This issue discusses the meaning of Work today & tomorrow



ANARCHY 118

Keith Paton on Work and Surplus, George Gardstein on Work and Culture

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Work and surplus

KEITH PATON

Part 1 WORK AND SURPLUS IN NEO-SLAVE SOCIETY

ECONOMICS—THE DISMAL SCIENCE, the liturgy of scarcity. "Perhaps the most telling achievement of the established order of thinkers has been the obscurantist isolation of the so-called subject of economics from the rest of life as we recognisably live it" (David Bazelon). Hence invocation of "the Needs of the Economy" is met by ordinary people not with hilarity but with mere suspicion. We need to learn the "gay science of how to use the social wealth for shaping man's world in accordance with his Life Instincts" (Marcuse: *Eros and Civilisation*).

One who made such an attempt was Stuart Chase in 1920. He calculated the number of useless jobs in America thus:

Manpower going into illth (harmful wealth):	8 m.
Idle manpower on any given day:	6 m.
Production Methods Waste:	4 m.
Distribution Methods Waste:	2½m.
TOTAL:	20½m.

which represented a manpower surplus of 50%. That was way before the Cybernetic Revolution. But even then "the horn of plenty is overflowing, but a dead hand reaches up to seal its mouth, and the fruits fall as slowly as before" (Chase: *The Tragedy of Waste*).

"The validity of paper in the absence of scarcity is unthinkable without conscious control of its quantity and/or value. When scarcity is in short supply, so to speak, paper leads to a literal form of madness —a distortion or denial of reality in order to preserve the illusion of the absent condition. And when the power of great corporations is a part of the situation, reality itself gives way to the illusion—and a weird, glistening, new kind of scarcity appears as an emanation from beyond the historical grave. It is Scarcity Regained—one of the ugliest of all human creations . . . I suggest that the Paper Economy is

nothing but a destructive perpetuation of existing power relations beyond their period of historical utility" (David T. Bazelon: *The Paper Economy*).

How to define "*socially necessary* labour"? The Lords and Dukes thought retainers in fancy uniforms were absolutely vital. The classical economists pointed out that they were only *feudally-necessary*, i.e. to maintain the remnants of a dispensable power system: But somebody like a patents office clerk—now there was a really useful job! But Marx pointed out that he was only *capitalistically-necessary*; from the standpoint of socialism patents offices are futile rubbish. "The bourgeois finds to his amazement that the rationalist attitude does not stop at the credentials of kings and popes, but goes on to attack private property and the whole system of bourgeois values" (Paul Baran: *The Political Economy of Growth*).

And for the anarchist, the rationalist goes on to attack Chiefs of Police, Commissars, Bureaucrats and all State functionaries. "In answer to an oral question (House of Commons, *Hansard* 14 April 1969) Mr. Crossman informed the House that for the half year from September 1968, £1,900 was spent in clerks wages alone in checking fraudulent claims for free prescriptions in Manchester, 6,600 forms were checked, 43 patients were found to be not in any of the exemption categories and £8 was recovered for the taxpayer." (*Poverty*, CPAG, No. 11, Summer 1969). Wonder why it took the clerks so long? Bloody shirkers, wasting the country's money!

Profits—for so long the bogey of left-wing thinking. Surplus value, long-term decline thereof. Which is crap. Baran and Sweezy showed that under monopoly conditions, there was a long term tendency for the rate of profits to *rise*, for the break even point to come at ever lower levels of capacity utilisation (30 to 40 per cent in the US Steel Industry). In a closed system this means slump: profits which can't find investment outlets aren't produced and show themselves up negatively in the under-capacity and unemployment rates. So it's necessary to open the system: first War, then the Permanent War Economy, then Imperialism (far too lucrative—makes the surplus crisis worse), then the Colonisation of Everyday Life (Tuppaware parties!), advertising and the implantation of pseudo-wants. Dead labour escapes through our heads (which must first be moronised). Thus "the notion of exploitation proper to modern capitalism must include not only the difference between what one produces and what one receives, but also the difference between what one ought to be able to produce (were it not for waste production) and what one ought to receive (enough, but not an addictively increasing enough). In short, exploitation under modern capitalism is the difference between potential social productivity and overall quality of life (including both work and consumption)". (*Consumption*: *Domestic Imperialism*, Movement for a Democratic Society Pamphlet No. 1.)

Surplus is where it's at—not surplus value. Baran gives the

example of a bakery where productivity rises from 2 loaves per man to 12.5 loaves *per usefully occupied worker* and the rate of exploitation remains constant at 50%. But how much else has changed! In Period One 100 bakers make 200 loaves and get the equivalent of 100. In Period Two the wages are still half of the total produced (500 loaves-equivalent out of 1,000 loaves) but the payroll now conceals 20 surplus bodies employed thus: five to constantly change the shape of the loaves, one to mix obsolescence powder into the dough, four to design new wrappers, five in advertising the "new improved versions", one to watch rival companies, two as legal watchdogs and two as public relations "experts" (Paul A. Baran: *The Political Economy of Growth*, Preface to 2nd edition). For the US, Baran and Sweezy estimate profits at only one-third of the potential economic surplus.

The other big theme of (conventional) Marxism is the "contradiction between the (social) forces of production and the (private) relations of production". Written under scarcity competitive capitalism. Technology was Technology and "it" got introduced. Not so in Monopoly Capitalism. Most Marxists only examine one half of the equation, the social relations of production. If they understood the scientific and technological potential of today they would see:

(1) that Technology doesn't exist (if ever it did): only specific technologies in chosen combinations with specific other technologies (which is why the phrase "Technological Society" is so ideological);

(2) that the diversion of technological application into socially useless channels goes way beyond both Space and Arms; and consequently,

(3) that *the* "productive forces" (*per se*) are completely indeterminate and inert and hence to talk of Technology "coming into conflict" with anything is to be in danger both of reifying the notion and of anthropomorphising the reality.

Consider where we would be if from 1950 "we" (i.e. they) had put the same resources into (a) agriculture instead of Arms, into (b) oceanography instead of Space, into (c) free and ecologically sane transport systems rather than Cars and Aeroplanes, into (d) health (understood in its widest sense) rather than anti-illness. One could go on for ever. I don't know for sure, but I'd be prepared to bet that the US Army spent more on the logistics of toothpaste than the whole of the world spent on developing Leaf Protein extraction technologies.

Nevertheless the "forces of production" do provide a partial yardstick or baseline for measuring (a) the waste *in* capitalist society (inefficiencies within a given productive process) and (b) the waste *of* capitalist society (the process, the products themselves). (A yardstick is a less misleading analogy than a baby struggling to be born. It's also less hopeful. Yardsticks are passive and indeterminate as to use.) Moreover, the forces of production may *potentially* have social implications—if only for enlightened capitalist planning. To substantiate, I'd like to take five areas from *Organisation, Automation and Society* by Robert A. Brady which is a Big Book on the scientific revolution

in industry. Without some heavy factual background it is hard to know what such writers as McLuhan, Marcuse and Fuller have in mind when they refer to technology. And harder still to criticise them.

A. Unitization: This refers to the way mining operations at a single field have to be co-ordinated. In oil, because of the technologies of surveying and drilling available, it is possible to double or triple the recoverable percentage of oil in place by manipulating relative pressures of gas, oil and water. But this requires control of the relevant variables over the whole geological field, not just down one well. Thus wherever oil is being extracted by several unco-ordinated wells, the cost to be laid at the door of capitalism is not just the overheads of superfluous wells, but relates to the (at present irrevocable) squandering of half the available oil.

B. River Valley Development: Any single-use proposal might be uneconomic, e.g. to build a dam to control floods. Development is feasible if it is multi-use, e.g. the flood control halts erosion which keeps the soil fertile for agriculture; the dam can be fitted with hydro-electric turbines; fishing and recreation can take place on the lake, etc. The problem is to create a non-exploitative basis for planning on the scale needed (determined by the size of the river system). We can certainly charge up to capitalism all the TVAs that haven't happened.

C. Standardisation: Brady considers this so important that he talks of the Standards Revolution on a par with the Materials Revolution or the Energy Revolution. Standards apply to such things as screw threads and size-intervals, prescriptions for lenses, scientific nomenclature, testing procedures, ratings and safety provisions, labelling, etc. Standards may extend only within a firm, or they may apply to a whole industry or nation; or they may be world-wide, thanks to the work of the International Organisation for Standardisation, a kind of clearing-house for standards and specifications which has Technical Committees for everything from ballbearings to frozen food packages, statistical treatment to tyres, rims and valves, electrodes to cloth widths, yarn counts to colour fastness tests. . . . The point is that incalculable waste and inefficiency is saved by appropriate standardisation. (Think of spare parts.) Yet despite the considerable progress in some fields where the scientists and engineers have had their way, as a general rule economists and industrialists have dragged their feet. The difference between actuality and historically realistic possibility in this sphere is huge and may be charged up under the head "Potential Economic Surplus".

However the question arises: "What about the danger of regimentation, of monotony, of lack of variety?" This fear is realistic only if standards are applied too restrictively and in inappropriate areas. Basically standards should increase the meaningful variety available to the consumer by cutting down only on phoney variety. Standardisation in colour does not mean that the world is reduced to a dull muddy

brown colour, i.e. uniformity. Standardisation means that the artist or designer is working with a large variety of hues determined by standard positions on the spectrum; his palette is purer but his freedom to combine and select is not interfered with—indeed it is enhanced. Again the standardisation of building components in partially pre-fabricated (modular) construction can lead to great savings in building costs but not at any architectural price—the standard door-frames can be fixed at just noticeable threshold differences.

