizing an illicit cartel. In fact their behaviour, according to the prosecution's charges, conformed closely to the directions of the international agreements (Blair, p71).

Price control

The system of control over production designed by the companies governs the individual rates of output of the various producing countries so as to attain a predetermined growth rate of overall supply. Thus, the yearly growth in overall output of crude oil for OPEC members between 1950 and 1972 (when OPEC accounted for 84.8% of Western oil, excluding North America) was almost exactly 9.55%. What is so extraordinary about this is the widely diverse movements of the separate components; for example, long-sustained steady increases (Saudi Arabia and Iran), much slower rates of increase (Venezuela, Kuwait and Iraq), precipitous rises (Libya until 1970, Nigeria, Abu Dhabi, Indonesia), and occasional pronounced declines (Iran in 1951-54; Iraq in 1957, 1967, 1972; Nigeria in 1968; Venezuela and Libya since 1970). The major oil companies have orchestrated these and other aberrations into a smooth and uninterrupted upward trend in overall supply. Thanks to the US Senate's Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, the forecasts made by Exxon from 1960-72 are on the public record. These forecasts are the core of company planning, and each of the majors produces a set. From them it is possible to see how production control has worked.

Since the late 1950s the system has begun by establishing a high production rate for Iran because of the desire of the US government to build up Iran as a bastion against Communist influence. Iran's annual production growth rate for 1958-72 was 12.46%. In its internal forecasts, Exxon had

said: 'Iranian production . . . would expand 12.5% per year during 1967 and 1968 *in accordance with agreements already made with the government*'.

In contrast to the old style cartel system of controlling oil, which would have required endless ad hoc meetings to secure agreements on innumerable day-to-day issues and problems, the modern complex system of production control and pricing made such meetings, and excessive reliance on an awareness of self-interest, unnecessary. The system was unlikely to fall apart in the face of a little opposition from OPEC.

During the mid-1960s however, sources of competition outside the mechanisms' control began to disturb the stabilized price structure. Both abroad and at home, streams of oil began to flow around the control of the majors. In international markets, medium-size companies that had recently won valuable concessions in Libya began to force their way into world markets by offering lower and lower prices. Moreover, if world output was not to exceed the predetermined growth rate, the majors were faced with the painful necessity of offsetting the Libyan expansion with corresponding reductions in the Middle East, thereby imperilling their invaluable concessions in that area. In domestic markets private brand operators, selling at discounts, were rapidly increasing their market shares at the expense of the majors. As compared to the late sixties, the profit rates of the majors had by 1971 fallen approximately a fifth and the intricate mechanisms of the past were no longer adequate to control the market.

Other problems loomed. The future of the concession system was endangered by rising nationalism throughout the Third World, including the oil-producing countries. Demands by OPEC leaders for control over their nations' oil wealth were now being achieved through participation and nationalization programs.

Congressional opposition to the various oil company tax perks was growing, and this problem was exacerbated by the fact that when the oil companies bought back crude

taken over by the OPEC countries, US tax authorities regarded this not as a tax payment which reduced the companies' tax liability, but as an ordinary business cost. Both the OPEC pressures and the domestic pressures on oil company perks required that the oil companies find a new cost structure which made profits not on crude, as had always been the case, but on refining and distribution.

The oil majors wanted a new, higher, target rate of return. Within a short span of about five years, they had achieved it.

The 1973/74 price increases however, could not have been made effective until the huge new flow of oil from the independent oil companies in Libya had been brought under control. In 1969, Colonel Qadhafi took power from King Idris, who had given concessions to independents and encouraged rapid production growth, making Libya the fourth largest OPEC producer. The new government wanted to conserve oil and maximise prices, or rather, the government revenue. Exxon backed the government's wish to tax on posted prices rather than the independents' lower prices, and the government cut back the production quota of Occidental, the largest independent. When OPEC decided in September 1971 that OPEC governments should seek shares in ownership of the oil companies, Libya took over or severely curtailed the operations of those companies whose shipments of Libyan oil had most seriously demoralised world markets.

This cutting off of independent oil supplies to price cutting private brands was supplemented by 'denial of supplies and the price squeeze' by the oil majors, possible because the majors control most oil at each stage – crude production, refining and retailing. The channel from independent to independent was therefore constricted and only 11% of the independent producers' output flowed to independent refiners. The majors, meanwhile, supplied oil cheap to their own dealers to squeeze the independents, many of which went to the wall in 1972/3.

The oil weapon

Then came the oil weapon, or rather, what the standard Western view presents as the first successful use of the oil weapon by the Arab oil exporters during the 1973 October war. There is, however, evidence which supports a very different view, which undercuts many of the assumptions of Western strategic interests in the Middle East as presented in the anti-OPEC, anti-Arab, anti-Islamic, anti-Soviet versions of events which are at the core of US pressure for the extension of NATO to cover the Middle East or for the Rapid Deployment Force. This evidence suggests that the oil weapon is more an indication of the power of the oil companies vis-a-vis both supplier (OPEC) countries and consumer (Trilateral) countries, than an indication of the power of OPEC to determine unilaterally oil prices and the availability of oil.

The main account of events, and the stated OAPEC (Arab OPEC members) intention, was that the USA and Netherlands receive no oil during the October war, and that overall production be cut 5% each month to put pressure on consumer governments for a pro-Arab (pro-Palestinian) solution in the Middle East. The first round of price increases, at a previously planned OPEC meeting two days after the start of the October war, look mild and inconsequential in retrospect – a mere 70% increase from \$3 to \$5.11 a barrel on 16 October. (Between the late 1940s and late 1970 posted prices were \$1.80 or \$1.90; costs of raising the crude were very small, say 20 cents, and a small royalty on each barrel was all that was paid through much of the period to the OPEC governments. The gap between production costs and prices is now even higher.) The second round of price increases, of which the Shah was the instigator, took the price to \$11.65 a barrel on 1 January 1974. These price increases had acute balance of payments and cost inflation effects in consuming countries, but the oil weapon, as a means of denying supplies and bringing the Western

supporters of Israel to their knees, was a total failure. The oil shortages simply did not happen on any significant scale.

In Western Europe as a whole, imports for 1973 rose by 7%, only fractionally below the 7.2% growth for the first six months, and the US, supposedly suffering a total embargo of imported oil from OPEC, found its total supply down a mere 5.5% in the five months after the embargo was declared. Consuming countries reported, at worst, only temporary interruptions in supplies which even then were minor. And production by OPEC countries in 1973 was virtually identical to that which would have been expected on the basis of OPEC's historical growth rate of 9.55%.

The oil companies' intelligence and connections with OPEC governments were sufficient to allow them to maintain their historic control of crude oil production levels throughout. The Arab oil exporters did cut output in the fourth quarter of 1973, the decreases ranging from Libya's 11% to Saudi Arabia's nearly 20%, but before the outbreak of war on 6 October, for some five months, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Qatar increased their production over the previous year's corresponding period by a third. This compared with their long-term growth rates of 11%. If there had not been a war and cut-backs, there would have been 'distressed oil', a glut, and, if this had not been storable by the majors, a threat of price cuts, not quadrupling increases. It seems that the companies expanded production after King Faisal of Saudi Arabia on 3 May, 1973 called on Aramco president, Frank Jungers, warning that Sadat would have to 'embark on some sort of hostilities' to marshal American opinion to press for a Middle East settlement and suggesting that the US disavow Israeli policies. The companies increased production to 18% over first quarter levels from May until October, but the closeness of the year's full output restrictions to the historic OPEC 9.55% suggests that the OPEC countries also tailored their output restrictions as part of the 'oil embargo' to the predetermined rate of growth (Blair, p267-8; Anthony Sampson, *The Seven*

Sisters, Coronet, pp 244-5). Since Iran and Nigeria put up their output during the 'embargo', a high-level of cooperation between the oil majors and their OPEC suppliers seems to characterise the whole episode.

The 'price explosion'

A different explanation to the conventional can also be presented for the 'price explosion' of late 1973 early 1974. In the face of uncontrolled independent output, some overall output control was necessary in order to hold prices. It seems clear that OPEC, which requires unanimous votes and has a secretariat with limited autonomy, was not in a position to operate this kind of cartel system. The argument is supported by confident assertions in specialist journals that any OPEC cartel would inevitably collapse and by the fact that, in 1975, the head of Middle East Economic Consultants pointed out that OPEC heads of state had refused to agree to a production control programme. In addition, the OPEC countries have to sell their product which they can do either to the major companies or to independents. The latter, if done by a major exporter, would make price control by the majors impossible and would bring prices crashing down, thereby threatening OPEC. Only once has Saudi Arabia even threatened to sell to independents, and then it was in order to persuade Aramco to accept formal (dependent) nationalisation, and there is ample evidence that Saudi Arabia understands the chaos that could result given the power of the majors in refining and distributing oil.

It seems clear, then, that the precise tailoring of supply to meet a diminishing demand must have been, as before, the work of the major companies which were simply continuing their historical role.

The oil weapon, whatever else, convinced the Trilateral governments for their own security of energy supplies to see the importance of a Middle East settlement which was satisfactory to Arab oil exporters. This meant that each country

moved more towards recognition of the role of Palestinians and some form of Palestinian state in a settlement. Even the US, with its strong Zionist influence, moved closer to recognition of Arab perceptions. Before Sadat's trip to Israel to address the Knesset which set off the Camp David partial settlement in December 1978, the prospects for a Geneva conference settlement involving all parties were good. The Camp David process has seen little fruit for the Palestinians as yet and the final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai which it requires may not be complete by the April 1982 deadline. Meanwhile the EEC/Saudi Arabian plans for a more comprehensive settlement are occupying more of the attention of British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, acting on behalf of the European Communities. Any settlement that might emerge, and prospects are not great for any settlement, would be a stabilisation of regimes which have been created by the intersection of the West's oil requirements with the existing social structures – it would be profoundly conservative and pro-Western.

The oil weapon also brought an immense increase in sales of advanced weapons systems to the Middle East, initially to Iran but more recently to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, North Yemen and other Arab countries who had long seen their weaponry kept inferior to that of Israel by major arms sellers. It also provoked widely publicised military exercises – demonstrations of US capabilities to take over the oil fields by force. The Rapid Deployment Force is part of this tradition.

The Rapid Deployment Force

The examination of the symbiosis of the oil majors and the OPEC states, particularly, Saudi Arabia, casts considerable doubt upon the views of the vulnerability of oil supplies to Russians, Islamics, Arabs, or anything but the impact of oil itself upon the Gulf. Nevertheless, the US war scare has proceeded apace and is used to justify increases in real terms in military spending throughout NATO.

In the wake of the Iranian revolution a series of US initiated studies and statements, unofficial and official, proposed a military build-up, while during the revolution the US Atlantic Council and Japan's Research Institute for Peace and Security began a two-year study of the common security interests of the US, Japan and NATO. A summary of this was published in *NATO Review* in February 1981. This said:

'Neither NATO nations nor Japan will be able to free themselves from vital dependence on Middle East oil for many years . . . Consequently . . . a credible deterrent force must be positioned in the area before access is denied, whether by Soviet military power or by local political upheavals.'

The joint working group outlined three possible ways of providing such a 'deterrent' in the Middle East: unilateral US military expansion in which the US would withdraw forces from Asia and Europe; increases in European and Japanese military efforts in their own regions, designed to free US forces for redeployment to the Middle East; or increased military spending by all three and deployment to the Middle East of multilateral forces drawn from western Europe, Japan and the United States.

The formation of the Rapid Deployment Force was announced by President Carter's Secretary of Defence, Harold Brown, to a convention of the National Security Industrial Association in September 1979, nine months after the Iranian revolution. And the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 provoked Carter to pledge in his State of the Union message in January 1980:

'Let the position be absolutely clear . . . an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.'