D. Distribution: The implications of standardisation run clean counter to the rule of the Market. Instead of the market reaching back and messing up engineering (so that the head of General Electric calls GE a marketing organisation), production priorities penetrate forward and clean up distribution. This implies an end to all phoney product differentiation and constant model-changing, which in turn implies the stabilisation of production at a socially determined optimal number of meaningful model-types, e.g. aspirins, car body shapes, grades of petrol. (Again we should remember that where uniqueness of design is important as in, say, dress-making, standardisation can still be helpful, e.g. yarn-counts, flame-proofness, colour-fastness, colour values, etc.) Instead of the magic of brand names and secret processes, we get meaningful variety and open information flow as regards material and processing standards involved. This means relevant labelling, standard packaging, the facilitation of repairs and replacements, the virtual abolition of the advertising industry, except for a minimal consumer education role. It also means a vast reduction in distribution costs, for example the diseconomies associated with transportation, ordering and stocking small quantities of artificially differentiated equivalents. Brady goes so far as to suggest that "distributing is building inefficiencies into our economic system almost as rapidly as other production processes are attaining new efficiencies)" (p. 356).

E. Research and Development: Another key area lies in research. At present basic research in most areas is liable to be "classified", while applied technological research is either for armies or for corporations and hence equally liable to be kept secret. This means that not only is science held back but also that duplication of effort occurs at many points and an army of security men are needed to stave off another army of spies. Suppression of innovation and patenting systems also result in huge waste wherever the "marginal profit" (Baran) from introducing a new technique is too low.

Technological development is also resisted by ordinary workers however. Thus Lincoln is probably correct in *The Restrictive Society* when he points to an increase of 15 to 20 per cent in annual production which could result from "switching off the deep freeze of restrictive practices". This too should be entered under Potential Economic Surplus, which is a different notion from the Planned Economic Surplus of a socialist society where the workers might choose to "overman"

machines, take leisurely tea-breaks, oppose shift-work and other such practices which so offend Lincoln's mindless technocratic sensibility. First we must calculate what "we" *could* produce (maximal surplus), before we decide what we *shall* produce (optimal surplus).

The question is, however, whether this aspect of disguised surplus should be laid at the door of capitalism, or at the door of some other factor such as a putative "traditional conservatism of the worker". I think it is clear that resistance to automation in, for example, transport, is a perfectly rational response for men who would otherwise find themselves, deskilled and past their peak, on an already overful unemployment dump. If those dockers, drivers and railwaymen at present engaged in staving off the Container Revolution (another example of standardisation) were free to choose between carrying on the fight and embarking on some project they could see the point of such as constructing a socialised environment, then, provided their wages could be safeguarded, most of them would be only too pleased to start task forces to build community centres, adventure playgrounds and swimming pools on every housing estate in the country, beginning with their own!

Much "resistance to change" among workers is simply traditional resistance to management. Other forms may be utterly rational—one man's job may well be at stake if a carpenter welds a piece of metal. In other circumstances resistance to change may occur where neither management nor the dole threaten directly. Here we may partly blame trade union bullying, but we should also understand that a narrow and rigid job-identification has been made. Is this the result of "human nature" or some individual pathology, considered as a historical and discrete causative agent? No indeed; for the men involved have been deeply scarred by poverty and unemployment—even perpetuating their own alienation on their own terms affords some scraps of dignity. Bureaucratic formalism is a historical social problem which stems directly from alienation in work, and we may readily find other examples of irrational rigidity right the way up the hierarchy, and not merely where the *Express* directs our attention. In an unalienated job milieu, on the other hand, *people can see through to the point of it all* (social utility and individual satisfaction) instead of acting according to alien principles.

One of the main reasons for the abolition of overt slavery was that plantation slaves were incredibly inefficient compared with so-called free men. Wage slaves and bureaucratic slaves are almost as inefficient. This "inefficiency" is not something wrong with the people involved, some psychological quirk of "laziness" or "stupidity", but forms part of the praxis of the slave, representing as it does a perfectly functional adaptation to an intolerable situation: Who wants to work his balls off in the hot sun? Better to be thought inately stupid and lazy, than to be expected to harvest two or three times as much cotton! And the same applies to Council workmen having tea-breaks and rests every

five minutes under the indignant but muslin-hidden gaze of the idle middle-class.

At this point we can separate out four distinct aspects of waste: (1) X is a typist and accounts clerk; (2) she has no control over her job situation; (3) she is exploited economically; (4) she works in an advertising agency (which advertises for the firm that makes the vans that Securicorps uses in the employment of the computer firm which programmes the missiles which destroyed the house that Jack built). In other words, futility right down the line! As a typical typist (2) she is doing someone else's work (a man's), she is bored and inefficient and actually works for only 40% of a $7\frac{1}{2}$-hour day. Occasionally she has the flicker of an idea as to how to streamline routine accounts, but she doesn't bother to work on it, much less pass it on. Mostly she just doesn't think. (3) represents conventional surplus value and will undoubtedly go into supporting parasites or expanding the number of busy useless jobs somewhere along the line. (4) indicates that even if she worked her guts out and was a constant dynamo of creative feedback in a profit-sharing co-operative, real welfare wouldn't increase in the real world—whatever the book-keeping consequences. But supposing even that the job was a useful one with a social point to it, routine office work as such (1) could undoubtedly be automated. From the standpoint of rationality, i.e. an anarchist-socialist society establishing priorities in 1950, whose scientists and technologists had been exploring the problems of office work automation, we can see that by now even the typing and accounts function is historically contingent. Incidentally this does not presuppose the dragooning of scientists into studying unworthwhile problems. Scientists would find as much intellectual challenge and theoretical and practical spin-offs from inventing a speech-typewriter as from sending hunks of metal into Space.

Advertising is so obviously useless because wrestling over halves of a per cent of the market doesn't expand the number of useful things produced overall for everyone. Obviously it has a highly important stabilising economic role, via resolution of the "surplus" disposal problem. But we should also realise advertising's role in steadying the whole social system: "the productive apparatus *sells* or imposes the social system as a whole" (Marcuse). A whole pecuniary philosophy, a pecuniary truth-criterion, a pecuniary aesthetic, have developed in association with modern advertising, as Jules Henry shows in *Culture Against Man*. Alienated work isn't so bad if it will lead to being able to recoup your soul in a shining, phallic automobile. You need to recoup your soul in your automobile if you have first lost your soul in work. "The organisation of work and the organisation of leisure are the blades of the castrating shears whose job is to improve the race of fawning dogs" (Vaneigem).

Advertising is of course a traditional boo word on the left. But take the man who worked on the assembly track which made the Securicorps van which guards the avionics computers which helps to

blow Jack's house to bits. Is he necessary? Or take his mate who makes private cars. As a production worker his whole life is sold to the motor car—in common with most of the 480,000 motor vehicle-manufacturing employees, the 431,000 car retailers, petrol fillers and garage employees, and the legion of car insurance and licence clerks, traffic wardens, policemen, chauffeurs, road and multi-storey car park builders, etc. Which works out at over a million able-bodied grown men being taken for a ride by cars.

Anyway, what are they for, these objects, these hunks of metal? For the actual physical culture of the commodity-spectacle, society has been neglected. Consider the car—ideology on wheels! Consider the city—ideology in concrete! What is the traffic jam but the daily staging of the most profound symbol imaginable of near total alienation? "The whole of urban planning must be understood as a sector of the publicity propaganda effort of our society. It is the organisation of participation in something in which it is impossible to participate. . . The aim of traffic control is the organisation of universal isolation. This is why its perfection is the major 'problem' of the modern city. It is the negation of the human encounter. It exhausts the energies needed for real communication." (*Unitary Urbanism*: Situationist Internation.)

But let us return to these disguised unemployment figures. The *Annual Abstract of Statistics* (Central Statistical Office 1969) gives 25.2m. as the total work force. (Naturally they don't count housework.) The armed forces absorb 400,000 directly, 120,000 civil servants in the Ministries of Defence, a further 150,000 industrial defence staff: equals 670,000. Add all those engaged in manufacturing engines for bombers for Vietnam, Polaris submarines and other such useful toys and we are certainly over the million mark. Add thousands of civil servants in national and local government: (e.g. 30,000 in Employment and Productivity; 83,000 in Inland Robbery; 45,000 Home Office and Courts; most of the Dept. of Health and Social Insecurity cohorts of 71,000; thousands of civil service office cleaners and regulation office carpet fitters; many local government employees numbering 770,000) and again we are pushing the million mark. Add nearly the whole of retailing and wholesaling and that makes at least 2m. Add 675,000 under the heading Insurance, Banking and Finance; 92,000 engaged in rendering accounts; 110,000 engaged in "legal services"; and most of 152,000 in private domestic service; and again that makes a million.

("Most of" and "many" in the way I interpret these figures means that although these jobs, as such, would be abolished together with government, there are some useful functions here, which would still have to be carried out on a co-ordinative basis by someone: e.g. a welfare society, as opposed to the Welfare State, would have *neighbourhood responsibility* for the aged, sick and helpless.) Then there are 467,000 in "other services" which looks suspicious, so add half to half of the equally suspicious "service trades" of hairdressing (163,000) and

laundries (141,000), making 375,000. Allow a 20% marginal futility ratio in Food, Drink and Tobacco (823,000) on the lines of Baran's bakery and Brady's critique of advertising. Similarly allow a 20% useless work rate in chemicals (506,000); metal (580,000); textiles (690,000); clothing (492,000); timber and furniture (321,000); sand, pottery, glass and cement (351,000); and "other manufacturing industries" (348,000). Allow at least 30% in printing, publishing and paper, and almost 30% in engineering and electrical goods (2,281,000). Reminding ourselves that we have counted military end-use waste again in our admittedly cavalier calculations (or else shipbuilding (180,000) would have had a large discount), we arrive at a total for manufacturing industry (less cars and arms) of 1,650,000 useless jobs. Add 20% of construction workers (1.6m.) involved in Centre Points, Supermarkets and building new estates when old communities could be rehabilitated at half the cost, including land opportunity cost, though not counting those involved in roads (already counted). Add another 20% for the non-development of building technology and we get 640,000. Add 100,000 for surplus railwaymen (out of 300,000); 100.000 for all the bus conductors; 60,000 surplus dockers (out of 136,000); 40,000 in air transport (out of 64,000); and nearly all the 241,000 poor sods in road haulage (replaceable by co-operative local distribution service, long distances by rail) and we get approximately 600,000 surplus transport workers.

Add the idle rich, living off their shares, those in jail and the unemployed (500,000) and we get 750,000. Then add the various totals:

Cars	1,000,000
Arms	1,000,000
Government	1,000,000
Distribution	2,000,000
The City, the Law, their servants	1,000,000
Services, service trades	375,000
Manufacturing (excluding arms and cars)	1,650,000
Construction	640,000
Transport	600,000
Idle rich and Lumpen	750,000
TOTAL	10,000,000

Guesses as they are, and even allowing for a certain amount of double counting, I must emphasise that I have been guessing conservatively:

(1) I have not included the unreal "slack" which could only be taken in by everybody working flat out as a robot would do—or an artist seized by inspiration.

(2) I have not included some mining clerks, caterers, electrical supply, students, teachers, parsons, doctors, and in doing so I have conceded some pretty big assumptions.

(3) I have not included many discounts for the creative rearrangements within concerns that would result from delegate co-ordination and workers' self-management, principally because the latter processes also take time as we shall see in Section II.

(4) Apart from cars and arms, relatively few assumptions have been made about the end-products to be produced. For example, under the heading "chemical industry" so as not to judge the economy by any too "utopian" alternative society, I have assumed that illness will still be prevalent, and that chemotherapy would go into the cure of the illness (or suppression of the symptoms?)—in other words I deducted for the nonsense of hundreds of competing brands of similar medicines, but not for drug medicines as such.

Recently I had an *en passant* conversation with a minister of religion:

Him: Dreadful business about X (friend of mine) being caught shop-lifting, isn't it? It's the downward slope. . . .

Me: (suppressing mirth) I agree that being *caught* shop-lifting is a bad business, but I don't see what's so terrible with shop-lifting. For example, take the Paris Metro. I understand that it now costs more to collect the fares than it does to run the Metro. So to avoid paying fares would be perfectly in accordance with the technological potential of the situation. Similarly, take the buses. Why can't they be free? And if all the conductors and all the other useless workers were enabled to diversify across to useful jobs, making goods with a high elasticity of demand, then we wouldn't need shop-girls and store-detectives to stop X taking groceries!

Him: I agree that collecting bus fares all day doesn't really make sense. But then what about all the unemployment if you suddenly sacked the busmen?

Me: That's your problem if you believe in this society. I don't. Apart from the fact that, as an anarchist, I would never want to be *able* to sack anybody, as far as I'm concerned the bus-drivers have arms and legs and would be glad to occupy themselves usefully and pleasantly in a decent society. Until then, I support the busmen against unemployment. But I also want to communicate my concern for the meaning and point of work and then people might get angry at a society which only offered them unemployment or malemployment.

Here was a man who one day reads prayers about work being a sacrament ("creation's solemn mass which is said every day through human labour") and the next day is quite prepared to say that bus-conducting is a useless job, but there's no alternative!

But it isn't only ministers who "live in an economy of abundance but think and behave in an economy of scarcity" (Stuart Chase, 1920). Numerous lefties, including a proportion of anarchists, maintain schizophrenic attitudes by dodging the issue of the social meaning of work. Ouvrieristes manage to say *both* that capitalism is an arms economy, leads to useless production, waste, etc., *and* that workers are the ones

from whom all the wealth flows. To admit that many workers are as much bound up in the total surplus irrationality of our society as any advertising agency, "spoils one's rhetoric", as Paul Goodman would say.

Nevertheless, to be honest, we should agree with Baran and Sweezy that, "by far the greater part of the sales effort is carried out not by obviously unproductive workers such as salesmen and advertising copy writers, but by seemingly productive workers, tool and die makers, draughtsmen, mechanics, assembly line workers".

Having reached a rough figure of ten million surplus workers, let us consider how we are going to "spend" them in the creation of a better society. (And notice how our language is such that even as we try to formulate libertarian meanings, there is a constant downhill slope towards centralist language. I meant of course "how we will *spend ourselves*" and how we believe that people in a post-revolutionary society should themselves decide to deploy themselves so that there is no longer a ten million malemployment figure.)

Part II WORK IN A FREE SOCIETY

Would work exist in a free society? Is total automation possible? Is it desirable? On what scale would post-scarcity society operate? Or would we still have scarcity?

We can distinguish two major positions: *Play* (*plus Work*) and *Play/Work*. These positions tend to be associated with the following clusters of variables.

	PLAY (plus WORK)	PLAY/WORK
Work	Progressive abolition of work, leading to "pure" spontaneity, "pure" creativity and expressivity, "pure" relating.	Progressive pervasion of (reduced) "work" by play. Expressive/Instrumental components in behaviour difficult to separate. A question of relative emphasis on play or work side. Affective togetherness rooted in common doing.
Technology	100% automation as rapidly as possible. Liberation by technology from technology. Means plus Ends.	Optimal automation involves consistency with desired scale of operations, conformity with ecological niche, etc. Means/End.
Unification Scale	Totally articulated techno-political system. "Global Village." World culture. World democracy.	Only partial integrations to preserve systematic redundancy. Integration through diversity. Many different appropriate scales. Loose world federation.
Representative Thinkers	McLuhan, Fuller, Norman Brown.	Morris, Goodman, Lewis Herber.

The usual line on work and play is Marx's description of the breakdown of the division of labour: "Production as a whole" being "regulated by society" (*sic*), it becomes "possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, in accordance with my inclination, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic". To us this may appear a picture of leisure and hence to support the play (plus work) position: the machines look after production and we go fishing. However in Marx's day fishing *was* production: the hares, fish and cattle would actually be eaten, if not by the same prolific specimen of free society, then at least by his fellows (or by the estate-labourers in the case of the aristocratic way of life Marx must surely have been using as a model). In other words this wan't a question of unarticulated or "pure" creativity—something would actually be created, and something socially necessary moreover. Nor would this fishing be a mere extra, a whimsical supplement in the interstices of the main apparatus of production. Distinctions between productivity and creativity would have appeared undialectical to Marx.

Marx saw that the abolition of physical toil might become possible: man would relate to the process of production "as supervisor and regulator". This would require the reappropriation of "his own social productivity, his knowledge and his mastery over nature through his social existence—in one word; the development of the social individual". But again, to understand the passage we need to think of chemists poring over tomes in dingy laboratories, of geologists making surveys and publishing their results, of scientific congresses and technical delegations. Marx was not thinking of a vast increase in the quantity of "free time": time is a reification for the series of actual projects engaged in, activities carried out *on something* or *in relation to someone*. By "development of the social individual" Marx was certainly *not* thinking of sensitivity groups. By "practical-sensuous existence" Marx was not meaning sensory awakening classes at Esalen: more what Tolstoy felt as he joined in the harvesting. Marx would have been amazed (if not shocked!) at anyone advocating a life full *only* of togetherness as such, the re-eroticizing of the body, the resurrection of the social/individual body, the conquest of the reality principle, *"poésie faite par tous"*.

One of the best advocates of the Play (plus vanishing work) position is Norman O. Brown: "My utopia is / an environment that works so well / that we can run wild in it / anarchy in an environment that works / . . . The environment can do all the work / Serious thought, / thought as work, / in pursuit of *Wirklichkeit*, / is about over / *Wirklichkeit*, the German word for reality, / the reality principle / The reality principle is about over. / Thought as work can be buried in machines and computers / the work left to be done is to bury thought; quite a job / To put thought underground / as communication-

network, sewage system, power lines / so that wildness can come above ground / technological rationality can be put to sleep / so that something else can awaken in the human mind / something like the god Dionysus / something which cannot be programmed. / The ordering of the physical environment will release unparalleled quantities and forms of human disorder / The future, if there is one, is machines and madness."

Definitely a beautiful trip. But compare the Play (plus work) position with a representative of the Play/work position, William Morris. Morris defined art as "that which is, or should be, done by the ordinary working man while about his ordinary work". Morris looked for the *abolition of alienation in work*, not for the abolition of work itself. If we ignore side-assumptions about the *conquest* of nature and the *manliness* of work, we can groove just as much with the following: "Nature will not be finally conquered till our work becomes a part of the pleasure of our lives. . . . The hope of pleasure in the work itself: how strange that hope must seem to some of my readers! Yet I think that to all living things there is a pleasure in the exercise of their energies, and that even beasts rejoice in being lithe and swift and strong. But a man at work, making something which he feels will exist because he is working at it and wills it, is exercising the energies of his mind and soul as well as of his body. . . . If we work thus we will be men, and our days will be happy and eventful."

Purposeful applied activities do not constitute the Toad Work, if the purposes are our own and worthy of our application, if our body/mind *enjoy* the activity (in the full sense of enjoy, as in "enjoy Him for ever"). The expressive and instrumental components in life are only partially separable—the aim being to *expand the expressivity of life*. This cannot happen in a natural or social vacuum. Likewise in our primary groups, we can get only so far along the path of liberation in leisure affinity groups. When even our "work" relationships can be suffused with the flow of Eros, then alienation is really coming to an end. The aim is not a premature "unity", appeals to any solidarity ethic for its own sake, and certainly not the phoney "togetherness" (like the advertisements for bourgeois marriage and drinking chocolate). Togetherness "comes" when it is rooted in common activities, in shared experiences of activities other than experiencing togetherness. (What Reich meant by "work democracy".)

The play/work position can be seen either as the permeation of technology by values ("the interpenetration of means and ends"—Goodman) or as the "translation of values into technical tasks—the materialisation of values" (Marcuse). The point is so crucial that it is worth noting them in more detail.