The concept of the Rapid Deployment Force, however, dates back several years to 1966 when the Johnson administration

pressed Congress to approve a new class of fast deployment logistics ships and cargo aircraft. Underlying such pressure was Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara's desire to demonstrate that the United States could deploy its ground forces rapidly to respond to crises beyond the NATO area. Readiness Command, and its predecessor Strike Command, both fulfilled fast-response functions, drawing primarily upon marines and airborne units to carry out their functions. (See Michael Klare: *War Without End, American Planning for the Next Vietnams*, Randon House, 1972 for earlier intervention planning.)

The State Department's under secretary for political affairs and the top career official at the time 'the Carter Doctrine' was announced, David Newsome, wrote subsequently in *Foreign Policy* magazine (June 1981) that he did not know Carter was intending such a commitment until he saw the draft of Carter's speech and, according to Newsome, the Gulf countries were not consulted in advance or even notified. Newsome compared Carter's speech with the 1957 promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine which called for the US to give assistance to any nations attacked by countries 'controlled by international Communism'. This had been extensively debated in Congress and in the media and a joint resolution of Congress ultimately approved the doctrine. Newsome pointed out that the Carter Doctrine went further than Eisenhower, since 'the US now decides when to intervene, with or without a request'. Further, 'as far as is known, neither the current administration nor the previous one has even conducted a detailed study of the implications of the policy or its alternatives.' At the time of Carter's speech, Newsome pointed out, the US had no capacity to back up that commitment with either troops or aircraft based in the region and that plans for the Rapid Deployment Force, and negotiations for use of air and sea installations, were not well advanced.

One reason why the Rapid Deployment Force took so long to get under way, was what the American right and armed forces

pejoratively call 'the Vietnam syndrome', in other words, the strong feelings against military interventionism in the Third World, engendered by opposition to US genocide in Vietnam. In 1976 this was enough to stop the US using even covert CIA armed forces in Angola. It certainly helped to prevent the open formation of new intervention forces throughout the period of the oil weapon when there was considerable discussion of military intervention. But by January 1981, the *Proceedings of the US Naval Institute* announced that:

'The Rapid Deployment Force is an idea whose time has come. The remarkable consensus behind this initiative is apparent when one considers how fast RDF-related items were conceived, put into the five-year defense plan, and began to appear in the fiscal year 1981 budget. This broad agreement on the necessity to move ahead rapidly with these forces is especially remarkable when one considers what the response to the creation of an American intervention force for the Middle East and other troubled areas would have been just a few years ago: a stereophonic roar of dissent.' However, it was reported only months later, that US opinion polls suggested that while 69% of Americans would support the US coming to the aid of West Europe in the event of invasion, 54% would oppose the use of force to counter a total oil embargo and 57% would oppose use of US troops if Israel were 'over-run by Arabs' (8 Days, 25.4.81).

In theory, the RDF was to be a flexibly sized force which could comprise several divisions, carrier battle groups, and air wings, as well as mobility and other supporting forces. In practice, it involved no new military formations other than another staff layer, commanded by a three-star general reporting in turn to Commander, Readiness Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida. The essence of the RDF concept was rapidity. The force, possibly well over 100,000 men, would have sufficient mobility to arrive in strength at any remote area – including the Persian

Gulf – within a month.

To achieve this the administration pressed for development of a new cargo plane (the CX), conversion of roll-on/roll-off ships to military specifications, and construction of a new class of maritime pre-positioning ships (MPS). Both the roll-on/roll-off ships and the MPS would be stocked with equipment for the RDF and would be pre-positioned overseas. Seven ships are pre-positioned at Diego Garcia (see below) with weapons, vehicles, munitions and supplies for RDF Marines already. The administration considered favorably acquiring a class of fast cargo ships that could transport equipment for an Army division to the Persian Gulf in about two weeks. Most important, the RDF involves a significant US effort to obtain access to overseas facilities. As such, it marks the reversal of a trend of withdrawals from overseas bases that resulted in facilities being available to US forces on a permanent or even emergency basis within 2,000 miles of the Persian Gulf.

The direct cost of the RDF and its attendant programs will exceed \$11 billion, the estimate given for fiscal years 1981-1985 alone. Of this, at least \$7 billion is projected for the CX aircraft, while well over \$1 billion appears earmarked for a variety of military construction projects. These include improvement of facilities in Oman, Somalia, Kenya, Diego Garcia, and Egypt, as well as Lajes in the Azores, which is the critical en route facility for operations in the Persian Gulf.

Diego Garcia

In US military planning Diego Garcia is the lynchpin of US military activity in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. It is the base for the pre-positioned ship-borne supplies for RDF intervention forces, for the aircraft carrier task-forces which have been stationed in the Indian Ocean since the Iranian revolution, for Marines and for B-52 bombers – a formidable arsenal. Diego Garcia is central, specifically, to the RDF planning.

Diego Garcia and other islands in the Indian Ocean were separated from the

colony of Mauritius in 1965 and named 'British Indian Ocean Territory'. In April 1967, the Labour Government under Harold Wilson signed an agreement allowing the US a 50-year lease on the island. 1,200 local people were deported to Mauritius, and they have demanded the right to return ever since. Mauritius itself was granted independence in 1968, and was given £3 million in compensation for losing Diego Garcia and the other islands.

Mauritius never accepted the arrangement, and Premier Sir Seewoosagar Ramgoolam – not a radical – told Mrs Thatcher during a visit to London in 1980 that he wanted it back. He was turned down flat (*The Times*, 17.7.80). Mauritius planned to raise the issue in the United Nations during the present session (*Daily Telegraph*, 6.8.81).

The harbour has been dredged to a depth of 45 feet, and a new 5,000 feet jetty can accommodate America's largest nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, like the USS Nimitz. The 12,000 feet long runway can accommodate the largest cargo aircraft like Lockheed Hercules and Star-freighters, and anti-submarine P-3 patrol aircraft. B-52 bombers, though more than twenty years old, are the mainstay of the US Air Force's offensive capability and Diego Garcia already has facilities to handle them. Nuclear weapons for the B-52s and for carrier-based aircraft are stored on the island.