Although Marcuse has explicitly attacked the idea of work becoming play—on the not very good grounds that such a conception is "romantic" (perhaps the dispute is about words), he has also called our technology over-developed, and this, among other things, marks him off from

Fuller and McLuhan:

"If the completion of the technological project involves a break with the prevailing technological rationality, the break in turn depends on the continued existence of the technical base itself. For it is this base which has rendered possible the satisfaction of needs and the reduction of toil—it remains the very base of all forms of human freedom. The qualitative change rather lies in the reconstruction of this base—that is, in its development with a view to different ends. I have stressed that this does not mean the revival of "values", spiritual or other (cf. Maslow or Rogers even in the US), which are to supplement the scientific and technological transformation of man and nature. On the contrary, the historical achievement of science and technology has rendered possible *the translation of values into technical tasks* —the materialisation of values. Consequently, what is at stake is the redefinition of values in *technical terms*, as elements in the technological process. The new ends, as technical ends, would then operate in the project and in the construction of the machinery, and not in its utilisation. . . . Industrial civilisation has reached a point where, with respect to the aspirations of man for human existence, the scientific abstraction from final causes becomes obsolete in science's own terms." (*One Dimensional Man.*)*

This, I think, puts him close to Goodman who covered the same ground in a very much simpler style in his mind-blowing *Communitas*. After rejecting modern architecture and aesthetics for tending to lose the "human scale" and "the intimate sensibility of daily life", Goodman goes back to Greek antiquity and proposes what he calls a neo-functionalist aesthetic: "form follows function, but let it subject the function itself to a formal critique. Is the function good? *Bona fide*? Is it worthwhile? Is it worthy of a man to do that? What are the consequences? Is it compatible with other, basic, human functions? Is it a forthright or at least ingenious part of life? Does it make sense? . . . Is the use as simple, ingenious, or clear as the efficient means that produce it? Is the using a good experience?" (P. and P. Goodman: *Communitas.*) These may seem simple questions here on paper, but start applying them to the objects, habits and life-styles about you and you'll find them deeply subversive. Nothing freaks a committee so much as to ask "What's the point?"

The Play (plus work) position is associated with a world-integrative position, which itself derives from an awareness of the fantastic potential of modern technologies (or could-be-technologies, in the case of suppressed applied science). For instance, Brady shows how automation has a sweep and logic extending ever out from the machine, to intra-

*This is what gives ecology its "critical edge" as Lewis Herber has shown in his beautiful "Ecology and Revolutionary Thought" (ANARCHY 69) and "Towards a Liberatory Technology" (ANARCHY 78). Simply to survive with our machines and techniques we are forced towards an organic value system and praxis.

plant integration, to continuous flow between factories and between industries and economies, extending back to resources and forward to consumption. Each "rationalised" process throws into relief new diseconomies in the form of flow fractures. Brady's ideal appears to be whole industries and economies linked to become one huge machine turning over 24 x 365 hours a year.

Ecologically, the project of super-productivity through automation and scale is highly dubious. Brady is aware of ecological factors, but prefers to try to plan for them so that large scale adjustments can be sustained. He may be right—if the planning is good, ecological theory well advanced, and information precise and comprehensive. But the truth is rather that *we simply do not know* how far we are from the point of no return regarding the irreparable destruction of several crucial cycles. Thus, vast specialised industrial farms bring with them pest and other problems which a more diversified system of smaller farms would never generate. That is, unless the large-scale farm can be served by a team of full-time ecologists—workers who should be deducted from the putative savings of scale.

Economic advantages in the large scale are generally considerable —provided the planning is totally rational. However, when ordinary mortals are involved the actual economies of scale have been much exaggerated. Moreover many presuppose a capitalist context, e.g. continual shift-work, buying and selling economies, greater security against business uncertainties, research and development on a private basis, market research economies, the economies of skilled specialist managers. (See E. Goodman *The Impact of Size*, Ch. 3 (Action Society Trust).) A national division of labour has the hidden cost of increasing distribution costs. Problems of adjusting supply and demand become acute. Finally, highly integrated large-scale automation is generally associated with extreme product specialisation by different plants. This means that it costs a great deal to turn out new products when demand for the first product falls off. (I mean, of course, when people no longer want more of the things in question—economics is full of reificatory language.)

Moreover, when external diseconomies are brought into the picture, over-complex gigantism invariably comes off worst. For instance, time taken to get to work should be counted in any real assessment of working hours. Moreover the ecological external diseconomies may be considerable: waste generated by several dispersed factories may be absorbed by the environment without long-term damage, whereas the same amount of production concentrated would probably destroy important local balances.

Culturally too, the automated world project would be disastrous. Ye Olde Worlde Englishe Culture for tourists is pitiable because it has lost its roots in the on-going realities of English life. A world-integrated technological and political system would result in a hom-

ogenisation of life-styles, language and culture which any amount of mass-produced African headcarvings, filmstrips on ancient India and school-trips to Morocco would only intensify. The point is to let diversity grow *at base* (in technics and in social organisation) and not to be fooled by a diversity of commodities and spectacles.

Brady himself quotes a technological objection which is interesting: "Tomorrow's generations, with far more people to be supported, must depend on extremely intricate technology. After any breakdown in the energy and processing cycle, the future generations might not be able to put in the tremendous quantity of energy to start the cycle once more." Put crudely (too crudely), how to mend electric power failures with electric-mains powered machinery? Although he does consider some variety in energy-source and energy-medium, Brady's faith is always in better and wider planning, planned unification of grids, etc. However he nowhere seems to have realised that large-scale rationalisation inherently cuts down diversity and hence increases instability in the long term. Huge integrated technologies are amazingly vulnerable to sabotage and seizure of control. Programming for all risks imaginable still leaves the unforeseen breakdown to challenge technocratic hubris. If scale and confidence are increased on the basis of the sum of the risks appropriate at smaller scales, the system as a whole must lose stability over time. For "chances in a million" never happen. Until they do.

A highly integrated world-political system is vulnerable, for similar reasons, to power-breakdowns of a different kind. Even on a smaller scale of say 50 million, the problems of overall political integration even in a (fully) democratic way are acute. A general rule for scale increase seems to be that interstitial energy increases x^2 as scale expands x. As an institution expands, functions that could be sustained on an informal basis by the members concerned become hived off into time-consuming and inefficient committees, which later need committees to liaise them. A logical next step is to hire teams of managerial consultants to sort out the muddle, and then consultants to sort out the consultants.

Paul Cardan has shown (in *Modern Capitalism and Revolution*, a Solidarity book) how the pure bureaucratic pattern is highly inefficient in many respects. Were it not for the initiative of those at the bottom, the enterprise would grind to a halt for lack of feed-back to the order-givers. Yet the authority relations (*per se*) generate alienation and participation-withholding. Thus people have to be "motivated" again; but not so as to endanger authority—hence the "participation/exclusion dialectic". However, the Solidarity analysis, excellent though it is, does not adequately distinguish the social/psychological consequences of alienation and authority from the purely information-flow propensities of a system. The "span of management control" is limited not simply because of management problems (authoritarian direction), but also because of information (and identification) entropy problems. (See the

superb article by John D. McEwan: "Anarchism and the Cybernetics of Self-Organising Systems" in ANARCHY 31.) Thus modern managements *do* manage to increase efficiency by adding on a "surplus" of relational patterns to the basic (abstract economical) Weberian grid. Information thus flows horizontally and diagonally as well as vertically, and task-appropriate networks cross-cut the formal authority structure.

From *Modern Capitalism and Revolution* the erroneous conclusion might easily be drawn that all that is necessary is for authority flow vectors to be reversed within the same relationally-sparse pyramid-shaped grid. Thus conclusion would only be valid at the very smallest face-to-face scales. At larger scales it is necessary to introduce a *principle of relative over-structuring*. The "rational", relationally-economical pattern, even a purely federative pattern, has inherent end-goal inefficiencies built in. "Surplus" functions (redundancy) are socially necessary for the libertarian. Surplus people (bureaucrats) on the other hand, are not, though they might incidentally carry out certain useful functions which need to be reappropriated by the base.

> **Editorial Interjection:** For this next bit, reader, you need to draw yourself a little diagram, like a family tree (but ignoring the fact that it takes two to make a baby). At the top put grandfather, or boss, or central committee A. He has five sons B1 to B5. They each have five sons C1 to C25, but on your diagram you only need to show B5's sons C21 to C25. Now the Cs too have five sons each (D1 to D125) but put on your diagram only C21's sons D100 to D105. Once you've drawn this little diagram, you can read on.

In a classical pyramidal pattern (A1, B1-5, C1-25, D1-125), the member numbered C21 relates directly only to D100-105, B5, and C22-25 if the pattern is classically syndicalist. The result is an impoverishment of "potential command" and of general ability to check errors before they ramify widely. Redundancy of potential command, on the other hand can be gained if C21 can also relate to, say, B1, C8, D70, and D120, where all these are also in contact "haphazardly". (This is of course haphazard only from the point of view of the would-be omniscient planner eager to draw a tidy map of how the structure works. From C20's point of view the relationships are not gratuitous, but, say, because delegates of steel-producing area C20 served on technical commissions with members from factories D70 and D120, and area C8 shared the same kind of ore-processing problem, and so they got together.)

Redundancy can also be gained from external relationships, for instance:

(1) if many people have two or three jobs they do at different times of the week/month/year;

(2) through people moving to a different area and keeping up contacts, or through being members of the same political group or

hobbies club;

(3) through shared backward or forward links in the overall industrial process;

(4) if other industries (e.g. food) are structured on a cross-cutting basis (e.g. that Steel area C_{21} is served partly by Food area C_{21} and partly by Food area C_{20}, which also has links with Steel area C_{19});

(5) if the industrial structures are balanced by a (sometimes cross-cutting) set of structures based on where people live.