The air facilities at Diego Garcia are to be dramatically expanded. The Pentagon plans to lengthen the runways and provide more aprons to station B-52s. The present facilities on Diego Garcia, restrict both the numbers of planes which can use the base, and the bomb load which they can carry.

The 2,000-mile distance from Diego Garcia to the Gulf is daunting, but is not an obstacle to a plane like the B-52, originally designed to fly half way round the world to drop nuclear bombs on the Soviet Union. US B-52s flew similar distances from Guam and the Phillipines to bomb Vietnam.

The Pentagon announced in March that \$237 million was to be spent in the fiscal year 1982 on upgrading the Diego Garcia base (*Aviation Week and Space Technology*,

16.3.81) and on 30 July, the British Government, which nominally owns the island, surreptitiously informed parliament that it had agreed to the plans. It did so at the start of the summer recess in a written answer which became public only in mid-August (*The Times*, 14.8.81). Labour MP, Joan Lestor, chair of the Labour Party's international committee, said that the way in which the decision was made public suggested that there was something to hide.

But expenditure is not limited to Diego Garcia. In the fiscal year 1982, the Pentagon also plans to spend \$106 million upgrading the base at Ras Banas in Egypt, \$78.5 billion in Oman, mainly on the Masirah island base, \$24 million on Berbera, Somalia, and \$26 million in Kenya, principally on Mombasa.

Arms sales

Pre-positioning of weaponry may have been agreed between the United States and Israel, and, perhaps more surprisingly, between the US and Saudi Arabia. Thus *Middle East Economic Digest* (18.9.81) reported that

'The US air force has been offered the use of two bases being built in the Negev desert under the supervision of the US Army Corps of Engineers to compensate Israel for its withdrawal from facilities in Sinai by April 1982 under Camp David agreements. Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin announced the offer at the end of his Washington visit. "We want strategic co-operation with the US. We suggested the pre-positioning of weapons. We also believe we could supply an air umbrella in case of an airlift. We also suggested naval co-operation. We have two ports the Sixth Fleet likes to visit from time to time".'

And the *Washington Post* (2.11.81) reported that the sale of AWACS radar planes to Saudi Arabia was part of a secret grand defence strategy for the Middle East. The Pentagon denied that there is a larger military strategy, but the *Post* said that 'an internal Pentagon paper and other sources' set the stage for 'a regionwide air defence

network, led by Saudi Arabia and potentially including such moderate states as Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrein, and Qatar.' The heart of the US-Saudi agreement reached in two years of negotiations towards the \$8.5 billion AWACS agreement was reported by the *Post* as follows:

'If the United States will sell the Saudis an integrated package of top-of-the-line military technology, Saudi Arabia will build and pay for a huge network of command, naval and air defense facilities large enough to sustain US forces in intensive regional combat involving the Soviet Union.

The strategy is intended to deal with graduated threats ranging from local insurgencies to all-out warfare with a major outside power such as the Soviet Union, according to knowledgeable American and foreign sources.

Ultimately, according to the US and foreign sources, the Saudis will permit the United States to 'pre-position' more than a 90-day supply of equipment, munitions and supplies, including refined oil, in facilities constructed in Saudi Arabia by US engineers according to US specifications.'

Shortly before the Senate voted for the AWACS sale, Saudi National Guard Commander, Prince Abdullah, took the trouble to summon the US press and inform them that Israel, not the Soviet Union, was the biggest threat faced by his country, rather undermining the Administration's attempts to claim that the building of a 'strategic consensus' against Soviet penetration was the reason for the 'Air Defense Enhancement Package', as the AWACS deal was officially termed. The Saudis were probably more interested in the rest of the package, long-range fuel tanks for their F-15s, six KC-707 aerial refuelling planes, and 1,177 Sidewinder missiles, than the vulnerable AWACS.

A similar deal is being, or perhaps already has been, struck with Egypt. The RDF has been using Ras Banas and Cairo West bases for over a year. In the wake of the assassination of Anwar Sadat, Alexander Haig promised that US arms would be speeded up, and a military team was visiting Egypt in the last days of October to see how this could be done (*International Herald Tribune*, 12.10.81). A major exercise 'Bright Star' in which troops and loaded B-52 flew from the US to Egypt, took place in the first week of November.

Next year, Egypt will begin assembling British Challenger tanks, (which, when they were to be supplied to the Shah, were called the Sher Iran), and the Scorpion light tank, useful for the sort of urban disturbance which seems increasingly likely in Egypt. The deal 'was given the green light during talks last month in Cairo between the British Defence Secretary, John Nott, and his Egyptian counterpart, Halim Abu Ghazala' (*8 Days*, 3.10.81).

'In fact a defence ministry official, pointing to a statement made by Nott on 17 March said that there was nothing new in Britain getting involved in the RDF. Nott, who had been asked in the House of Commons about British involvement with the RDF in the Gulf, had said that Britain would act "in concert with other allies, principally the United States, where our assistance is sought, to protect the interests of friendly local states, and of the West in strategic regions".'

During a visit by Egyptian officers to the British Army of the Rhine, the *Daily Telegraph* (29.9.81) reported forecasts that Britain would help

'Egypt become a major arsenal that could cater for a good slice of the Middle East arms market in "three to four years."

"Britain is becoming a major supplier of equipment for the Egyptian armed forces in order to support the anti-Soviet strategy," said a British source close to the talks which Mr Nott held in Egypt.'

REVIEWS & SOURCES

BOOKS

VOICES FROM THE GREAT WAR, by Peter Vansittart. London: Jonathan Cape, 1981, 303 pp., £7.95 cloth.