The whole thing becomes far too complex to be governed! The information network should be too rich for secret deals, future Kronstadts, etc., would be impossible. Even if an attempt was made to gain control by monopolising/striking at the most obvious communication channels, people would reconstruct their networks through devious ways and means.

What has all this to do with surplus and the future society? In the first place general wealth facilitates the material infrastructure for decentralist communication. Having all roads lead to Rome and all railways leading to Moscow is only justifiable in conditions of scarcity. When the rest of the web is filled in, "peripherals" each become potential centres for particular functions or projects. Obviously a libertarian society would not want to link every home to every home by private lines, but it would be prepared to pay for linking every region to every other region on an independent basis, and similarly with the chief community-centres within regions.

At present the trade unions oppose combine-committees, and all inter-union or inter-branch communication that takes place other than via the top. From their bureaucratic perspective such link-ups are "unnecessary". But the TUC could, if it wanted, provide each branch with the means to contact every other branch: a duplicator, a phone, and a directory of branches classified according to union, occupation, industry, firms and area.

This would be a considerable check on the worst abuse of power, but, in itself, it would not mean that the TUC would become other than a once-a-year talk-shop. The scale is too huge for it to be democratic without a *vast increase in group inter-structuring at the base*: the means of communication would actually have to be *used*, and used a great deal. All bottom-up organisations *need* a relative over-structuring at the base and apparently "stray" useless communications links. Of course, from a libertarian viewpoint they aren't useless. But they are time-consuming. Which brings us to the crux of the problem.

At what point are the hours saved through large-scale automation lost again through the time needed (in delegate committees, conferences, journal writing, etc., etc.) in order to stop the scale getting out of control (bureaucratic degeneration)?

At one extreme there is the crofter who is his *own* estate manager,

agricultural consultant, co-ordination committee delegate, tool repairer, insurance agent, distribution department, etc. Also there is the kibbutz where only one-eighth of energy expended might be interstitial (e.g. kibbutz meetings, accounts and inventory) and the result still be democratic.

At the other extreme there is the sort of World Unification of the Fuller or McLuhan kind, whereby we might be totally liberated from physical labour and technical-thinking work only to be enslaved to the necessity to exercise constant political vigilance about procedures and proposals. Hours and hours would be needed in horizontal and vertical connections, and just as long would be required in studying the issues stemming from the vertical connections, so that the delegates would know which way to vote on the various problems facing the world and its continents. For those who think such a totally neurotic level of involvement unnecessary, consider:

(1) that if World Oligarchy was once formed, that would be that. . . .

(2) that with the huge scale any wrong decisions would ramify exceedingly widely, that every decision would be a matter of life and death. . . .

(3) that technological omnipotence would need to be informed by scientific omniscience, hence fantastic capacities for relevant information collection *and processing* would be necessary among ordinary World Citizens; otherwise irreversibly suicidal decisions would be made, or at the least, the advantages of productivity through scale would be nullified by decision-making which, though quite possibly intelligent, was *incompetent in relation to scale*. . . .

Even integration at the national level, if it was to be *efficient* and fully *democratic*, would scarcely leave time for a fuck—let alone for the Resurrection of the Body!

Something more modest is required, something looser and more communal. This does not mean that for particular purposes a *loose* World Federation is undesirable. (I am aware that this is presupposing the destruction of imperialism.) Co-ordination would still take place—indeed it would increase when freed from governmental-nationalist rivalries. Conflicts of interest would still take place, especially over raw materials and food supply. This would lead to "unnecessary" inefficiency and unequal development, but if the price for removing it were overtoppling with the insanities of governmentalism, it would make sense simply to rely on persuasion and/or learn to live with the particular problem (e.g. shortage of copper). Likewise at the national level: it is possible that the South-East would try to maintain its relatively privileged position (in GNP terms at any rate). The remedy could only come: (1) through the deprived regions supporting those South-Easterners who were trying to ferment opposition and reverse the relevant decisions at regional level, and/or (2) via sanctions and unpleasantness transmitting themselves to South-Easterners, informally and via the various cross-cutting associations which they shared with

people in other regions. In short *there can be no cast-iron guarantees and any attempt to create national guarantees cannot itself be guaranteed and is hence the biggest risk.* The same applies in such questions as States Rights and the South in the USA. A similar thought pattern is at the basis of the question of homeopathic medicine (see Brian Inglis: *Fringe Medicine*) and "losing life to find it". Life just *is* dangerous. Faith to flow with it is the best non-guarantee available. Existence cannot be totally pacified.

A world of small loosely-federated regions and communities, then, would still take advantage of co-ordination in relevant areas. Thus, in the area of standards and specifications, although Brady argues from the advantages of standardisation to the need for planning powers, he himself admits that a huge range of appropriate standards has already been built up voluntarily, often by humble engineers acting out of professional competence. Kropotkin's example of the European standard railway gauge could be updated and multiplied a hundredfold from the work already carried out by the International Standards Organisation.

Such a modest and partial degree of integration would leave enough PLAY in the system for serendipitous advance, for experimentation and retreat, even for sheer anti-technological cussedness, where desired. It would be capable (1) of evolving progressively refined adjustments according to the unique pattern of local natural resources; (2) of evolving a variety of unique design idioms; (3) of evolving pluriform and increasingly refined patterns of complex multi-level industrial and political structures.

One such pattern might involve a general one-step or two-step localisation of functions, as compared with the present:

Level One: Increase in do-it-yourself, kit-construction, repairs: spread of domestic tools and machinery.

Level Two: Neighbourhood workshops,* redevelopment of craft work at high technological level: also communal task forces, e.g. build-it-ourselves projects for community centres, swimming baths, adventure playgrounds, etc.

Level Three: Small multipurpose community factories able to create a variety of products by flexible tooling (and/or programming) on versatile machines over which men can remain in control.†

Level Four: Medium-sized largely automatic factories for intra-and inter-regional relative specialisation (and for export sector?), evenly spread throughout the country. For production both of finished goods, and for servicing of community factories and workshops with standardised materials and parts, machine tools, etc.

*See original articles on "The Community Workshop" and "Towards a Do-It-Yourself Economy" in ANARCHY 30. Also "Tenants Take Over", ANARCHY 83.

†See Lewis Herber "Towards a Liberatory Technology", ANARCHY 78. Also Paul and Percival Goodman: *Communitas,* Chapter Six.

Such a system might be inefficient (in the short term especially) in raising every citizen's gross standard of commodities, but that would not be its purpose. Compared with the possibilities of world and nation-wide continuous flows, this system might conceivably result in definite failures of co-ordination, but never in irreversible breakdown. And so what if hundreds of men can't work because of a supply breakdown? It's a lovely morning, let's go for a walk. . . .

A crucial goal would be *transparency of operation,* with reference to (1) the machines and consumer durables (built for ease of use and repair), and (2) the economic (that is social) interrelatedness of society. The general idea would be to have an economy of *things,* not generalised money (Goodman).

What else is an economic relationship but a social one mediated by a product? And what else is money but a veil for social relationships? "The nature of money is . . . that the mediating activity of human social action by which man's products reciprocally complete each other is alienated and becomes the characteristic of a material thing, money, which is external to man. When man exteriorizes this mediating activity he is active only as an exiled and dehumanised being." It is ironic that the man who taught us this (Marx) nevertheless ended up with "objective scientific laws" (such as the falling rate of profit) which seem to me to depend on the actual, not just socially assigned "reality" of economic and legal forms. The fluidity and convenience aspects of money could be replaced by sensible social arrangements. Some sectors of the economy could be fully socialised and progressively released from scarcity, e.g. bread, transport, housing. Other sectors would still be curtailed by scarce resources and apportionment on some basis or other would have to take place. Only the vital decisions would be seen to stem from *people,* not from money.

Problems of fitting supply to demand (which at the level of the national economy might absorb the vain efforts of thousands of "economists") would become comprehensible at the regional level, and positively simple at the community or neighbourhood level. Where ordinary citizens could see the point of it all, problems of bureaucratic formalism would vanish, all structures becoming more or less ad hoc and task-oriented. (Structure is function in slow time.)

To give some idea of the radical consequences of *"breaking through to the point of it all"* (and to give some idea of the difficulty—for it surely wouldn't happen as easily as I'm going to suggest it would), let us consider a factory of 5,000 employees, 1,000 of whom are managerial and minor bureaucrats. The factory is a car factory. After the carnival of revolution come the appeals to return to work. To get into the habit of responding to orders/exhortations to raise the GNP would be to sell the pass straight away. On the other hand production must eventually be got going on *some* basis or other. What basis? Return to *what sort of work*? For what? So what?

So instead of restarting the assembly track (if the young workers haven't already smashed it) they spend two months discussing the point of their work, and how to rearrange it. Private cars? Why do people always want to go somewhere else? Is it because where they are is so intolerable? And what part did the automobile play in making the need to escape? What about day to day convenience? Is being stuck in a traffic jam convenient? What about the cost to the country? Bugger the "cost to the country", that's the same crap as the national interest. Have you seen the faces of old people as they try to cross a busy main road? What about the inconvenience to pedestrians? What's the reason for buying a car? Is it wanting just to HAVE it? Do we think the value of a car rubs off on us? But that's the wrong way round. Does having a car really save time? What's the average hours worked in manufacturing industry? Let's look it up in the library: 45.7 hours work a week. What's the amount of the family's spending money in a week that goes on cars? 10.3% of all family income. Which means more like 20% if you've got a car because half of us don't have one. What's 20% of 45 hours? Christ, 9 hours! That's a hell of a long time spent "saving time"! There must be a better way of getting from A to B. By bus? OK, let's make buses. But what about all the pollution and that? What about those electric cars they showed on the telly once? Etc., etc.