BERTRAND RUSSELL AND THE PACIFISTS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR, by Jo Vellacott. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980, 326 pp., £28.50 cloth

The first world war was the apogee of personalised mass violence. How many tens of thousands perished by the bayonet will never be established. Ten million died altogether, a further 30,000,000 were wounded or missing, and in 1918-19 a further 10,000,000 died of influenza. The USA, entering the war in April 1917, lost 800,000 troops.

Peter Vansittart has produced an anthology of extraordinary range and power, giving a devastating overview of the carnage in the words of selected contemporaries, on a skeleton of essential facts. The politicians, generals, mass media and patriots condemn themselves as criminal idiots, while opponents of the slaughter struggle to maintain their sanity in prison, guardroom and the front line.

This book is worth a hundred histories, since it allows the reader to see the war as collective lunacy. It also shows how the centuries-old warfare, symbolised by the horse and the localised engagement, began to spawn the new, impersonal destruction: before the armistice, barbed wire, bayonets and trenches were fast giving way to gas, tanks and aircraft. Such power in the hands of politicians, who had shown how to destroy their domestic oppositions and mobilise and manipulate their cannon fodder, pointed straight to a resumption of warfare. As Ferdinand Foch put it with remarkable prescience at the 1919

Versailles Treaty: 'This is not peace, it is an armistice for 20 years.'

One of the foremost opponents of the war from its first day was Bertrand Russell, and Jo Vellacott's magnificent book, founded on a remarkable command of the written sources (illustrated here by over 800 footnotes) is only the second book on Russell since his death to begin to do justice to his stature (the first was Noam Chomsky's Cambridge lectures at the time of Russell's centenary).

Vellacott's book does three things very well. First, it shows that there was a most powerful opposition to the war in Britain, founded on significant elements of the Independent Labour Party, the pacifists, the No-Conscription Fellowship, the Union of Democratic Control, the Quakers and others. Secondly, it follows Russell's life almost daily throughout the war, in writing, agitation, as Chairman of the NCF, dismissed from his Cambridge lectureship and ending in Brixton prison. Since this was a most creative period in Russell's life, such a book was long overdue. Thirdly, such a detailed study of the forces of the opposition reveals all too clearly the perennial problems of organisation facing all radical movements, and there is much to be learned of continuing relevance.

Vellacott is currently working on a biography of Catherine Marshall, who held the NCF together and previously had worked almost full-time for six years for the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies. Since Marshall has been shamefully forgotten, and Vellacott's present book is so impressive, this too promises to be a work of importance.

MODERN POLICING. Edited by David Watts-Pope and Norman L Weiner. London: Croom Helm, 1981. £8.95 paperback, £13.95 cloth.

Although the editors say that this book is 'primarily addressed to policemen' and although its authors are police officers and academics attached to the Police Staff College at Bramshill (and perhaps because of those same reasons) this is a collection of real interest to the lay reader too.

The book is a series of essays falling broadly into the liberal tradition of policing philosophy – not surprising since Bramshill is itself a part of that tradition. For example, Michael O’Byrne in a discussion of public order policing, argues that once black community confidence in the police is sufficiently lost, the only police option is saturation policing. This, says O’Byrne, will be counter-productive, will produce siege mentalities on both sides and will probably ensure that police methods become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The prescription offered in two companion essays, by David Watts Pope and John Rhind, is for better ‘preventive’ policing and greater informal police accountability.

The second group of essays attempts to justify, or perhaps rehabilitate, the value of social sciences to policing. They thus challenge the ‘coppering is just plain common sense’ school, and the notion that policing must inevitably enforce any and every aspect of ‘social stability’. One of the best contributions is a short polemic by Irene Wilson arguing for a recognition of the political nature of policing and hence for a politically literate police force.

The final section is devoted to managerial issues in policing; managerial training, language, the use of the computers and the effectiveness of criminal statistics. For many police readers, especially those who are steeped in the Bramshill philosophy, these last essays will be the most meaningful. If only for that reason, non-police readers ought to grapple with them too.

COMMUNITY VERSUS CRIME by Colin Moore and John Brown. London: Bedford Square Press, 1981, 150 pp., £8.95 cloth, £4.95 paper.

Colin Moore is a Chief Superintendent with the Devon and Cornwall Police and heads the Exeter Crime Prevention Support Unit (CPSU), a key component of Chief Constable Alderson’s community policing philosophy and practice. John Brown’s involvement with the police as a sociologist has included his notorious report *Shades of Gray* on the Handsworth area of Birmingham which led to the establishment

of the Handsworth community policing experiment in which Brown has maintained a close involvement.

This book is not about community policing in general but is rather a detailed descriptive account of the CPSU experience in Exeter, based on Moore’s M.Sc. thesis at the Cranfield Institute of Technology. As stated in the author’s preface it:

‘offers a descriptive analysis of the ways in which the information on local crime was gathered, plotted, disseminated, and used as a catalyst for activating police, other statutory agencies, voluntary organisations and communities to work together more effectively to control local crime, and to develop strategies in this sphere.’

Moore and Brown trace the origins of contemporary community policing, if all too briefly, from the work of Chief Constable David Gray (later to become Chief Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland) in Clydeside in the late 1950s through the writings of architect Oscar Newman on ‘defensible space’ to the Kirkby community policing scheme initiated in 1974. But there is little else of the antecedents of community policing – nothing of other schemes in other areas, and nothing of the important Ditchley Conference on preventive policing held in 1977, which was attended by both Brown and by Alderson and from which much of the current practice of community policing has developed.

The bulk of the book is concerned with a description of how the Crime Prevention Support Unit was set up, how the local ‘crime problem’ was analysed, how ‘communities were activated’, how the inter-agency placements were organised. All this is useful as putting some meat on the bones of Alderson’s theoretical writings and it is useful to have information on how community policing actually operates and how it is perceived by some of the community and by the police.

In the closing chapter of the book the authors note that:

‘Analysis of the CPSU projects and the many comments made about them pose fundamental questions about future

policing practices in this country.' Unfortunately they do not identify these questions and there is therefore no discussion of community policing in a social and political context. The authors deny that the police are at any kind of crossroads where they have to decide which approach to take. There is no apparent awareness of the important *structural* changes which have taken place in policing, particularly in the last decade, which have resulted in a recourse to technology, specialisation, fire-brigade policing, enforcement of repressive legislation and a general growth of 'hard' policing.

Where does community policing fit into this? The authors not only do not tell us, they seem unaware of the problem, suggesting only that police forces have to 'balance' the pro-active (community policing) side of their work with the reactive (everything else). Yet this is surely a 'fundamental question' worthy of consideration. That it is not discussed must stand as a major criticism. There are other undiscussed problems. There is no consideration by Brown and Moore of the undemocratic nature of much community policing which not only bypasses elected police authorities but marginalises those who will not participate or who criticise.

Nor is there any real questioning of the role of the police as 'social engineers' in community policing. True, Moore and Brown acknowledge that the police can come to believe that they are filling what they see as a 'leadership void' in society but their objection appears to be one of tactics rather than one of principle. Such an assumption of leadership, say the authors, could blow back in the faces of the police, creating distress and conflict. Police 'leadership qualities . . . must be subdued so that they are seen in terms of "service" rather than . . . a more insidious form of social control.'

That community policing may have a lot to do with police public relations work and image improvement is, however, alluded to but in an unconscious way. Developing closer links with other agencies, say the

authors, will certainly help the police dispel their image as supporters of the status quo. They can then 'return to their original traditions of identity with the community'. Even the most superficial study of police history would show that such 'original traditions' are but myths and were in reality those of considerable conflict.

The main importance of this book lies perhaps not in what it says but in its mere publication. It has been published by the publishing arm of the influential National Council for Voluntary Organisations, an umbrella group and servicing body for most of Britain's voluntary organisations and charities and whose new chairman is the former British ambassador to the United States, Peter Jay. In addition, it carries a foreword by the Attorney-General in the last Labour government, Sam Silkin, who argues that those who have come to think of the police being 'on the other side' can come to appreciate that 'there is only one side'. This apparently unthinking and uncritical support for community policing from such quarters, implying a new-found status for the idea, should in itself be some cause for concern.

CONSPIRACY: Law, Class and Society, by Robert Spicer. Lawrence and Wishart, London, 190 pp., £7.50.

It is difficult to fault this book. It is comprehensive and concise. It is lucidly written and clearly presented. It avoids jargon and where technical words are unavoidable the unfamiliar reader can have recourse to a useful glossary at the start of the book. Above all, perhaps, it has a clear analytical line running through it which never takes off on its own into realms of unnecessary abstract theorising nor is it ever lost in description.

Conspiracy law is an important weapon of the state and as such has been used considerably since 1800 in key areas of struggles which have threatened the state. The first of these is in relation to Ireland and Spicer points out that a reading of conspiracy cases listed in legal textbooks 'reads almost like a biographical dictionary

of Irish nationalism – O'Donnell, O'Connell, Deasy, Mulcahy, Parnell . . . ' The trial of Mulcahy, for example, in 1868, for conspiring to make war and to aid the objects of the Fenians, is still a leading legal authority on the legal definition of conspiracy. It consisted, said Mr Justice Willes,

'not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more, to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means . . . And so far as proof goes, conspiracy is generally a matter of inference . . . '.

The Irish conspiracy cases not only attempt to deal with waves of violent nationalism; they also made a permanent contribution to the English common law. This, however stopped at the Easter rising of 1916, which was not followed by conspiracy trials. Rather: ' . . . the rebels were simply eliminated with a minimum of legal formality. The façade of the liberal democratic state was dropped, and the imposition of criminal sanctions handed over to the military.'

There have, of course, been conspiracy trials connected with Ireland but these have occurred mainly since 1969. These have included the trials of Roche and Bowes Egan, prosecuted for conspiracy to effect a public mischief after a canister of CS gas was thrown into the House of Commons, in 1971, the Hackney Arms Trial of 1972, and two cases involving the Special Branch informer, Kenneth Lennon.

The second area where conspiracy has been extensively used is that of political 'dissidents'. Spicer charts the use of the law through the nineteenth century against Henry Hunt and others who were prominent in the Peterloo demonstration in 1819, Henry Vincent, the Chartist orator and Feargus O'Connor and 58 others for their part in the 'Plug Riots'. In the twentieth century ten leading members of the Communist Party were convicted of conspiracy in 1925 to incite breaches of the Incitement to Mutiny Act 1797 and seditious conspiracy. The judge told them they could keep their freedom if they promised to dissociate themselves from the

party and desist from political activity. None accepted his offer. In 1960, a similar offer was made to members of the Committee of One Hundred who were convicted of conspiracy to incite others to commit a breach of the Official Secrets Act 1911 by occupying RAF Wethersfield. Again, none accepted. And so to the major conspiracy trials of the 1970s: the Angry Brigade, Ian Purdie and Jake Prescott, Peter Hain, the British Withdrawal from Northern Ireland Campaign, International Times, Oz and the 'Persons Unknown' anarchists case in 1979.

The third area where conspiracy has been used is that of trade union struggles. Among those convicted were nine trade union leaders in 1851 who tried to organise a strike against a dismissal and London gas workers in 1872, fighting for a reduction of their working week from eighty hours. In more recent times, there have been the trials of the Shrewsbury Three, resulting in a sentence for Des Warren twelve times greater than that which could have been awarded for the substantive offence of intimidation and the trials of five members of the building workers' union UCATT for occupying the office of a bureau supplying 'lump' labour.

In each of these three areas there have been two distinct phases of the use of conspiracy charges. The first ending about 1920 and the second beginning in the 1960s. (In the case of Ireland this was primarily because of Irish independence. Conspiracy charges were used again in response to the recent 'troubles'.) Spicer suggests a number of reasons for this non-continuous use of conspiracy. These include increasing unconventional behaviour leading the establishment to react with conspiracy laws as in the cases of Oz, International Times and the Ladies' Directory. More important perhaps is that the use of conspiracy reflects increasing concern with problems of 'public order', leading to more serious charges and more severe penalties. The common law offence of conspiracy has been an effective weapon in this process.