The most basic project would of course involve *TRANS*INDUSTRIALISATION. After a month of intensive discussion and reseach in complexly cross-cutting groups, the following sort of consensus for eventual self-redeployment might emerge:

Number of workers: 185.
Point: *Car refurbishing* (to increase use-value of models already on the road, e.g. by adding exhaust filters).
Scale of use: Community.
Scale of making: Small community factory.
Technical mode: Varied—little end-product specialisation due to variety of makes and problems.

Number of workers: 1850.
Point: Buses, for connecting train and monorail termini with where people want to go.
Scale of use: National (also part regional, part export, and part give-away—voluntary overseas aid).
Scale of making: Large regional factory, plus several smaller parts factories in communities in the region. (Also, not included in the 1850, parts from outside the region.)
Technical mode: Regional factory not on shift work or automatic track. Gangs of men who see whole buses through to completion, including distribution. Smaller parts factories make standardised parts, therefore high level of automation.

Number of workers: 740.
Point: Overhead monorail cars.
Scale of use: Regional (and small surplus exchanged with other regions), i.e. on a national basis.
Scale of making: Small regional factory and smaller parts factories.
Technical mode: As above except only quasi-automatic machinery (e.g. Leaver and Brown drilling machine).

Number of workers: 555.
Point: Electric cars and scooters for disabled people and inner city travel especially.
Scale of use: Regional.
Scale of making: Two small community factories of 250, making the engines. Glass fibre and plastics factory for bodywork.
Technical mode: Glass fibre and plastics factory at high level of automation.

Number of workers: 370.
Point: White bicycles for communal use.
Scale of use: Community.
Scale of making: Neighbourhood workshops for kit construction and frame manufacture—parts from community factories, regional factories.
Technical mode: Automation for ball bearings, hubs, in community factories. Regionally produced standard steel tubing. Made into bicycles by neighbourhood craft work and kit construction.

Number of workers: 925.
Point: Construction of dignified housing with built-in communal potential, communal centres and workshops.
Scale of use and making: Task forces attached to neighbourhoods.
Technical mode: Great variety of work—some construction standardisation with prefabricated modules, but no standardisation of design.

Number of workers: 375.
Dropouts from organised work—some do minimal work (say 5 hours gardening a week). 15% dropout ration at first, reduces to 7½% as many drift into congenial milieux. This 7½% largely compensated for by the number of casual *drop-in* workers at community and neighbourhood levels, especially in communal construction work. Kids and old people like to make themselves useful.
Important to create a reasonable subsistence existence for non-workers, otherwise theft, antagonisms, stigma, etc. Antagonisms diminish when people enjoy their own work, and therefore don't resent "skivers". Diminished fear of not-working leads to more rational attitude to the point of work: OK to take plenty of breaks, etc.

* * * *

But there are other questions on the agenda:

A. *Materials Use*: Supply, alternative uses? end-use specification?
B. *Ergonomic Redesign*: Men in charge of machines, degree of optimal automation, machines fitting in with men (no night work).
C. *End Product Design*: Transparency of operation and repair; functionally appropriate ranges of variation.
D. *Standards and Specifications.*
E. *External Liaison Functions*: With parallel industries in different parts of the same country or region; with transportation, etc.
F. *Distribition*:
(1) E.g. buses; distribution to community councils on basis of size which make exact allocations on basis of *need* to neighbourhood councils;
(2) E.g. electric cars; distribution to neighbourhood councils on basis of social *need*;
(3) E.g. bread; no problem for distribution—bread free—bakeries decentralised and guaranteed flour by farmers in return for neighbourhood and community products;
(4) Individual consumer goods (e.g. record players) can be earned by presenting work tokens allocated according to hours worked and need of home circumstances;
(5) Other consumer goods can be had on a "come and work for it" community factory basis.
G. *Aid*: Voluntary extra work undertaken by a factory or area. Town-twinning. New Delhi needs buses, provide them by voluntary work.
H. *Voluntary Extra Work*: As work becomes more and more pleasurable, as technology and society develop to allow more and more craft aspects to return at high technological level, the idea of *voluntary extra* over the (reduced) fixed working week becomes feasible. Even the fixing of the working week become superseded. The aim is to confuse work and non-work, on the terms of play.
I. *Work Hours*: Reduced to 30, 20, 15, 10 hours per week. Can be taken at different points of the day, week, month, year, or spread out evenly. All figures approximate. No time-keeping. Deliberate blurring between personal and productive time.
J. *Variety in "Work"/Play*: Large-scale/craft production; active/passive; indoor/outdoor; brain/brawn, etc. It follows that the figures given earlier for, say, buses, contain hours done by different people. Most importantly, it would be accepted practice for women with young kids to relieve the husband in the factory, so that he could take his fair share of looking after the kids, house work, etc.
K. *Other-Educative Functions*: Open to community, therefore to children. Thus every factory worker is a potential "environmental studies" instructor, if a child comes up and asks him how something works.

L. *Self/Group Educative Functions*: The factory as university. Students and lecturers are themselves members for variety from *their* "jobs". Factory discussion groups, internal radio, magazine, etc.
M. *Discussion, Research*: Directly related to important policy decisions, working out social "costing" procedures, previously known as money accounts.
N. *Managerial Functions of Control*: Abolished.
O. *Worthwhile Managerial Functions*: Absorbed. Self-management as a re-appropriation of capacities.

* * * *

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY

Consider the example of the bored typist in the advertising agency. In the face of such a mountain of shit (the superfluous substance) right down the line, what can one say to her? The "your boss is exploiting you" approach seems almost an insult, as does "you want workers' control, don't you?" To pamphleteer at the factory gates, urging more strikes, more pay, more participation, is to hit the problem at a tangent. Work is the problem. *Work is the essential contradiction* which establishes the total dependence of the worker on a system which utterly rejects him as a person.

Factories producing the unwanted commodities of a fetishised world have no relevance, nor have supermarkets controlled by their workers, nor mental hospitals controlled by their inmates. In our society (but not in the society we want) "alienation is work itself, the commodities produced and the structure of relationships that arises out of this imposed need to buy, to sell, to profit." (*King Mob* 6.)

"Psst! Why work? You know it doesn't make sense!"

Work and culture

GEORGE GARDSTEIN

A CONCERN WITH "the working class" or with "workers" is not a humanistic concern, not a concern with real human beings. The term "worker" denotes not a full person, but a component in production, a part-person, a role. To be concerned with "the workers" is not to be concerned with men, but with abstractions. Industrialism treats men and women as mere functions, and is concerned with them only insofar as they play their roles properly. Socialism reveals its bourgeois basis by swallowing industrial jargon and the attitude to men that it denotes. When "workers" stopped playing the role allotted to them by the

Bolsheviks, and marched through St. Petersburg in 1921, Lenin said they were acting against the interests of "the working class" (which they were: they were acting in their own interests as people) and had them shot. Socialist workerism is bourgeois ideology and viciously anti-human.

When we meet a person, we habitually ask him, "What do you do?" and he replies with information about that part of his life that he hates most: "I'm a drill grinder". But not only does he not say, "I go out to the country with my wife and kids, now and again, and play the trombone", he says, "I *am* a drill grinder", not "I grind drills in return for money". His work, his bondage, his alienation become what he *is*, not what he does. Instead of a man he becomes a worker.

To take an example of this kind of thinking from literature:

> "I saw what he was then, and I felt a kind of mild shock go through me. He was a clean-up boy for the park. He carried a stick with a sharp end, and there beside him on the ground was a bucket with old candy wrappers and trash in it, stuff he'd picked up with the stick." ("Secret Heartbreak" in *True Story*, February 1969.)

One's being is defined by one's doing.

What is work? There are so many things people call work that have little in common, just as there are so many games that have little in common—e.g. solitaire and professional football. What does working on an article in one's spare time have in common with the work a lifeguard does? It is widely thought that only hatred, prolonged, concentrated, paid physical activity done for another and essential for livelihood is work. Is this so?

It is difficult to arrive at a comprehensive definition of work, and equally difficult to list necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification of anything as work. But isn't it a necessary condition for the identification of something as work that it must be an activity? Even this is contentious: aren't there people whose work does not involve any particular activity at all? We can accept activity as a necessary condition only if we make a distinction between work and occupation.

Proceeding from here, we can take, one by one, all the characteristics of that activity which is widely thought to be the only real work:

Hated
Prolonged
Concentrated
Paid
Physical
For another
Essential for Livelihood

None of these provides a necessary condition, and only the last one provides a sufficient condition with any certainty. Moreover, all of them taken in combination do not provide a comprehensive definition.

Then we can make a list of characteristics opposite to these:

Enjoyed
Brief
Unpaid
Mental
For oneself
Inessential for Livelihood

Although these connote leisure, if anything, rather than work, and although none of them provides either necessary or sufficient conditions, activities which partake of any or some of these characteristics—not to mention combinations of characteristics from the first and second lists—can still be classed as work.

At this moment, the development of automated technology is changing the nature of work and our attitudes towards it. In the deployment of manpower, there is a continual shift away from agricultural, extractive and industrial work (primary and secondary work) towards service, human-care and human-training work (tertiary and quadernary work). This is particularly true of the USA, to which the following figures relate. (Most of them and many of the following observations are taken from Michael Harrington's *The Accidental Century* (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1966).)

Since the last war, the agricultural labour force has been reduced from 14 to 7 per cent of the population. Taking account of the fact that this figure includes those who are either underemployed or just eking out a living for themselves, we can say that the real figure is more like 5 per cent. And the food produced by this 5 per cent is more than can be profitably sold to the other 95 per cent. In secondary production, automation has been responsible for an accelerated increase in the output per man-hour. Between 1909 and 1947, the annual increase in productivity per man-hour was 2 per cent. Between 1960 and 1963 it had risen to 3.6 per cent. One result has been the elimination of jobs.