Spicer does not stop at description and analysis of the cases, however. He also dissects the process by which conspiracy

charges come to be decided upon, looking in turn at the roles of the police, the legal profession and the government law officers. In 1977 parliament passed the Criminal Law Act abolishing the common law offence of conspiracy. Many welcomed the new law but, as Spicer notes, it was more noteworthy for what it didn't say than for any reforms it made. It did not affect the definition of guilty intent, it did not affect industrial disputes, nor the rules of evidence. It did not deal with the practice of charging both conspiracy and the full offence in the same indictment, it left untouched the offence of conspiracy to corrupt public morals, and it did nothing to restrict the powers of prosecutors to add 'persons unknown' clauses to indictments as a way of broadening the scope of conspiracy or of charging individuals with conspiracy. The 'Persons Unknown' case illustrated one of these points. The trial of the Paedophile Information Exchange (PIE) officials (for conspiracy to corrupt public morals) illustrated another. And in Bradford at the time of writing, twelve youths face serious conspiracy charges in the aftermath of summer's riots.

This is an important and timely book which ought to be made available to a wider audience in a cheaper edition.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Secret Wars: A Guide to Sources in English, Volume II, Intelligence, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare. Covert Operations, 1945-1980, by Myron J. Smith, Jr. Oxford: Clio Press, 1981, 471 pp., £40.50 Cloth. Contains a chronology, reference guide, author index and sections on propaganda and psychological warfare, intelligence, espionage and covert operations, and personalities. With 4,700 citations, this must serve as a source catalogue for some years, though the material cited is most uneven.

SOE: Recollections and Reflections, 1940-1945, by J.G. Beevor. London: The Bodley Head, 1981, 269 pp., £8.95 cloth. A senior staff officer of the Special Operations Executive gives his view of operations from his background of banking, the law and business. The interest lies in the dominance of political over technical

considerations. For example, he shows conclusively that the Foreign Office's obstinate attachment to Prince Paul of Yugoslavia was entirely ideological; what eventually persuaded them of the reality of Tito's partisans was not SOE but the Nazis, whose Enigma messages were blindingly clear about the forces of resistance. The author's reflections are unfortunately slight.

The Secret War of Charles Fraser-Smith, with Gerald McKnight and Sandy Lesberg. London: Michael Joseph, 1981, 160pp., £8.50 cloth. Memoirs of a supplier of materials and gadgets for MI6 and MI9 during World War II.

Auschwitz and the Allies: How the Allies responded to the news of Hitler's Final Solution, by Martin Gilbert. London: Michael Joseph, 1981, 368 pp., £12.00 cloth. Carefully researched explanation of why the gas chambers and deportation lines were not bombed: other targets were considered more important. Not least in interest is the attitude of British officials: 'Familiar stuff. The Jews have spoilt their case by laying it on too thick for years past . . .' (Colonial Office, December 1942); and 'In my opinion a disproportionate amount of time of the Office is wasted on dealing with these wailing Jews . . .' (Foreign Office, September 1944).

PAMPHLETS

Missiles, Reactors and Civil Liberties: against the nuclear state edited by Gari Donn. Scottish Council for Civil Liberties, 146 Holland Street, Glasgow G2 4NG. £1.40.

Over 200 people attended the SCCL's conference earlier this year, 'Against the Nuclear State'. This is an edited version of what they heard and is a useful contribution to the nuclear debate from a civil liberties point of view. The various papers do not repeat the arguments of, for example, Robert Jungk about the curtailment of civil liberties implicit in the development of civil nuclear power; that much is almost taken for granted. They raise different, equally important, questions of civil liberties. Professor Stuart Hall, for example, in the main text raises the issues of the lack of accountability of the nuclear technologists and nuclear bureaucracy, the necessary secrecy of nuclear planning and the nuclear state's contempt for the democratic process. Most important, he draws together the questions of military nuclear power and civil

nuclear power as part of the same question, pointing out that it is 'not a question only about nuclear weapons or about nuclear power or civil liberties. It is now about the nature of a political system which finds its best expression in a nuclear state.'

In other papers, Pete Thompson argues that current military thinking in the west has little to do with any 'soviet threat' but is more the product of a US radical-right reinterpretation of military statistics. Brian Wynne pursues Stuart Hall's theme of the non-democratic nature of the nuclear decision-making process where scientists as 'experts' make decisions insulated from the political process, while the big inquiries demand technological 'fact' as the basis of the 'discovery of truth', permitting no distinction between fact and social choice. Finally, Les Levidow examines the issue of nuclear power's privatised, authoritarian and capital intensive production methods which stand in direct opposition to more democratic, egalitarian structures.

In a conclusion, Gari Donn argues that the nuclear state is a corporate response to anticipated social, political and economic unrest raising questions of state power, state authority and state control. This is an important collection containing much that is original which deserves to be read by those opposing nuclear power and by those defending civil liberties.

Illegal Entrants by Andrew Nicol. Runnymede Trust and the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, £1.50. Andrew Nicol explains how breaches of immigration have been successively criminalised by parliament but also, and more important, how parliament's concept of 'illegal entry' has been widened by the courts at the behest of the Home Office. Whereas once it was thought that an illegal entrant was one who either avoided immigration control altogether or who was deceitful in order to gain entry now, the House of Lords has ruled, it can be someone who does not disclose to an immigration officer a material fact. That he or she is never asked for the information, and that he or she has no reason to think it of importance, is irrelevant.