These figures reflect the following sort of developments:

10 men produce the same number of automobile motor blocks that were previously produced by 400 men;
2 men now produce 1,000 transistor radios a day, previously produced by 200 men;
in a Pennsylvania steelworks, 3 men make 220 steel rods a day, previously made by 30 men;
in Chicago stockyards, automation has cut the work force from 25,000 men to 4,000.

Work on an automated plant, the best examples of which are provided by the petrochemical industry, is quite different from work on non-automated production lines. On an automated continuous-flow plant, the worker does not produce, but supervises production. Instead of doing the same task hundreds or even thousands of times a day, he does the same task perhaps three or four times a day, and much of

the time he is idle. At times of breakdown he is very active for a short period, doing work with more apparent significance than the worker on the non-automated production line.

Since the war, the greatest increase in manpower has occurred in public service: 300,000 per annum. In private service employment there has been a recent increase of 250,000 per annum. Between 1957 and 1963 wage and salary employment in secondary occupations dropped by 300,000. Computerisation means the elimination of thousands of clerical and middle-level management jobs. These developments are sufficient for a Senate sub-committee, which reported in 1964, to talk of a manpower revolution. It suggested that men will soon have to be paid for not working. Robert Theobald, an economist who sat on the committee, said, "Society must accept that work as we know it must eventually disappear. Man, as a working instrument, is heading towards obsolescence."

Although computerisation creates jobs which previously did not exist, it displaces many more. The rate of development in data-processing industries is remarkable: the projected development in Britain of computer hardwares between 1970 and 1980 is 12 per cent per annum, and in softwares it is 29 per cent per annum. The result of automation and computerisation is unemployment of a new type. The relevant heckle at the hustings is now, "Since you've been in power, unemployment has reached half a million. This isn't good enough: if you are re-elected can you guarantee two million unemployed?" US developments give rise to recommendations for prolonged education, shorter working day and earlier retirement.

The effect this is having is explosive. As early as 1857 Marx foresaw the transformation of work from production to supervision of production (in *The Outline of the Critique of Political Economy*). With remarkable insight, he analysed trends within capitalism that have become more marked with the cybernetic watershed. As a producer, Marx wrote, the capitalist needs to reduce the labour-time required in production. He increases profitability by increasing productive efficiency and cutting his work-force and wage-bill. As a seller, however, the capitalist needs an increase in the total work-force, so that the market expands alongside production. As long as consumption is tied to earnings and earnings are tied to work, this must be so. The contradiction is obvious. Automation undermines the cycle: work-wages-consumption-profit-production-work. A story relates that Henry Ford III was showing Walter Reuther, the auto-workers union boss, round a completely automated plant. Ford to Reuther: "How will you organise the workers here?" Reuther to Ford: "Which of them will buy your cars?"

Although the dream of a totally workless society is hardly worth serious consideration, we are approaching a situation in the west where work ceases to have the same significance as hitherto. Unemployment

becomes essential. The Protestant Ethic of work, delayed gratifications, sobriety and mediocrity has less and less rationale. It becomes more difficult to keep people in their place because it is less clear where their place is. The importance of the rock-revolution and the hip-culture is that it is the most rational reaction to the conditions of advanced capitalism, where the classical Marxist material precondition of communism begins to obtain. The villification of the work-shy springs from an outdated maintenance of the Protestant work-ethic. Hip non-work is more in tune with the times than socialist job-protection.

What we usually refer to as "the working-class" is not a class at all in the sense of a social group playing a constant economic role. This may sound strange, but a class is identified by its relation to the means of production, and we in fact identify the working class by a system of cultural signs. The "working-class" is more a status and cultural group than a class group. A proletarian is identified by his job; a member of the working-class by his style. There is no one-to-one relation between proletarian and working-class man. Some proletarians aren't working-class; some working-class people aren't proletarians.

We can make similar observations about the bourgeoisie in a society where everyone tries to be middle-class. "Bourgeois" denotes a pattern of culture, ethics and ideology rather than a relationship to the means of production. (I use "culture" with a small c to denote style of life, and "Culture" with a capital C to denote art.)

The word "bourgeois" used indiscriminately and as a term of abuse certainly refers to culture rather than class. Used by revolutionaries it means simply "not-revolutionary". This indiscriminate use crudely lumps stuffed-shirt entrepreneurs together with dropouts. Although hippies, say, are not working-class, and are rarely proletarians, it is ridiculous to class them as bourgeois. A better word for all those groups which the socialist indiscriminately and completely wrongly labels bourgeois might be "transbourgeois", meaning: the characteristics of a person or group whose cultural style, ethics and ideology stand in marked contrast to the bourgeois values of work, repression, delayed gratification, sobriety, conformity and mediocrity; but whose background, or experience and points of reference or relation to the means of production are bourgeois. The transbourgeois hip style is embraced by a whole spectrum from prole dropouts to trendy young execs. Like the beat, some hippies are transworking-class. All are declassé.

In a society where the great majority do work which is uncreative and stultifying, a new invention is made: art. Art is the symbol of a sick and sad society. Art never existed before capitalism: people used to call it "work". "We have no art," say the Balinese. "We do everything as well as we can." Art galleries are an apologia for insipid surroundings and the grotesqueness of the industrial city; paintings are an attempt to justify the despoliation of the countryside and the pollu-

tion of the biosphere. The Design Centre and the Craft Centre are agents of a system that forces millions to do deadening work and to consume badly-made and ugly objects. The Institute of Contemporary Arts and the National Film Theatre have the function of prolonging and deepening the spiritual deprivation of the working-class.

It would be unwise in a capitalist society, which requires millions of obedient and unimaginative epsilons, to make any effort to bring education and Culture to everyone, to bring Culture and creativity out of everyone. It would subvert capitalism. People who could see the possibility of work which was satisfying and which contributed to their growth, would not be prepared to put spokes in bicycle wheels at the Raleigh works all their lives. But is it possible to distinguish between beautifying drab lives and spiritually bankrupt souls on the one hand, and ramming bourgeois culture down working-class throats on the other?

For not only is Culture the property of a small, privileged, educated and often powerful and monied minority: the content of bourgeois Culture is bourgeois culture. This is true not only of Virginia Woolf and Ivan Turgenev, but of magazines, advertisements, television programmes and children's reading books. (Note the bourgeois-twee content of the Woodentops on *Watch with Mother*, and the bourgeois-mediocre content of "The Ladybird Key Words Reading Scheme"). Practically the only communications medium that consistently portrays life comprehensible to the working-class is the British children's comic. In a comic like *Tiger and Jag* every hero, even the hero of the jungle and his black companion, are working-class—the comic reader's older brother or brother-ideal. (And little Joe, in comics and on children's TV, lives in a world familiar to more children than the world of Peter and Jane in the "Ladybird" books. Joe's mum and dad run a transport caff.)

Is there any meaning in "working-class Culture" (Prolekult)? Isn't anything we could identify as Prolekult—apart from defunct forms like folk-art—really the trivia and pap of the entertainment and communication industry—a form of Culture that prolongs Cultureless cultures? In the twentieth century, Dwight Macdonald has argued, "political democracy and popular education broke down the old upper class monopoly of culture". At the same time, business realised that it was possible to make money in producing mass culture products. Communications technology—the movies, radio and television—gave this development an unprecedented scope and tempo. The commodities of the new cultural assembly line flooded the society. Serious art fled to the margin, folk art was all but abolished in the city, and entire way of life became committed to machine-tool mediocrity. And finally, Macdonald theorises, this process took on the aspect of a vicious circle: "The masses, debauched by several generations of this sort of thing, in turn came to demand trivial and comfortable cultural products." (Harrington, *op. cit.* For his small c in culture read my capital C.)

There is a split, a gulf among men more deadly than the split between proletarian and exploiter, and more deadly even than the split between working-class and middle-class. It is the split between those who have been able to develop their spiritual, creative and intellectual potential and choose the sort of life they lead, and those with bludgeoned souls and narrow horizons for whom "something is happening, but you don't know what it is, do you, Mr. Jones?" It is a split which is encouraged by the Culture fiends: "The masses must ever remain the masses. There could be no Culture without kitchen maids" (Treitschke). "A high Culture can only develop where there are different castes in society, the workers and the leisured, the caste of forced work and of free work" (Nietzsche). Art, it seems, is a form of social violence.

The answer to this is not workers' control: that is the answer to a different question. Workers who had the choice would not do the work that the proposed control is over. Neither does automation provide a pat answer. Firstly, it is being developed by an elite of systems analysts, who require a corresponding army of card-punching proles; secondly, it will never eliminate all drudgery; thirdly, it is going to be quite a while before it eliminates a fraction of the *global* drudgery done now; and fourthly, it provides us, at the possible worst, with the prospect of a vast pool of unemployed, half-educated people, maintained on a diet of bread and circuses by the state. (One consolation is that such a situation would be incredibly unstable: something's got to give.)

As automation sharpens the contradictions of capitalist society, it creates a situation where people have access neither to work nor to Culture, and whose culture is breaking down. What gives?

We must have a Cultural Revolution. Art must cease to be a commodity and an investment. Artists must put a maximum price on their work, and if it is ever sold at higher price, destroy it. Marcel Duchamp introduced Readymades: common objects like urinals and hat-stands made into art simply by being exhibited. He postulated, "A Readymade in reverse: use a Rembrandt for an ironing board." But no art movement, not even (far less?) an anti-art movement like Dada escapes from the limited audience of the bourgeois and trans-bourgeois consumer, aesthetic or intellectual. Does then the Chinese example of Cultural-Revolution-as-philistine-destruction-of-Culture-movement provide a challenge rather than a warning? (Apart from the fact that it was about inner-Party dissent, not Culture.)

Understandably, given the position and role of art, there are signs of the rise of the kitchen maids against Culture. There are indications that this is not just a gloss put on events by pundits. Ray Gosling wrote on "The Rise of the Lumpen" in the *Guardian* (6 December 1969):

> The Kingfisher is my local fish and chip shop. . . . Towards midnight it collects a motley and amiable crew—yours truly and behind me one night in 1969 a youth of about 16 years of age. He was my first captive skinhead. . . .
>
> "You a skinhead?" I asked him.
>
> "Oh yeah," he replied, pouting his thick lips. The youth had a fleshy, peasant face. He wore a purple unisex vest and thick standard

overall-blue jeans a size too big for him. I found him instantly revolting. . . . He told me he'd bought his big black boots that very day. He worked washing cars in a garage. Lived with his Mum and Dad and three brothers and sisters in a council house on a big estate.

"Why the boots?"

"It's for aggo." He couldn't pronounce "agro", not properly . . . ". . . for when you get in a punch-up. . . ."

"What is it about, this skinhead thing?"

"Well," and I noticed the stubble of his head was the colour of straw and his eyes a clear and pleasant blue. "Er," and he holds his head up and screws his eyes a little to say ever so proudly—"you see what we are is we're the rise of the lumpen."

This skinhead thing is an aggressive Prolekult. They are, as Jeremy Bugler called them, Puritans in boots—last-ditch defenders of Protestant morality. They stand for cleanliness, hard work and sobriety. (They say so themselves.) They hate hippies more than they hate greasers. Their uniform is larger-than-life factory garb. They used to be ashamed of being workers. Now they wear loose denims for play as well as work, hitch them up to show off their industrial footwear, and cut their hair even shorter than safety regulations demand.

This skinhead thing doesn't point a direct way out of the dilemma, because its values are the obverse of bourgeois values. Working-class culture will (or should) vanish when middle-class culture vanishes. But the dialectical outcome of this pride and philistinism may be of value.

A FOOTNOTE

Isaac Deutscher was highly critical of the whole idea of cultural revolution. "You may use the term in a metaphorical sense to indicate the cultural rise of a formerly oppressed and illiterate people. . . . But how can you make a cultural revolution in a single act? Can you transfer at a stroke the knowledge and skills accumulated in the head of one class into the head of another? Revolutionaries who would do this would indeed perform a feat which the philosophers, including the philosophers of Marxism, have not dreamt. One can, of course, kill or reduce to silence or send to concentration camps a whole generation of an intelligentsia and in this way deprive society of a certain fund of knowledge, civilised habits and skills that have accumulated over generations, but this will not turn those who destroy the old intelligentsia into the possessors of the knowledge, the skills and arts of those they have annihilated. . . . Not "cultural revolution" but mastery of the cultural heritage was the guiding idea in Lenin's time. . . . And so much was and is vital [in this cultural heritage], because in science and the arts the old dominant classes had in a sense transcended their own limitations. . . . Only savages, or petty-bourgeois, half-baked ultra-radicals, or bureaucratic upstarts can make bonfires of the works of the great thinkers and artists of the past."

Ernst Fischer suggests we cannot speak of either bourgeois or working-class Culture. "There is no such thing as bourgeois or proletarian, capitalist or socialist means of expression in art. There is such a thing as a socialist way of thinking. This way determines the artist's attitude in crucial situations: but it does not prejudice his adherence to this or that movement in art, nor saddle him with a view of reality laid down by a sacred ideology."

Fischer relates a conversation he had with Togliatti about a comrade whom neither of them liked. "How can he call himself a Marxist?" asked Togliatti. "He isn't even abreast of bourgeois culture."

Getting rid of toil

JEREMY HUNT

SABOTAGE is the Society for the Abolition of Toil Amongst the Gainfully Employed and its aim is to abolish monotonous, repetitive, soul-destroying work. If men and women must work, and it appears that work will be necessary to both our physical and mental well-being as far into the future as we can see, then let the work either be interesting and satisfying or, if that is not possible, then give the worker a chance to vary his monotonous routine.

We are told that the age of leisure is imminent—although British workers may be forgiven scepticism about this, they now average longer hours and fewer holidays than any Common Market country—and it is conventional wisdom among sociologists that leisure for the masses will be a problem. They point to outbreaks of hooliganism and mob disorder amongst the young, and a pining away among the old when faced with the "problem" of leisure.

Surely, though, the problem is not leisure—most of us have only fleeting experiences of leisure. The real problem is what has conditioned us for most of our lives—toil. If we don't know how to enjoy leisure it is because we have learned only the habit of toil.

The pity is that toil is accepted by government, and by employers, and even by organized labour as necessary and virtuous. Disagreement arises only over the reward for toil, whether it should be derisory or merely inadequate. Most unions assume that the battle they have to fight is not so much over conditions, but low wages.

This is an error in strategy. The attack by organized labour should be directed at eliminating repetitive and degrading human tasks, rather than at being paid more money for doing them. No man or woman should be expected to waste fifty years of his or her life working in a factory as servant to a machine with only two or three weeks' holiday a year and an unofficial strike, or an unwelcome spell of sickness, to break the monotony.

Young people, better educated than their parents and grandparents, know that they face the prospect of a lifetime's drudgery, either as factory serfs or as managerial upper servants in some oligarchic corporation. The end product may be useful, but the methods of making and selling it are often soul-destroying.

As an alternative to leisure the pursuit of high wages is as unreal as the pursuit of happiness. High wages can only be high relative to low prices, a will-o'-the-wisp situation that vanishes as soon as it is achieved.

But the elimination of toil, of workmaking, of the drearily uncreative job, can be a reality. Inflation will erode high wages, but cannot erode shorter hours and longer holidays. If workers were to

pursue as their first aim the abolition of unnecessary toil, then all other benefits would follow—automated production, shorter hours, clean working conditions, better job opportunities and training, higher real wages and higher living standards.

If there are to be strikes let them be for the abolition of unnecessary toil. The response will be astonishing. Capital will be found on the instant to mechanise and automate. There will be crash programmes to train workers in new skills. There will be fewer but better jobs, and redundancy (with generous release-from-toil payments geared to fresh training) will no longer be feared in advance and shameful when it happens.

Set out below is an abolition of toil programme that would go some way towards establishing more humane standards in industry:

All employees to be entitled to a six month spell to train for alternative work after X years continuous service with a company, but with job security retained at the end of six months.

All employees at 50 to be entitled to early retirement on pension with six months on full pay to train for a retirement job.

Four day week for all production workers, possibly extending the working day for those not on round-the-clock shifts from eight to nine hours. By establishing a three day break we encourage short holidays away from home, give better opportunities to hobbyists, do-it-your-selfers, and to moonlighters who are an important and underrated factor in service industries.

Release schemes for young workers in semi-skilled or unskilled jobs to study a subject or skill of their choice, not necessarily related to their work.

These modest recommendations are apart from industrial action against specific companies to alleviate or abolish needless toil. What we lack, of course, is detailed information about dreary jobs, both clerical and manual. Readers are invited to write to SABOTAGE (address below) giving information about jobs that are inhumanly dull or monotonous, and suggest, if they can, how the work might be rearranged.

SABOTAGE may be regarded by some workers with suspicion and as a threat to their livelihoods, but it should be remembered that the initiative in this will lie with the worker. It may not be wise for the collier in an unprofitable pit to be militantly anti-toil, but the council sewage worker has shown he is in a strong position to fight for decent conditions.

There are too many men and women now in jobs that are the equivalent of long prison sentences, without the benefit of remission for good behaviour. What is needed is a forward looking trade union with a comparatively young membership to adopt the aims of SABOTAGE and demonstrate to workers where their real interest lies.

Meanwhile, if you have information to offer about no-hope jobs and how they might be reorganized, or if you have constructive ideas for an industrial programme to eliminate needless toil then please write to SABOTAGE, 19 St. Michael's Road, London, S.W.9.

CHANGE OF EDITOR

THIS IS THE LAST issue of ANARCHY to appear under my editorship. Freedom Press, the publishers of ANARCHY and FREEDOM, has been the fragile vehicle of continuity in anarchist propaganda in this country for longer than anyone can remember, and today, when there are more people than ever before who would describe themselves as anarchists, it seems to me important that our press should reflect the approach of a new generation.

At the time of our 100th issue I wrote an account (in FREEDOM 14 June 1969) of the ways in which I thought ANARCHY had succeeded and the areas in which it had obviously failed. It remains for me to thank once again everyone who has helped in its production and distribution, and to welcome the new editor, Graham Moss.

During its first ten years ANARCHY has played its part in influencing the new wave of radical opinion. But this influence has been far too slight, and it needs to find ways of gaining a more far-reaching effect in the future. If you value ANARCHY, extend its influence.

COLIN WARD.

ANARCHY 119 IS ANARCHY 1 . . .

. . . second series, but that, small as it is, is not the only change. The changes will, however, be somewhat superficial, inasmuch as they will not be in the realms of ideology or approach to anarchism. I feel as if I have been weaned on the last ten years of ANARCHY, and that is one tradition which I like to think others will find a continuing benefit.

The idea of keeping as far as possible to one issue/one topic will be retained, and changes of size and format will, hopefully, allow room for more material, including regular book reviews, letters and illustrations. The cover will have the title boldly across the top, and will accommodate the list of contents as well as a relevant design and the month and price. For 1971 at least, it's intended that the cover price should include postage to subscribers. The page size will be 8½″ by 12″, as against 9″ by 5″ now, and there will be 32 pages.

It has been pointed out that such changes may not be welcomed, despite the fact that ANARCHY will change from issue to issue next year as it has done for the past ten years. Still, should you feel that you'd like to withhold renewing your subscription until you've seen ANARCHY 1, please do so, and unless you renew no further copies will be sent. A list of topics proposed for future issues will be in ANARCHY 1, and certainly letters of comment, criticism, ideas and articles will be very welcome. I have every hope that ANARCHY will be regarded as being as much your concern as mine . . . and hope to hear from you.

GRAHAM MOSS