The subject of illegal entry is important, the author argues, for a number of reasons. Firstly, there were those who had entered the UK quite lawfully and who, given a proper opportunity, could have shown as much. Secondly, the way in which the executive and the judiciary have operated is 'not a healthy diet for democracy' and the extension of their powers in this way makes further extension all the more difficult to resist. Finally, the cases on illegal entry shed light on the

position of the judiciary in our society. They stand as a 'damning indictment of the liberal mythology' of courts which are independent and a bulwark between the citizen and the government. They show to whom Lord Denning's statement, 'Trust the Judges' was really addressed: 'The Home Office could rest assured that it would be protected by the courts.' The pamphlet, which argues for the application of ordinary principles of criminal law and procedure to those accused of illegal entry, is an invaluable guide for those who want to understand an important and much neglected aspect of the law and a valuable study of the growth of executive power.

Passport Raids and Checks: Britain's internal immigration controls by Paul Gordon, £2 from Runnymede Trust, 37A Grays Inn Road, London WC1 8PS. Internal controls on immigrants have existed since external controls began. The Special Branch, for example, has always had as one of its functions the surveillance of aliens and has traditionally supplied reports on 'undesirables' to the Home Office. Such internal controls have taken on increasing significance as black immigration has been reduced through stricter external controls and attention has turned increasingly to questions of 'illegal entrants' and 'overstayers', along with questions of who is and who is not entitled to state benefits. This pamphlet usefully brings together and connects information which was previously disparate; about the Illegal Immigration Intelligence Unit, the immigration service intelligence unit, Special Branch, identity cards, police operations, workplace controls and passport checking within the welfare state. Chapter 1 provides the legal context of how the definition of 'illegal entrant' has changed over the years and scope of the law widened.

To those already involved in immigration work and anti-racism much of this will already be familiar, although it is useful to have it collated in this way. To those not so involved the reality of Britain's internal controls may be brought home.

Civil Liberties: Civil Liberties is the new bi-monthly journal of the Scottish Council for Civil Liberties. The first issue, September/October, includes articles on the aftermath of the summer's riots, the Press Council and education. The main article is on prison secrecy and accountability. Copies at 50p each from SCCL, 146 Holland Street, Glasgow G2 4NG.

ARTICLES

POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

Interview with Russell Proffitt, Rights, vol 6 no 1, Sept/Oct 1981. A Lewisham councillor gives his views on racism, the police and accountability.

Alderson's Law, Tony Judge, Police, October 1981. The row over Alderson's evidence to Scarman.

High Noon at Moss Side, James Anderton, Police, October 1981. On the confrontation between Anderton and local politicians.

How to make police complaints stick, Martin Kettle, New Society, 29 October 1981.

The police force that Exeter wants, Colin Moore, New Society, 15 October 1981. Head of a Crime Prevention Support Unit argues for community policing.

Not anti-police, Police Review, 4 September 1981. Interview with Harriet Harman of the NCCL.

Manchester: Is the police committee 'impotent'? Dave Clark, Leveller, 18 Sept-1 Oct 1981.

POLICE OPERATIONS

Summer in the city, Stuart Hall, New Socialist, No 1 Sept/Oct 1981. An overview of this summer's riots.

Why police opened fire, Rob Rohrer, New Statesman, 18 September 1981. On Chief Constable Oxford's report on the riots.

Guarding the mighty hunters, Brian Hillard, Police Review, 30 October 1981. On the RAF police at Kinloss.

POLICE TECHNOLOGY

Police secrets for sale, Duncan Cambell, New Statesman, 23 October 1981.

Officer suspended after NS exposé, Duncan Campbell, New Statesman, 30 October 1981.

Sultan's staff checked on police records, Duncan Campbell, New Statesman, 6 November 1981. Three articles on the illegal use of information on police computers.

DEFENSE

Clouds of death, Jane Bowers, Scram Energy Bulletin, No 26, Oct/Nov 1981. The effects of radiation.

A Trident base at Coulport, statement by the SCCL, Crann Tara, No 15 Autumn 1981.

Defense choices for the '80s, David Greenwood and Peter Hennessy, The Times, 27, 28, 29, 30 October 1981. Four articles examining the different options for a future defense policy.

SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE

My life in the CIA file, Jonathan Mirsky, New Statesman, 6 November 1981.

Other side of the Mountie, Duncan Campbell, New Statesman, 16 October 1981.

CIVIL DEFENSE

Deathtrap for city dwellers, Duncan Campbell, New Statesman, 25 September 1981.

War from the warrens, Duncan Campbell, New Statesman, 2 October 1981.

FOREIGN POLICY

Will Papandreou go 'all the way'? Claudia Wright, New Statesman, 23 October 1981. American responses to the PASOK victory.

GOVERNMENT

Making use of section 159, Mike Harris, New Statesman, 6 November 1981. How to penetrate the secrecy of local government.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

The treatment of suspects, Chief Constable Kenneth Oxford, Police Review, 16 October 1981. The text of his address to the Superintendents Association.

Verdicts on Phillips: Police Federation seminar on the RCCP, with contributions from Basil Griffiths, Walter Merricks, Patrick Mayhew, Det. Chief Supt. Dick Holland, Police, October 1981.

NORTHERN IRELAND

What should we do about Northern Ireland? David Lipsey, New Society, 24 September 1981. A survey of British attitudes to withdrawal.

DEATHS IN CUSTODY

Winston Rose, Barry Prosser: What happens now about deaths in custody? Phil Scraton, Leveller, 30 October - 12 November 1981.

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STATE RESEARCH PAMPHLETS

The Secret State by E.P. Thompson (no 1). This important essay states the case for defending and extending civil liberties against the increasing powers of the secret agencies of the state. 60p

Policing the Eighties: The Iron Fist (No 2). This is a unique analysis of developments in policing over the last 15 years. (First published as a background paper in State Research Bulletin no 19). 60p

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Typeset by Range Left Photosetters Ltd (TU) 01-251 3959

Printed by Russell Press, Gamble Street, Nottingham.

Trade Distribution Southern Distribution, Building K, Albion Yard, 17a Balfe St, London N1 9ED.

Published by Independent Research Publications Ltd, 9 Poland Street, London W1.

ISSN 0141-1667